docs: R-47 shipped in controller v0.153.0 — H4 window closed on both restore paths

ROADMAP: R-47 collapsed to a shipped one-liner naming both paths (offsite
ReconstituteFromOffsite and local RestoreFromRecoveryUnit), the DB-only
window mechanism, the fail-closed rule, and the no-agent-coupling
declaration (MinAgent stays 0.90.0).

Capability map: the offsite-restore PARTIAL row and the customer-restore
MISSING row both note that H4 is closed in controller v0.153.0 and that they
now await only one clean acceptance run.

Also corrects the stale "closes in v0.149" wording in BOTH rows — v0.149.0
was the F3 dashboard BackupStatus fix; R-47 shipped in v0.153.0.

documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md

@@ -58,14 +58,14 @@
 | Nightly DB dumps (postgres/mariadb autodiscovery), atomic writes | controller v0.118 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-BAK-FULL (pg+mariadb autodiscovered); atomicity `CAMPAIGN-6B` P4 + `CAMPAIGN-6E` B1/B2 (SIGKILL mid-write → only `.tar.tmp` touched, last-good byte-unchanged); DB restore `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-3` F7 is the *finding* of non-atomic writes, and T-RST-DB was auth-hollow — corrected to the 6B/6E fix-proofs.) T-6E-1 dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW) → R-10 |
 | Tier-2 secondary-drive copy: class-driven legs, v2 relpath layout, NAS-target exclusion, safe-remove boundary | controller v0.135 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6E-2026-07-15` (P-TIER2 deep-4 PASS), `CAMPAIGN-6C` | |
 | Offsite (restic → Hetzner Storage Box): mandatory class only, raw-data quota, enlargement gate, retention regrouping | controller v0.134, agent, hub | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D-2026-07-15` (mandatory-only P-IMMICH; enlargement gate fired at real 50GiB quota P3-DELIVERY); `VALIDATION-offbox-storagebox-2026-07-09` (byte-perfect round-trip) | Raw-data quota (SP-1) + retention regrouping (SP-2) are `SPIKE-restic-snapshot-shape` **dry-run** verdicts — mechanism validated, not fired in a live product run; only the enlargement gate is live-fired. **Reinstall-continuity (controller v0.142.0, 2026-07-17):** a recreated data volume that orphaned the repo (new passphrase can't open the old keys) is now CLASSIFIED (`wrong password or no key found`) → explicit ORPHANED card + event (not nightly-spam) + a move-aside (never-delete) reset (unclaimed auto / claimed confirm), instead of a raw nightly restic error. Fake-based scenarios + red-proofs. **The live leg FIRED on its own during the 2026-07-18 rehearsal** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`, S7): after a RESET + re-enable, the first offsite run hit the previous lifecycle's ciphertext and the guard **classified it, pushed `offbox_repo_orphaned`, skipped the run and showed the card (16:58:14)** rather than nightly-spamming a raw restic error; the operator-confirmed reset then **moved the repo aside (never deleted) to `.orphaned-20260718` and re-initialised (16:59:26→16:59:32)**, and the next run produced 2 snapshots / 48.717 MiB. The guard behaved exactly as designed — **the finding is that it had to fire at all** (R-32: RESET destroys custody, so the ciphertext it leaves behind is dead by design and should be purged, while the move-aside guard stays correct for reinstall-WITHOUT-RESET). `DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17` |
-| Offsite restore: local-preferred scratch, unit-only default, full two-step, missing-only place-to-live | controller v0.134/134.1/135 | **PARTIAL** — *scope corrected 2026-07-19* | `CAMPAIGN-6D` accept legs (immich end-to-end from offsite alone) | **2026-07-19:** `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` finds **no offsite path loads a DB dump** — all three buttons are file-only (R-43). The mechanics in this row's title are each proven; the phrase "**immich end-to-end from offsite alone**" is what is contested, since a DB-indexed app cannot be reconstituted by any offsite action. **RULED 2026-07-19 (Viktor): 6D's destruction hit the FILE TREE ONLY — the database survived in its named volume** (`immich_postgres_data` is a named volume in both the v2 and v3 template eras), so "immich end-to-end from offsite alone" **overclaimed scope**: the file half was proven, the DB half was never destroyed and therefore never restored. Row downgraded PROVEN-LIVE → **PARTIAL**, scope-corrected. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` (no offsite path could replay a DB at all) + the P-FAB destructive re-import (the proven-replay evidence, on the LOCAL path). **2026-07-19, controller v0.148.0:** the DB half now exists in code (R-43 + R-44) and its replay reached a live box — but **round 2 found it aborts against a running app** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`, H4: the replay races immich's own schema repair; `clip_index` recreated by the app 2 s before the dump's CREATE INDEX). Stays PARTIAL until that closes in v0.149 and a clean §9 run exists |
+| Offsite restore: local-preferred scratch, unit-only default, full two-step, missing-only place-to-live | controller v0.134/134.1/135 | **PARTIAL** — *scope corrected 2026-07-19* | `CAMPAIGN-6D` accept legs (immich end-to-end from offsite alone) | **2026-07-19:** `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` finds **no offsite path loads a DB dump** — all three buttons are file-only (R-43). The mechanics in this row's title are each proven; the phrase "**immich end-to-end from offsite alone**" is what is contested, since a DB-indexed app cannot be reconstituted by any offsite action. **RULED 2026-07-19 (Viktor): 6D's destruction hit the FILE TREE ONLY — the database survived in its named volume** (`immich_postgres_data` is a named volume in both the v2 and v3 template eras), so "immich end-to-end from offsite alone" **overclaimed scope**: the file half was proven, the DB half was never destroyed and therefore never restored. Row downgraded PROVEN-LIVE → **PARTIAL**, scope-corrected. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` (no offsite path could replay a DB at all) + the P-FAB destructive re-import (the proven-replay evidence, on the LOCAL path). **2026-07-19, controller v0.148.0:** the DB half now exists in code (R-43 + R-44) and its replay reached a live box — but **round 2 found it aborts against a running app** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`, H4: the replay races immich's own schema repair; `clip_index` recreated by the app 2 s before the dump's CREATE INDEX). **2026-07-20, controller v0.153.0: H4 IS CLOSED (R-47)** — both restore paths now replay into a DB-ONLY window (`StartStackServices` brings up the database service alone; the app starts only after the replay exits 0), with a fail-closed refusal when a dump has no identifiable DB service. *(The earlier note here said "closes in v0.149" — that was wrong: v0.149.0 was the F3 dashboard `BackupStatus` fix. R-47 shipped in v0.153.0.)* Row stays **PARTIAL** until one clean acceptance run exists — the code window is closed, the evidence is not yet taken |
 | Manual `.fab` export/import: class-scoped capture, browser up/download, tunnel-proof chunking | controller v0.125/128/130/136 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB / Accept #1 (1.7 GB full circle, byte-identical, app boots); chunking `CAMPAIGN-6B` P2 (100 MiB via real CF edge, 120 MiB→413) | Chunking proven at the real CF edge via `curl --resolve`; the **rendered browser file-picker** upload leg is still Viktor's open full-circle test (6C ran it NOT-RUN). C6B-F1 was the 6B *finding*; fix verified in 6D |
 | Guest-loss DR: PBS restore with full-fidelity layout from archive, restore-test verification | agent v0.75/0.76, PBS | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-P9-DESTROY-RESTORE (whole-guest `pct restore` of 9201 → running+healthy) + T-PBS-VERIFY (`verify_state: ok`, 13 snapshots); `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 0d (restore-test `mount_parity: ok`) | (Cited `VALIDATION-newbox-restore` is offbox **restic** file-restore, wrong tier — corrected.) Real **offsite** guest-loss round-trip still R1-blocked → S5 DR drill |
 | PBS-DR secret self-heal on reused-peer re-provision | hub v0.56 | **IMPLEMENTED** | hub v0.56.0 (`pbsdrheal/reconciler.go`, `RestageHostPBSSecret`, all §10 red-proofs); `SPIKE-pbsdr-selfheal-2026-07-15` (root cause) | Reconciler is **scoped to one host** (`PBSDRHEAL_ONLY_HOST`), not fleet-wide; already fired live hands-free on drill qm300 (07-15) — real-customer firing + fleet-wide widening pending |
 | Crash/power-loss mid-backup/mid-migration → self-heal on next run | controller, agent | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` P5-REST (SIGKILL mid-offbox → auto-restart ~15s, run marked failed not false-success, no stale lock); `CAMPAIGN-6E` B1-B3 | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-RBT-* legs were empty / auth-hollow — corrected.) Live mid-**migration** crash→self-heal is the weakest sub-claim (P5-REST is mid-backup) |
 | Box survives a **site/network change** (relocation, different subnet, DHCP re-lease) with the control plane intact | agent, controller, bootstrap | **PARTIAL** | `audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` — a real relocation of the demo box: guest + hub telemetry + WG/PBS + Cloudflare tunnel all survived untouched, but the **controller↔agent control plane did not** (agent binds a LAN literal → `bind: cannot assign requested address` → storage/PBS-backup/quiesce/restore-test/DR down until fixed). Mitigated for the window by pinning `vmbr0` static | **R-50** (island-bridge control plane, spike-first) is the durable fix. Related: **R-51** (dead-primary alerting) and **R-52** (boot desired-state reconciliation) — the same event left two apps `Exited` with no alarm and no recovery |
 | Soft-quota: usage bar, pre-push enlargement block, customer notification | controller v0.109/134, hub v0.41/55 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | 6D/6E; hub OffsiteChecker | |
-| **A customer (not the operator) performs a restore via UI alone** | all | **MISSING** (as evidence) | — | Alpha will produce this; script it into R-3. **2026-07-19:** the C6 evidence attempt ran and found a **product gap instead of evidence** — `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`. A customer-driven UI restore of a DB-indexed app cannot currently succeed (R-43 file-only restore, R-44 stale dump), so this row cannot flip until those close. Row stays MISSING **by finding, not by absence of attempt** — the rehearsal system working, not failing. **2026-07-19: the blocking product gaps are CLOSED in controller v0.148.0** (R-43 + R-44 shipped), so this row is now blocked only on the evidence run itself, not on missing capability. It flips the moment the §9 acceptance produces screenshots + the outcome flash + a snapshot ID. **2026-07-19 round 2 — PARTIAL EVIDENCE ONLY, row NOT flipped** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`): a deliberate run from snapshot `49e7cb46` did recover all 11 assets (`status=active`, files resolve), but the operation **reported failure** and left immich reporting schema drift, because the replay aborted against the running app (H4). Photos back ≠ clean acceptance. Blocked on H4 closing in v0.149, then one clean run. Method note for R-3's script: deleting in an app's own UI usually means *trash*, not deletion, so a drill written that way merges 0 files, flashes success and proves nothing — a real drill must empty the trash **and** verify the app's *content*, not the file count |
+| **A customer (not the operator) performs a restore via UI alone** | all | **MISSING** (as evidence) | — | Alpha will produce this; script it into R-3. **2026-07-19:** the C6 evidence attempt ran and found a **product gap instead of evidence** — `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`. A customer-driven UI restore of a DB-indexed app cannot currently succeed (R-43 file-only restore, R-44 stale dump), so this row cannot flip until those close. Row stays MISSING **by finding, not by absence of attempt** — the rehearsal system working, not failing. **2026-07-19: the blocking product gaps are CLOSED in controller v0.148.0** (R-43 + R-44 shipped), so this row is now blocked only on the evidence run itself, not on missing capability. It flips the moment the §9 acceptance produces screenshots + the outcome flash + a snapshot ID. **2026-07-19 round 2 — PARTIAL EVIDENCE ONLY, row NOT flipped** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`): a deliberate run from snapshot `49e7cb46` did recover all 11 assets (`status=active`, files resolve), but the operation **reported failure** and left immich reporting schema drift, because the replay aborted against the running app (H4). Photos back ≠ clean acceptance. **2026-07-20: H4 is closed in controller v0.153.0 (R-47) — on BOTH paths**, so this row is blocked solely on one clean acceptance run. *(The "closing in v0.149" wording above was wrong — v0.149.0 was the F3 dashboard fix; R-47 shipped in v0.153.0.)* Method note for R-3's script: deleting in an app's own UI usually means *trash*, not deletion, so a drill written that way merges 0 files, flashes success and proves nothing — a real drill must empty the trash **and** verify the app's *content*, not the file count |
 
 ## D. Storage & devices
 

documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
 | R-44 | **[P2-HIGH] A manual offsite push ships an unrefreshed DB dump — "backed up now" is false for the DB half.** `offboxRunHandler` → `RunOffboxBackup` goes straight to the restic push and never calls `RunDBDumps` / `captureAllRecoveryUnits` (`controller/internal/web/offbox_handlers.go:203-227`, `backup/offbox.go:574-759`); the recovery unit merely **enumerates** existing dump filenames via `listFileNames`, never creates them (`backup/recovery_unit.go:105-106`). Dumps come only from the separate local `db-dump` daily at **02:30** (`cmd/controller/main.go:542`), with the scheduled offsite at 04:15 — so a *manual* run at any other hour ships a dump up to ~24 h old. **There is no freshness check and no RPO surface anywhere:** zero `RPO` hits across `controller/`; `offboxUnitTime` is only a two-drive tiebreak (`offbox.go:827-837`); the `DBValidationCache` exists (`backup.go:364-370`) but no offsite or restore path reads it. | S–M | **SHIPPED controller v0.148.0 (2026-07-19)** | **SHIPPED:** every offsite run — **manual AND nightly** — now refreshes the DB/volume dumps and recovery units (`offsitePreDump` → `runDBDumpsInternal`) BEFORE the restic capture, so each snapshot is an internally coherent `{DB@T, files@T}` bundle and retention becomes a history of restorable points. Order is the mechanism and is red-proofed (moving the capture first yields `[capture dump]`): the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never remove one it does. This also makes the nightly ordering **structural** rather than a coincidence of two scheduler entries at 02:30 and 04:15. Each unit manifest carries `offsite_run_id` + `dumps_at`, so a pair's coherence is verifiable at restore time instead of assumed; the periodic refresh carries a prior stamp forward and never invents one. A dump-leg failure is a loud WARN that does NOT abort the push (data-first: a degraded backup beats none). Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: an unstamped pre-v0.148 pair reports its skew in the confirm, and `ValidateDump` gained an **exact-match** accounts-table sniff for customer-empty dumps (a substring match on "user" would flag `user_metadata`/`album_user`/`user_audit` on every healthy single-user box — red-proofed). — **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`.** Today's unit dump `immich-postgres.sql` (51 954 452 B, mtime **02:30 CEST**) probed to **`asset: 0 rows`, `user: 0 rows`, `album: 0 rows`** — the 52 MB is entirely immich's shipped `geodata_places`/`naturalearth_countries` reference data. It predates both the admin user (created 07:56:25) and the photos (07:57). Same for the unit's `immich_immich_postgres_data.tar` (323 MB, also 02:30). **A dump that looks substantial by size can contain zero customer content** — size is not a health signal, and nothing in the product says otherwise. **Latent hazard:** had a full restore actually loaded that dump it would have written an empty DB over the live one, destroying the trashed rows that were the only surviving recovery path. Direction: dump-before-push on manual runs (the honest fix), **or** an explicit RPO line in the UI („adatbázis-állapot: <dump time>") so the operator/customer can see what they are actually shipping. Cheap interim: surface dump mtime + row-count sanity from the existing `DBValidationCache` on `/backups/restore` |
 | R-45 | **[P2] Unified async-job feedback.** Every long operation invents its own progress surface, or none. Tonight produced three more one-off cards (v0.147.x: samba bring-up, offsite progress, restore result) on top of two existing patterns (deploy 3-step panel; storage-init/netstorage status poll). They agree on nothing: some use `{ok,data}` envelopes and some raw JSON, some poll 1 s / 1.5 s / 3 s, some are in-memory-only and lie after a restart, and each re-implements single-flight + snapshot + phase→Hungarian mapping. | M | idea | Origin: 2026-07-19 feedback slice 1 (controller v0.147.0). The cases to generalise from are all in-tree: `web/storage_init_job.go` (the best shape — acquire/release/set/snapshot), `web/netstorage_job.go`, `web/samba_ensure_job.go`, `backup/opstatus.go`, `backup/offbox_progress.go`. Shape: one job registry + one poll endpoint + one client-side renderer, phases declared per job. **Two lessons tonight that any framework must encode:** (1) a terminal state must be **probed, not inferred** — `compose up -d` exits 0 on a crash-loop; (2) a progress source that reports nothing is normal, not broken — restic reports 0 bytes for a whole incremental run, and a bar that sits at 0% is worse than no bar. Also fixes the restart hole: in-memory job state currently vanishes and the card silently disagrees with reality  **2026-07-20 — the first bill for NOT having this arrived, and it was customer-facing.** The samba card's poll (`web/samba_ensure_job.go` + `sharing.html`) mixed a job EDGE and a service LEVEL on one JSON field, and `/sharing` reload-looped at ~1.2 s for every customer with sharing enabled until controller v0.151.0 (`audits/DIAG-sharing-2026-07-20.md`, S-1/S-4). v0.151.0 fixed THAT card's contract only — the framework is still this item. **Third lesson for it to encode, beside the two already listed:** a phase a client answers with a one-shot action must be an EDGE the registry SERVES ONCE, and must never be synthesised from a level; if it can be re-read, it will be re-acted on. |
 | R-46 | **[P2] Verification copies need a customer-visible browse surface and an expiry.** v0.147.0 made them *visible* (listed with path/size/date, individually deletable) — but the customer still cannot LOOK INSIDE a verification restore to confirm the file they wanted is really there, which is the entire point of a verification restore, and nothing ever removes them. | S–M | idea | Origin: 2026-07-19 feedback slice 4a, registered as the explicit follow-up to it. Two gaps, deliberately designed together because they are the same object: (a) **the invisible-result gap** — a read-only browse of `backups/offsite-restore/<app>` (the FileBrowser infra stack already exists and already serves scoped roots, so this may be a mount rather than new code); (b) **the disk-lifecycle gap** — auto-expiry after N days with the count/size surfaced before it fires, so a drive is never quietly filled by verification restores nobody remembers taking. Pairs with R-43: a browse surface is also how a customer would discover that a DB-indexed app's files came back but the app still cannot see them |
-| R-47 | **[P2-HIGH] The DB replay races the application's own schema repair — a restore can abort half-applied.** The reconstitution starts the stack BEFORE replaying (ImportDump needs a live container), which hands the app a window to recreate schema objects the dump is about to create. Proven to the second on 2026-07-19: controller began the replay 10:58:25, **immich-server logged `Reindexing clip_index` → `Reindexed clip_index` at 10:58:33**, and the dump's own `CREATE INDEX clip_index` failed at 10:58:35 with `already exists` (exit 3, `ON_ERROR_STOP=1`). immich then reported **schema drift** — the indexes the aborted script never reached. | M | idea | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md` (H4, live on demo-felhom).** The photos survived only because `pg_dump` emits COPY data BEFORE CREATE INDEX, so the abort landed after the rows — **that ordering is luck, not design**: a collision earlier in the script aborts before the data and leaves a genuinely half-restored database, reported identically. **Class defect, not offsite-only:** the same start-then-replay shape is on the LOCAL path (`RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` → `RecreateStackFromUnit` → `reimportDBDumpsCtx`), so the local restore carries the same race. Direction (NOT decided — needs a spec): bring up the DB container alone for the replay and start the app only afterwards, or quiesce the app's schema management for the duration. Note `--clean --if-exists` + `ON_ERROR_STOP=1` are both CORRECT and should stay — the bug is the window, not the flags. Blocks the §9 acceptance and therefore the customer-restore map row |
+| R-47 | **[P2-HIGH] The DB replay races the application's own schema repair.** | M | **SHIPPED — controller v0.153.0, 2026-07-20** | Fixed on **BOTH** paths (it was a class defect, not an offsite-only one): offsite `ReconstituteFromOffsite` AND local `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` now open a **DB-only window** — `appbackup.DBServiceNames` names the database SERVICE from the compose `services:` map, `stacks.Manager.StartStackServices` brings up only that service, the dump is replayed with the application still stopped, and the full start runs only after the replay exits 0. **Fail-closed:** a `.sql` dump with no identifiable DB service refuses BEFORE the first mutation. Every exit from the window (replay failure, DB-only start failure) still does a best-effort full start, so a failed restore never leaves a box with a database and no application. `--clean --if-exists` + `ON_ERROR_STOP=1` untouched — the bug was the window, not the flags. Enablers: `RedeployFromEnv` split into `PersistUnitRedeployConfig` + its unchanged tail; `StackDataProvider.RecreateStackFromUnit` → `RecreateStackDefinitionFromUnit` (the hidden `up -d` inside the old name is what carried the defect locally). **No agent coupling — MinAgent stays 0.90.0.** 19 tests + 3 red-proofs, 23/23 green. Unblocks the capability-map **offsite-restore (PARTIAL)** and **customer-restore (MISSING)** rows, both of which now await only one clean acceptance run. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md` (H4) |
 | R-48 | **[P2-HIGH] Restore controls are separable only by layout — and the difference between them is whether the data comes back.** The offsite restore row renders four buttons plus hint text into an overlapping, unreadable line, and the decisive second step („Teljes visszaállítás indítása") appears ONLY after „…előkészítése" was pressed, with no signposting that a second step exists or that the first one did nothing to live data. | M | idea | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md` (finding 1) — this is not theoretical: it is the CAUSE of the round-2 incident.** An operator who had read the code pressed the missing-only button instead of the full restore; the controller log shows `/backup/offbox/reconstitute` was never hit at all. The rule this establishes, worth stating once and applying beyond this page: **two adjacent controls whose difference is "your data comes back" vs "your data cannot come back" must not be distinguishable only by layout.** Direction (ruled in principle, spec rides v0.149): collapse to a single „Visszaállítás…" guided dialog — one intent, visible phases, the escrow-wizard precedent. Pairs with R-45 (the phases are exactly the async-feedback surface) and R-46 |
 | R-49 | **[P2] The offsite capture set is ~90% cache and duplication — 1.1 GB of a 1.2 GB immich "photo backup".** Measured 2026-07-19: `immich_ml_cache.tar` **823 660 032 B (~60%)** — re-downloadable ML model weights; `immich_postgres_data.tar` **308 251 136 B (~23%)** — a raw tar of the postgres data dir that DUPLICATES the logical `.sql` dump captured beside it; `upload/backups/` **18 MB** — immich's own nightly dump, a backup inside the backup, growing daily; plus the stranded pre-v3 `dccc13fe…` tree (~36 MB) no DB has ever referenced. Actual irreplaceable content: **72 MB of originals**. | S–M | idea | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md` §4 (full byte breakdown).** This is the customer's offsite quota and transfer cost, and it lands on the Hetzner sub-account they are billed for. **Recorded, deliberately not changed** — a capture-set exclusion is a data-loss-shaped decision and gets its own ruling, not a drive-by edit. Candidates in priority order: (a) `immich_ml_cache` — pure cache, strongest case; (b) the `postgres_data` volume tar where a logical dump of the same DB is already captured (the dump is what the restore path actually replays); (c) `upload/backups/`. Likely generalises past immich into a template-classification rule about cache volumes and self-backup directories, so it should be specified against the catalog, not one app |