docs: REPORT + CONTEXT for the NAS verify-before-commit share (host-install v1.13.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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> Created with the REUSE.md rollout (2026-07-03). Authoritative history: `hub/CHANGELOG.md` (hub),
> `website/CHANGELOG.md`, `scripts/CHANGELOG.md`; end-of-task detail in `REPORT.md`.
- **2026-07-11 — NAS verify-before-commit SHIPPED (agent v0.81.0 + controller v0.113.0 LIVE on demo;
host-install v1.13.0).** The spike's production task landed same-day: add = agent verify (retry=0
unit, journal-classified, auto-rollback) → controller uid-1000 write probe (--netprobe re-exec) →
register LAST; full rollback on any failure; §3.2 Hungarian error map (nfs_export merged);
storage_network.html redesigned (SMB-first, Route-A guidance); orphan rows; systemd-journal group
(NO sudoers). Live AE validated vs an isolated sim NAS, Route A proven in production (alien-uid
1060 server-side). Feature doc: `documentation/controller/network-storage-nas.md`. NOT published
(no Gitea/Day-0 bump; Peti pending with the usermod one-liner). Record:
`felhom-controller/REPORT.md`.
- **2026-07-11 — SPIKE: NAS verify mechanisms + NFS squash matrix — ALL FIVE QUESTIONS ANSWERED, no
blocker.** Record: `documentation/audits/SPIKE-nas-verify-2026-07-11.md`. Q1 in-guest access DOES
wake the host automount (make-or-break PASS; container bind-mount too); Q2 controller drops to uid
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> **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md); the scripts history lives in [scripts/CHANGELOG.md](scripts/CHANGELOG.md).
## SPIKE — NAS verify mechanisms + NFS squash matrix — 2026-07-11
## NAS verify-before-commit — felhom.eu share (host-install v1.13.0 + feature doc) — 2026-07-11
**Class:** spike (findings doc is the only artifact; no production code touched).
**Record:** `documentation/audits/SPIKE-nas-verify-2026-07-11.md`.
**Baselines (read-only):** felhom-agent `300f06722b` (v0.80.0, `netmount.go` = recipe under test),
felhom-controller `3db9126121` (v0.112.0, the probe container), felhom.eu `8ca1272db6`.
Part of the cross-repo task (agent **v0.81.0** + controller **v0.113.0**, both LIVE on the demo;
full task-wide record incl. red-proofs + the AE live-validation transcripts:
`felhom-controller/REPORT.md`). This repo's commit: `27e2fb0`.
### Verdicts (all five questions answered live, evidence in the record)
- **`scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` v1.13.0** — the agent-user setup adds `felhom-agent` to the
**`systemd-journal` group** (idempotent `usermod -aG`): the verify pipeline classifies mount
failures from an UNPRIVILEGED `journalctl` read; group membership instead of a sudoers grant.
Existing installs: `usermod -aG systemd-journal felhom-agent && systemctl restart felhom-agent`
**applied to the demo host (felhom-pve) during this task's live validation**; Peti's box gets
it only when the NAS feature reaches him. Also fixed: the header still said v1.11.0 while
`SCRIPT_VERSION` was 1.12.0 (the 1.12.0 bump had no changelog entry either) — both now 1.13.0.
- **NEW `documentation/controller/network-storage-nas.md`** — the authoritative network-storage
feature doc (none existed; the knowledge lived only in the two spike docs): the locked recipes
(incl. `retry=0` + its evidence), the verify pipeline, the §8 mount-truth table, the Q4 error
taxonomy (with the merged `nfs_export` honesty rule), the protocol-honest NAS-side recipes
(SMB plain-user; NFS map-all-users vs full-fidelity `anonuid=<uid+100000>`), Route A caveats
incl. the operator-facing "chmod succeeds and persists" nuance, and the open items (Q1c
restart-window test, appliance pass).
- **Q1 — in-guest automount trigger: PASS (make-or-break).** A `pct exec` ls AND a docker
bind-mount access from inside guest 9201 both wake the host systemd automount (~1 s); content
correct, nfs4 propagates host→guest; idle-unmount + re-trigger proven. Q1c open item: whether a
trigger installed BEFORE guest start carries through at boot needs a restart-window test (no
restart permitted this spike).
- **Q2 — controller uid-1000 probe: PASS.** `docker exec -u 1000:1000` chain proof + `setpriv
--reuid 1000` mechanism proof (same syscalls as `syscall.Credential`); CapEff `a80425fb` has
SETUID/SETGID; server-side files land `101000:101000`.
- **Q3 — Route A: ACCEPTED-with-caveats.** `all_squash` to an arbitrary server uid (1050) gives the
guest-uid-1000 app full read/create/rename/**hardlink**/delete. Caveats: guest sees
`nobody:nogroup`; `chown` fails immediate-clean EPERM; `chmod` SUCCEEDS and persists server-side.
q3c pinned the June WRONG case: `anonuid` without `all_squash` never applies to non-root traffic —
wire uid 101000 fails on others-perms. Consumer guidance must require the "map/squash ALL users"
mode, not just an anon-uid field.
- **Q4 — error taxonomy + timing:** full table in the record. Headlines: NFSv4 returns the IDENTICAL
`No such file or directory` for nonexistent vs not-permitted exports (merge those error
categories); dead server = systemd `timeout` at **90 s** (systemd kills mount.nfs before its 2-min
retry — no diagnostic string); **`retry=0` recommended for the PRODUCTION unit** (dead-server
verify 90 s→3.1 s with clean `No route to host`; guest on-demand access 91 s→3.8 s ENODEV; happy
path untouched; autofs retries fresh per access). SMB splits cleanly: `error(13)`=credentials,
`error(2)`=share name. **Budget (Q4-vii):** verify cannot ride the agentapi global 15 s timeout
(`client.go:87`) — worst case is systemd's 90 s; give AddNetStorage its own longer-lived path or
async status-poll, ~120 s end-to-end, agent-side `systemctl start` bounded at ~95 s.
- **Q5 — plain-user SMB: PASS.** Stock user + rw share, zero server-side uid config, all 8 probe
steps pass INCLUDING hardlink (on Debian Samba/ext4 — re-verify on a real appliance); server-side
ownership = the authenticated account; guest sees forced `1000:1000/0664`.
### Safety rails held
Isolated scratch root `/srv/nas-spike2/` on 180 (backups `.bak-nasspike2`); no iptables/network
manipulation (unreachable case = verified-unused 192.168.0.199); no guest restart; spike mounts only
under `/mnt/felhom-drives/spike2-*`. **Teardown verified:** exports back to pre-count 2, smb.conf
sections 6, spike users/scratch/units/creds/mountpoints all gone, 0 spike2 mounts on host and in
guest, controller 0.112.0 healthy, spike-pulled alpine image removed.
**Next:** the production "NAS verify-before-commit + UI redesign" TASK is written by the operator
side on these findings (STOP honored — no production work started).
No hub/website/manifest changes; nothing to deploy from this repo (the script ships via the Day-0
supply chain on the operator's publish decision — NOT triggered by this task).