burn-down night: ctrl-c lane recorded — R-578, R-576, R-488, R-325 closed; R-569/R-492/R-574 on controller main (193 -> 189)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 2m4s

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-05 22:32:27 +02:00
parent 4372b46b44
commit 8e1cef8f8b
3 changed files with 21 additions and 7 deletions
@@ -62,3 +62,10 @@ cherry-picks onto `main`, writes CHANGELOG, closes rows, pushes and watches CI.
| R-615 | fixed on controller main | 20 | controller `0b349e2` |
| R-25 | fixed on controller main | 20 | controller `1355391` |
| (hub, no row) | fixed: Docker set first-seen stamped on the tick; flaky page test on a fixed clock | 25 | felhom.eu `6f78bd9f` |
| R-578 | fixed and closed (test only) | 40 | controller `9271f33` |
| R-569 | fixed on controller main | 35 | controller `d15ad10` |
| R-492 | fixed on controller main | 35 | controller `7b8216a` |
| R-576 | fixed and closed (gate) | 35 | controller `074ddda` |
| R-574 | fixed on controller main | 30 | controller `391967b` |
| R-488 | fixed and closed (tests 444 s → 2 s; a real ssh from a test removed) | 60 | controller `8ce496f` |
| R-325 | fixed and closed (both halves; drift check kept — one line why in the row) | 25 | controller `daeed27` |
+11
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,17 @@
---
## 2026-10-05 (night) — the burn-down night: controller tooling and tests
The full text of every row below: `git show 4372b46b:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`.
| Row | What | Closed | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **R-578** | **[P3-LOW] A helper that takes the settings lock must never be called from inside a settings callback — there is no gate, only one test in one package.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — FIXED (the burn-down night): the deadlock guard covers every controller package | controller `9271f33`: `TestR578NothingTakesTheSettingsLockInsideASettingsCallback` (internal/settings) derives the lock-taking `*Settings` methods and every helper reaching one from source, per package, and names file:line for any call inside an `UpdateOffboxStatus`/`UpdateCrossDriveStatus` callback; decoy test; red-proof: planted `m.note` (backup/offbox.go) and `GetLanguage()` (web/offbox_handlers.go) were both named. Test only — no release needed. |
| **R-325** | **The shared copy vocabulary is imported by ONE of its two consumers, and drift-checked into the other.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — FIXED (the burn-down night): one stem list, imported by both consumers | controller `daeed27`: `retrieval_promise_gate.py` imports `RETRIEVAL_STEMS` from `felhom.eu/scripts/customer_copy_vocab.py` (CI clones felhom.eu beside the controller, `.gitea/workflows/gates.yml`); absent or empty = INCONCLUSIVE, never a pass; two decoys. felhom.eu `7ee00d59`: `hub_copy_gate.py`'s drift check reads „ok — single source”. **The drift check is KEPT, against the row's „delete it”:** it now convicts a stale literal re-added beside the import — a second copy coming back is the R-299 defect, and the check is the only thing that would see it. |
| **R-488** | **[P3-LOW] `go test ./internal/backup` takes 5½ minutes: 89 off-site tests wait on real clocks.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — FIXED (the burn-down night): `go test ./internal/backup` 444 s → ~2 s | controller `8ce496f`: `waitForHealthy`'s clock (3 s / 5 s / 90 s) is three package vars, production values pinned by `TestR488_HealthWaitDefaultsAreProduction`, shortened once in the package `TestMain`. **Found on the way:** `TestOffbox_ConfirmedReset` spawned a real `ssh felhom@nas.local` from DooPlex (10 s timeout) — now a failing SSH fake. Test only. |
| **R-576** | **[P3-LOW] `i18n_go_parity.py` cannot see a call site that LOST text; it only checks that the text a key carries is real.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — FIXED (the burn-down night): the parity gate judges the call too | controller `074ddda`: `scripts/i18n_go_parity.py` checks ARITY (argument count = printf verbs of the key's Hungarian value; spread calls skipped) and NO-CONCAT (a key literal is never an operand of `+`); 485 calls judged, none convicted; three decoys (dropped argument and key+suffix convict; nested parentheses pass). Tooling — live on push. |
## 2026-10-05 (night) — the burn-down night: gate fixes
The full text of every row below: `git show 86def579:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`.
+3 -7
View File
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R-578** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A helper that takes the settings lock must never be called from inside a settings callback — there is no gate, only one test in one package.** FOUND 2026-09-18 the hard way, by localisation slice 2 release C introducing exactly that: `UpdateOffboxStatus` holds the settings WRITE lock while it runs its callback, `boxLang()` reads the language through the READ lock, and `sync.RWMutex` is not reentrant — so the off-site run's final status write DEADLOCKED, **holding the settings lock**, which would wedge everything else on that box that touches `settings.json`. The only symptom was `go test ./internal/backup/` going from 8 minutes to a 25-minute timeout. Fixed by hoisting the language resolution; `TestNoteHelpersAreNotCalledUnderTheSettingsLock` (internal/backup) now names the file and line in a second. **What is still open:** that test covers `internal/backup` only, and it knows only the `note`/`noteErr`/`boxLang` helpers. Any other settings-reading helper, in any other package, can make the same mistake with nothing to catch it but a hang. **Fix shape:** promote it to a gate over every package, keyed on "a call to a method that reads settings, inside a literal passed to a `settings.Update*` function"; or give `Settings` a re-entrant read path and remove the class. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
| **R-733** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The test bench has NO swap and the boxes have 512 MiB — so a box proof can pass on swap where the bench fails, and nobody records whether a customer guest has swap.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 (R-732): immich's first start was OOM-killed 61–104 times on the bench (swap 0) and passed on 9202 by swapping ~108 MB; the bench given 512 MiB swap passed too. demo-hp 9201, 9202 and demo-felhom 9201 all read `swap: 512`; the golden's guest config is not recorded in its bake evidence, so a customer guest's swap is NOT measured. The harness's memory watch judges `anon` against the limit and never reads `memory.swap.current`. **Needs:** the golden's `swap` read and recorded; the box walk and the harness report `memory.swap.peak` beside `anon`; a decision whether proofs run with swap off (the stricter venue, as R-732's fix was proven). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (harness + golden evidence)** | — | — | CC |
| **R-887** | Process & tooling | P3 | **Some CI jobs are never run, and Gitea fails them ~10–13 minutes later with no log.** Seen 2026-10-05: felhom.eu job 1361 (commit `1122b5c`) and felhom-controller job 1357 (`114ff27`): every step reads `failure`, including the first fetch, the log API answers `file does not exist`, and the runner pod's log has no `task` line for them (its task ids are job id + 1). A re-run through the API ran the controller job normally (success in 32 s) but the felhom.eu job was again never picked up and failed after ~12 min. The runner pod (`gitea-system/act-runner`, image `felhom-act-runner:0.1.0`) had restarted 5 times ~142 min earlier, around the Longhorn instance-manager restart (R-882). Suspected, NOT measured: a stale runner registration claims jobs it never runs — the session's Gitea token cannot list runners (`read:admin` scope). Consequence: a red CI verdict that is not about the code, and **no failure mail** (the alarm step never runs either), so only the pull check sees it. **CORRECTED 2026-10-05 18:21 (operator's screenshot of Gitea → Site Administration → Runners): ONE runner only — ID 2, `felhom-gates-runner`, v0.6.1, label `felhom-gates`, Idle, last online „now". There is no old registration; the stale-registration guess (this row's first text and the reviewer's) was WRONG.** **RE-DIAGNOSED 2026-10-05 (round 2), from the logs that survive:** (1) **„lost in a runner restart" does NOT fit** — the runner pod last restarted 13:24:42Z (`restartCount 5`, all around the 13:20Z Longhorn restart), the lost attempts started 1.5–2.5 h later. (2) **FOUR attempts were lost, not two:** controller job 1357 (start 15:05:41Z → failed 15:18:38Z), felhom.eu job 1359 (15:15:37 → 15:28:38 — the previous session blamed that one on the BusyBox fault; the runner never ran it), job 1361 (15:33:21 → 15:43:38) and its API re-run (15:46:48 → 15:58:38). None has a `task` line in the runner log; every one was failed at a :38-second mark on a 5-minute step, 10–13 min after it was handed out — **the shape of Gitea's periodic „zombie task" stop** (a task assigned to a runner that never reports is failed after ~10 min; no log exists because none was written). (3) The runner's task ids are NOT job id + 1 (the controller re-run was task 1363). (4) **Gitea's own log for the window is gone** — the pod log starts 16:16:32Z (rotated), so the assignment side cannot be read. **Likely mechanism, NOT proven:** the runner's fetch-task request timed out on its side after Gitea had already assigned the task, so the task was orphaned. In that same hour this session polled Gitea's jobs API hard (15 pages every 15 s per wait loop) and Gitea logged „slow" requests — a plausible load cause, and the session's own. Mitigation taken: the session's CI waiter now polls once a minute. **Nothing changed on DooPlex.** **MECHANISM SEEN 2026-10-05 17:15–17:28Z, with Gitea's own log (round 2):** catalog run 1368 (`4828dc7`) — 17:15:14 the job is marked started; 17:15:16 `router: slow POST /api/actions/runner.v1.RunnerService/FetchTask for 10.42.0.42 (the runner), elapsed 3192ms`, then `UpdateRepoRunsNumbers … context canceled` and `GetActionWorkflow: EOF` — **the runner abandoned its fetch after Gitea had assigned the task**; the runner log has no line for task 1371; 17:28:39 `actions/clear_tasks.go:174 stopTasks() [W] Cannot transfer logs of task 1371` — Gitea's zombie-task stop. **The load at that minute:** an outside crawler (216.73.216.78) walking commit pages and `archive/*.tar.gz`, and THIS session's CI waiter, whose 15-page job listings took 13–31 s each. An API re-run passed in 7 s. **Done in-session:** the waiter now asks `GET …/actions/runs?head_sha=<sha>` once a minute (1 s). **Not done (DooPlex, the operator's):** the runner's fetch timeout and Gitea's exposure to the crawler. | **OPEN** **DATED CHECK 2026-10-12 (DUE-CHECKS):** if no job was lost since 2026-10-05 16:00Z (no completed job whose runner log has no `task` line / whose log API answers `file does not exist`), close. | — | Operator: decide whether to raise the act-runner fetch timeout and/or rate-limit the public Gitea pages the crawler walks; meanwhile re-run a lost job via `POST /repos/admin/<repo>/actions/runs/<id>/rerun`. Keep the 2026-10-12 check | operator |
| **R-206** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The build-cache cap and the weekly prune exist only as a hand-edited `/etc/docker/daemon.json` on DooPlex — not in Ansible, so a rebuild loses them.** The `node_housekeeping` role must also carry the prune, which today it is forbidden to run | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | **The spike validated the recipe; this row builds it.** Three parts. **(a) Template `/etc/docker/daemon.json`** with the **`policy` array** form — **the flat form (`{"gc":{"reservedSpace":…}}`) is SILENTLY IGNORED**, measured: the daemon starts, logs nothing, and `docker buildx inspect` still reports the built-in defaults. **The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`, never `dockerd --validate`** — the validator returned `configuration OK` for a bogus key AND for the config that then **crashed the daemon** (`filter` takes one value per policy entry, not an array; `error initializing buildkit: filters expect only one value`). **(b) Narrow the role's Docker ban** (`node-housekeeping.sh.j2:10-14`) to permit exactly `docker builder prune -af` and nothing else — the ban's stated premise ("Docker here runs only unrelated jarr-* dev containers") is obsolete: the growth is Felhom Go build cache. **The measured prune is SYNCHRONOUS** (150.35 GB back at t+0, two consecutive polls <1 MB apart within 60 s) — **unlike containerd's image GC, so it needs no `settle_imagefs` equivalent**, but it MUST measure the filesystem rather than trust the command: `prune` claimed **156.9 GB** and the filesystem returned **150.35 GB**, the 6.5 GB gap being layers still shared with images. **(c) A restart-safety note in the role:** a bad `daemon.json` takes the daemon down AND leaves the `unless-stopped` dev containers stopped — they needed a manual `docker start` — so the role must restart-and-verify, not validate-and-assume. Recipe + every measurement: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` | CC |
@@ -334,20 +333,17 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-230** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Three instruction/memory follow-ups deliberately left by the part-2 session (2026-08-06), each needing a decision rather than an implementation.** (a) **A ruling is owed on auto-written staleness.** The hand-written `CLAUDE.md` files are now clean of version literals and expired blocks — the gate enforces it — but `MEMORY.md`, which Claude writes and which is the LARGER half of what loads (8.4k tokens vs the root file's 6.6k), carries **21 lines with component version literals**, **5 with bare host addresses**, and an entry still reading *"demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02"* — the same expired-TEMPORARY class the gate was built to kill, now surviving in the one file the gate's content rules do not cover. **Partly actioned 2026-08-06 (close-out), and the ruling is STILL OWED:** the **three statements that were actively false** were corrected — `R-193 decision open` (closed 2026-08-05), `demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02` (the box answers on the home LAN), `OPEN R-25b` (shipped 2026-07-21) — and gate check 6 now **WARNs** on version literals, host addresses, expired statements and stale-open citations in the index. WARN, never FAIL: Claude writes that file between sessions, so a hard failure would refuse a human's push over a line no human typed, and the warning is read by the model that will next edit it. **The remaining 32 version literals and 4 host addresses were deliberately left** for that loop. What is still owed is the bulk-correction ruling. **Correcting the premise:** the earlier report's "three expired statements" were all FALSE POSITIVES — each matched an ISO date inside a markdown link target, i.e. a filename — while the one real expired claim carried no ISO date at all. (b) **CLOSED 2026-08-06 (close-out)** — the workspace-root `CLAUDE.md` **is now a relative symlink** to the versioned copy, so the divergence class is gone rather than policed. Check 5 learned two shapes: for a link it asserts the target resolves to a real file (**a dangling link is worse than a diverged copy — the instructions load NOTHING and there is no content left to notice is wrong**), for two files byte-identity as before, so a clone elsewhere is unaffected. **Proven, not assumed:** three fresh sessions logged `session_start` for the link path, and a fourth **with no tools at all** quoted standing rule 1 verbatim — the content reaches the model, not just the path. (c) **The spec-as-failing-test pilot**, approved in principle and not started (was R-229(d)). | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
| **R-288** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The capability map is too long to be read, and that is why it stops being true.** `architecture/00-capability-map.md` is **134 642 bytes / 19 456 words across 99 table rows in only 159 lines** — because the rows ARE the length. Measured, longest first: the unaided-recovery-journey row is **3 024 words**, the offsite-password-recovery row **1 087**, the unattended-restore-proof row **971**, the app/guest-network-failure row **904**. That single longest row is a novella of nested corrections, each appended rather than resolved. Its own verification stamp reads **2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip `4b18cc5`** (line 23) — three weeks stale, which is the measurable consequence: nobody re-reads a row they cannot finish. **This is the project's memory, so restructuring it is surgery and wants daylight** — filed, deliberately not attempted in the 2026-08-09 session. **What the shape should probably be:** one line of status per capability plus a dated evidence pointer, with the argument moved to the audit it came from | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Do not fold this into another session; it needs its own. **SECOND CONCRETE COST, 2026-08-10 — and it is a different failure mode from the first.** An *execution record* — 33 package deletions on the operator's rule — was undiscoverable for two days because it lives **inside the row about the Configuration page being slow**. Two sessions searched for it: one reported "no register row records a package prune", the other exhausted the Gitea logs, the activity feed and the schema before concluding it might be unestablishable. It was in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` the whole time. **The first cost (2026-08-09) was two records that looked contradictory and were not; this one is a record that could not be found at all.** Illegibility now has two measured costs and they are different in kind: prose rows make claims ambiguous, and rows-about-other-things make facts unfindable. **The rule this earns is in CONTEXT.md: a record that lives inside a row about something else has not been recorded** | Viktor |
| **R-290** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Most capability-map rows that back a green dot cite no evidence document at all — measured, 20 of 28 probed.** The page's *Walked* means *"done end to end on real hardware, evidence on file"*. Extracting the evidence column for the 28 rows behind the page's claims found a `tests/` or `audits/` path in **8**; the other 20 carry prose only. **Consequence, applied this session:** of 32 claims the page drew as Walked, **12 were downgraded to Built** because no walk document exists for them — `install.installer-by-tag`, `use.lifecycle`, `drives.enrol`, `drives.migrate`, `backup.tier1`, `backup.whole-machine`, `backup.restore-proof`, `fault.selfheal`, `fault.operator-email`, `fail.drive-filling`, `fail.lost-recovery-code`, `fail.hub-down`. **This is not a claim that those twelve are false** — several are near-certainly fine — it is a claim that nothing on file distinguishes them from an opinion, which is exactly what the status word promises. **The gate now enforces it going forward:** `scripts/check_stands.py` fails on `status: walked` with no `evidence:` source. **What is owed:** either a walk document per row, or an honest demotion in the map itself (the map is the source; the dataset only follows it) | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | R-288 | The dataset was corrected; **the capability map itself still says PROVEN-LIVE for these rows** and is the thing to fix | Viktor |
| **R-325** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The shared copy vocabulary is imported by ONE of its two consumers, and drift-checked into the other.** `customer_copy_vocab.py` is the single list; `hub_copy_gate.py` imports it. **`felhom-controller/controller/scripts/retrieval_promise_gate.py` still carries its own `STEMS` literal**, because the session that created the shared module was under a hard end-state requirement to leave `felhom-controller` untouched — its target box was being re-deployed the same evening. **Two copies of a word list is not a theoretical risk in this project: it is the R-299 defect exactly**, where a guard asserted one inflection of a Hungarian verb and the plural walked past it. **So the gap is instrumented rather than left open: `hub_copy_gate.py` READS the controller gate's `STEMS` and FAILS if the two disagree** — single-source semantics tonight without a cross-repo edit. **Watched failing:** removing one stem from the shared list produced *"the shared vocabulary is no longer shared"* with both lists printed, and restoring it returned the gate to green. An ABSENT sibling clone is **INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never a pass** — the G-1 lesson. **This is a scaffold, not the destination** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-13, RANK 3** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): felhom.eu half on `main`** (`7ee00d59`: `hub_copy_gate.py` accepts the controller gate importing the shared list). Left: the controller gate imports it; then delete the drift check. | R-299, R-324 | Make `retrieval_promise_gate.py` import `felhom.eu/scripts/customer_copy_vocab.py` and delete its own literal — a felhom-controller change of a few lines, needing no bake (a gate is not shipped code). Then the drift check becomes redundant and should be removed with it, rather than left as a second mechanism nobody re-reads | CC |
| **R-327** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The standing picture still describes a defect that has been fixed twice over.** Found by the first run of `unproven.py` (R-326), which is the argument for having built it. `where-felhom-stands.yaml`'s `claim.code-naming` is `status: partial` and its title reads *"The same word is used for two different secrets across three surfaces; the email points at a page a rebuilt machine does not show"* — **both halves of which are now false.** The box side shipped 2026-08-10 (R-295), the hub half and the page-naming fix on 2026-08-13 (R-295 hub, new `reenroll` mail kind), and the third near-homograph on 2026-08-13 (R-323). **NOT MOVED BY THIS SESSION, deliberately and by the dataset's own rule:** *"A status may not be RAISED here — if the evidence supports a stronger status than the capability map records, the MAP changes first and this file follows it."* Raising it here would be the exact inversion the file's header forbids, and the map edit is a separate judgement about what "walked" means for a naming change that no customer has yet met | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-13, RANK 4** | R-295, R-323, R-326 | Decide the capability-map status for the naming arc, then let the dataset follow it. **Note the honest difficulty: no customer has typed „Tulajdonosi jelmondat” yet**, so `walked` would be an over-claim; `built` is probably right, and the title needs rewriting either way because it describes a defect rather than a capability | operator + CC |
| **R-377** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`CONTEXT.md`'s standing rulings are 188 KB in one section with no sub-headings, and that is why nobody reads them.** Measured 2026-08-22: `CONTEXT.md` is 217 KB, of which **187,913 bytes — 86% — is a single `## Standing rulings` section** carrying 39 `S-` ids and 153 bullets under **one** heading. **This session deliberately did NOT compress or split it**, and the reason is the ruling itself: `PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md` §3.4 and this file's own contract say the decision log is *dated, never edited afterwards*, and it is the only place that answers *"has this been proposed before, and why did we say no?"* — compressing it destroys exactly that. With no per-ruling delimiter, any mechanical split risks cutting a live ruling from its reason, which is the failure this whole arc is correcting. **So the problem is navigational, not volumetric, and the fix is structural: give each ruling a sub-heading with its `S-` id and date.** Then it can be linked, cited and found without a single word being edited. **13 mentions of SUPERSEDED already sit inside that blob** and cannot be separated from live text safely today. | **OPEN — LOW** | R-369 | Add per-ruling sub-headings only. Do not compress, do not reorder, do not edit any ruling's text. | CC |
| **R-392** | Process & tooling | P4 | **No architecture document covers the two-AI workflow.** `documentation/architecture/` holds eight documents and **all eight cover the product** — topology, host agent, control-plane authorization, hub, off-site connectivity, backup, controller modules, capability map. Nothing records how the Claude.ai / Claude Code split works, what each side owns, how skills and `.claude/rules/` are scoped, or why. **The absence was found by trying to fill the template field, not by a survey:** the task that added the five process skills (2026-08-25) had to name an owning architecture document and could not, and the template requires that be recorded rather than passed over. The exposure today is low — the split is stable and both sides work — but it lives entirely in the operator's head and in chat, which is precisely the shape of a commitment nothing enforces. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Write one architecture document for the agent-tooling layer: which AI owns which artifact class (`TASK-*.md`, `RUNBOOK-*.md`, validation), how skills are scoped and installed, what belongs in a `CLAUDE.md` versus a skill versus a rules file, and the reasoning for each boundary. **The rules themselves already exist** in `skills/felhom-doc-authoring/SKILL.md`; what is missing is the map of who owns what. Do not restate the doc-authoring rules there — point at that skill. | CC |
| **R-394** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`felhom-build-deploy/SKILL.md` is 179 lines, over the 150-line limit its own repo now enforces.** Found 2026-08-25 by `scripts/check_skills.py` on its first run — the over-length was discovered BY the new checker, on the day the limit was written down, which is the checker working as intended. **It is not edited and not trimmed here:** the task that introduced the limit explicitly scoped the four pre-existing skills out, and trimming a build-and-deploy skill without exercising its commands is how a wrong command ships to a live host. **It is a named single-entry exception in `GRANDFATHERED` in `scripts/check_skills.py`, printed as a WARN on every run**, so it cannot fade; a NEW skill over the limit is convicted normally, and growing the set requires editing that file in a commit with a row to name. **The rationale for the limit** — attention thins across the excess, so the lines that matter are not the ones that survive — is in `skills/felhom-doc-authoring/SKILL.md` §5. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Trim `felhom-build-deploy/SKILL.md` under 150 lines in a session that can VERIFY the commands it keeps, then delete its `GRANDFATHERED` entry in the same commit. The likely trim is the per-artifact command blocks moving behind a pointer to the runbooks, keeping the gotchas inline — but that is a judgement for a session with a build to run, not a line-count exercise. | CC |
| **R-421** | Process & tooling | P4 | **THE CLASS: an instrument that matches a LABEL rather than the fact it names — five instances, every one found by accident.** R-410 (a `mkdir` turned the release gate green), R-400 (seven debug controls answering nothing), R-378 (a status word inside a sentence), R-419 (a phrase inside prose, including prose saying the marker was ABSENT), R-94 (a test comparing a constant to itself). **The gates are the machinery that enforces everything else in this project, and they were the one part nothing had ever checked.** The 2026-09-01 decoy sweep read all 29 scripts and fooled **16**. Ten were fixed the same day; four remain with rows (R-422..R-425); six could not be given a plausible decoy and are named. **The shapes, so the next one is cheap to recognise:** (1) name-for-fact — it matches a path or directory NAME while the fact lives inside the file; (2) substring-for-field — it matches a token anywhere in a body instead of in the field that carries it; (3) declaration-for-reachability — it checks a thing is declared, not that it RESOLVES; (4) constant-for-measurement — it compares a value against itself. **The single largest cause was mundane:** eight gates set their SCOPE with `os.listdir` (one level), so every one was green and correct today and would have gone blind the moment anyone added a subdirectory. `decoy_coverage_gate.py` now refuses a new gate that ships without a decoy. | **OPEN — the class row; it stays open as the place the next instance is recorded** | — | — | CC |
| **R-426** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The decoy-coverage exemption list — 20 registered gates that ship WITHOUT a decoy test, each named.** `scripts/decoy_coverage_gate.py`'s `EXEMPT` map is debt, and this row owns it so it lives in the register and not only in a Python literal. **Four kinds:** (a) genuinely covered in the 2026-09-01 sweep but not yet moved into a suite — `hub-copy`, `instructions`, `docker-v`, `image-pins`; (b) blocked by an open hole and therefore un-assertable as rejecting — `site` (R-423), `one-register` (R-424), `offbox-rename` (R-425); (c) shared scripts whose decoy lives in `felhom.eu` and is counted there — `reuse-refs`, `instructions`, `observations` in the controller and agent runners; (d) **no plausible decoy constructed yet** — `hostinstall`, `wire-contract`, `due-checks`, `published`, `image-resolvable`, `volume-persistence`. Group (d) is the honest unknown: six gates whose soundness is UNTESTED, not established. **The list is green today and shrinks; a NEW gate with no decoy fails immediately.** | **OPEN — 20 names; group (d) is six untested gates** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): PARTIAL** (`68df84bc`): the instructions gate's decoy is in the suite; the exemption list is **16** (was 20; wire-contract has decoys now). The row stays open for the 16. | — | — | CC |
| **R-488** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `go test ./internal/backup` takes 5½ minutes: 89 off-site tests wait on real clocks.** MEASURED 2026-09-13 (`-v` timings, run alone: 581 tests, 333 s in total, 89 of them ≥ 1 s — `TestOffbox*`, `TestOffbox3a*`, `TestOffboxRun*`, `TestR4xx*` reconstitute fixtures at 3–8 s each). The controller's per-commit gate is therefore ~6 minutes, most of it sleeping, and two concurrent runs of the package looked like a hang. **Fix shape:** the waits are `waitForHealthy`-style polls and retry back-offs with fixed durations; make them seams the fixtures shorten (the R-457 rule: one clock). Not a correctness defect. **Checked from source 2026-10-05 (burn-down round 2):** The fixed real-clock waits named in the fix shape are unchanged: felhom-controller@114ff27 controller/internal/backup/restore.go:208-227 waitForHealthy has hard-coded `interval := 5 * time.Second` and `time.Sleep(3 * time.Second) // initial settling time`, called from offbox_reconstitute.go:927, tier2_restore.go:443, restore.go:90, restore_unit.go:471. No commit since 2026-09-13 touching internal/backup mentions R-488/test speed. Runtime (333 s) was NOT re-measured here (read-only). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: developer speed only.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-492** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `cfg.Paths.HDDPath` is empty on every box and still has readers; delete it.** R-465 audited its six readers and found every one falling back; R-490 (v0.242.0) gave the last one, `systemInfo`, the same fallback. The global now carries no information on any box and its deletion was deferred twice. **Fix shape:** remove the field, its env binding and the readers' fallback branches; a build proves nothing reads it. Next controller release. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: dead-code cleanup; every reader already falls back correctly.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-492** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `cfg.Paths.HDDPath` is empty on every box and still has readers; delete it.** R-465 audited its six readers and found every one falling back; R-490 (v0.242.0) gave the last one, `systemInfo`, the same fallback. The global now carries no information on any box and its deletion was deferred twice. **Fix shape:** remove the field, its env binding and the readers' fallback branches; a build proves nothing reads it. Next controller release. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: dead-code cleanup; every reader already falls back correctly.** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): FIXED on controller `main`** (`7b8216a`; `cfg.Paths.HDDPath`, its env binding and every fallback removed; an old controller.yaml with the key still loads (`TestR492_OldConfigWithHDDPathStillLoads`)). Ships with the next controller release; close after delivery. | — | — | CC |
| **R-502** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The bootstrap regression harness is run by NO gate and NO CI — and it had never exercised the pairing banner.** MEASURED 2026-09-14: `grep -rn bootstrap-modes scripts/*.py .gitea/workflows` → nothing; the harness is run by hand in `felhom-iso-assistant:trixie`. While adding the R-496 checks, its fake hub's `register` reply turned out to carry no `pairing_code`, so `print_pairing_banner` returned early in every run: the banner that a household reads first had no test at all until ISO v1.27.0. **Fix shape:** register the harness in `repo_gates.py` behind a container-available check that reports INCONCLUSIVE (never skip-as-pass) when docker is absent, with a decoy. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: test harness coverage; no household meets it directly.** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS THE OPERATOR.** The harness runs `docker run`; registered as a gate it would run Docker on DooPlex on every full gate run. Next: an operator word that a non-fast container gate may run there (INCONCLUSIVE without docker; never in --fast — CI has no docker). | — | — | CC |
| **R-507** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The proof-install harness cannot drive the graphical installer, so a release's graphical entry is proven only up to its password screen.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 on VM 332 (ISO 1.27.0): `qm sendkey 332 tab` did not move focus (both password copies landed in one field), `mouse_move 1237 772` + `mouse_button 1` did not move the cursor or press Next, while `alt-n` did advance a page. The TUI entry is fully drivable. The gate's "proof install on BOTH menu entries" was met for 1.26.1 (by a person) and not for 1.27.x. **Fix shape:** measure QEMU `input-send-event` with absolute coordinates, or a VNC client on DooPlex; until then a release's graphical proof is an operator click-through. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: release-test tooling; an operator click-through covers it.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-569** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Four more API handlers pick their status code by matching ENGLISH words in an error — the same shape as R-553, one language over.** FOUND 2026-09-17 while fixing R-553: `controller/internal/api/router.go` matches `"protected"`, `"not found"`, `"not deployed"`, `"still running"`, `"not orphaned"` in `err.Error()` at the stop/start, remove and orphan-cleanup handlers (three separate blocks). These strings are internal English, so localisation does not move them — the risk is a reworded internal error, not a translation, which is why this is P3 and was NOT folded into R-553's release. **Fix shape:** the same `util.KindErrorf` sentinels in `internal/stacks` (`ErrProtectedStack`, `ErrStackNotFound`, `ErrStillRunning`, …), a `statusFor` helper per handler family, and one table test per family passing a reworded message. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: internal robustness; only a future rewording would break it.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-574** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `web/handler_debug.go` mixes page copy with JSON payload, so neither half could be converted safely.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by localisation slice 2 release A (R-557): the file holds 39 Hungarian literals and the inventory classifies them by STATEMENT, not by data flow (`I18N-INVENTORY-2026-09-17.md` §4), so which are section headings the debug page renders and which are values inside a diagnostic dump the operator copies out is not established. Converting a dump value would change what an operator pastes into a report; leaving a heading Hungarian leaves a half-English page. **Fix shape:** walk the file once and label every literal page-copy or payload in the same table slice 2 release A used, then convert only the page-copy half. Belongs to slice 2 release B or C. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: debug page is operator-facing.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-576** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `i18n_go_parity.py` cannot see a call site that LOST text; it only checks that the text a key carries is real.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by localisation slice 2 release B, and found the hard way: the bulk converter silently dropped the continuation of a multi-line concatenation (`fmt.Errorf("a: "+ "b: %s", x)` kept only `"a: "`), damaging **7** producers — and the gate stayed GREEN throughout, because every surviving fragment WAS a byte-equal base-commit literal. Its question ("is this text real?") was answered yes while the CALL had lost half its sentence and its arguments. Two behaviour tests caught it (`TestR356_ScenarioC_UndeployedAppIsStillRefused`, `TestR379_ScenarioA_RollbackSucceeds_AppComesBack`), because they assert the sentence a customer READS. **Fix shape:** the gate learns a second question — for every `util.MsgError("key", …)` call site, the count of its arguments must equal the count of printf verbs in the key's Hungarian value, and no key-naming literal may be adjacent to a `+`. Both are cheap and would have convicted all 7. **The general lesson, worth keeping whatever is built: a structural gate over the TEXT cannot see a defect in the CALL.** | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: gate improvement; tooling only.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-569** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Four more API handlers pick their status code by matching ENGLISH words in an error — the same shape as R-553, one language over.** FOUND 2026-09-17 while fixing R-553: `controller/internal/api/router.go` matches `"protected"`, `"not found"`, `"not deployed"`, `"still running"`, `"not orphaned"` in `err.Error()` at the stop/start, remove and orphan-cleanup handlers (three separate blocks). These strings are internal English, so localisation does not move them — the risk is a reworded internal error, not a translation, which is why this is P3 and was NOT folded into R-553's release. **Fix shape:** the same `util.KindErrorf` sentinels in `internal/stacks` (`ErrProtectedStack`, `ErrStackNotFound`, `ErrStillRunning`, …), a `statusFor` helper per handler family, and one table test per family passing a reworded message. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: internal robustness; only a future rewording would break it.** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): FIXED on controller `main`** (`d15ad10`; the lifecycle handlers pick 404/403/409 by the refusal's KIND via `api.stackOpStatusFor`; message bytes unchanged; tests + red-proof. Side effect stated: an unrelated wrapped error containing „not found” now answers 500, not 404). Ships with the next controller release; close after delivery. | — | — | CC |
| **R-574** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `web/handler_debug.go` mixes page copy with JSON payload, so neither half could be converted safely.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by localisation slice 2 release A (R-557): the file holds 39 Hungarian literals and the inventory classifies them by STATEMENT, not by data flow (`I18N-INVENTORY-2026-09-17.md` §4), so which are section headings the debug page renders and which are values inside a diagnostic dump the operator copies out is not established. Converting a dump value would change what an operator pastes into a report; leaving a heading Hungarian leaves a half-English page. **Fix shape:** walk the file once and label every literal page-copy or payload in the same table slice 2 release A used, then convert only the page-copy half. Belongs to slice 2 release B or C. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: debug page is operator-facing.** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): FIXED on controller `main`** (`391967b`; 38 debug-page literals from the bundle (`debug.api.*`, hu byte-identical, en added); the one payload string stays a literal on purpose; `TestR574_DebugPageCopyFollowsTheLanguage` + red-proof). Ships with the next controller release; close after delivery. | — | — | CC |
| **R-579** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Five page shells loaded `style.css` with NO cache-buster, so a browser holding an older copy kept being served CSS that did not know about the newest UI.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by the operator's screenshot of the v0.254.0 language globe: it rendered as a bare, unstyled `<details>` — a stray triangle and two plain words outside the card — because `login.html`, `claim.html`, `recovery.html`, `launcher_shared.html` and `launcher_share_password.html` requested `/static/style.css` with no `?v=`, while `layout.html` has used `?v={{.Version}}` since v0.166.0. **`.Version` was also absent from three of those five data maps.** FIXED AND CLOSED in the same session (controller v0.255.0): the parameter on all five, and `Version` set once in `executeTemplateLang` so a new shell cannot miss it; `TestGlobeOnAnonymousShells` now refuses an absent or EMPTY `?v=`. **The general form, which is the part worth keeping: a template that loads a versioned asset WITHOUT its version is invisible to every test that reads markup — the markup is correct and the browser fetches the wrong file.** A gate over "every stylesheet/script link in a template carries `?v=`" would catch the class; not built, because 8 first-boot-wizard templates would fail it and R-554 deletes them. | **DEFERRED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the gate "every stylesheet/script link carries `?v=`" was deliberately not built until R-554 deletes the old wizard; nothing else owns it) — **CLOSED 2026-09-18 - controller v0.255.0** | — | — | CC |
| **R-624** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Three of the catalog's apps cannot be seeded by ANY headless route, and for two of them that is a deliberate security decision — so the upgrade harness has a permanent ceiling nobody has written down.** FOUND 2026-09-21 while widening R-462 from 3 apps to <N>. **`vaultwarden` and `zipline` close self-registration ON PURPOSE** — vaultwarden by `SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=false` (R-512, *„a stranger who guesses vault.<domain> must not be able to register"*), zipline by answering `E1037: User registration is disabled` — and neither ships a CLI that could make an account instead. So there is no route to a first account without the admin secret, and **that is correct**: the harness must not be the reason a customer-facing app accepts strangers. **`gitea` is a different and fixable case:** the template sets no `INSTALL_LOCK`, so a fresh instance sits in its web-installer state and `gitea admin user create` refuses (`MustInstalled() [F] Unable to load config file for a installed Gitea instance`); POSTing the installer form first would work and was simply not written tonight. **Why this is a row rather than three notes:** `09` §3 decision 6 says the upgrade test goes to **all** apps, and R-462 is costed as if every app is reachable given enough fixture work. It is not. There is a class — *apps whose only account-creating route the catalog deliberately closes* — for which the honest maximum is `inconclusive` unless the harness is given the app's admin secret at deploy time, which is a decision nobody has taken. **Needs:** the class named in R-462's scope so the remaining count is honest; a decision on whether the harness may hold an app's admin secret (it already holds the ones IT generates — see R-619); and, separately and cheaply, a gitea installer-form fixture. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/apps/{vaultwarden,zipline,gitea}/verdict.json`. **— NIGHT 2026-09-23:** `gitea` stayed inconclusive on both venues (its installer); `vaultwarden`/`zipline` not attempted (closed sign-up, by design); `code-server`, `outline`, `rallly` have no front-door seed route (listed, not moved); `bentopdf`, `glance`, `crafty-controller`, `wger`, `wanderer` (meilisearch) and `uptime-kuma` have no fixture tonight (listed, not moved). **-- 2026-09-30: the ceiling was WRONG for three of the six named apps.** outline has a front-door first-run route (`POST /api/installation.create` — its self-hosted setup, refused once a team exists), rallly signs up through its own better-auth API with the e-mail code read from its own table in place of a mailbox, and zipline 4's first-run route is `POST /api/setup` (the fixture had tried `/api/auth/register` and `/api/auth/setup`, which are not it). Fixtures for outline and rallly are in `upgrade_fixtures_box.py` and both apps moved on both venues; zipline's fixture now tries `/api/setup` first (measured on the bench: a SUPERADMIN made, the login works). **What remains in the class:** vaultwarden (closed sign-up by design, no CLI), code-server (a browser IDE). `audits/pg-last-six-2026-09-30/`. **-- 2026-09-30 (evening): gitea's fixable case is DONE** — the fixture posts gitea's own first-run installer form (the form's own defaults + an admin; no CSRF on that form), measured on the bench and through the setup gate on 9202; gitea 1.27.0 → 1.27.3 published `d7ba60c`. What remains in the class: vaultwarden, code-server. `audits/more-night-apps-2026-09-30/` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog harness)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: an upgrade-test coverage limit; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-652** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The memory watch counted the kernel's file cache as the app's memory.** MEASURED 2026-09-23 night on the bench: nextcloud 34.0.4 read **100 %** of its 1 GiB and immich's PostgreSQL **100 %**, each with **0** kernel `oom_kill`s — `memory.peak` includes page cache, which the kernel drops before it kills anything. Under the watch as built (R-635 follow-up) both would be marked `memory_tight`, and the gate would demand a raised `mem_limit` — a customer-box capacity figure — for cache. **Done the same night (09 §3 decision 22, CC — operator may reverse):** the watch samples the app's own memory (`anon` of `memory.stat`) every 15 s; the mark and the ladder's `memory_peak_pct` read it where measured; the cgroup peak stays beside it (`memory_cgroup_peak_pct`). **Open:** romm's backfilled entry carries M1's 80.9 % cgroup peak (measured before the anon sample existed) — re-measure it on its next step; and decide whether an app whose anon is low but whose cgroup stays pinned at its limit (cache thrash) should be marked at all. Evidence: `audits/night-2026-09-23/apps/nextcloud/bench-1024M/`, `apps/immich/bench-noanon/`. | **READY — P3; owner: CC (catalog harness)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the main fix is done; what is left is harness tuning, no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |