DRILL 2026-08-21: the off-site restore never replays named volumes (R-354..R-365)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 16s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 16s
Diagnostic only — no code changed, no version bumped, nothing deployed.
The verdict is a mixture. The unit and the off-site snapshot HOLD the data, proven
by identity in both storage classes including two Hungarian accented filenames. The
loss is in the last leg: ReconstituteFromOffsite skips every isUnit placement and the
volume tars live inside the unit, so the off-site full restore has no named-volume
leg at all — while the local restore-from-unit does, and returned the same tar
byte-identical minutes later.
Twelve rows opened, ceiling R-353 -> R-365. Three HIGH:
R-354 off-site restore never replays volume dumps
R-355 paperless-ngx's Postgres is dumped under a non-existent stack, so its unit
has no DB dump, no safety dump is taken, and the customer is told it has none
R-356 the off-site restore refuses for all 40 no-drive apps saying the running app
"is not installed", with a remedy those apps make impossible
R-353's instruction (2) is satisfied and annotated: the 40-class DOES reach the
off-site tier. Its instruction (1) stands and is now larger. R-329 confirmed still
live and now the only bad-severity emit fleet-wide.
Evidence: documentation/audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,190 +1,451 @@
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# REPORT — RUNBOOK ep0: read the PBS changelog, then decide whether to upgrade (2026-08-18, midday)
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# REPORT — DRILL: does the backup hold the data, and does the restore tell the truth? (2026-08-21 night)
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**Outcome:** changelog read → **no connection-handling fix in the range**; operator ruled to upgrade
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anyway **for rehearsal value**; upgraded **4.2.2-1 → 4.2.5-1** cleanly; **the fd slope did not change,
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which is the predicted result.** Two dated checks filed as **R-341**.
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**Both STOPs cleared by the operator.** No code changed in any repo; `documentation/` only.
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Evidence: `documentation/audits/evidence-ep0-pbs-upgrade-2026-08-18/`.
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**Unattended diagnostic drill on `demo-hp`. No code changed in any repository. No version bumped, no
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image built, nothing deployed.** Evidence:
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`documentation/audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/`.
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---
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## 1. Baselines re-confirmed on the machine
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## 1. THE VERDICT
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Not from the audit file — from `dpkg -l` and `apt-cache policy`, per the runbook.
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**It is a mixture, and the drill's three options are all present — but they belong to different
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faults, and only one of them explains the thing you actually saw.**
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### What explains YOUR observation (OpenGist, 2026-08-21 afternoon): **THE BACKUP IS EMPTY**, and then **THE MESSAGE LIED**
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Reproduced independently tonight, and it agrees with what R-353 already recorded:
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1. The off-site restore for OpenGist **never ran**. It refused, because OpenGist declares no data
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drive, and the refusal says *„a(z) opengist nincs telepítve"* — **"OpenGist is not installed"** —
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about an app that was installed, deployed, running and healthy.
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2. The person therefore used the **local** restore-from-unit. The local unit on the freshly rebuilt
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box was **genuinely empty of data** — no dump cycle had run yet on a one-hour-old machine — so it
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held `compose/` and nothing else.
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3. The restore returned that configuration and reported a bare completion.
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So for that specific event the data was not in the thing that was restored. **R-353 called this
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correctly and I did not find an error in it.** I nearly filed a correction against it and was wrong
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to think so; its text is more careful than the CHANGELOG's summary of it.
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### What the drill found that nobody had seen: **THE RESTORE LOSES IT**
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This is new, it is worse, and it is not the same fault:
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**When the off-site snapshot DOES hold the data, the off-site full restore still does not return it.**
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The off-site restore has a files leg and a database leg. **It has no named-volume leg at all.**
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Proven live on `calibre-web` at 22:23:36 with planted files:
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| leg | in the unit | in the off-site snapshot | in the checking folder | returned by the off-site restore |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| declared user files (`media/books`) | n/a | yes, 5/5 byte-identical | yes, 5/5 byte-identical | **yes, 5/5 byte-identical** |
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| named volume `calibre_web_config` | yes, 1 422 848 B | yes | yes | **NO — silently skipped** |
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and the customer was told:
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> „A(z) calibre-web: **5 fájl visszaállítva** (mentés: 2026-08-21 22:16) — az alkalmazás újraindult.
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> Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa."
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Five files came back. A 1.4 MB tar of the app's own configuration volume did not, and the sentence
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does not mention it. **For `calibre-web` the lost leg is the app's settings. For the 40 catalogue
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apps that declare no data drive, that leg is the entire dataset.**
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**Why:** `ReconstituteFromOffsite` skips every placement flagged `isUnit`
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(`controller/internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:341-346`), and the volume tars live *inside* the
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unit. `grep` for a volume-restore call in the whole off-site path returns nothing. The **local**
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restore does have one (`restore.go:99 restoreDockerVolumes`) — proven tonight by restoring
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PrivateBin's planted 1 MB from its volume tar, byte-identical. **Two code paths, the same tar, one of
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them replays it.**
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### And a third, separate: **THE BACKUP IS EMPTY** — really empty — for `paperless-ngx`'s database
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`paperless-ngx` runs a 72-table PostgreSQL. Its recovery unit records **`db_dumps: null`**. It always
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has. The dump is taken — 284 617 bytes, valid, 72 tables — and written to
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`/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/**paperless**/db-dumps/`, a directory named after a stack
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that does not exist, on the wrong drive. Nothing off-sites it. Nothing restores it. And because the
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safety-dump code filters on the same wrong name, **the destructive restore takes no undo at all** and
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then says:
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> „A(z) paperless-ngx: 0 fájl visszaállítva … **Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa.**"
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The controller had dumped that database five minutes earlier.
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**One app in 53 is affected** (catalogue-wide sweep in §6). It is the document archive.
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---
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## 2. THE FULL/EMPTY CONTRAST
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**Apps chosen, and why.** From the two storage classes: **`calibre-web`** declares a data drive
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(`needs_hdd: true`, `backup.userdata: media/books class: mandatory`) and **`privatebin`** /
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**`opengist`** declare none (the 40-class; data lives in a Docker named volume). I ran **three** cases
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rather than two, deliberately: FULL and EMPTY alone cannot separate *"it was empty"* from *"the class
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is broken"*, so `privatebin` was run FULL as the disambiguator.
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**The fixture** — 5 files, two with Hungarian accented names, recorded as raw bytes:
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```
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SENTINEL.txt 0c23c8531214fe20cbc1ed177da22f51d65570c5aaedb39e380aa8d4d3e62991
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binary-1mb.bin 725763bbe679b22d5c231a14083ff13155f475c028c22ade4623955b50a2a84a
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nested/őszibarack.md a39ad6f623da67ac72f2e62a24245eef46c722c279ae89cd6b0c7c45afa6a4c4
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plain.txt 07e91a985809fc96752f97cddcf6523b211bc607c81a5808befabe35573926f1
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árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt 0d6a22ec56acf61b8a80e73eb12cb223d607acaa3684acfcfa7c3e34ecdfabea
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name bytes (UTF-8 NFC):
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árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt = c3a1 72 76 c3ad 7a 74 c5b1 72 c591 2d 74 c3bc 6b c3b6 72 66 c3ba 72 c3b3 67 c3a9 70 2e 74 78 74
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őszibarack.md = c591 73 7a 69 62 61 72 61 63 6b 2e 6d 64
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```
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**The comparator was proved able to convict before it was trusted.** One byte flipped at offset
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500 000 of `binary-1mb.bin` (`af` → `00`): `sha256sum -c` reported `binary-1mb.bin: FAILED`, rc=1,
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while the other four passed; the unmodified set passed rc=0. The mutant was discarded.
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### The results
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| case | class | data leg | in unit | in off-site snapshot | checking folder | off-site restore | local restore |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| **calibre-web FULL** | drive | user files | n/a | 5/5 identical | 5/5 identical | **5/5 identical** | — |
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| **calibre-web FULL** | drive | named volume 1.42 MB | yes | yes | yes | **NOT restored** | — |
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| **privatebin FULL** | no drive | named volume 1.06 MB | yes | 5/5 identical | 5/5 identical | **REFUSED — false reason** | **5/5 identical** |
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| **opengist EMPTY** | no drive | named volume 181 KB skeleton | yes | yes | yes | **REFUSED — false reason** | — |
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**The contrast decides it.** The unit and the off-site snapshot **hold the data, verified by
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identity**, in both classes, accented filenames included. So the capture is sound. The failure is
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entirely in the last leg.
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**Both messages, verbatim:**
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- FULL, drive class → `ok=true`, *„A(z) calibre-web: 5 fájl visszaállítva (mentés: 2026-08-21 22:16)
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— az alkalmazás újraindult. Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa."*
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- FULL and EMPTY, no-drive class → `ok=false`, *„a(z) privatebin nincs telepítve, ezért nincs hová
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visszaállítani az adatait. A mentése szerint az adatai itt voltak: /mnt/sys_drive. Telepítsd újra
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az alkalmazást (Alkalmazások) ugyanerre a helyre…"*
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The second is the important one. **FULL and EMPTY got the identical sentence**, so the message cannot
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distinguish them — but the sentence is worse than uninformative, it is false twice over: the app is
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installed, and the instruction ("reinstall it to the same place") **cannot be followed**, because a
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40-class app is offered no storage field at deploy time (that is R-352's own measurement).
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**This closes R-353's second instruction.** It asked for proof that a named-volume app reaches the
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off-site tier rather than inference from gate order. It does. Manifests read tonight:
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```
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privatebin volume_dumps = ['privatebin_privatebin_data.tar'] db_dumps = None
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opengist volume_dumps = ['opengist_opengist_data.tar'] db_dumps = None
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kimai volume_dumps = ['kimai_kimai_db_data.tar', 'kimai_kimai_var.tar']
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db_dumps = ['kimai-mariadb.sql']
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calibre-web volume_dumps = ['calibre-web_calibre_web_config.tar'] db_dumps = None
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paperless-ngx volume_dumps = [3 tars] db_dumps = None ← the defect
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```
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---
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## 3. PART 0 — did the floor move the machine?
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**Yes, unaided, in 17 seconds.**
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| | |
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|---|---|
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| Installed | `proxmox-backup-server` / `-client` **4.2.2-1** |
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| Candidate | **4.2.5-1** (4.2.3-1, 4.2.4-1 also available) |
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| Proxy PID / started | 542065, **03:54:53Z**, unrestarted since the incident |
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| Effective `open files` | **65536 / 65536** — the morning's drop-in in force |
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| `Recv-Q` / loopback | **0** / **`200` in 11 ms** |
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| Datastore | 3.7 G of 98 G, 4% |
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| felhom.eu `main` @ start | `435e044` — matches the runbook's stated baseline |
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| moved from → to | **0.216.0 → 0.217.0** |
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| who initiated | **the hub** — the operator saved the floor at `19:48:37Z`; a poke reached the agent from `10.77.0.1:58093` at `19:48:32Z` for the artifact-manifest save 6 s earlier. No customer action, no agent-side decision. |
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| how long | floor saved `19:48:37Z` → *"controller-swap: new controller healthy"* `19:48:54Z` = **17 s**. Swap requested `19:48:41Z` → healthy = 13 s. |
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| **the container's own tag on the box** | **`gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.217.0`**, created `2026-08-21 19:48:45 UTC` — read from `docker ps` in guest 9201, not from the hub. |
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## 2. The before-slope — and a correction I owe the morning's report
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The hub's own host page for `demo-hp` shows the guest's **Controller column as „—"** — the hub does
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not know which controller version the box runs, while the `controller_updated` event it received says
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exactly that. Two hub surfaces, one blind.
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Two independent windows on the same proxy generation:
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`demo-felhom` also runs 0.217.0, but it started it at `19:31:04Z` — **17 minutes before the floor was
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saved** — and emitted `controller_started` with **no `controller_updated`**. It was moved by hand
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during the golden bake, not by the floor.
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| window | from → to | delta | rate |
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---
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## 4. PART 2 — the four answers, from source
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**1. What puts a dump into a backup unit, and when? Which apps qualify?**
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- **Database dumps** — `runDBDumps` (`backup/backup.go:444-560`). Qualification is **a running
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container whose image matches a database image**, mapped to a stack by `deriveStackName`
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(`appbackup/dbdump.go:770`). Written to `<nsRoot>/backups/primary/<stack>/db-dumps/<stack>-<type>.sql`.
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- **Volume dumps** — `runVolumeDumps` (`backup/backup.go:607`). Qualification is **a deployed,
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non-protected stack with at least one Docker *named volume*** (`GetDockerVolumes`). An app with
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zero named volumes is skipped silently and is never stopped.
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- **When** — one cycle, both legs, scheduled `db-dump` daily at **02:30 CEST**; and again as the
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coherence pre-phase of every off-site run (`offbox.go:938-951`), which is what makes a snapshot an
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internally coherent {DB@T, files@T} pair.
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- `CaptureRecoveryUnit` **only enumerates what is already on disk**
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(`recovery_unit.go:131-132`). It writes no dump itself.
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- **The gap this leaves:** an app whose data is a *bind mount* and which has no database container
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produces neither leg. Its unit is configuration only — and nothing anywhere says so.
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**2. What should a correct backup contain?**
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- **Declares a data drive** (13 of 53): the recovery unit (compose + `app.yaml` carrying the portable
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secrets + whatever dumps exist) **plus** the paths its `.felhom.yml` `backup:` block marks
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`mandatory`, appended to the restic snapshot as extra paths (`offbox_capture.go:32`).
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- **Declares none** (40 of 53): **unit only**. `offboxCaptureSet` returns `(nil, nil)` when the app
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has no backup block, so the off-site snapshot is the unit and nothing else. That is correct *given*
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that their data is inside the unit's volume tars — and tonight confirmed it is.
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**3. What does the restore report, and on what evidence? — THE ANSWER IS: FROM THE ABSENCE OF AN ERROR.**
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`ReconstituteFromOffsite` returns `res` and `nil`. Nothing in it ever asks whether anything was
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restored. The handler then calls `EndRestoreOp(**true**, reconstituteOutcomeMsg(...))`
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(`web/offbox_handlers.go:455`). `reconstituteOutcomeMsg` (`web/offbox_handlers.go:463-475`) formats
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counters:
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```go
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if res.DBsReplayed == 0 {
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return fmt.Sprintf("A(z) %s: %d fájl visszaállítva%s — az alkalmazás újraindult. "+
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"Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa.", app, res.FilesPlaced, when)
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}
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```
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So with `FilesPlaced == 0` and `DBsReplayed == 0` the customer reads **"0 files restored — the
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application restarted"** under a **success**. **This is a finding on its own and is recorded whichever
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way the rest goes.** Two aggravations found on top of it:
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- **"This application has no database" is asserted from a counter, not from a fact.**
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`reimportDBDumpsFrom` returns `(0, nil)` when the dump directory is absent *or* holds no `.sql`
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(`restore_db.go:30-46`), so an app that certainly has a database is told it has none. Proven live on
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`paperless-ngx`.
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- **The file count is rsync's transfer count, not a restore count.** A correct restore of unchanged
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data reports **"0 fájl visszaállítva"** — indistinguishable from a restore that did nothing.
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Observed: the same app reported 5, then 2, then 0 across three runs.
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**4. What did the 9 August off-site snapshot contain, and is it still readable?**
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**Readable, and it contained the data.** Three snapshots at `2026-08-09 08:30`:
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| id | app | contents |
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|---|---|---|
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| `41c830db` | calibre-web | unit + `userdata/media/books` incl. the 9-Aug rehearsal fixture (`árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt`, `őszibarack.md`, `binary-3mb.bin`, `plain.txt`) |
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| `9e38b84c` | opengist | unit + **`volume-dumps/opengist_opengist_data.tar`, 182 272 B** — manifest records `volume_dumps: ["opengist_opengist_data.tar"]` |
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| `78b93f04` | privatebin | unit + `volume-dumps/privatebin_privatebin_data.tar`, 2 560 B |
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All still readable tonight; `restic check` over the whole repository reports **"no errors were
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found"**. **So the 9 August off-site copy of OpenGist's data exists and is intact** — it simply was
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not the thing the afternoon's restore read, and the off-site route that would have read it refuses
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for that class of app.
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**The repository had also been dead since 9 August** and nothing said so: no snapshot between
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`2026-08-09 08:30` and tonight. The cause is visible in the hub event at 16:01 — the off-box target
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was lost by the guest rebuild (R-193's shape) — and, after tonight's self-heal restored the target,
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**every per-app off-site toggle was still off**, so the first run I triggered reported:
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```
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[offbox] backup run started (0 app(s) toggled)
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[offbox] backup OK: 0 app(s) backed up, 18 snapshot(s), 14s
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```
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**Credit where it is due:** the *card* does not lie about this. It reads „Aktív — nincs kijelölt
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alkalmazás" and „Sikeres — nincs mentésre jelölt alkalmazás" beside the green tick. The tick still
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leads, and the log line alone says only „backup OK".
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---
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## 5. THE TWO CYCLES COMPARED
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*(filled in after the scheduled run — see §11)*
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---
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## 6. PART 4 — everything attempted, and the message judged
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| # | test | outcome | message judged |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 31 min | 09:18:21Z fd=62 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +4 | **183/day** |
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| 5.64 h | 04:11:36Z fd=19 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +47 | **200/day** |
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| 1a | **destructive restore: nothing is ever deleted** | **PASS both ways.** A file created after the snapshot survived; a file mutated after the snapshot was overwritten back to the snapshot's content. | count is rsync transfers, not files restored — see §4.3 |
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| 1b | **safety dump taken and verified before the stop** | **PASS.** `21:02:47Z` dump written → `21:02:47Z` `StopStack romm`. | correct: „0 fájl **és az adatbázis** visszaállítva" |
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| 1b | **…and the whole operation refuses if it cannot be** | **PASS.** Made impossible by putting a regular file at the `db-dumps` path. Refused; `plain.txt` kept its post-snapshot mutation; the container's `StartedAt` was unchanged — **the app was never stopped.** | honest and names the path, but leaks a raw Go `mkdir … not a directory` into a customer surface |
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| 1b | **the hole in it** | **FAIL.** For `paperless-ngx` the discovery resolves the database to the wrong stack, so `hasDB` is false: **no safety dump is taken and the refusal cannot fire.** The undo is absent, not refused. | „Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa" — false |
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| 2 | **end of the abandonment countdown** | state created and overdue; **fires at 05:10 CEST** — see §11 | card states a **past** date in the future tense while overdue |
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| 3 | **damaged store** | **MIXED — see below** | honest at the point of failure, then forgotten |
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| 4 | **drive pulled mid-restore** | restore failed, nothing written to the wrong place, **the agent re-bound the drive within 5 s** (`23:15:29` pulled → `23:15:34` re-bound) | **WRONG DIAGNOSIS.** „restore dir: mkdir …: permission denied" for a drive that had vanished. A person reads that and goes looking at permissions. |
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| 5 | **full disk, non-destructive path** | **PASS — refuses before it starts.** | **exemplary:** „Nincs elég szabad hely a visszaállításhoz (183.6 MB szükséges, 99.2 MB szabad)." Both numbers named. |
|
||||
| 5 | **full disk, destructive path** | **FAIL — no gate at all.** `offbox_reconstitute.go` contains **zero** references to `offboxFree`; the three headroom gates are all on non-destructive paths (`offbox_restore.go:231,297,423`). It stopped the app, failed halfway on ENOSPC, left `DRILL-2026-08-21/` holding 2 of 5 entries, and restarted the app. | honest (`No space left on device (28)`) but raw rsync output |
|
||||
| 6 | **controller killed mid-restore** | **PASS.** SIGKILL inside the stop→restore→start window. On restart: *"[appstop] crash recovery: an off-site restore (op \"offbox-reconstitute:paperless-ngx\") was interrupted and left 1 app(s) stopped — restarting them"*. App restarted, marker cleared, **and the hub was told** (event 3009). | good — names the operation, not just the app |
|
||||
| 7 | **the 40-class under pressure** | **the backup noticed; the alarm did not.** Filled the 69 GB filesystem that holds the Docker data-root, the system namespace and all 40-class data, to 99% / 1.2 GiB free. All 12 containers stayed healthy. The **reserve refused per app**: „App backup REFUSED for kimai (size) … reserve: 97% used or 1.0 GiB free", and the hub got `recovery_unit_capture_failed` (**error**) naming the filesystem and its numbers. **The fill watcher said nothing** — it runs **once a day at 03:30** plus once at startup (`cmd/controller/main.go:1092`). | the refusal messages are good; the silence is the problem |
|
||||
|
||||
**This morning's incident note said ~85/day and "≈2 years of runway". Both were wrong.** They were
|
||||
extrapolated from a single 17-minute window whose delta was **one descriptor** — a sample of one
|
||||
cannot carry a daily rate, and the agreement with the historical ~73/day that made it feel solid was
|
||||
coincidence. **The real rate is ~185–200/day, ~2.6× what I published, and the runway is ~357 days,
|
||||
not two years.** Corrected in the incident document and in R-336 rather than left standing.
|
||||
**Where the clock stopped me:** nothing in Part 4 was skipped for time. Item 2's terminal deletion is
|
||||
scheduled rather than forced, because the sweep has no on-demand entry point — it is a daily job only.
|
||||
|
||||
**The mechanism I named was also the minority one.** `CLOSE-WAIT` held flat at **1** across the
|
||||
window while `ESTAB` grew **45 → 49** — *all* the growth was established connections. At the wedge
|
||||
the split was **1011 ESTAB / 543 CLOSE-WAIT**, so ESTAB dominated there too. **R-336's fix must target
|
||||
connections the proxy never reaps, not just `CLOSE-WAIT` sockets.**
|
||||
### 4.3 in detail — the damaged store
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The changelog, verbatim — the run's primary deliverable
|
||||
One byte flipped inside pack `967853d2…` at offset 5 000 000, over the repository's own SFTP
|
||||
transport. Pack files are named by their content hash, so this is genuine corruption.
|
||||
|
||||
All three entries between 4.2.2-1 and 4.2.5-1 read in full (128 lines), then swept for
|
||||
`connection|file descriptor|fd|accept(|close_wait|keep-alive|socket|EMFILE|nofile|leak|proxy|listen|
|
||||
backlog|hyper|tokio`.
|
||||
- **`restic check` detects it** — *"ciphertext verification failed"*, *"Fatal: repository contains
|
||||
errors"*.
|
||||
- **But nothing in the product ever runs it.** The only restic verbs in the entire controller are
|
||||
`restore, snapshots, backup, unlock, stats, init, forget, prune, cat`. The agent's restore-test is
|
||||
**PBS-tier only**. **The off-site store is never verified by any layer, at any time.** Corruption is
|
||||
discovered at restore time — the worst possible moment.
|
||||
- **A restore that touches the damage fails honestly:** `ok=false`, naming the file and
|
||||
*"ciphertext verification failed"*.
|
||||
- **But the failure is not remembered.** It left a **partial** checking folder — 78 MB, 54 files,
|
||||
15 of 16 originals. `OffboxFullScratchReady` (`offbox_restore.go:305`) asks only *"does the
|
||||
directory exist and is it non-empty"*, so the wizard then offered **all three** actions including
|
||||
„Teljes visszaállítás indítása".
|
||||
- **Pressing it ran the destructive restore from that known-incomplete copy and reported SUCCESS.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Exactly one hit, and it is a false positive:**
|
||||
The repository was repaired from byte-identical originals; `restic check` now reports **"no errors
|
||||
were found"**.
|
||||
|
||||
> `* S3: config: allow editing the use-node-config flag that controls whether requests S3 endpoints`
|
||||
> ` honor the node's proxy settings or not`
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
HTTP-proxy configuration *for S3 requests* — not the `proxmox-backup-proxy` daemon.
|
||||
## 7. PART 5 — the two rows that were observed and never filed
|
||||
|
||||
What the range does contain. **4.2.5-1** — a security release hardening client-supplied manifests:
|
||||
**5.1 — the delete guard on verification copies is blind, and its own comment says otherwise.**
|
||||
`offboxVerifyCopyDeleteHandler` (`web/offbox_handlers.go:502`) gates on `backupMgr.IsRunning()` — the
|
||||
**concurrency** flag — while its comment states *"It refuses while a backup/restore op is running: the
|
||||
copy being deleted could be the one currently being written."* R-351b moved all seven restore handlers
|
||||
onto `restoreOpBlocked()` (which reads both flags); **this handler was left behind**, and one other
|
||||
site (`:239`) reads the bare flag correctly and documents why.
|
||||
|
||||
> `* backup: harden the handling of client supplied backup manifests:`
|
||||
> ` - only accept archive names that are plain file names carrying a server side type extension. A`
|
||||
> ` crafted name in a manifest could previously make a sync job read or write outside of the`
|
||||
> ` snapshot directory, running as the unprivileged 'backup' user.`
|
||||
> ` - keep an uploaded manifest in memory and only persist it on backup finish, checking that every`
|
||||
> ` archive it lists was really uploaded during that session and that the checksums match`
|
||||
**Reachability is not a race — it is the whole operation.** `RestoreOffboxScratch`
|
||||
(`offbox_restore.go:211`) **never calls `acquireRunning` at all**, so `IsRunning()` is false for the
|
||||
entire duration of an off-site verification restore. Demonstrated live, flags read immediately before
|
||||
and after the delete:
|
||||
|
||||
plus a sync/push chunk-reuse fix and a subscription-key architecture check. **4.2.4-1** — S3 rate
|
||||
limits, a file-locking user-lookup cache, the new `proxmox-enterprise-support-keyring` dependency,
|
||||
docs. **4.2.3-1** — UI/journal work, an LDAP search-filter escape, tape and timezone fixes.
|
||||
```
|
||||
--- BEFORE delete 22:35:25 display= True offbox-restore kimai concurrency= False
|
||||
--- DELETE calibre-web verification copy: „Az ellenőrző másolat törölve…"
|
||||
--- AFTER delete 22:35:25 display= True offbox-restore kimai concurrency= False
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Nothing addresses descriptor lifetime or connection reaping. My recommendation was: do not upgrade
|
||||
for this reason.**
|
||||
The copy was removed. The guard is app-agnostic, so the same call naming the *restoring* app hits the
|
||||
directory the restore is writing into. **Rank: MEDIUM** — it needs a customer to press delete during a
|
||||
restore, but both controls live on the same page, the window is the whole restore, and the target is
|
||||
the restore's own source. (Reconstitute and place *do* hold the flag, so the exposure is the
|
||||
verification-restore window only.)
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. STOP 1 — the ruling
|
||||
**5.2 — accented-text search is an instrument that fails silently, and it nearly did again tonight.**
|
||||
Filed as an instrument defect. **Occurrences I can evidence:**
|
||||
|
||||
**Operator (Viktor) ruled: upgrade anyway, for rehearsal value** — *"see how that works for us, we
|
||||
need practice with that too"*. Legitimate and recorded as such: this was **a practice run of the
|
||||
upgrade procedure on a Tier-2 protected machine, not a fix for the leak**.
|
||||
1. **2026-07-20** — an accented grep through `ssh → pct exec → bash -c` nearly produced a wrong
|
||||
"banner cleared" claim. Recorded in `felhom-controller/.claude/rules/ui-hungarian.md:19-22`.
|
||||
2. **2026-08-13** — `kubectl exec … sh -c "grep '<accented>'"` returned **0 for three strings that
|
||||
were present**, one step from being reported as a failed hub v0.105.0 deploy.
|
||||
3. **2026-08-21, tonight, 22:07** — `tar -tf` rendered `őszibarack.md` as `\305\221szibarack.md`
|
||||
(octal escaping). Recording the accented filenames' raw bytes from that listing would have been
|
||||
wrong. Caught by extracting the archive and reading the names with `xxd`.
|
||||
|
||||
**The interpretation was fixed in writing before any numbers existed** (`stop1-ruling.txt`):
|
||||
unchanged slope = **expected**, not a failed upgrade; changed slope = a **surprise** needing
|
||||
explanation, not a confirmation. That file was written at the ruling, not afterwards, so neither
|
||||
outcome could be rationalised into a success.
|
||||
**Correction to the task's premise:** that is **two inside two weeks**, plus the founding case a month
|
||||
earlier. I looked for a third inside the two-week window and did not find one on record.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. STOP 2 — the snapshot, and what it does not cover
|
||||
**The smallest guard I would propose — and did NOT build:** the problem is not grep, it is that every
|
||||
one of these tools *silently transforms* the bytes. So the guard is not "use ASCII fragments" (a
|
||||
discipline, which is what failed three times) but **a negative control that the harness cannot skip**:
|
||||
any search whose pattern contains a byte ≥ 0x80 must be run twice — once for the target and once for a
|
||||
string that MUST be absent — and a zero result from the first is only reportable when the second also
|
||||
returns zero *and* a third probe for a known-present ASCII anchor returns non-zero. Three probes, one
|
||||
helper, no judgement required at the call site. Everything else has been tried and is what "nearly"
|
||||
means in all three cases.
|
||||
|
||||
Snapshot **421440873** `felhom-hetzner-20260818`, 15.06 GB, status **Available** (complete, not
|
||||
merely started), server #147604682, project 15217960.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**It covers `/dev/sda` only.** `/mnt/pbs-datastore` is `/dev/sdb`, a separate 100 GB **Volume**, and
|
||||
Hetzner server snapshots exclude attached volumes — so this is a rollback for the *software* state
|
||||
(packages, unit files, the `LimitNOFILE` drop-ins, nftables, wg) and **not a backup of the backup
|
||||
data**. Fine for a package install that writes no datastore content; **it must not be remembered as
|
||||
datastore protection.** Taken on a running server, deliberately: powering off ep0 to guard a userspace
|
||||
package install would take the only off-premises copy offline.
|
||||
## 8. RANKED REGISTER ROWS OPENED
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. The upgrade and its verification
|
||||
Ceiling was **R-353**; it **moved to R-365**.
|
||||
|
||||
Simulated first (`-s`): **0 to remove**, so the abort condition never triggered. Then
|
||||
`apt-get install --only-upgrade -y proxmox-backup-server`, **09:51:00→09:51:06Z, exit 0**. Upgraded
|
||||
server/client/docs to 4.2.5-1 plus one new dependency, `proxmox-enterprise-support-keyring 1.1` —
|
||||
**which the 4.2.4-1 changelog had declared**, a small real consistency check between what I read and
|
||||
what apt did.
|
||||
| id | rank | what |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **R-354** | **HIGH** | The off-site full restore has **no named-volume leg**. The tar is in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder, and is never replayed; the outcome reports success. For the 40-class this is the entire dataset. `offbox_reconstitute.go:341-346`. |
|
||||
| **R-355** | **HIGH** | `paperless-ngx`'s PostgreSQL is dumped to a directory for a **non-existent stack** (`…/primary/paperless/`), so its unit records `db_dumps: null`, nothing off-sites it, **no safety dump is taken on a destructive restore**, and the customer is told the app has no database. `appbackup/dbdump.go:770-798`. One app in 53. |
|
||||
| **R-356** | **HIGH** | The off-site restore **refuses for all 40 no-drive apps** with „nincs telepítve" about an installed, running app, and instructs the customer to reinstall it "to the same place" — an instruction those apps' deploy page makes impossible. `offbox_reconstitute.go:208-227`. |
|
||||
| **R-357** | **MEDIUM** | The **destructive** restore has no headroom gate (the three that exist are all on non-destructive paths). It stops the app, fails halfway on ENOSPC and leaves a partially-restored data directory. |
|
||||
| **R-358** | **MEDIUM** | A **failed** scratch restore leaves a partial copy that `OffboxFullScratchReady` reports as ready; the destructive restore then runs from it and reports success. |
|
||||
| **R-359** | **MEDIUM** | The off-site restic store is **never verified** by any layer — `restic check` is not among the verbs the controller runs, and the agent's restore-test is PBS-only. |
|
||||
| **R-360** | **MEDIUM** | Verification-copy delete gates on `IsRunning()`, which `RestoreOffboxScratch` never holds — deletable throughout a restore. Its comment asserts the opposite. **(Part 5.1)** |
|
||||
| **R-361** | **MEDIUM** | The safety dump **overwrites the unit's own DB dump**: `DumpOne` writes the canonical `<stack>-<type>.sql` and only then renames it away. The comment at `offbox_reconstitute.go:147-148` states it "can never overwrite the app's real dump". Proven: romm's `romm-mariadb.sql` was present before and absent after. |
|
||||
| **R-362** | **MEDIUM** | A data drive detached mid-restore is reported as **„permission denied"**. The restore path never consults drive state. |
|
||||
| **R-363** | **MEDIUM** | The fill watcher runs **once a day (03:30)** plus at startup. A filesystem that fills at 03:31 is unannounced for ~24 h — while the backup reserve is already refusing apps. |
|
||||
| **R-364** | **LOW** | Accented-text search is a silently-transforming instrument; discipline has failed at least three times. Guard proposed, not built. **(Part 5.2)** |
|
||||
| **R-365** | **LOW** | An **overdue** abandonment countdown renders its past due-date in the future tense („…2026-08-20 napján véglegesen töröljük" shown on 2026-08-21). |
|
||||
|
||||
| check | result |
|
||||
**Confirmed still live, not re-filed:** **R-329** — `app_start_failed` emits severity `"warn"`
|
||||
(`internal/notify/notifier.go:546`), outside the hub's vocabulary, so it coerces to `info` and emails
|
||||
nobody. Observed tonight as event 3006, severity `info`. A sweep of every `emit(` call site shows this
|
||||
is now the **only** remaining instance fleet-wide.
|
||||
|
||||
**R-353:** its instruction (2) is **satisfied** — see §2. Its instruction (1) stands and is now
|
||||
strictly larger than when it was written, because R-354 shows the bare completion can also be reported
|
||||
over a unit that *did* have a data leg.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. WALL CLOCKS, AND EVERY STEP OFF THE CUSTOMER'S PATH
|
||||
|
||||
| time (CEST) | what |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| installed | server / client / docs **4.2.5-1** |
|
||||
| daemons | `proxmox-backup-proxy` **active running**, `proxmox-backup` **active running** |
|
||||
| proxy restarted | 542065 → **551655** @ 09:51:04 |
|
||||
| **effective `open files`** | **65536 / 65536** — survived the new package |
|
||||
| drop-ins on disk | both present, unmodified |
|
||||
| `Recv-Q` | **0** |
|
||||
| loopback | **`200` in 12 ms** |
|
||||
| `felhom-pve` over tunnel | **`200` in 0.103 s**, `felhom-pbs active` |
|
||||
| `demo-hp` over tunnel | **`200` in 0.096 s**, `felhom-pbs active` |
|
||||
| hub gauge, post-upgrade | `11:59:31 [INFO] PBS-DR box refreshed: 3.7% full (3.7 GB of 97.9 GB)` |
|
||||
| 21:57 | start; baselines |
|
||||
| 22:00 | break-glass into `demo-hp` |
|
||||
| 22:09 | fixture planted, comparator control passed |
|
||||
| 22:12 | manual local backup |
|
||||
| 22:13 | manual off-site run — **0 apps toggled** |
|
||||
| 22:17 | off-site run with 3 apps enabled |
|
||||
| 22:19–22:20 | checking-folder restores |
|
||||
| 22:21 | reconstitute privatebin → refused |
|
||||
| 22:23 | reconstitute calibre-web → **the conviction** |
|
||||
| 22:25 | local restore-from-unit privatebin → data returned |
|
||||
| 22:27 | Part 4.1a — no-delete invariant |
|
||||
| 22:39–22:45 | paperless-ngx → R-355 |
|
||||
| 22:51–22:57 | Part 4.3 damaged store; repo repaired |
|
||||
| 23:02–23:04 | Part 4.1b safety dump, both directions |
|
||||
| 23:10–23:12 | Part 4.5 full disk; Part 4.6 controller killed |
|
||||
| 23:15 | Part 4.4 drive pulled |
|
||||
| 23:17–00:16 | Part 4.7 filesystem filled and freed |
|
||||
| 23:35 | abandonment countdown created (fires 05:10) |
|
||||
|
||||
`proxmox-backup-manager version` now reads `4.2.5-1 running version: 4.2.5`. **This independently
|
||||
settles the morning's confusion**: that string was never reporting a stale daemon, and now that
|
||||
installed and running genuinely match, both halves agree.
|
||||
**Steps off the customer's path, named:**
|
||||
|
||||
**One false alarm, mine.** I queried `systemctl is-active proxmox-backup-api` and got `inactive`.
|
||||
**That unit does not exist** — `systemctl cat` returns *"No files found for
|
||||
proxmox-backup-api.service"*. The real pair is `proxmox-backup-proxy.service` ("API Proxy Server")
|
||||
and `proxmox-backup.service` ("API Server"), both active. A bad query, not a fault — recorded because
|
||||
for as long as it took to check, it looked exactly like one.
|
||||
1. **Break-glass root access** to `demo-hp` via the hub-vaulted `host_recovery` credential — the box
|
||||
had lost DooPlex's SSH key (its `authorized_keys` held only its own `root@demo-hp` RSA key) and its
|
||||
tailnet address was unreachable. DooPlex's public key was **re-added** to `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`
|
||||
and an `ssh` alias `hp` → `192.168.0.104` was added to `~/.ssh/config` on DooPlex.
|
||||
2. **A hub DB snapshot** (`hub.db` + `-wal` + `-shm`) was streamed to the scratchpad to read
|
||||
`host_recovery` and the events table. It holds every host's secret; it is in the session scratchpad
|
||||
only and is not in any committed file.
|
||||
3. **`settings.json` was edited directly** (controller stopped, backup at `/root/settings.json.drill-backup`)
|
||||
to create the overdue abandonment state. There is no product path to shorten a countdown, and the
|
||||
real orphan→reset path would have destroyed `demo-hp`'s entire off-site history.
|
||||
4. **The set-aside store the sweep will delete was created by hand** at
|
||||
`u629488-sub3:/home/felhom-repo-superseded-drill-20260821`, for the same reason.
|
||||
5. **Two restic pack files were deliberately corrupted and then restored** from byte-identical copies.
|
||||
6. **`fallocate` fillers** were used to fill two filesystems and were removed.
|
||||
7. Apps deployed for the drill: `opengist` (re-deployed empty), `kimai`, `paperless-ngx`, `romm`.
|
||||
|
||||
**No backup, restore or verify was triggered** to "prove" the endpoint, per the runbook: the reads
|
||||
above answer it without mutating a protected datastore.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. The after-slope — unchanged, as predicted
|
||||
## 10. THE FENCES
|
||||
|
||||
| | window | delta | rate |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| before (PID 542065) | 09:18:21Z fd=62 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +4 / 1885 s | **183/day** |
|
||||
| after (PID 551655) | 09:51:22Z fd=17 → 10:23:21Z fd=22 | +5 / 1919 s | **225/day** |
|
||||
- **`ep0` / the off-site endpoint — untouched outside this machine's own path, and here is how I know.**
|
||||
`demo-hp` authenticates as the Hetzner Storage Box **sub-account `u629488-sub3`**, which is chrooted
|
||||
to its own home: `ls /` returns **`Permission denied`**, and `/home` contains exactly `.ssh` and
|
||||
`felhom-repo`. Every write, the two corruptions, the set-aside store and the sweep's target are
|
||||
inside that home. **`demo-felhom` is a different sub-account (`u629488-sub1`)** and a real customer's
|
||||
copy is a different sub-account again — none reachable with this key. `restic forget`/`prune` were
|
||||
never invoked by me; the nightly retention that ran as part of the customer-path off-site button kept
|
||||
every 9-August snapshot (verified by listing all 24, not by a count).
|
||||
- **`demo-felhom`'s two fixtures — confirmed intact, not assumed.**
|
||||
(a) the unopenable set-aside store `u629488-sub1:/home/felhom-repo.orphaned-20260810` — listed
|
||||
tonight, `config`/`data` (258 shards)/`index`/`keys`/`locks`/`snapshots`, mtimes still 18 Jul and
|
||||
3 Aug; (b) the retained-key case — hub `host_escrow_superseded` rows **11 and 12** for
|
||||
`demo-felhom-8363b5`, each with a 572-byte `identity_blob`, dated 2026-08-12. `demo-felhom` is
|
||||
healthy on 0.217.0, its own off-site ran at 02:15 with `last_status: ok`, and
|
||||
**`--abandon-status` there reports „no abandonment countdown is running on this box"**.
|
||||
- **`peti-felhom` — not contacted.** It does not appear in the hub host list at all; no command in this
|
||||
session named it.
|
||||
|
||||
**These are not distinguishable.** The windows differ by **one descriptor**; Poisson uncertainty on
|
||||
n=4 is ±2 and on n=5 is ±2.2, so both are consistent with a single unchanged rate. **The after-figure
|
||||
being numerically higher is noise, not a regression — and certainly not an improvement.** Composition
|
||||
repeats the pattern: **ESTAB 0 → 5, CLOSE-WAIT 0 → 1.**
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Thirty minutes cannot settle this in either direction, and nothing here claims it does.**
|
||||
## 11. SCHEDULED CYCLE AND THE COUNTDOWN
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Register
|
||||
*(filled in as they fire — 02:30 local backup, 04:15 off-site, 05:10 abandonment sweep, all CEST)*
|
||||
|
||||
- **R-341 filed, WATCHING** — the two dated checks: **+24 h (2026-08-19 ~10:00Z)** and
|
||||
**+7 d (2026-08-25 ~10:00Z)**, against new `t0` **fd=17 @ 09:51:22Z, PID 551655**, with the exact
|
||||
command and the instruction to **record the ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split, not just the total** — the
|
||||
split is what identifies which leak it is. If the PID has changed, the window is void.
|
||||
- **R-336 updated and STILL OPEN.** Its wrong 85/day baseline is corrected to 183–200/day, the
|
||||
mechanism is re-pointed at ESTAB, and the upgrade's null result is recorded. **It stays open on its
|
||||
own merits:** an upgrade that *had* fixed the leak still would not make ~85,000 requests/day to a
|
||||
weekly-write DR endpoint correct.
|
||||
- `documentation/runbooks/offsite-endpoint.md` — **no change made, correctly**: it states no PBS
|
||||
version literal, only package names, so there was nothing to update (and per `docs.md`, version
|
||||
literals do not belong in a current-state doc anyway).
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Teardown
|
||||
## 12. MACHINE STATES AT THE END
|
||||
|
||||
**This run provisioned nothing.** No `.deb` was downloaded — `apt-get changelog` served the text
|
||||
directly, so the runbook's `/tmp` cleanup was never needed. The Hetzner snapshot **is retained** as
|
||||
the rollback; deleting it is an operator decision, and it costs €0.018161/GB/month.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Observations, not acted on
|
||||
|
||||
- **`pvesm status` reports `felhom-pbs` with Total/Used/Available all `0`** on both boxes while
|
||||
status reads `active`. Consistent before and after the upgrade, and the hub's own gauge reads the
|
||||
real 3.7 GB / 97.9 GB, so nothing is broken — but the PVE-side numbers are not usable as a capacity
|
||||
signal. Likely the namespace-scoped token lacking datastore-level audit. Not filed; noted here.
|
||||
- **8 other packages are held back** (`8 not upgraded`), untouched deliberately — `full-upgrade` on
|
||||
this machine is forbidden by the runbook and would change the kernel and WireGuard alongside the
|
||||
thing under test.
|
||||
- **The morning's `--no-verify` situation is unchanged**: `golden-currency` still convicts on the
|
||||
inherited R-334 (controller 0.216.0 vs golden 0.214.0), untouched by this run.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. CI, checked by run ID
|
||||
|
||||
**Run `351`, `head_sha 3e50902a9`, conclusion `failure`, elapsed 15 s** (10:27:00→10:27:15Z).
|
||||
Inherited, not caused: CI's only step is `python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast`, which convicts
|
||||
`golden-currency` on **R-334** (controller 0.216.0 vs newest golden 0.214.0) — files this run did not
|
||||
touch. 15 s is the workflow's own honest-failure band, not the R-265 reap band. The previous run
|
||||
`350` on `435e044` failed identically, before this run began.
|
||||
|
||||
**Expect one `[felhom CI] gates FAILED` mail for run 351.** Same cause as run 348 this morning; not a
|
||||
new fault, and not related to the upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
`python3 scripts/unproven.py --summary` — **unchanged: 23 walked, 32 not walked of 55.** No number
|
||||
moved, correctly: this run proved an operational fact, not a product claim.
|
||||
*(final state recorded in §13 after the scheduled runs)*
|
||||
|
||||
+42
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:33 offsite-restore/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:33 offsite-restore/opengist/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-03 08:11 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 14:51 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-03 08:29 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 23:13 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-06 22:02 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1750 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1260 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 287 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 182272 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/volume-dumps/opengist_opengist_data.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1121 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/manifest.json
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-03 08:11 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 14:51 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-03 08:29 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x root/1000 0 2026-08-04 18:45 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/
|
||||
drwxr-sr-x root/1000 0 2026-08-04 18:50 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 10:15 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 181 2026-08-04 14:53 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/DRILL-SENTINEL.txt
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 21 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/plain.txt
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 3145728 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/binary-3mb.bin
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 25 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/\305\221szibarack.md
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 59 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/\303\241rv\303\255zt\305\261r\305\221-t\303\274k\303\266rf\303\272r\303\263g\303\251p.txt
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 32768 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-shm
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 04:15 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-wal
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 413696 2026-08-04 14:52 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 23:13 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-06 22:02 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 3035 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 2122 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 317 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 368640 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/calibre-web_calibre_web_config.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1157 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/manifest.json
|
||||
+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
c9498bfba3dab7b8c59196be8a6c792f0044356d969b2d81ce4b00b61950aa96 documentation/audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/phase0-preexisting-scratch/offsite-restore-scratch.tar
|
||||
BIN
Binary file not shown.
+22
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
DRILL 2026-08-21 — FULL/EMPTY contrast on demo-hp. All hashes sha256, byte-for-byte.
|
||||
Comparator positive control: one byte flipped at offset 500000 of binary-1mb.bin
|
||||
(af -> 00) => sha256sum -c FAILED rc=1; original PASSED rc=0. Mutant discarded.
|
||||
|
||||
Planted fixture (5 files, incl. two UTF-8 Hungarian accented names):
|
||||
SENTINEL.txt 0c23c8531214fe20cbc1ed177da22f51d65570c5aaedb39e380aa8d4d3e62991
|
||||
binary-1mb.bin 725763bbe679b22d5c231a14083ff13155f475c028c22ade4623955b50a2a84a
|
||||
nested/őszibarack.md a39ad6f623da67ac72f2e62a24245eef46c722c279ae89cd6b0c7c45afa6a4c4
|
||||
plain.txt 07e91a985809fc96752f97cddcf6523b211bc607c81a5808befabe35573926f1
|
||||
árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt 0d6a22ec56acf61b8a80e73eb12cb223d607acaa3684acfcfa7c3e34ecdfabea
|
||||
Name bytes (UTF-8 NFC):
|
||||
árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt = c3a1 72 76 c3ad 7a 74 c5b1 72 c591 2d 74 c3bc 6b c3b6 72 66 c3ba 72 c3b3 67 c3a9 70 2e747874
|
||||
őszibarack.md = c591 73 7a 69 62 61 72 61 63 6b 2e 6d 64
|
||||
|
||||
| class | data leg | in unit | in offsite snap | checking folder | OFF-SITE restore | LOCAL restore
|
||||
calibre-web FULL | drive | userdata files | n/a | YES 5/5 ident. | YES 5/5 ident. | YES 5/5 ident. | -
|
||||
calibre-web FULL | drive | named volume | YES 1.42MB | YES | YES | NO (silent) | -
|
||||
privatebin FULL | no-drive | named volume | YES 1.06MB | YES 5/5 ident.| YES 5/5 ident. | REFUSED (false) | YES 5/5 ident.
|
||||
opengist EMPTY | no-drive | named volume | YES 181KB skeleton | YES | YES | REFUSED (false) | -
|
||||
|
||||
CONCLUSION: the unit and the off-site snapshot HOLD the data, verified by identity.
|
||||
The off-site full restore has no named-volume leg at all; the local restore has one.
|
||||
+88
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:19 offsite-restore/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:33 offsite-restore/opengist/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:00 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:01 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1750 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1260 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 287 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 181248 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/volume-dumps/opengist_opengist_data.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1121 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/opengist/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist/manifest.json
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:19 offsite-restore/privatebin/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:00 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:01 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1723 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1223 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 288 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1055744 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/volume-dumps/privatebin_privatebin_data.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1118 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/privatebin/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin/manifest.json
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:00 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x nobody/nogroup 0 2026-08-21 18:26 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-07-22 03:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x root/1000 0 2026-07-21 19:08 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x root/1000 0 2026-07-26 08:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-21 22:10 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 181 2026-08-04 14:53 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-SENTINEL.txt
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 35 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/plain.txt
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 1048576 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/binary-1mb.bin
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/nested/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 21 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/nested/\305\221szibarack.md
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 46 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/SENTINEL.txt
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 52 2026-08-21 22:09 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/DRILL-2026-08-21/\303\241rv\303\255zt\305\261r\305\221-t\303\274k\303\266rf\303\272r\303\263g\303\251p.txt
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 21 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/plain.txt
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 3145728 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/binary-3mb.bin
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 25 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/\305\221szibarack.md
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 59 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/\303\241rv\303\255zt\305\261r\305\221-t\303\274k\303\266rf\303\272r\303\263g\303\251p.txt
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 32768 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-shm
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 04:15 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-wal
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 413696 2026-08-04 14:52 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books/metadata.db
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-07-23 12:10 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 18:31 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 3035 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 2122 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 327 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1422848 2026-08-21 22:16 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/calibre-web_calibre_web_config.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1165 2026-08-21 22:17 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web/manifest.json
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 14:51 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-03 08:29 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x root/1000 0 2026-08-04 18:45 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/
|
||||
drwxr-sr-x root/1000 0 2026-08-04 18:50 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/
|
||||
drwxrwsr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 10:15 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 181 2026-08-04 14:53 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/DRILL-SENTINEL.txt
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 21 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/plain.txt
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 3145728 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/binary-3mb.bin
|
||||
drwxrwxr-x 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 25 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/nested/\305\221szibarack.md
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1000/1000 59 2026-08-09 09:59 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/rehearsal-2026-08-09/\303\241rv\303\255zt\305\261r\305\221-t\303\274k\303\266rf\303\272r\303\263g\303\251p.txt
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 32768 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-shm
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 0 2026-08-09 04:15 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db-wal
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1000/1000 413696 2026-08-04 14:52 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books/metadata.db
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-04 23:13 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-06 22:02 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 3035 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/.felhom.yml
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 2122 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
-rw------- root/root 317 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/compose/app.yaml
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 368640 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/volume-dumps/calibre-web_calibre_web_config.tar
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- root/root 1157 2026-08-09 10:30 offsite-restore/calibre-web/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web/manifest.json
|
||||
+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
7e59e57d6458d28f530dbaddbee0f2314ea1ef885052701531f57bad2529849d documentation/audits/DRILL-backup-truth-2026-08-21/evidence/phase3-experiment/checking-folders-after-full-restore.tar
|
||||
BIN
Binary file not shown.
+32
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
VERBATIM customer-facing outcome strings, read from /api/backup/restore-status
|
||||
(the same value the wizard banner renders). Times CEST.
|
||||
|
||||
1) 22:21:51 off-site FULL RESTORE (reconstitute), app = privatebin [40-class, no HDD_PATH]
|
||||
ok = FALSE
|
||||
"A teljes visszaállítás sikertelen: a(z) privatebin nincs telepítve, ezért nincs hová
|
||||
visszaállítani az adatait. A mentése szerint az adatai itt voltak: /mnt/sys_drive.
|
||||
Telepítsd újra az alkalmazást (Alkalmazások) ugyanerre a helyre, utána ez a
|
||||
visszaállítás működni fog"
|
||||
FACT AT THAT MOMENT: privatebin deployed=true, state=running, container healthy.
|
||||
|
||||
2) 22:23:36 off-site FULL RESTORE (reconstitute), app = calibre-web [drive class]
|
||||
ok = TRUE
|
||||
"A(z) calibre-web: 5 fájl visszaállítva (mentés: 2026-08-21 22:16) — az alkalmazás
|
||||
újraindult. Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa."
|
||||
FACT: the 5 declared-userdata files came back byte-identical.
|
||||
The named volume calibre-web_calibre_web_config was NOT restored, though its
|
||||
1,422,848-byte tar was in the snapshot, in the checking folder, and named in
|
||||
manifest.json volume_dumps. The message does not mention it.
|
||||
|
||||
3) 22:25:31 LOCAL restore from recovery unit, app = privatebin
|
||||
ok = TRUE
|
||||
"privatebin visszaállítva (helyi)."
|
||||
FACT: the named volume WAS restored, all 5 planted files byte-identical.
|
||||
The message carries no counts at all - it reads the same whatever happened.
|
||||
|
||||
4) 22:13:15 off-site backup run with ZERO apps selected
|
||||
log: "[offbox] backup run started (0 app(s) toggled)"
|
||||
"[offbox] backup OK: 0 app(s) backed up, 18 snapshot(s), 14s"
|
||||
card: badge "Aktív — nincs kijelölt alkalmazás" / "✓ Rendben" /
|
||||
"Sikeres — nincs mentésre jelölt alkalmazás" /
|
||||
"Nincs távoli mentésre jelölt alkalmazás — jelölj ki legalább egyet."
|
||||
+5
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
0c23c8531214fe20cbc1ed177da22f51d65570c5aaedb39e380aa8d4d3e62991 DRILL-2026-08-21/SENTINEL.txt
|
||||
725763bbe679b22d5c231a14083ff13155f475c028c22ade4623955b50a2a84a DRILL-2026-08-21/binary-1mb.bin
|
||||
a39ad6f623da67ac72f2e62a24245eef46c722c279ae89cd6b0c7c45afa6a4c4 DRILL-2026-08-21/nested/őszibarack.md
|
||||
07e91a985809fc96752f97cddcf6523b211bc607c81a5808befabe35573926f1 DRILL-2026-08-21/plain.txt
|
||||
0d6a22ec56acf61b8a80e73eb12cb223d607acaa3684acfcfa7c3e34ecdfabea DRILL-2026-08-21/árvíztűrő-tükörfúrógép.txt
|
||||
+59
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
|
||||
ID Time Host Tags Paths
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
e6132ae5 2026-08-04 19:36:26 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
9ac78c98 2026-08-04 19:36:31 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
92212ff8 2026-08-04 19:36:36 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
9d6d233f 2026-08-05 09:12:42 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
29e7b245 2026-08-05 09:12:48 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
cd1db049 2026-08-05 09:12:53 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
0ef7a006 2026-08-06 20:00:44 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
8662a8c1 2026-08-06 20:00:50 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
6dfa6602 2026-08-06 20:00:54 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
3635f945 2026-08-07 02:15:13 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
7b1fa8b0 2026-08-07 02:15:17 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
38edf5b8 2026-08-07 02:15:21 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
a4d03ee3 2026-08-08 02:15:12 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
f534bffe 2026-08-08 02:15:17 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
a685d30e 2026-08-08 02:15:22 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
41c830db 2026-08-09 08:30:38 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
9e38b84c 2026-08-09 08:30:49 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
|
||||
78b93f04 2026-08-09 08:30:53 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
8c44bd4c 2026-08-21 21:00:52 demo-hp felhom-offbox,calibre-web /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/calibre-web
|
||||
/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/userdata/media/books
|
||||
|
||||
07bac5ad 2026-08-21 21:00:55 demo-hp felhom-offbox,privatebin /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/privatebin
|
||||
|
||||
7e4b703b 2026-08-21 21:00:58 demo-hp felhom-offbox,kimai /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/kimai
|
||||
|
||||
16cb8ce7 2026-08-21 21:01:08 demo-hp felhom-offbox,paperless-ngx /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/appdata/paperless/media
|
||||
/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/paperless-ngx
|
||||
|
||||
2a891149 2026-08-21 21:01:13 demo-hp felhom-offbox,romm /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/romm
|
||||
|
||||
49b9f317 2026-08-21 21:01:22 demo-hp felhom-offbox,opengist /mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/opengist
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
24 snapshots
|
||||
+34
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
paperless-ngx: the database is dumped into a directory for a stack that does not exist,
|
||||
so the recovery unit never contains it, and the restore then tells the customer the app
|
||||
has no database. Proven live 2026-08-21 22:39-22:45 CEST on demo-hp.
|
||||
|
||||
MECHANISM (source):
|
||||
internal/appbackup/dbdump.go:770 deriveStackName("paperless-postgres", known)
|
||||
1. candidate = suffixStripStackName("paperless-postgres") = "paperless" (line 801)
|
||||
2. known is non-empty, known["paperless"] is FALSE (the stack is "paperless-ngx")
|
||||
3. known["paperless-postgres"] is FALSE
|
||||
4. no known stack name is a prefix of "paperless-postgres" ("paperless-ngx" is not)
|
||||
5. FALLS THROUGH to `return candidate` (line 797) -> "paperless"
|
||||
An unresolved mapping is returned as if resolved. There is no warning and no refusal.
|
||||
|
||||
OBSERVED CONSEQUENCES (all live):
|
||||
a) the dump is written to
|
||||
/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/paperless-postgres.sql
|
||||
284,617 bytes, 72 tables, valid=true -- an orphan directory for a non-existent stack,
|
||||
on the SYSTEM drive, while the app's real unit is on /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1.
|
||||
b) the real unit /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/paperless-ngx/manifest.json
|
||||
records "db_dumps": null
|
||||
c) the off-site snapshot therefore carries no .sql at all
|
||||
(checking folder: `find ... -name "*.sql" | wc -l` = 0)
|
||||
d) writeSafetyDump (offbox_reconstitute.go:115) filters discovered DBs on
|
||||
db.StackName == stackName, so `mine` is empty -> returns ("", nil) -> hasDB = false.
|
||||
NO pre-restore safety dump is taken. Verified: `find /mnt -name "pre-restore-*"`
|
||||
returned nothing before AND after the destructive restore.
|
||||
e) the destructive restore ran to completion and reported SUCCESS:
|
||||
"A(z) paperless-ngx: 0 fájl visszaállítva (mentés: 2026-08-21 22:41)
|
||||
— az alkalmazás újraindult. Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa."
|
||||
The controller had dumped that same database 5 minutes earlier.
|
||||
|
||||
The orphan directory is also invisible to the app's off-site push, because the push
|
||||
resolves paths from the app's own unit path -- so the only copy of that database dump
|
||||
is on the system drive of the machine it protects.
|
||||
+9
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:38:46Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless","source":"dbdump.go:150"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:39:37Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless","source":"dbdump.go:150"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:39:37Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DumpOne: starting dump for container=paperless-postgres, stack=paperless, dbType=postgres, dumpDir=/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps","source":"dbdump.go:189"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:39:37Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DumpOne: completed paperless-postgres → paperless-postgres.sql (size=277.9 KB, valid=true, tables=72, duration=313ms)","source":"dbdump.go:330"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:41:23Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless","source":"dbdump.go:150"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:41:23Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DumpOne: starting dump for container=paperless-postgres, stack=paperless, dbType=postgres, dumpDir=/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps","source":"dbdump.go:189"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:41:23Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DumpOne: completed paperless-postgres → paperless-postgres.sql (size=278.2 KB, valid=true, tables=72, duration=314ms)","source":"dbdump.go:330"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:43:46Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless","source":"dbdump.go:150"}
|
||||
{"timestamp":"2026-08-21T20:44:33Z","level":"DEBUG","message":"DiscoverDatabases: paperless-postgres → stack=paperless, dbUser=paperless, dbName=paperless","source":"dbdump.go:150"}
|
||||
+48
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
total 288
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 21 20:41 .
|
||||
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Aug 21 20:39 ..
|
||||
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 284902 Aug 21 20:41 paperless-postgres.sql
|
||||
--- real unit:
|
||||
{
|
||||
"schema_version": 2,
|
||||
"app_name": "paperless-ngx",
|
||||
"display_name": "Paperless-ngx",
|
||||
"controller_version": "0.217.0",
|
||||
"created_at": "2026-08-21T20:42:01Z",
|
||||
"drive": "/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1",
|
||||
"namespace_root": "/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1",
|
||||
"image_pins": [
|
||||
"ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:2.20.15",
|
||||
"postgres:16-alpine",
|
||||
"redis:7-alpine"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"secret_env_vars": [
|
||||
"DB_PASSWORD",
|
||||
"PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY",
|
||||
"PAPERLESS_ADMIN_PASSWORD"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"data_key_env_vars": null,
|
||||
"secret_source": "portable secrets (data keys, DB passwords, internal signing secrets) are IN this unit's compose/app.yaml (0600); internet-reachable admin logins are NOT, and come from the guest's app.yaml or are regenerated on restore",
|
||||
"config_files": [
|
||||
"docker-compose.yml",
|
||||
".felhom.yml",
|
||||
"app.yaml"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"db_dumps": null,
|
||||
"volume_dumps": [
|
||||
"paperless-ngx_paperless_data.tar",
|
||||
"paperless-ngx_paperless_postgres_data.tar",
|
||||
"paperless-ngx_paperless_redis_data.tar"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"checksums": {
|
||||
".felhom.yml": "a7cce0a557fd151e6385a137f4721366dd2cd0aa3876783f0f9f0acc9a78dd23",
|
||||
"app.yaml": "8dfec452dfc00c7e3dce26864bf97165acac44f32470d2425c96e2bd86649cf0",
|
||||
"docker-compose.yml": "b112952565ef3928f192358ea58fdf4a5a26d788593bf2614e36050c77539b3d"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"portable_secret_env_vars": [
|
||||
"DB_PASSWORD",
|
||||
"PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"offsite_run_id": "20260821T204123Z",
|
||||
"dumps_at": "2026-08-21T20:41:23Z"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
||||
PART 4 — things we claim and have never watched. demo-hp, 2026-08-21, times CEST.
|
||||
|
||||
4.1 THE DESTRUCTIVE RESTORE
|
||||
(a) "nothing is ever deleted" -- PASS, both directions, calibre-web 22:26:59.
|
||||
POST-SNAPSHOT.txt, created after the snapshot, SURVIVED the restore.
|
||||
plain.txt, mutated after the snapshot, was OVERWRITTEN back to the snapshot's
|
||||
content (sha 07e91a98…). Copier is rsync -a, no --delete, no --ignore-existing
|
||||
(offbox_reconstitute.go:94).
|
||||
NOTE ON THE COUNT: the message says "2 fájl visszaállítva" because rsync counts
|
||||
TRANSFERS, not files restored. An identical restore reports "0 fájl visszaállítva",
|
||||
which is indistinguishable from a restore that did nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
(b) "a safety dump is taken and VERIFIED before anything is stopped, and the whole
|
||||
operation refuses if it cannot be"
|
||||
HAPPY PATH -- PASS, romm 23:02:44.
|
||||
21:02:47Z "[offbox] romm: pre-restore safety dump written →
|
||||
pre-restore-20260821T210246Z-romm-mariadb.sql (60.8 KB)"
|
||||
21:02:47Z "[stacks] StopStack romm: current state=running"
|
||||
The dump precedes the stop. Message correctly said
|
||||
"0 fájl és az adatbázis visszaállítva".
|
||||
THE REFUSAL -- PASS, romm 23:04:15.
|
||||
Safety dump made impossible by putting a regular FILE at the db-dumps path.
|
||||
Result: ok=FALSE,
|
||||
"A teljes visszaállítás sikertelen: a biztonsági mentés könyvtára nem hozható
|
||||
létre: mkdir /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/primary/romm/db-dumps:
|
||||
not a directory"
|
||||
Nothing changed: plain.txt kept my post-snapshot mutation (sha 3754dfc6…), and
|
||||
romm's container StartedAt was unchanged (21:03:08) -- the app was never stopped.
|
||||
JUDGEMENT: honest and it names the path, but it leaks a raw Go mkdir error into
|
||||
a customer surface.
|
||||
THE HOLE -- the guard only protects apps whose database the discovery resolves to
|
||||
the right stack. For paperless-ngx it concludes "no database", so hasDB is false
|
||||
and the refusal CANNOT fire: the undo is absent rather than refused. See
|
||||
../phase4-paperless/FINDING.txt.
|
||||
SIDE EFFECT, NOT PREVIOUSLY FILED -- the safety dump DESTROYS the unit's own DB dump.
|
||||
DumpOne writes the canonical `<stack>-<dbtype>.sql` (appbackup/dbdump.go:200-202),
|
||||
i.e. the app's real dump, and only THEN is it renamed to pre-restore-*.
|
||||
The comment at offbox_reconstitute.go:147-148 states it "can never overwrite the
|
||||
app's real dump". It does.
|
||||
PROVEN: romm's db-dumps held romm-mariadb.sql (62,270 B) at 22:59; after one
|
||||
reconstitute it held ONLY pre-restore-20260821T210246Z-romm-mariadb.sql.
|
||||
Consequence: until the next backup run the LOCAL restore-from-unit finds no .sql
|
||||
and tells the customer the app has no database.
|
||||
|
||||
4.3 A DAMAGED STORE -- MIXED
|
||||
Method: one byte flipped inside pack 967853d2… (offset 5,000,000) via the repo's own
|
||||
SFTP transport; the pack's name is its content hash, so this is genuine corruption.
|
||||
* `restic check` DOES detect it ("ciphertext verification failed",
|
||||
"Fatal: repository contains errors"). BUT the controller NEVER RUNS `restic check`:
|
||||
the only restic verbs in the whole controller are restore, snapshots, backup, unlock,
|
||||
stats, init, forget, prune, cat. The agent's restore-test is PBS-tier only.
|
||||
So the off-site store is never verified by any layer, at any time.
|
||||
* A restore that TOUCHES the damage fails honestly:
|
||||
ok=FALSE, "A visszaállítás sikertelen: offbox restore paperless-ngx: exit status 1:
|
||||
… ignoring error for …/documents/originals/0000011.pdf: ciphertext verification failed"
|
||||
* BUT the failure is not remembered. It left a PARTIAL scratch (78 MB, 54 files,
|
||||
15 of 16 originals). OffboxFullScratchReady (offbox_restore.go:305) only asks
|
||||
"does the directory exist and is it non-empty", so the wizard then offered all three
|
||||
actions including "Teljes visszaállítás indítása".
|
||||
* Pressing it ran the DESTRUCTIVE restore from that known-incomplete copy and reported
|
||||
SUCCESS: ok=TRUE, "A(z) paperless-ngx: 0 fájl visszaállítva … Ennek az alkalmazásnak
|
||||
nincs adatbázisa."
|
||||
REPO REPAIRED afterwards from the byte-identical originals; `restic check` now says
|
||||
"no errors were found".
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
|
||||
# REPORT — RUNBOOK ep0: read the PBS changelog, then decide whether to upgrade (2026-08-18, midday)
|
||||
|
||||
**Outcome:** changelog read → **no connection-handling fix in the range**; operator ruled to upgrade
|
||||
anyway **for rehearsal value**; upgraded **4.2.2-1 → 4.2.5-1** cleanly; **the fd slope did not change,
|
||||
which is the predicted result.** Two dated checks filed as **R-341**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Both STOPs cleared by the operator.** No code changed in any repo; `documentation/` only.
|
||||
Evidence: `documentation/audits/evidence-ep0-pbs-upgrade-2026-08-18/`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Baselines re-confirmed on the machine
|
||||
|
||||
Not from the audit file — from `dpkg -l` and `apt-cache policy`, per the runbook.
|
||||
|
||||
| | |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Installed | `proxmox-backup-server` / `-client` **4.2.2-1** |
|
||||
| Candidate | **4.2.5-1** (4.2.3-1, 4.2.4-1 also available) |
|
||||
| Proxy PID / started | 542065, **03:54:53Z**, unrestarted since the incident |
|
||||
| Effective `open files` | **65536 / 65536** — the morning's drop-in in force |
|
||||
| `Recv-Q` / loopback | **0** / **`200` in 11 ms** |
|
||||
| Datastore | 3.7 G of 98 G, 4% |
|
||||
| felhom.eu `main` @ start | `435e044` — matches the runbook's stated baseline |
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. The before-slope — and a correction I owe the morning's report
|
||||
|
||||
Two independent windows on the same proxy generation:
|
||||
|
||||
| window | from → to | delta | rate |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 31 min | 09:18:21Z fd=62 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +4 | **183/day** |
|
||||
| 5.64 h | 04:11:36Z fd=19 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +47 | **200/day** |
|
||||
|
||||
**This morning's incident note said ~85/day and "≈2 years of runway". Both were wrong.** They were
|
||||
extrapolated from a single 17-minute window whose delta was **one descriptor** — a sample of one
|
||||
cannot carry a daily rate, and the agreement with the historical ~73/day that made it feel solid was
|
||||
coincidence. **The real rate is ~185–200/day, ~2.6× what I published, and the runway is ~357 days,
|
||||
not two years.** Corrected in the incident document and in R-336 rather than left standing.
|
||||
|
||||
**The mechanism I named was also the minority one.** `CLOSE-WAIT` held flat at **1** across the
|
||||
window while `ESTAB` grew **45 → 49** — *all* the growth was established connections. At the wedge
|
||||
the split was **1011 ESTAB / 543 CLOSE-WAIT**, so ESTAB dominated there too. **R-336's fix must target
|
||||
connections the proxy never reaps, not just `CLOSE-WAIT` sockets.**
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The changelog, verbatim — the run's primary deliverable
|
||||
|
||||
All three entries between 4.2.2-1 and 4.2.5-1 read in full (128 lines), then swept for
|
||||
`connection|file descriptor|fd|accept(|close_wait|keep-alive|socket|EMFILE|nofile|leak|proxy|listen|
|
||||
backlog|hyper|tokio`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Exactly one hit, and it is a false positive:**
|
||||
|
||||
> `* S3: config: allow editing the use-node-config flag that controls whether requests S3 endpoints`
|
||||
> ` honor the node's proxy settings or not`
|
||||
|
||||
HTTP-proxy configuration *for S3 requests* — not the `proxmox-backup-proxy` daemon.
|
||||
|
||||
What the range does contain. **4.2.5-1** — a security release hardening client-supplied manifests:
|
||||
|
||||
> `* backup: harden the handling of client supplied backup manifests:`
|
||||
> ` - only accept archive names that are plain file names carrying a server side type extension. A`
|
||||
> ` crafted name in a manifest could previously make a sync job read or write outside of the`
|
||||
> ` snapshot directory, running as the unprivileged 'backup' user.`
|
||||
> ` - keep an uploaded manifest in memory and only persist it on backup finish, checking that every`
|
||||
> ` archive it lists was really uploaded during that session and that the checksums match`
|
||||
|
||||
plus a sync/push chunk-reuse fix and a subscription-key architecture check. **4.2.4-1** — S3 rate
|
||||
limits, a file-locking user-lookup cache, the new `proxmox-enterprise-support-keyring` dependency,
|
||||
docs. **4.2.3-1** — UI/journal work, an LDAP search-filter escape, tape and timezone fixes.
|
||||
|
||||
**Nothing addresses descriptor lifetime or connection reaping. My recommendation was: do not upgrade
|
||||
for this reason.**
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. STOP 1 — the ruling
|
||||
|
||||
**Operator (Viktor) ruled: upgrade anyway, for rehearsal value** — *"see how that works for us, we
|
||||
need practice with that too"*. Legitimate and recorded as such: this was **a practice run of the
|
||||
upgrade procedure on a Tier-2 protected machine, not a fix for the leak**.
|
||||
|
||||
**The interpretation was fixed in writing before any numbers existed** (`stop1-ruling.txt`):
|
||||
unchanged slope = **expected**, not a failed upgrade; changed slope = a **surprise** needing
|
||||
explanation, not a confirmation. That file was written at the ruling, not afterwards, so neither
|
||||
outcome could be rationalised into a success.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. STOP 2 — the snapshot, and what it does not cover
|
||||
|
||||
Snapshot **421440873** `felhom-hetzner-20260818`, 15.06 GB, status **Available** (complete, not
|
||||
merely started), server #147604682, project 15217960.
|
||||
|
||||
**It covers `/dev/sda` only.** `/mnt/pbs-datastore` is `/dev/sdb`, a separate 100 GB **Volume**, and
|
||||
Hetzner server snapshots exclude attached volumes — so this is a rollback for the *software* state
|
||||
(packages, unit files, the `LimitNOFILE` drop-ins, nftables, wg) and **not a backup of the backup
|
||||
data**. Fine for a package install that writes no datastore content; **it must not be remembered as
|
||||
datastore protection.** Taken on a running server, deliberately: powering off ep0 to guard a userspace
|
||||
package install would take the only off-premises copy offline.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. The upgrade and its verification
|
||||
|
||||
Simulated first (`-s`): **0 to remove**, so the abort condition never triggered. Then
|
||||
`apt-get install --only-upgrade -y proxmox-backup-server`, **09:51:00→09:51:06Z, exit 0**. Upgraded
|
||||
server/client/docs to 4.2.5-1 plus one new dependency, `proxmox-enterprise-support-keyring 1.1` —
|
||||
**which the 4.2.4-1 changelog had declared**, a small real consistency check between what I read and
|
||||
what apt did.
|
||||
|
||||
| check | result |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| installed | server / client / docs **4.2.5-1** |
|
||||
| daemons | `proxmox-backup-proxy` **active running**, `proxmox-backup` **active running** |
|
||||
| proxy restarted | 542065 → **551655** @ 09:51:04 |
|
||||
| **effective `open files`** | **65536 / 65536** — survived the new package |
|
||||
| drop-ins on disk | both present, unmodified |
|
||||
| `Recv-Q` | **0** |
|
||||
| loopback | **`200` in 12 ms** |
|
||||
| `felhom-pve` over tunnel | **`200` in 0.103 s**, `felhom-pbs active` |
|
||||
| `demo-hp` over tunnel | **`200` in 0.096 s**, `felhom-pbs active` |
|
||||
| hub gauge, post-upgrade | `11:59:31 [INFO] PBS-DR box refreshed: 3.7% full (3.7 GB of 97.9 GB)` |
|
||||
|
||||
`proxmox-backup-manager version` now reads `4.2.5-1 running version: 4.2.5`. **This independently
|
||||
settles the morning's confusion**: that string was never reporting a stale daemon, and now that
|
||||
installed and running genuinely match, both halves agree.
|
||||
|
||||
**One false alarm, mine.** I queried `systemctl is-active proxmox-backup-api` and got `inactive`.
|
||||
**That unit does not exist** — `systemctl cat` returns *"No files found for
|
||||
proxmox-backup-api.service"*. The real pair is `proxmox-backup-proxy.service` ("API Proxy Server")
|
||||
and `proxmox-backup.service` ("API Server"), both active. A bad query, not a fault — recorded because
|
||||
for as long as it took to check, it looked exactly like one.
|
||||
|
||||
**No backup, restore or verify was triggered** to "prove" the endpoint, per the runbook: the reads
|
||||
above answer it without mutating a protected datastore.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. The after-slope — unchanged, as predicted
|
||||
|
||||
| | window | delta | rate |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| before (PID 542065) | 09:18:21Z fd=62 → 09:49:46Z fd=66 | +4 / 1885 s | **183/day** |
|
||||
| after (PID 551655) | 09:51:22Z fd=17 → 10:23:21Z fd=22 | +5 / 1919 s | **225/day** |
|
||||
|
||||
**These are not distinguishable.** The windows differ by **one descriptor**; Poisson uncertainty on
|
||||
n=4 is ±2 and on n=5 is ±2.2, so both are consistent with a single unchanged rate. **The after-figure
|
||||
being numerically higher is noise, not a regression — and certainly not an improvement.** Composition
|
||||
repeats the pattern: **ESTAB 0 → 5, CLOSE-WAIT 0 → 1.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Thirty minutes cannot settle this in either direction, and nothing here claims it does.**
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Register
|
||||
|
||||
- **R-341 filed, WATCHING** — the two dated checks: **+24 h (2026-08-19 ~10:00Z)** and
|
||||
**+7 d (2026-08-25 ~10:00Z)**, against new `t0` **fd=17 @ 09:51:22Z, PID 551655**, with the exact
|
||||
command and the instruction to **record the ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split, not just the total** — the
|
||||
split is what identifies which leak it is. If the PID has changed, the window is void.
|
||||
- **R-336 updated and STILL OPEN.** Its wrong 85/day baseline is corrected to 183–200/day, the
|
||||
mechanism is re-pointed at ESTAB, and the upgrade's null result is recorded. **It stays open on its
|
||||
own merits:** an upgrade that *had* fixed the leak still would not make ~85,000 requests/day to a
|
||||
weekly-write DR endpoint correct.
|
||||
- `documentation/runbooks/offsite-endpoint.md` — **no change made, correctly**: it states no PBS
|
||||
version literal, only package names, so there was nothing to update (and per `docs.md`, version
|
||||
literals do not belong in a current-state doc anyway).
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Teardown
|
||||
|
||||
**This run provisioned nothing.** No `.deb` was downloaded — `apt-get changelog` served the text
|
||||
directly, so the runbook's `/tmp` cleanup was never needed. The Hetzner snapshot **is retained** as
|
||||
the rollback; deleting it is an operator decision, and it costs €0.018161/GB/month.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Observations, not acted on
|
||||
|
||||
- **`pvesm status` reports `felhom-pbs` with Total/Used/Available all `0`** on both boxes while
|
||||
status reads `active`. Consistent before and after the upgrade, and the hub's own gauge reads the
|
||||
real 3.7 GB / 97.9 GB, so nothing is broken — but the PVE-side numbers are not usable as a capacity
|
||||
signal. Likely the namespace-scoped token lacking datastore-level audit. Not filed; noted here.
|
||||
- **8 other packages are held back** (`8 not upgraded`), untouched deliberately — `full-upgrade` on
|
||||
this machine is forbidden by the runbook and would change the kernel and WireGuard alongside the
|
||||
thing under test.
|
||||
- **The morning's `--no-verify` situation is unchanged**: `golden-currency` still convicts on the
|
||||
inherited R-334 (controller 0.216.0 vs golden 0.214.0), untouched by this run.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. CI, checked by run ID
|
||||
|
||||
**Run `351`, `head_sha 3e50902a9`, conclusion `failure`, elapsed 15 s** (10:27:00→10:27:15Z).
|
||||
Inherited, not caused: CI's only step is `python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast`, which convicts
|
||||
`golden-currency` on **R-334** (controller 0.216.0 vs newest golden 0.214.0) — files this run did not
|
||||
touch. 15 s is the workflow's own honest-failure band, not the R-265 reap band. The previous run
|
||||
`350` on `435e044` failed identically, before this run began.
|
||||
|
||||
**Expect one `[felhom CI] gates FAILED` mail for run 351.** Same cause as run 348 this morning; not a
|
||||
new fault, and not related to the upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
`python3 scripts/unproven.py --summary` — **unchanged: 23 walked, 32 not walked of 55.** No number
|
||||
moved, correctly: this run proved an operational fact, not a product claim.
|
||||
@@ -652,7 +652,19 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
|
||||
| **R-350** | **SECURITY — the hub operator password was printed in cleartext into a session transcript by CC, 2026-08-20. Rotation recommended.** **What happened:** vouching the artifact manifest used `curl -w '%{redirect_url}'` for confirmation. The hub answers `POST /configuration/artifacts` with a **303**, and curl renders the redirect target **with the basic-auth credentials re-attached** — so the URL it printed contained `http://:<HUB_PW>@10.43.52.34:8080/configuration?flash=artifacts_set`. The password was never read aloud from the credentials file, never echoed deliberately, and every other call in the session correctly printed only `${#HUB_PW}`; it arrived through curl's own output formatting, which is why the usual discipline did not catch it. **Blast radius, stated precisely rather than minimised:** the value is **not** in git, not in `CHANGELOG.md`/`REPORT*.md`/any committed file (checked), and not in the evidence directory — it is in the Claude Code session transcript under `~/.claude/projects/` on DooPlex, which is operator-readable and persists across sessions. The hub UI is reachable only on the k3s ClusterIP and via the operator's own routes, not from the internet. **The value is deliberately not recorded here; it is stored out-of-band in the usual credentials file.** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-20** | — | **Operator decides whether to rotate.** The hub's own `/configuration` password form does it (`current_password`/`new_password`/`confirm_password`), and per `hub-password-ui-2026-07-13` the DB override wins over the ConfigMap, which stays break-glass. CC can perform the rotation **file-to-file without printing the new value** (the `operator-present-one-time-secrets` convention) if asked — it did not do so unilaterally, because rotating a credential the operator holds in their own head or notes is their call, not CC's. **The reusable half, which matters more than this one password:** never use curl's `%{redirect_url}` (or `-v`, or `--libcurl`) against a basic-auth endpoint — all three re-render the credential. Confirm a redirect with `%{http_code}` and read the flash from a follow-up GET. | **Viktor decides**, CC executes |
|
||||
| **R-351** | **The restore never read back where the backup said the data lived, and a second press started a second restore.** Two findings, one session, both shipped. **(a) The blindness.** Every recovery-unit `manifest.json` has carried `drive` and `namespace_root` since schema 1 (`controller/internal/backup/recovery_unit.go:48-49`), written at capture from the app's own placement. `grep -rE '\.Drive\b\|\.NamespaceRoot\b' --include=*.go` found **no non-test reader anywhere** — the reconstitution opened the manifest (`offbox_reconstitute.go:235`) purely for the coherence stamp and resolved its destination from the LIVE app instead. **A restore into a destination different from the recorded one therefore succeeded silently, under a green message.** **(b) The second press.** All seven restore handlers gated on `backupMgr.IsRunning()` — the CONCURRENCY flag, acquired *inside* the goroutine (`offbox_reconstitute.go:180`) **after** the handler returned. Established with a test before any change: both the reconstitute and place handlers answered „…elindult" and **overwrote the first restore's op/stack**. The wizard had read the correct flag since v0.154.0 and said so in a comment; the handlers were never moved over. **(c)** The banner gated its terminal result on a page-local `sawRunning`, so a restore that finished before the page opened — the 8.666 s OpenGist restore — was shown to nobody. | **CLOSED 2026-08-21** — controller | — | **Shipped:** `backup/offbox_placement.go` (`CheckPlacement`, `PlacementMismatchMessage`, `RecordedUnitForStack`); mismatch **named and refused** before the safety dump, with `ack_placement` as a **separate** field from `confirm=1`; the not-installed refusal names the recorded drive; deploy page **prefills the address and folder from the app's own backup**; `Server.restoreOpBlocked()` reads BOTH flags; `RestoreOpStatus.LastRecent` + `RestoreResultWindow` moved to `internal/backup` as ONE expression for two surfaces. Red-proofs: B with **both** guards removed **was seen starting a restore with no drive attached** (no error, full 3.00 s run into `/tmp/mutant-destination`); C, E and A each returned their wrong outcome; D forced on broke 8 ordinary reconstitute tests, proving reachability both ways. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-352** | **Four screens state something untrue about where an app's data goes, and the configured default is consulted by nothing that places data.** Measured on `demo-hp` 2026-08-21. **(1)** **40 of 53** catalogue templates declare no data path (`grep -rl 'env_var: HDD_PATH' --include='.felhom.yml'` → 13; total 53); those apps get **no storage field and no default** — their data lands in a named Docker volume on the system drive. **(2)** `GetDefaultStoragePath()` has exactly **three** non-test callers — the metrics collector (`cmd/controller/main.go:410`), the dashboard SystemInfo panel (`web/server.go:733`) and `.fab` import landing (`handler_export_upload.go:154`). **The deploy route never reads it.** Its field comment `// new apps use this by default` (`internal/settings/settings.go:453`) has never been true — an invariant with no test pinning it. **(3)** The first-tier backup follows the data onto the same disk (`backup/backup.go:324-334` → `systemDataPath`), so data and nearest copy share one device for a customer doing nothing wrong — the posture Tier 2 refuses outright at `tier2.go:329`. **(4)** „1 alkalmazás használja" on the Drives page counts only `Env["HDD_PATH"] == path` (`web/handlers.go:2118`), so it can never include the 40-class; it truthfully means *„1 of the apps that CAN use a drive does"*. | **PARTLY CLOSED 2026-08-21** — visibility shipped; **placement OPEN** | — | **Shipped tonight (visibility only, no placement change, nothing migrated):** the deploy page now states where the app's data will live before the button is pressed, naming the system drive for the 40-class and the selected drive for the 13. **The specification for the rest is filed at `documentation/backlog/SPEC-app-data-placement-2026-08-21.md`** and lists the five points a ruling must settle (compose-template vs controller, existing deployments, when the SSD is legitimately right, `IsDefault` must become true or go away *with a test*, and the Drives-page count). **An earlier recommendation to refuse deployment until a drive is registered was WITHDRAWN** — it assumed the customer had failed to choose; they had no choice to make. | **Viktor rules**, CC executes |
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| **R-353** | **A restore reported success having returned configuration and no data — and no screen could have told the customer.** `demo-hp`, 2026-08-21, OpenGist. The off-site reconstitution refused at 16:37:14 (not installed); the person reinstalled and ran the local unit restore, which reported `Restore-from-unit completed: opengist in 8.666896042s`. **The unit it restored from contains `manifest.json` + `compose/{app.yaml,.felhom.yml,docker-compose.yml}` and NOTHING else — `volume_dumps: None`, `db_dumps: None`** — and the off-site snapshot was **182.3 KB**. So the restore returned the app's configuration; there was no data leg in the unit to return, and the outcome said only that it had completed. **A warning beside a success is read as a success, and an unknown must never be drawn as healthy.** **Compounding, and recorded as UNKNOWN rather than fine:** whether the 40-class reaches the off-site tier at all has **not been observed** — `runVolumeDumps` (`backup/backup.go:607+`) covers them on paper, but every unit on the box reported `volume_dumps: None`, including `calibre-web` on the data drive, because no nightly dump run had happened on a one-hour-old box. | **OPEN — NEXT SESSION'S FIRST ITEM** | — | **Two things, in order. (1)** A restore whose unit carries no `db_dumps` and no `volume_dumps` must **say so in its outcome** — „a mentés csak a beállításokat tartalmazta, adatot nem" — instead of reporting a bare completion. The verdict must consult what was actually placed, not merely that the operation ended. **(2)** Then *prove* the off-site coverage of a named-volume app by running a dump cycle and reading the resulting manifest, rather than inferring it from the gate order. Do not close (1) on the strength of (2) being likely. | CC |
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| **R-353** | **A restore reported success having returned configuration and no data — and no screen could have told the customer.** `demo-hp`, 2026-08-21, OpenGist. The off-site reconstitution refused at 16:37:14 (not installed); the person reinstalled and ran the local unit restore, which reported `Restore-from-unit completed: opengist in 8.666896042s`. **The unit it restored from contains `manifest.json` + `compose/{app.yaml,.felhom.yml,docker-compose.yml}` and NOTHING else — `volume_dumps: None`, `db_dumps: None`** — and the off-site snapshot was **182.3 KB**. So the restore returned the app's configuration; there was no data leg in the unit to return, and the outcome said only that it had completed. **A warning beside a success is read as a success, and an unknown must never be drawn as healthy.** **Compounding, and recorded as UNKNOWN rather than fine:** whether the 40-class reaches the off-site tier at all has **not been observed** — `runVolumeDumps` (`backup/backup.go:607+`) covers them on paper, but every unit on the box reported `volume_dumps: None`, including `calibre-web` on the data drive, because no nightly dump run had happened on a one-hour-old box. | **OPEN — NEXT SESSION'S FIRST ITEM** | — | **Two things, in order. (1)** A restore whose unit carries no `db_dumps` and no `volume_dumps` must **say so in its outcome** — „a mentés csak a beállításokat tartalmazta, adatot nem" — instead of reporting a bare completion. The verdict must consult what was actually placed, not merely that the operation ended. **(2)** Then *prove* the off-site coverage of a named-volume app by running a dump cycle and reading the resulting manifest, rather than inferring it from the gate order. Do not close (1) on the strength of (2) being likely. **(2) IS NOW SATISFIED — drill 2026-08-21.** A dump cycle was run and the manifests read: `privatebin volume_dumps=[privatebin_privatebin_data.tar]`, `opengist volume_dumps=[opengist_opengist_data.tar]`, `kimai volume_dumps=[kimai_kimai_db_data.tar, kimai_kimai_var.tar]` — the 40-class DOES reach the off-site tier, and PrivateBin's planted 1 MB came back byte-identical from its off-site snapshot into the checking folder. **(1) stands and is now strictly larger than when written:** R-354 shows the bare completion is also reported over a unit that DID carry a data leg, because the off-site restore never replays volume dumps at all. | CC |
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| **R-354** | **The off-site full restore has NO named-volume leg — the tar is in the unit, in the snapshot and in the checking folder, and is never replayed.** Proven live on `demo-hp` 2026-08-21 22:23 with planted files. `calibre-web`'s `calibre_web_config` tar (1 422 848 B) was present at every stage and the restore returned 5 declared user files and **not the volume**, under „5 fájl visszaállítva … az alkalmazás újraindult". Cause: `ReconstituteFromOffsite` skips every placement flagged `isUnit` (`controller/internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:341-346`) and the volume tars live INSIDE the unit; a grep for a volume-restore call across the whole off-site path returns nothing. The **local** restore does have one (`restore.go:99 restoreDockerVolumes`) — proven the same night by returning PrivateBin's planted 1 MB byte-identical from the same tar. **For the 13 drive-declaring apps the lost leg is the app's own configuration; for the 40 no-drive apps it is the entire dataset.** | **OPEN — HIGH** | — | Restore the unit's `volume-dumps/*.tar` from the SCRATCH unit on the off-site path, as `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` already does from the live unit. Assert the CONSEQUENCE (planted bytes come back), not the mechanism. | CC |
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| **R-355** | **`paperless-ngx`'s PostgreSQL is dumped into a directory for a stack that does not exist, so its unit has never contained a database dump — and the destructive restore therefore takes no safety dump and tells the customer the app has no database.** `deriveStackName("paperless-postgres", known)` (`controller/internal/appbackup/dbdump.go:770-798`) strips the `postgres` suffix to `paperless`, finds it is NOT a known stack, finds no known stack is a prefix of the container name, and then **returns the unresolved candidate anyway** — no warning, no refusal. Observed live 2026-08-21: the dump (284 617 B, 72 tables, valid) landed in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/` on the SYSTEM drive while the app's unit sits on `/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1` recording `"db_dumps": null`. The orphan directory is outside the app's off-site capture set, so the only copy of that dump is on the machine it protects. `writeSafetyDump` filters on the same wrong name, so `hasDB` is false: **no undo is taken and the fail-closed refusal cannot fire** — verified, `find /mnt -name "pre-restore-*"` empty before AND after a destructive restore. Outcome said „0 fájl visszaállítva … Ennek az alkalmazásnak nincs adatbázisa." **A catalogue-wide sweep of every DB-bearing template shows this is the ONLY affected app (1 of 53).** | **OPEN — HIGH** | — | Two candidates, both two-repo: rename the container to `paperless-ngx-postgres`, or make an unresolved candidate a loud skip rather than a silent fallback. The second is the one that generalises. Pin with a test that a container whose name resolves to no known stack is never dumped silently. | CC |
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| **R-356** | **The off-site restore refuses for all 40 no-drive apps, says the app "is not installed" when it is running, and then gives an instruction those apps make impossible.** `ReconstituteFromOffsite` refuses when `GetStackHDDPath(stack)` is empty (`offbox_reconstitute.go:208-227`); for a 40-class app that is ALWAYS empty, because they are offered no storage field at deploy time (R-352's own measurement). Observed 2026-08-21 22:21 on `privatebin` while it was `deployed=true, state=running, healthy`: „a(z) privatebin nincs telepítve, ezért nincs hová visszaállítani az adatait. A mentése szerint az adatai itt voltak: /mnt/sys_drive. Telepítsd újra az alkalmazást ugyanerre a helyre…". **The predicate is "has an HDD path"; the sentence says "is not installed"; for this class they are different things**, and the remedy offered cannot be carried out. This is also what the 2026-08-21 afternoon OpenGist journey hit before falling back to the local restore (R-353). | **OPEN — HIGH** | — | Separate the two questions. A 40-class app has a destination — the system data path — and the restore already knows it. | CC |
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| **R-357** | **The DESTRUCTIVE restore has no free-space gate; the three that exist are all on non-destructive paths.** `offbox_reconstitute.go` contains **zero** references to `offboxFree`; the gates sit at `offbox_restore.go:231` (scratch restore), `:297` (prepare-full) and `:423` (place-to-live). Proven 2026-08-21 23:11 with 300 KB free and 1 MB to write: it stopped `paperless-ngx`, failed halfway (`rsync … No space left on device (28)`), left the data directory holding **2 of 5** planted entries, and restarted the app. The message is honest but is raw rsync output. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Same gate, same wording as `:297`, before the stop. | CC |
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| **R-358** | **A FAILED scratch restore leaves a partial copy that the product then offers as a full restore source — and the destructive restore runs from it and reports success.** `OffboxFullScratchReady` (`offbox_restore.go:305`) asks only whether the directory exists and is non-empty; its comment defers completeness to `PlaceOffsiteRestore`, which stats top-level placements, not files. Proven 2026-08-21 22:54-22:56 against a deliberately corrupted store: the restore failed honestly (`ciphertext verification failed`, 54 files, 15 of 16 originals), the wizard then offered „Teljes visszaállítás indítása", and pressing it reported `ok=true`. **The failure is detected and then forgotten.** | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Record the failure against the scratch and refuse to place from it until it is re-prepared. | CC |
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| **R-359** | **The off-site restic store is never verified by anything, ever.** The complete set of restic verbs in the controller is `restore, snapshots, backup, unlock, stats, init, forget, prune, cat` — **no `check`**. The agent's `RestoreTest` is PBS-tier only. Established 2026-08-21 by deliberately corrupting one pack: `restic check` catches it immediately („ciphertext verification failed", „Fatal: repository contains errors"), and the product only meets the damage when a customer is already trying to recover. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | A periodic `restic check` (structure) with an occasional `--read-data`, reported like any other backup verdict. Note PBS already has verify jobs; this is the tier that does not. | CC |
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| **R-360** | **The verification-copy delete gates on the concurrency flag, which the verification restore never holds — so the copy is deletable for the whole restore, and the handler's own comment claims the opposite.** `offboxVerifyCopyDeleteHandler` (`web/offbox_handlers.go:502`) reads `backupMgr.IsRunning()`; `RestoreOffboxScratch` (`offbox_restore.go:211`) **never calls `acquireRunning`**. R-351b moved all seven restore handlers onto `restoreOpBlocked()` (both flags) and left this one behind. Demonstrated 2026-08-21 22:35 with the flags read immediately before and after: `display=True offbox-restore kimai / concurrency=False` on both sides, and the delete succeeded. The guard does not compare app names, so the same call naming the restoring app removes the directory the restore is writing into. **Observed in two consecutive reports and filed neither time; filed now.** | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | `restoreOpBlocked()`, and a test that asserts the CONSEQUENCE — the copy survives a delete attempt mid-restore. | CC |
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| **R-361** | **The pre-restore safety dump overwrites the app's own DB dump, and the comment beside it says it cannot.** `writeSafetyDump` calls `DumpOne`, which writes the canonical `<stack>-<dbtype>.sql` (`appbackup/dbdump.go:200-202`) — i.e. the unit's real dump — and only THEN renames it to `pre-restore-*`. The comment at `offbox_reconstitute.go:147-148` states the rename means it "can never overwrite the app's real dump". Proven 2026-08-21: `romm`'s `db-dumps/` held `romm-mariadb.sql` (62 270 B) at 22:59 and held ONLY `pre-restore-20260821T210246Z-romm-mariadb.sql` after one reconstitute. Until the next backup run the local restore-from-unit finds no `.sql` and reports the app has no database. The `pre-restore-*` file is also enumerated into the manifest's `db_dumps` and shipped off-site. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Dump to the safety name directly, or to a temp name. Pin the invariant the comment already asserts. | CC |
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| **R-362** | **A data drive detached mid-restore is reported as „permission denied".** Observed 2026-08-21 23:15: the guest-visible bind was unmounted 4 s into a scratch restore; the restore correctly failed and wrote nothing to the wrong place, but said „A visszaállítás sikertelen: restore dir: mkdir /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups: permission denied". The controller has a drive-state concept (`IsDisconnected`, used by both backup legs) and the restore path never consults it. **A correct refusal that misdescribes why sends the reader at a permissions problem that does not exist.** Creditable in the same test: the agent re-bound the drive 5 s later, unaided. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Consult drive state when a restore path operation fails on ENOENT/EACCES and name the drive. | CC |
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| **R-363** | **The fill watcher runs once a day, so a filesystem that fills at 03:31 goes unannounced for ~24 h while the backup is already refusing apps.** `sched.Daily("fill-watch", "03:30", …)` (`cmd/controller/main.go:1092`) plus one startup check. Proven 2026-08-21 23:17: the 69 GB filesystem carrying the Docker data-root, the system namespace and ALL 40-class app data was filled to 99% / 1.2 GiB free; the backup reserve refused `kimai` per app and the hub received `recovery_unit_capture_failed` (error) naming the filesystem, **and the fill watcher said nothing at all**. The package comment says it "warns the CUSTOMER that a filesystem is filling, BEFORE anything fails"; at a daily cadence it frequently cannot. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | The reserve already computes the same numbers every run. Let the watcher share that reading rather than owning a separate daily one. | CC |
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| **R-364** | **Accented-text search is an instrument that silently transforms its input, and discipline alone has failed at least three times.** (1) 2026-07-20, `ssh → pct exec → bash -c`, nearly a wrong "banner cleared" claim (`felhom-controller/.claude/rules/ui-hungarian.md:19-22`). (2) 2026-08-13, `kubectl exec … sh -c grep` returned **0 for three strings that were present**, one step from a wrongly-reported failed hub deploy. (3) 2026-08-21, `tar -tf` rendered `őszibarack.md` as `\305\221szibarack.md`; recording the fixture's name bytes from that listing would have been wrong. **NOTE: that is two inside two weeks plus the founding case a month earlier — a third inside the two-week window is not on record.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | **PROPOSED, NOT BUILT:** a helper that refuses to report a zero for any pattern containing a byte ≥ 0x80 unless a negative control also returns zero AND an ASCII anchor known to be present returns non-zero. Three probes, one helper, no judgement at the call site — because judgement is what failed. | CC |
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| **R-365** | **An overdue abandonment countdown renders its past due-date in the future tense.** With the terminal step due and the daily sweep not yet run, the card reads „A kérésed szerint a korábbi távoli mentéseidet **2026-08-20** napján véglegesen töröljük" — on 2026-08-21. The window is up to ~29 h in production (due moment → next 05:10 sweep). | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Say "due, will run at the next daily sweep" once the date has passed. | CC |
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| **R-339** | **The hub was SILENT when it lost sight of the off-site stores — and a 9 h 37 m outage proved it.** Both box checkers (`OffsiteBoxChecker` over the Hetzner API, `PBSDRBoxChecker` over ep0's `usage` op) held their last snapshot and returned quietly on a failed fetch. That is **correct for a fill signal** — a missing reading must never be mistaken for 0%, which is why degraded data drives no band transition — but the consequence was that a completely dead off-site endpoint and a healthy one were **indistinguishable on the operator channel**. During the 2026-08-18 ep0 incident the hub said nothing for the entire outage; the only mails came from the boxes' own backup failures, and **only because the WEEKLY offsite run happened to fall inside the window**. Two days earlier, nothing would have fired at all | **SHIPPED — hub v0.106.0, 2026-08-18.** Reachability is now a second, independent signal: consecutive failed fetch windows counted per checker, `pbsdr_box_unreachable` / `offsite_box_unreachable` (severity `warning`) past a default **3 windows (≈30–45 min)**, with paired `*_recovered` all-clears wired into `recoveredPairedDownTypes` — necessary because both recoveries are severity `info` and `severityNotifies` drops `info`. Threshold tunable via `alerting.box_unreachable_windows`. **The fill logic is untouched**: no threshold, throttle, band or escalate-once behaviour changed. Evidence: `internal/monitor/box_reachability_test.go` (Scenarios A–F) + `internal/notify/dispatcher_box_reachability_test.go` (the cross-package wiring, asserting an actual operator mail), plus three companion red-proofs each seen failing with a message naming the right cause | — | **PROVEN-LIVE still owed.** No real or constructed outage has exercised the emit path end to end, and one cannot be manufactured without making ep0 or the Hetzner API unreachable — ep0 is Tier 2 protected, so that is forbidden. The honest route is a constructed outage against a scratch hub instance with the tenantsync client pointed at a blackholed address. **Do not close this row on the unit tests** | CC |
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| **R-340** | **The new reachability check does not touch the surface that actually failed.** R-339 reports when the hub cannot READ ep0 — but the read it performs is the `usage` op, which is `proxmox-backup-manager` plus `df` over SSH, and therefore rides the **local API daemon**. The 2026-08-18 incident explicitly CLEARED that daemon: `proxmox-backup.service` was healthy throughout, and it was the **HTTPS proxy on 8007** that was wedged with a full accept queue. **So R-339's check would have returned green for all 9 h 37 m of that outage.** It closes the case where ep0 is unreachable *as a host*; it does not close the case that actually happened. This is not a defect in R-339 — it is the honest boundary of what it watches, recorded so a future reader does not mistake a green box gauge for a working off-site tier | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | a tenantsync endpoint-script version bump (the op is added on ep0, so it needs the same version-gated rollout `ErrUsageUnsupported` already models) | Add a **health op** to `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` that probes `https://127.0.0.1:8007/` on ep0 and reports the proxy's fd count and listen-queue depth, then surface it as a third signal. **Overlaps the connections spike (R-336's remaining half): both want the same observations from ep0, so whichever runs SECOND must reuse the first's evidence rather than re-measuring a protected machine twice** **REUSE, per this row's own instruction — the connections spike ran FIRST (2026-08-20) and already produced most of what the health op wants; do not re-measure a protected machine a third time.** Available in `audits/evidence-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20/`: the proxy **fd count** and its type breakdown (`lsof` + `/proc/<pid>/fd`), the **listen-queue depth** (`ss -lnt` — `Recv-Q 0`, `Send-Q 1024`), the **ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split**, the **per-peer** connection histogram, a **31-minute persistence diff** of full 4-tuples, and a **46.18 h** slope with Poisson bounds. What the health op would still add beyond these: a loopback `GET https://127.0.0.1:8007/` probe — the observation that distinguished "process problem" from "network problem" on 2026-08-18 and the one thing this spike did NOT take, because it is the surface R-339 cannot see. **And this spike sharpens what the op should report:** a rising **ESTAB** count is the live signal (CLOSE-WAIT was **0**, not merely flat), and per **R-344** the fd ceiling that matters may be the **agent's**, not only ep0's. | CC |
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user