Part F: nine one-page designs (R-314/279/177, R-30, R-79, R-35, R-717, R-138, R-435, R-893); R-177 and R-298 closed with evidence; R-415 re-filed (lost in the 2026-10-03 triage); STATUS decision sheet D1-D9; 131 -> 130
gates / gates (push) Successful in 3m57s

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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**Ready for the first real tester (Tester-2): yes. Tester 2 (a laptop) is off; nothing was sent to it.**
**Updated 2026-10-08 (day): hub 0.143.1; demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 run agent 0.153.0 and controller 0.303.0
(nothing delivered today — tonight is the second kernel night). The open-items list is at 130. Reports: `REPORT.md`,
`REPORT-day-2026-10-08.md`.**
**Updated 2026-10-08 (afternoon): hub 0.143.1; demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 run agent 0.153.0 and controller
0.303.0 (nothing delivered today — tonight is the second kernel night). The open-items list is at 130. Reports:
`REPORT-day-2026-10-08.md` (morning), `REPORT-day2-2026-10-08.md` (afternoon).**
## Afternoon (2026-10-08): your four answers built, and one sheet of decisions
- **The FAQ is honest now** (you approved the text): it says where backup copies and remote traffic go. Live.
- **Deletion times:** the hub deletes a removed customer's mail and event records 1 year after the deletion (ships
tomorrow). The job that removes a removed customer's copy on DooPlex within 30 days is written and tested, **not
installed** (see D9). Both times are in the privacy-notice draft.
- **You get a mail when a household's code opens, or may open, an old package** (ships tomorrow).
- **Cloudflare:** on the list as a later item.
- **Nine stuck items have a one-page design.** Two were no longer true and are closed; one lost item is back on the list.
### The decision sheet — answer „all as picked", or name the numbers you change
| # | Question | Pick | Cost | If you do nothing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | May the hub (with your password, no signing key) ask a box to run an off-site backup now, run a named check now, and stop or extend a household's deletion countdown? | Yes — a fixed list of safe, repeatable actions, carried in the box's report reply | ~1 session, controller + hub | A household calling in the first 14 days of a countdown needs a shell on its box; only the household can start an off-site run |
| D2 | When the hub has had no connection from a box for ~6 minutes, may „delete host" go ahead at once after you tick „I checked: the box is off"? | Yes (step 1, showing the live link on the host page, needs no answer) | ~½ session, hub | Deleting a switched-off box (and a reset) waits up to 45 minutes after its last report |
| D3 | May the household's „system health" mail drop the raw technical note and point to the dashboard for the list? | Yes (the dashboard half needs no answer; CC builds it) | ~1 h hub + a hub release | The mail keeps a curly-bracket note with English lines in it |
| D4 | May the box remember a dashboard sign-in across its own restarts (on disk only a fingerprint that cannot be used to sign in)? | Yes | ~½ session, controller | The household is logged out at every settings push and every controller update |
| D5 | Is the measured address block enough for opengist's sign-up, or should the box also close opengist's own switch? | Enough — close the item | Nothing | Same as the pick: the item closes |
| D6 | Should the hub check with Cloudflare that a pasted key reaches only that customer's own domain? | Yes (the „no duplicate or nested domain" guard needs no answer; CC builds it) | ~½ session, hub; a save fails while Cloudflare is down | A key made for the whole account by mistake could change every household's web addresses |
| D7 | Should the hub mail you an error when even one off-site snapshot disappears outside a clean-up window it opened? | Yes | ~½ session, hub | A deletion through any other key stays silent unless it removes over half of a household's history |
| D8 | After a failed off-site restore of one app: keep the app stopped for support now, and „put back exactly as it was" next? | Yes, both, in that order | ~½ session now; ~1 session + a test + disk space for one copy later | The app restarts on a mix of old files and a newer database, and the screen says all is back as it was |
| D9 | May CC install the DooPlex job that removes a deleted customer's copy (dry run first, then daily)? | Yes, after tomorrow's releases are read back | ~30 min; one new local token on DooPlex | A deleted customer's copy stays on DooPlex, and the privacy-notice line „within 30 days" is not true |
Full designs: `documentation/audits/day-2026-10-08/`.
## Day (2026-10-08): fixes built for tomorrow, the old-code answer made honest, legal drafts
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# R-138 — a Cloudflare token that can write a shared zone, on a customer's box: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
Baselines read: felhom.eu `b2dce901`, felhom-controller `a0370b4`. Architecture: `01-topology-and-trust.md` §5
(trust boundaries: „hub ↔ Cloudflare API") and §7 (networking: „Every customer has their OWN domain — never a name
under `felhom.eu`", operator ruling 2026-09-14). **Status:** design only, nothing built. The token itself is stored
out-of-band; it was not read, printed or used for this page.
## 1. The problem, and what changed under it
- **The mechanism is still as the row says.** The hub form copies `cf_api_token` verbatim into the customer's config
(`hub/internal/web/configs.go:1682-1684`); the controller writes it to a 0600 `.env` for Traefik
(`controller/internal/infra/infra.go:157-159`; the row's `:123` is stale). An empty token selects HTTP-01
(`controller/internal/infra/templates/traefik.yml.tmpl:52-61`). The controller also uses it for the geo-WAF
(`controller/internal/web/handlers.go:642`).
- **The row's risk needs a SHARED customer zone, and the design has ruled that out.** `01` §7 (2026-09-14): every
customer has their own domain, never a name under `felhom.eu`. Today's boxes match: demo-felhom, demo-hp and
Tester 1 (`enkicsifelhom.hu`, `operations/nodes.md:44`) each sit on their own zone. The shared-zone plan the row was
written against (`audits/RECON-subdomain-onboarding-2026-07-31.md` §5) is not the plan any more.
- **But nothing ENFORCES the ruling.** The hub accepts any domain, including one equal to or under another customer's
domain, or under `felhom.eu`: `domain TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''` with no uniqueness (`hub/internal/store/store.go:164`),
and the create path refuses only a duplicate customer id (`configs.go:740`). That check was row **R-415** (READY, XS) —
**it was removed from `OPEN-ITEMS.md` in the 2026-10-03 triage (`71b8c8c6`) and never reached `CLOSED-ITEMS.md`**;
it is lost, not closed.
- **A second residue the row does not name:** the four zones sit in ONE Cloudflare account (RECON §2, line 163). A
token minted with account scope (all zones) instead of one zone would let one box rewrite every household's DNS —
the same blast radius as a shared zone, by a typing mistake in the token wizard. Nobody checks the token's reach.
## 2. Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A** | Close R-138 on the ruling; do nothing more. | Nothing. | The ruling is a sentence; an operator mistake (a duplicate or nested domain, an account-wide token) passes silently. |
| **B** | **Enforce the ruling on save (revive R-415):** the hub refuses a domain that equals, contains or sits under another customer's domain, or sits under `felhom.eu`. | Hub only; one store query, one form error, tests. ~¼ session. | None to customers: it refuses an operator input that the ruling already forbids. |
| **C** | B **plus a reach check on the token:** when a `cf_api_token` is saved, the hub asks Cloudflare which zones that token can see (`GET /zones`, the call the hub already makes in `hub/internal/cloudflare/unblock.go:115`) and refuses unless it sees exactly the customer's own zone. | Hub only; one outbound call at save time (an existing dependency, not a new one); a save fails while Cloudflare is down — the form must say so and keep what was typed. ~½ session. | A save blocked by a Cloudflare outage; the operator retries. |
## 3. The pick — B now (follows the ruling, no decision needed); C on the operator's word
B is the guard the row asked for, re-scoped: not „refuse a token for a shared-zone customer" (no such customer may
exist) but „refuse the layout that would make one". C closes the account-wide-token hole, which is the same danger by
another road; it adds a network call to a form save, so it is the operator's choice.
## 4. First slice and its red test
- **Hub (B):** in the create and edit paths, before any provisioning: `store.DomainConflicts(customerID, domain)` and a
`felhom.eu` suffix check; the form re-renders with the submitted values and one sentence.
- **Red test (fails on today's code):** create customer `a` with `example.hu`; creating `b` with `example.hu`,
`x.example.hu` or `t1.felhom.eu` is refused and nothing is stored. **Controls:** `b` with `example2.hu` is accepted;
editing `a` with its own `example.hu` is accepted (no self-conflict); `notexample.hu` is accepted (suffix match is on a
label boundary).
- Register: R-415 re-filed (or folded into this row) and R-138 closed on B's commit.
## 5. One question for the operator
**When you paste a customer's Cloudflare key into the hub, should the hub check with Cloudflare that the key reaches
only that customer's own domain, and refuse it otherwise?** My pick: yes (option C). *If you do nothing:* a key that was
made for the whole Cloudflare account by mistake goes onto the customer's box, and that box could change the web
addresses of every other household.
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# R-30 — box presence from the live connection, not the report clock: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
Baselines read: felhom.eu `b2dce901`, felhom-controller `a0370b4`, felhom-agent `b228b44`. Architecture:
`05-hub-architecture.md` §4 (liveness / dead-man's-switch); `03-host-agent.md` §4 (the host-delete guard's reason).
**Status: design only. Nothing is built.**
## 1. The problem, with today's numbers
- **Measured 2026-07-21 (the row):** a powered-off box stayed „healthy" on the hub until `host_stale` fired after the
threshold („no report for 30m"). **Today the wait is longer:** the threshold is 45 minutes (live ConfigMap
`felhom-system/hub-config`, `alerting.stale_threshold: "45m"`, operator ruling A on R-549). The row's „30 min" is stale.
- The agent reports every 900 s (hub `internal/api/handler.go:653-655`, `defaultHostPollSeconds = 900`; agent
`internal/config/config.go:849`). „Online" on the host page is report age under the threshold
(`internal/web/hosts.go:31-44`). **Host delete refuses while „online"** (`hosts.go:935-937`, and since R-599 it says when
the refusal ends). **RESET refuses while any host row exists** (`internal/web/customer_reset.go:106-110`). So a forced
teardown of a box that is already off waits up to 45 minutes after its last report.
- **Measured today (read-only, the ingress access log on DooPlex, 07:0x–07:50 UTC):** the controller's wait channel
(`GET /api/v1/wait`) completes every **241–243 s** per box — three sources, 11–12 holds each, every hold 240.00x s.
So a healthy box starts a new wait at most ~243 s after the previous one started.
- **Not measured:** what the hub sees when a box loses power in the middle of a hold. Read in source: the hub writes a
newline every 25 s into nginx (`internal/api/wait.go:10-23`) and ends the hold itself at 240 s, so the hold most likely
ends normally and then **no new wait arrives**. That gap is the signal. Slice 1 measures it.
## 2. The three signals
| Signal | Cadence | What it proves | Blind spot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agent host report | 900 s | the host and its agent | slow; the alarm needs 45 min hysteresis (R-549) |
| Controller wait channel | ~241 s | the guest's controller is running and reaching the hub | a crashed or updating controller looks like a dead box; per customer, not per host |
| WireGuard handshake age on ep0 | ~2 min (protocol rekey; not measured here) | the host's kernel, independent of both processes | needs a new forced command on ep0 and a hub poller; ep0 is protected |
## 3. Options
**A. Keep the report clock.** Nothing to build. A teardown waits ≤45 min; alarms stay right.
**B. The hub records wait-channel presence; the host page shows it; the delete guard may use it.** In `handleWait`
(once per request — not in `intent.Hub.Wait`, which runs once per 25-s window, `internal/intent/hub.go:77-102`) record
per customer: last wait start, holds open now. Presence = **connected** (a hold is open, or one started < 243 s + 90 s
grace ago), **not connected since T**, or **unknown** (hub restarted < 333 s ago — in memory only, so it falls back to
the report clock; the safe direction). Alerting is not changed. Cost: hub only, ~½ session. Wrong case: a crashed
controller on a live host reads „not connected"; if the guard trusts it, the operator deletes a live host and its agent
is locked out until re-enrolled — no household data is touched.
**C. B + the WireGuard handshake from ep0 as host-level presence.** The best signal (the host itself, a third channel).
Cost: an ep0 change, a new key and forced command, a hub poller; ep0 work needs an operator task.
**Pick: B, in two slices.** Slice 1 is display only and needs no decision. Slice 2 (the guard) needs the operator's word.
C only if slice 1's measurement shows the wait channel does not go quiet when a box dies.
## 4. First slice and its red test
- **Hub:** `intent.Hub` gains `MarkWaitStart / MarkWaitEnd / Presence(customerID, now)` behind a clock seam;
`handleWait` calls them; the host page shows „Box connection: connected now / last connected <time>" from the host's
customer. Debug log on each change of presence.
- **Red tests** (fail today — no such state): (1) a wait starts at t0 and ends at t0+240 s, and none follows → at t0+300 s presence
is `connected`, at t0+334 s it is `not connected since t0+240 s`; (2) a new start at t0+242 s keeps it `connected`; (3) a new
`Hub` (a hub restart) answers `unknown`, never `not connected`; (4) a render test per branch — the „not connected"
line appears only when absent (the seam-built-but-never-wired trap).
- **Live measurement** (after a hub release; scratch 9202 only): stop guest 9202, then read the time until the host
page says „not connected". Control from a different channel: the ingress access log's last `/api/v1/wait` line from
that box's address. Evidence copied off before 9202 is started again.
- **Slice 2 (after the operator's answer):** when report-age says „online" but presence says „not connected" for longer
than the grace, the delete refusal offers a tick box „I checked: the box is off"; the delete is logged and raises one
operator event.
## 5. One question for the operator
**When the hub has had no connection from a box for about six minutes, may „delete host" let you delete it at once,
after you tick „I checked: the box is off"?** My pick: yes (slice 2). It costs: if the box was really on (only its
controller had crashed), its host agent is locked out until it is re-enrolled; no household data is touched. *If you do
nothing:* slice 1 still shows „last connected", but deleting a powered-off host, and so a RESET, still waits up to
45 minutes after its last report.
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
# R-314, R-279, R-177 — the operator's door into a running controller: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
Baselines read: felhom-controller `a0370b4`, felhom-agent `b228b44`, felhom.eu `b2dce901`. Architecture:
`03-host-agent.md` §4 (signature only for destroying or overwriting the only copy of customer data),
`04-control-plane-authorization.md` §6 („routine work: no signing"), `07-backup-architecture.md` (decision 74, R-241/R-245).
**Status: design only. Nothing is built.**
## 1. What is still true (read in source today, not from the rows)
- **R-177 is no longer true — close it.** The row says fill-watch runs only at 03:30 and at start. Since controller
v0.297.0 (R-363, 2026-10-05) it also runs every 10 minutes: `cmd/controller/main.go:1579`
(`sched.Every("fill-watch-interval", …)`), `main.go:2478` (`fillWatchInterval = 10 * time.Minute`), pinned by
`cmd/controller/r363_fillwatch_interval_test.go`. Every run logs a positive line
(`internal/fillwatch/fillwatch.go:267`, „checked N filesystem(s) …"), which the operator reads through the hub's
existing controller-log pull. „Did the warning clear after the household freed space?" is now a ≤10-minute wait,
not a restart. Its general ask („run a named job now") is folded into option A below at no extra cost.
- **R-279 is still true.** The only way to start an off-site run on demand is the household's dashboard
(`internal/web/server.go:752` → `offbox_handlers.go:264`). A search of hub, controller report code and agent for any
run-now path finds only the nightly call (`main.go:1417`).
- **R-314 is half true now.** The CLI levers are unchanged (`main.go:91-93`, `229-270`) and run as a SECOND process —
the lost-update problem is written down at `main.go:208-219`. What changed: **decision 74** — on the pinned
off-site tier the deletion is the HUB's, 7 days after the box asks for it, and the operator can cancel it at the hub
(`hub/internal/web/server.go:685-704` → `offsitekeys/service.go:474`; a route, no button). The box follows that cancel
(`internal/backup/offbox_abandon.go:240`). **The gap that remains:** the box's own 14-day countdown
(`offbox_abandon.go:31`) runs first, and a hub cancel during it does nothing — `CancelOffsiteAbandon` only touches
pending rows (`hub/internal/store/offsite_keys.go:284-291`), and on day 14 the box asks again
(`offbox_abandon.go:266`). On a non-pinned target the box deletes by itself on day 14 (`offbox_abandon.go:287`) with
no hub window at all. So a household that telephones in the first 14 days still needs a shell.
## 2. The door already exists — it is the report reply, not the controller's web surface
The 2026-10-05 note looked at the controller's HTTP surface (the household's session). The running process already
takes operator requests another way: operator presses a button → the hub stores a pending row and bumps the box's
intent generation → the controller's wait channel wakes (`internal/report/waiter.go:131-138`) → an out-of-cycle report
→ the reply carries the request (`internal/report/pusher.go:43-50`; hub `internal/api/handler.go:600-610`) → the running
controller acts. Proven for log pulls (hub `internal/web/logbundle.go:43-67`, controller `internal/report/selftail.go`).
Latency: seconds; worst case the 15-minute cycle. The hub never connects into the box.
**Trust.** `03` §4 asks for a signature only to destroy or overwrite the only copy. None of these does: an off-site
run adds a snapshot (the pinned tier cannot delete, decision 69); a check only reads; stop/extend keep data. The hub can
already cancel the hub-phase deletion (decision 74), so „stop" gives a compromised hub no new power. **Not on the list:**
anything that deletes or starts a countdown, and clearing a restore hold (R-379 — it lets an app start on a possibly
broken database; it stays on the CLI).
## 3. Options
| | What | Cost | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A** | **Operator actions in the report reply.** Hub table `operator_actions(id, customer_id, action, arg, requested_at, done_at, outcome, message)`, buttons on the host page, reply field `operator_actions:[{id,action,arg}]` until a result arrives. Controller: a CLOSED switch in the running process; result in the next report `operator_action_results:[{id,outcome,message}]`; hub marks it done and saves a hub-minted operator event. | ~1 session, two repos, additive wire fields (wire-contract gate). | A controller that crashes mid-action gets it again — every listed action is safe to repeat (single-flight, refuse-when-nothing-running). |
| **B** | Signed job through the agent, which runs `docker exec … --abandon-stop` in the guest. | New signed-op class + an agent exec path; a signing ceremony for a non-destructive act (against `04` §6). | Still a second process: the lost-update at `main.go:208-219` stays. |
| **C** | A unix socket in the container served by the running controller; the CLI flags become its clients. | ~½ session, controller only. | Fixes the second-process problem but the telephone path is still a shell. Good later for R-379. |
**Pick: A.** It reuses a proven channel, needs no key, and the household-visible state changes inside the process
that owns it.
## 4. First slice and its red tests
- **Controller** `internal/report/opactions.go` (the `selftail.go` shape) + a closed map in `main.go`:
`offsite_backup_now` (the same four checks as `offboxRunHandler`, then `RunOffboxBackup` in a goroutine);
`abandon_stop` → `StopAbandon` (which also cancels a hub-phase request); `abandon_extend` (arg 1–30 days) →
`ExtendAbandon`; `run_job` (arg ∈ fill-watch, offsite-integrity, offsite-proof, disk-health-check) → a new
`Scheduler.RunNow(name)` that refuses unknown or running jobs. An unknown action answers `refused`, never silence.
- **Red tests** (each fails today — the reply field does not exist): (1) a reply with `abandon_stop` during a countdown
→ `AbandonStatus().Active` is false in the SAME manager AND `settings.json` on disk agrees; (2) the same id delivered
twice → `StopAbandon` runs once; (3) an unknown action → result `refused`, nothing called; (4) hub: a host-page POST
stores a row and bumps intent; the reply lists it until a result arrives, then not; a result naming another
customer's id is ignored.
- **Live proof** (scratch 9202 only, after the releases): `run_job fill-watch` and `offsite_backup_now`. Positive
observables: the hub's result event; control from another channel: the controller log pull (the „checked N" line)
and the off-site snapshot list on the box's backup page.
## 5. One question for the operator
**May the hub, with only your hub password and no signing key, ask a box to run an off-site backup now, run a named
check now, and stop or extend a household's deletion countdown?** My pick: yes (option A). It costs one session in the
controller and the hub. *If you do nothing:* nothing is built; a household that telephones in the first 14 days of a
countdown is served by a shell on its box, and an off-site run can only be started by the household.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# R-35 — a config apply ends the household's dashboard session: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
**Status:** design only. Read in source today (controller `main` a0370b4ed8ef). Architecture documents:
`architecture/02-controller-module-map.md` (config refresh), `07-backup-architecture.md` §5 (the whole-guest archive is
plaintext on the household's premises), `09-update-architecture.md` §3 decisions 63-64 (the family gate).
## The problem, as measured
2026-07-21: the hub raised `config_version` 10→11 at 16:54:58; the controller self-restarted (StartedAt 16:54:59Z, up
16:55:02); the household was logged out mid-flow (row evidence `controller-log-full.txt`). Still true in source:
- `internal/report/config_refresh.go:33-71` — any `config_version` change: re-pull `controller.yaml`, record, then
`Restart` = `api.GracefulSelfRestart` (`cmd/controller/main.go:1100-1109`). No per-setting choice.
- `internal/web/auth.go:15-18, 250-270` — dashboard sessions live only in `s.sessions map[string]*session` (token,
expiry, CSRF token). Any process exit ends every session. **This is not only a config-apply problem:** every
controller update (the floor, the household's own update press, a crash restart) logs the household out too.
**New since the row's last note (2026-10-05):** the family gate (decisions 63-64, controller v0.287.0) already persists
its sessions to `family.json` (0600, tmp+fsync+rename) in the data dir „so a restart keeps every session"
(`internal/family/family.go:11-12, 45-50, 267-290`). It stores the session ID itself. So „login tokens on disk" is
already the product's state for family sign-ins; the dashboard is the odd one out.
## Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A — hot-apply** | Adopt changed `controller.yaml` fields in the running process; restart only for fields that need it. | A per-field ruling over the whole config (hub, offbox, cloudflare, paths…), a reload path per module. ~2-3 sessions. | A field applied half-way; fixes config apply only, not updates. |
| **B — persist sessions, token on disk** | Write the session map to `sessions.json` (0600) like `family.json`. | ~½ session. | A copy of the archive (plaintext by design, `07` §5) holds live 7-day dashboard tokens. |
| **C — persist sessions, fingerprint on disk** | As B, but the file holds `sha256(token)` → {expiry, CSRF token}; lookup hashes the cookie. Cleared by `invalidateAllSessions` (password change) and logout as today; expired rows dropped at load and at the 15-min cleanup. | ~½ session + tests. | A stolen archive gives a fingerprint that cannot be turned back into a cookie. A box restored from an archive keeps that day's sessions valid until they expire (≤7 days) — the same as family sessions today. |
**Pick: C.** It ends the logout for every restart, not just config apply, at the smallest cost, and it removes the one
cost the row named (tokens in the archive). A stays a later refinement if restarts themselves become a problem.
**First slice, with its red test:** `internal/web/session_store.go` (load at `NewServer`, save under `sessionsMu` on
create/delete/invalidate, atomic write as in `family.saveLocked`). Tests: (1) create a session, build a NEW `Server` on
the same data dir, the cookie is still valid and returns the same CSRF token — red today (map is fresh); (2) the file
contains no token bytes (grep the file for the token: must be absent); (3) after `invalidateAllSessions`, a new
`Server` rejects the old cookie; (4) an expired row is not loaded. Live check on scratch 9202: sign in, trigger a
controller restart, the next page load needs no login.
## One question for the operator
**May the box remember a dashboard sign-in across its own restarts, keeping on its disk only a fingerprint that cannot
be used to sign in?** *If you do nothing:* the household is logged out at every settings push and every controller
update, as today.
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# R-435 — the snapshot-drop detector does not see one app's off-site history vanish: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
Baselines read: felhom.eu `b2dce901`, felhom-controller `a0370b4`. Architecture: `07-backup-architecture.md` §11 row 10
(ransomware / malicious deletion; the 2026-10-03..05 `[FACT]` entries on the append-only key and the clean-up window);
`09` §3 decisions 68, 69 (the box prunes only in a hub-opened window; the hub-provisioned key is append-only).
**Status:** design only, nothing built.
## 1. The problem, and what changed under it since the row was filed (2026-09-01)
- **Still true in code.** `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go:254-257`: an alarm needs a fall of more than half the last
count AND at least 5 (`snapshotDropped`, `:285-295`). One app's tag (~9 of 69 on demo-hp when measured) is invisible.
The limit is written in the comment above the constants (`:242-253`), as the row says.
- **The row's second complaint is gone.** `STATUS.md` no longer says „noticed within a day" (`grep -n -i "within a day\|noticed" STATUS.md`
returned nothing today). `07` row 10 says „only a fall of MORE than half (R-435)".
- **The threat the row describes is now mostly PREVENTED, not only undetected.** Since decisions 68–69 (2026-10-03) the
box's off-site key cannot delete (provider refusal measured, `07` row 10). The box deletes only inside a hub-opened
window (`controller/internal/backup/offbox_window.go:203-225`, `t.Pinned()`), and inside it the fake-snapshot guard
refuses any plan that removes a snapshot younger than `keepDaily` days that is not superseded the same day
(`offbox_window.go:24-36`). A one-app wipe must remove that app's newest snapshots, so the guard refuses it.
- **What is left uncovered:** a deletion by something that is NOT the box's key — anyone with a deleting credential
for the sub-account or the provider account — or a box that lies about its plan. The count detector sees those only
above one half.
## 2. The new fact that makes a precise detector cheap
On a pinned tier the **only legitimate way the count can fall is a clean-up window**, and the hub records every window
with `count_before` / `count_after` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:835-845`, `offsite_keys.go:84-101`). So the hub can
say „this fall is explained" exactly, with no threshold: between two trustworthy reports, the count may fall by at
most what the windows closed in that interval removed. **Any fall beyond that is unexplained — even one snapshot.**
## 3. Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A** | Keep as is: documented blind spot. | Nothing. | A single-app deletion from outside the box stays silent. |
| **B** | The row's own suggestion: the controller reports a count per app tag; the hub keeps a per-tag baseline and threshold. | Two repos, a new report field (wire-contract gate), a per-tag threshold nobody has measured; retention also moves per-tag counts, so it needs its own calibration. ~1.5 sessions. | Noise from retention on boundary days — the reason the global threshold is high. |
| **C** | Hub only: on a **pinned** tier (hub holds a confirmed append-only key for the customer), compare `prev − cur` with the snapshots removed by windows closed since the previous trustworthy report. Any unexplained fall ≥ 1 raises `offsite_snapshots_dropped`. Non-pinned tiers (the household's NAS) keep today's half-rule. | One repo. One store query (windows closed in an interval), one branch in `snapshotDropped`, tests. ~½ session. | A window that closes by timeout without a box result has no `count_after`; treat it as „explains anything" (no alarm, log one INFO line) — the safe side for noise, recorded as a limit. |
## 4. The pick — C
C covers the shape B was meant to cover — and any size — without a new threshold, a new field or the second repo. It
uses the only fact that is exact (the windows the hub itself opened). It keeps the half-rule for NAS tiers, where the
box still prunes by itself. B stays a note: it would add per-app naming in the message, which C does not have (C says
„N snapshots went, outside any clean-up window"; the operator reads which ones on the box).
## 5. First slice and its red test
- Hub: `store.RemovedByWindowsBetween(customerID, from, to) (removed int, unknown bool)`; `OffsiteChecker` keeps the time
of the last trustworthy baseline beside `lastCounts`; on a pinned customer, alarm when `prev − cur > removed` and not
`unknown`. The message adds „outside any clean-up window".
- **Red test (seen failing on today's code):** pinned customer, baseline 69, next trustworthy report 60, no window →
exactly one `offsite_snapshots_dropped` event. Today: none (9 < 34.5).
- **Controls:** same fall with a closed window that removed 9 → no event; NAS (not pinned) customer 69 → 60 → no
event (half-rule kept); untrustworthy report → no event and baseline unchanged (existing rule).
- Live proof, when releases resume: on scratch 9202 only — a window granted by hand removes N and no alarm; then the
hub's own row for that window as the control from another channel.
## 6. One question for the operator
**Should the hub raise an error mail when even ONE off-site snapshot disappears outside a clean-up window it opened?**
My pick: yes (option C). *If you do nothing:* deletions by the box stay blocked as today, but a deletion through any
other credential stays silent unless it removes more than half of a household's off-site history.
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
# R-717 — opengist's sign-up switch: its container has no tool to write it: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
**Status:** design only. Read today: controller `main` a0370b4ed8ef, catalog `main` 32d134639c0c, opengist upstream
`master` (fetched 2026-10-08). Architecture: `09-update-architecture.md` §3 decisions 46-47 (setup gate, sign-up block),
`01-topology-and-trust.md` §5 (the gate).
## Where it stands
- Wishlist is done (controller v0.301.0 `open_command`, proven on 9202 2026-10-06). The row is narrowed to opengist.
- Opengist (`templates/opengist/docker-compose.yml`, image `ghcr.io/thomiceli/opengist:1.15`) is closed by the address
block alone: `signup_block: "PathRegexp(`(?i)^/+-/+register`)"` (`.felhom.yml:42`). Measured 2026-09-29: every trick
shape — trailing slash, upper/mixed case, percent-encoded, double slash, query string — answers 403
(`audits/signup-lock-2026-09-29/B/B6-tricks-all-regex.txt`). The app publishes no port; traefik is its only door.
- **Upstream, read today:** the switch is row `disable-signup` in opengist's admin-settings table; startup seeds it to
`"0"` from a hard-coded map — no config key and no env feeds it (`internal/db/db.go`; `config.yml` has no
signup/register key). **The settings are read from the database on every request** (`dataInit` middleware →
`loadSettings` → `db.GetSettings()`, `internal/web/server/middlewares.go`). So a row written while the app runs takes
effect at the next request — the row's „needs its sqlite with the app stopped" is not needed.
- The controller already embeds a pure-Go SQLite (`modernc.org/sqlite`, `go.mod:11`) and already runs short helper
containers on app volumes (`docker run --rm -v vol:…`, `internal/stacks/undo.go:205-235`, image `alpine`, which has
no sqlite).
## Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A — the box writes the row with its own image** | New `after_setup` form `sqlite: {volume, file, close_sql, open_sql, check_sql}`; the controller runs `docker run --rm -v opengist_data:/v <its own image> <subcommand>` that opens the file with modernc sqlite (busy timeout), runs the statement, reads it back and prints the marker. Feeds the existing close/open/loop machinery unchanged. | ~1 session controller + catalog line + a 9202 proof. No new external image. | A second writer on a live SQLite (normal locking; same kernel). A schema rename upstream → the read-back fails → the existing failure record, never silent. |
| **B — a sidecar with a sqlite tool** | Add a small sqlite image as a second service in the template. | ~½ session. | **A new external dependency** (fenced — operator only), RAM and an image to keep current on every box. |
| **C — keep the address block alone** | Accept the measured block as the lock for opengist; close the row as decided. | Nothing. | The switch stays „open" inside the app; only a path traefik does not see could reach it, and the app has no such path today. |
**Pick: C, with A ready.** The block is measured against every trick shape and the app has no door but traefik, so A
buys defence in depth for a P3-LOW. A is the right build if the operator wants the app's own switch closed too: it adds
no dependency and serves any later app whose switch lives only in its database.
**First slice of A (only on the operator's yes), with its red test:** `after_setup.go` accepts the `sqlite` form; a test
with a temp SQLite file runs close → the read-back prints the marker and the row reads `1`; open → `0`; a missing table
→ an error and no marker (red today: the form is unknown and the spec is refused). Then the opengist template line and a
9202 proof in wishlist's shape (stranger 403/refused after setup, a family member signs up inside the window, closed again
after it).
**Small, for the parent now (comments only, no decision):** `internal/stacks/after_setup.go:33` names opengist among the
apps „closed by `command`" — today only wishlist is; `internal/stacks/signup_block.go:22` shows opengist's block as
``PathPrefix(`/-/register`)`` while the template uses the case-insensitive `PathRegexp` above.
## One question for the operator
**Is the measured address block enough for opengist, or should the box also close opengist's own sign-up switch (about
one working session)?** *If you do nothing:* opengist stays closed by the address block alone, and the row closes as
decided.
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# R-79 — health issue and warning text on the household's pages and mail: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
**Status:** design only. Read in source today (controller `main` a0370b4ed8ef, hub `main` b2dce901b23f). Architecture
document: `architecture/10-localisation.md` (§9 „compared, not shown", §10.1 „on the wire = not translated",
§10.6b residue table).
## The row is half stale — what moved since it was filed
The row (filed 2026-07-26) says „every producer is English" and asks for a spike to pick the seam. **The seam was picked
and built** by R-516 item 10 (controller, after 0.252.0): the wire text stays frozen (`internal/monitor/wire_golden_test.go`)
and each entry carries a parallel `MsgRef` (bundle key + args) that the dashboard banner renders in the household's
language (`internal/monitor/healthcheck.go:28-35, 73-86`; `internal/web/alerts.go:238-279`, `MessageKey`/`MessageArgs`
rendered by `GetAlerts(lang)`). That is the render-boundary seam, and it is the right one: the hub report keeps its bytes.
**Done (key attached, pinned by `internal/monitor/r516_resource_msgs_test.go`):** all 7 resource entries —
system/data disk high + critical, memory, CPU, temperature (`healthcheck.go:357-441`).
**Still verbatim on the household's banner (zero `MsgRef`):**
| producer | `healthcheck.go` | wire text | what a household sees |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker unreachable | 138 | `Docker: %v` (English) | English in both languages |
| protected container down | 157 | `Protected container not running: %s` (English) | English in both languages |
| storage almost full (issue) | 170 via `checkStoragePaths` 336 | `issueFmtStorageAlmostFull` (Hungarian, frozen) | Hungarian for an English household |
| storage unavailable / not separate / usage high (warnings) | 173 via 322, 328, 338 | `warnFmtStorage*` (Hungarian, frozen) | Hungarian for an English household |
(The disconnected-drive warning is already replaced by its own banner, `alerts.go:254-261`.)
**The mail half, not covered by R-516:** `health_critical` is customer-on by default
(`controller internal/settings/settings.go:635`). The controller sends `HealthDetails{issues, warnings}` as the event's
details (`internal/notify/notifier.go:139-144, 383-396`). The hub's customer mail localises the headline
(`mail.event.health_critical`) but then appends the **raw details JSON** as „- Megjegyzés: {…}"
(`hub internal/notify/templates.go:187-189`, called from `dispatcher.go:331, 880`). So the household's mail carries
`{"previous_status":"ok","current_status":"fail","issues":["Protected container not running: cloudflared"]}`.
## Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A** | Dashboard only: give the 6 remaining producers a `MsgRef` (`checkStoragePaths` returns a parallel `[]MsgRef`); 6 hu+en keys whose Hungarian equals today's text. | ~2 h, controller only. | None on the wire (the wire golden stays green by construction). |
| **B** | A + mail: the hub stops appending the raw details JSON to the CUSTOMER mail of `health_degraded` / `health_critical` / `health_recovered` (operator mail unchanged); the household's mail says what the headline says and points to the dashboard, where A shows the list in its language. | A + ~1 h hub (one set + one test). Needs a hub release. | The household loses a list it could not read anyway; the operator keeps it. |
| **C** | A + translated list in the mail: details carry `issue_keys` [{key,args}] and the hub renders them from its own bundle. | Two-repo, ~1 session; the hub must hold copies of controller keys (two producers, one sentence — the R-516 trap). | Drift between the two bundles. |
**Pick: A now, B after the operator's word.** A is a small, decision-free fix in the shape R-516 item 10 already set.
B is the cheapest honest mail; C buys a translated list at the price of a second copy of every sentence.
**First slice (A), with its red test:** extend `r516_resource_msgs_test.go` with a case per remaining producer
(`checkStoragePaths` with a fake unavailable / not-separate / >90 % path; the Docker and protected-container issues via
their seams) asserting (1) the wire text is unchanged byte for byte and (2) the entry carries its key. Red-proof: drop one
`MsgRef` → the case fails and the `internal/web` banner test shows the wire text. The i18n Go-parity gate
(`scripts/i18n_go_parity.py`) checks the Hungarian values equal the frozen literals.
## One question for the operator
**May the household's „system health" e-mail stop showing the raw technical note, and send the household to the
dashboard for the list instead?** *If you do nothing:* A ships alone; the dashboard is right in both languages, and the
mail keeps its note — a line of English inside curly brackets — as it does today.
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# R-893 — after a failed off-site database replay, the rollback mixes new and old: a one-page design (2026-10-08)
Baselines read: felhom-controller `a0370b4`, felhom.eu `b2dce901`. Architecture: `07-backup-architecture.md` §6.3
(„[FACT] 2026-10-06 — restoring over a newer schema", the R-893 known limit) and „[DESIGN] 2026-08-22 — the failure
ladder: replay → rollback → hold"; `09` §3 decision 154 (R-638 option A). **Status:** design only, nothing built. Not
measured yet — the 9202 measurement the row asks for is slice 0 below.
## 1. The problem (read in source today, `controller/internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go`)
The off-site restore of one app does, in order:
1. `:758` — the undo copy: a **logical dump of the LIVE database** (`writeSafetyDump`, `:214`). Nothing else is saved.
2. `:804-811` — when the snapshot was written at another app version, the **snapshot's older definition** is written.
3. `:812-842` — the snapshot's **files are copied over** the live ones (placements).
4. `:856` — the **named volumes are replaced** with the snapshot's tars (this includes the database volume).
5. `:873-917` — DB-only start, replay of the snapshot's dump. **If the replay fails**, `rollbackSafetyDump` (`:456`)
loads the step-1 dump (NEWER state) into the database that now sits on the step-4 (OLDER) volume, then the app starts.
What the household gets after a failed replay:
- the database: the older volume with the newer dump laid over it — the loader drops only what the dump knows, so
tables only the older version had stay (`07` §6.3);
- files and other volumes: the **snapshot's** state (steps 3–4 are never undone);
- the definition: the **older** one when step 2 ran — the rollback branch never writes the live one back.
And the sentence shown (`hu.json:1261`, `en.json:1266`, key `err.backup.db_restore_failed_rolled_back`) says
„your data is back as it was before the restore, and the app is still running". **That is true only of the database
rows, and not of the files, the other volumes or the version.**
## 2. Options
| | What | Costs | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A** | **Pre-restore copy of the app's volumes.** After step 1, while stopped, tar the live named volumes to an undo folder beside the undo dump (the recovery-unit volume-dump helper; one implementation). On a failed replay: put back those volumes, the live definition and the live files' copy → the exact state before the restore. A fit check refuses to start when the copy does not fit (R-685's lesson). | Disk = one copy of the app's volumes for the restore's duration; time ≈ one volume dump. ~1 session + a 9202 drill. | Small: the helpers exist; the new part is the undo of steps 2–4. Files placed by step 3 need the same treatment, or step 3 must write to a staging folder first. |
| **B** | **R-638 option B: a loader that rebuilds** (drop and re-create the database before loading). The newer dump over the older volume then gives exactly the newer database. | Changes the loader under EVERY restore path, Postgres and MariaDB. ~2 sessions. | High blast radius; still leaves files, other volumes and the definition at the snapshot's state. |
| **C** | **Hold instead of a mixed start.** On a failed replay when step 2 ran (version changed) or step 4 replaced any volume: roll the database back as now, write the live definition back, and **hold the app stopped** (the ladder's third step, `holdAppAfterFailedRollback`) with an honest sentence and an operator event. | Small: one branch, one sentence pair (hu/en), tests. ~½ session. | The app is down until the operator acts; no household data is changed beyond what happens today. |
## 3. The pick — C now, then A
C removes the worst outcome (an older app running on mixed data while the screen says „back as it was") at no disk
cost and without touching the loader. A is the real fix — it makes „back as it was" true — and is built after the 9202
measurement shows how big the volume copy is for the standing apps. B stays a note: it fixes only the database and
widens the risk to every restore.
## 4. First slices and their red tests
- **Slice 0 — measure (9202 only, throwaway app):** off-site snapshot at version N, Update to N+1 (migrating), then an
off-site restore with the replay forced to fail (the `rollbackImport`/`reimportDBDumpsFrom` seam is for tests; on the
box, a snapshot dump truncated by hand in the scratch copy). Record: tables, files, app version, the sentence. Evidence
copied off before teardown.
- **Slice 1 (C):** red test beside `r379_rollback_test.go` — `ReconstituteFromOffsite` with `defineFromSnapshot` true
and a failing replay must (a) call the definition write with the LIVE definition, (b) NOT start the app, (c) leave a
hold, (d) return a sentence that does not contain „visszakerültek" / „back as it was". Today (a)–(d) all fail —
`TestR379_ScenarioA` pins the opposite for its fixture, which has no version change, so it stays green.
- **Slice 2 (A):** red test — after a failed replay, the volume-replay seam is called a second time with the undo
folder, and the app starts; a too-small free space refuses before step 1 with nothing touched.
## 5. One question for the operator
**When an off-site restore of one app fails half-way, which do you want: the app stopped and waiting for us (no extra
disk), or the app put back exactly as it was (needs free space for one more copy of that app's data during the restore)?**
My pick: stopped now, „exactly as it was" next. *If you do nothing:* after such a failure the app keeps starting on a
mix of the older backup's files and the newer database, and the screen tells the household everything is back as it was.
+2
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ The full text of every row below: `git show b2dce901b2:documentation/backlog/OPE
| Row | What | Closed | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **R-177** | **There was no operator-triggerable „run the fill check now" path.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-08 — NO LONGER TRUE: since controller v0.297.0 (R-363) the fill check also runs every 10 minutes, so no door is needed for it | `felhom-controller/controller/cmd/controller/main.go:1579` (`sched.Every("fill-watch-interval", …)`), `:2478` (`fillWatchInterval = 10 * time.Minute`), pinned by `cmd/controller/r363_fillwatch_interval_test.go`; each run logs „checked N filesystem(s)" (readable through the hub's controller-log pull). Design `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-314-279-177.md`. |
| **R-298** | **The `/storage` page's unregistered list filtered on `role==='user-data'`, so a drive that is also the backup target could never be registered.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-08 — NOT REPRODUCIBLE / NOT TRUE: the agent's role comes from the storage type and backing disk and never from being the backup target, so a backup-target drive on a non-system disk IS user-data | `felhom-agent/internal/storage/role.go:172-186` (unchanged since 2026-07-13); `internal/localapi/disks.go:212-233` and `:1239-1249`; August topology `audits/evidence-rehearsal-2026-08-09/GATE0-demo-hp-before.txt:47-84` → user-data; read-only today: demo-felhom `felhom-backup` on `sdb` (root on `sda`). Side fix on controller main `a40729a`: no eject/format button on a backup-target drive (the agent refuses the eject, 403). |
| **R-900** | **The website's FAQ said the household's data is not with a third party, while copies and traffic go to processors.** (P2) | CLOSED 2026-10-08 — PUBLISHED: the GDPR answer on `gyik.html` and `en/faq.html` (visible text and structured data) now names the box, the encrypted copies at Hetzner in the EU, and Cloudflare's view of remote-access traffic; text approved by the operator in chat (`09` §3 decision 180) | website commit `b2dce901`; live read-back 2026-10-08: the new sentence 2× on each page (visible + JSON-LD), the old „nem harmadik félnél" 0×; rest of the site searched (ASCII fragments, positive control) — no other page makes the claim. Left for R-813: the contact form's consent line „harmadik félnek nem adjuk ki", which the consent draft already replaces. |
## 2026-10-07 — the operator's answers on the night designs
+10 -11
View File
@@ -152,12 +152,12 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-232** | Backup & restore | P2 | **DooPlex's backup makes every copy inside the same box — and nothing tells anyone when it fails.** Surveyed read-only 2026-08-06 (`audits/RECON-dooplex-backup-2026-08-06.md`). **What works:** five sets, 14/14 successful runs in 14 days; a file was restored from the `data` repo and matched the live original **byte for byte**; every set except two is cross-disk; k3s is integrity-checked on every run. **What the matrix exposes, ranked:** (a) **`notify_failure` is a no-op** — `NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE=true` but `NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL` is commented out, so a failed backup notifies **nobody**; the project already has a working Resend path that CI uses. Cheapest item, and it makes every other failure visible. (b) **Nothing leaves the box** — no rclone, no remote repo, no off-site target anywhere; Longhorn's target is `nfs://192.168.0.180:` pointing at DooPlex itself, and the only outbound-looking cron pulls *inbound* from Hetzner for a different project. The machine that runs the hub managing the customers' off-site chain has no off-site copy of its own. (c) **The backup tree is a single writable path** and the restic repos are not append-only — one bad script or ransomware destroys every copy at once. (d) **Two same-disk sets**: `.claude-memory` and the PostgreSQL dumps, whose source directory sits *inside* the backup tree. (e) **Longhorn `retain=1`** — one generation per volume, so a corruption noticed a day late has no earlier copy. (f) **`/opt/backup/docs/BACKUP-RESTORE.md` does not exist** though the systemd unit advertises it. (g) **`secrets/restic-repo` has never held a snapshot** — `backup-secrets.sh` contains no `restic` call; the secrets are GPG files on `sda1` only. (h) **No restore has ever been run** beyond today's single-file probe — the matrix's "ever demonstrated?" column is otherwise entirely empty. **Not a finding:** the restic passphrase. The on-box copy is on `sdb1`, a different disk from the backups, and the **operator holds an offline copy out of band** — so a disk loss is recoverable. The narrow residual is that it is operator-held rather than system-held, unlike the customer case's hub-vaulted escrow, so it should be confirmed current and findable by someone else. **Nothing was changed by the recon.** | **NARROWED 2026-10-08 — owner Viktor.** (a) DONE with the operator's yes in chat: `notify_failure` now mails admin@felhom.eu through Resend; proven by one test mail that reached the inbox (`audits/day-2026-10-08/r232/`; no backup was started). (b) partly: the hub database leaves DooPlex nightly to ep0 (R-173); everything else stays on the box. (c)–(h) unchanged. **READY** for the rest | — | — | operator |
| **R-304** | Backup & restore | P2 | **The retained escrow key works, and the customer is told their correct code is wrong.** DRILL 2026-08-12 answered the three questions separately, on `demo-felhom`, with planted data. **(a) retention: WORKS** — the first retained row in fleet history to carry material (`host_escrow_superseded` id 11, `identity_blob` 572 B), byte-identical (`sha256 a10032341c8584ed…`) to the pre-supersession `host_escrow` row. **(b) the material opens the old store: YES** — unsealed with the OLD recovery code it yielded a password byte-identical to the pre-change one (`sha c60c8bc737a6b7c6…`), and restored three planted files **byte-identical** from a store the box itself could no longer open (negative control first: `Fatal: wrong password or no key found`), **including a Hungarian accented filename verified as raw bytes**. **(c) the customer's route: DOES NOT EXIST, and misinforms.** `ListSupersededEscrow` (`store.go:2841`) is the only reader of a retained `identity_blob` and has **zero production callers** — five call sites, all `_test.go`; the product path (`POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password` → `FetchIdentityEscrow` → `GetHostDRBundle`, `store.go:3152`) selects `FROM host_escrow` — the CURRENT row only. Asked for the old password with the code that demonstrably opens the retained row, the product answered **"the recovery code did not open the sealed bundle — nothing was written"**. **This is the R-224 class again**: there an unreachable hub was reported as a bad code; here a VALID code for retained history is reported as a bad code, and the customer's attempt ends there. **Consequence:** the census answer stands (it was about retention); the countdown banner's promise is true in substance and false in practice; **any capability-map claim that the customer can recover the old history with their recovery code is false today and must move** | **READY — the operator mail is BUILT on main 2026-10-08 (decision 183; controller `a40729a` + hub, ships with the next releases).** The honesty fix is on main too (agent `91b9405`, controller `75b3b39`). Left: the runbook „open a retained package for a household" (design option C, second slice). Design `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-304.md`. | R-198, R-199, R-224, R-241 | Release controller + hub; write the retained-package runbook from the 2026-08-12 drill §4; then close | CC |
| **R-518** | Backup & restore | P2 | **[P2-MEDIUM] „Mentés most" on the whole-system backup stops every app for about eight minutes while the page promises „csak néhány másodpercre".** MEASURED 2026-09-14 (BIGNIGHT, VM 333, 12 apps): the button's call quiesced all 12 stacks at 19:03:23Z (first stopped 19:03:27Z); the local vzdump ran 19:03:49 → 19:09:59Z; the controller then kept the apps stopped for the second (PBS) tier and restarted them at 19:10:09Z after it failed, the last started 19:11:12Z (`phase4/guest-backup-quiesce-log.txt`) — **≈ 7 m 45 s** with every app answering 404. The page under the button: „Pillanatkép-mód: az alkalmazások csak néhány másodpercre állnak le." A household pressing it at dinner loses every app for the length of the dump, and longer on a bigger box. **Fix shape:** state the real expected downtime (it scales with data), or quiesce per tier and not across a second tier's attempt; do not start a tier whose storage is absent (see R-517). **NARROWED 2026-09-15 (controller v0.243.0 + agent v0.131.0):** a tier whose storage the agent reports absent is skipped before anything stops (`backup_tier_skipped`, once per absence; unknown never skipped), and the button copy now says „általában néhány perc, nagyobb adatnál több". Unit-proven with red-proofs. **Still open:** quiesce per tier, so a slow second tier does not keep every app down. **— NIGHT 2026-09-23 (controller v0.267.0):** the copy half is DONE: the page and the confirm now state the measured stop (≈ 8 minutes on a 12-app box), both languages, red-proofed (`audits/night-2026-09-23/A5-*`). The brief's „csak néhány másodpercre" had already gone in v0.243.0. **Still open:** quiesce per tier, so a slow second tier does not keep every app down. | **READY — P2, narrowed to per-tier quiesce; owner: CC (controller). 2026-10-05: the copy now states today's measurement too (demo-hp, 9 apps, local tier only: 5 min 47 s) — controller v0.296.0, `audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partE/`.** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): a one-page design proposal (no code) is in `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-05/design-R-518.md`** — for the operator. **2026-10-06: BUILT — controller v0.301.0, `09` §3 decision 156 (reverses R-82's one window).** One stop per tier; the button makes the local copy only. Measured first, read-only: demo-felhom's night off-site job reached `snapshotted` 2 s after it started, the app back 8 s later (the off-site part of a stop is seconds). **Not shown live:** a press under the new rule — scratch 9202 has no agent connection and the demo boxes take deliveries only. Red tests and the build: `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`D/. **Risk noted, unmeasured:** after a local copy the agent runs its OS step, and the off-site tier then answered BUSY (2026-10-05) — under the new rule that costs one short stop with no copy before the 15-min backoff. **2026-10-06 (night), from Part C:** demo-hp's off-site tier was NOT overdue — its last copy is 2026-10-01 20:15Z (ep0's listing, verify ok), so with the 7-day cadence it is due ~2026-10-08; the night of 2026-10-06→07 is most likely local-only on both demo boxes (demo-felhom's off-site landed 2026-10-06 04:21Z). The two-tier night under the new rule is then ~2026-10-08 on demo-hp. **2026-10-07 (morning): the local-tier night and one press READ BACK** (`audits/readback-2026-10-07/RESULT-B-D.md`): the night stop on demo-hp (9 apps) was ~91 s (was 5 min 47 s), demo-felhom (1 app) ~11 s; one press on demo-hp: 80 s from press to the last app (per app 39–79 s), the copy finished 4 min later with the apps running, only the local tier ran; the page's „kb. 1–1,5 perc" holds. Two channels each (controller log + agent journal / container StartedAt + a 5-s HTTP sampler). **Left:** the first night with both tiers due on demo-hp (~2026-10-08). | — | Read back the ~2026-10-08 night (both tiers on demo-hp); then close | CC |
| **R-893** | Backup & restore | P3 | **After a failed OFF-SITE replay, the rollback pours the NEWER pre-restore copy over the OLDER volume just put back.** Read in source 2026-10-06 (R-638 option A, not measured): `internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go` writes the undo copy from the live (newer) database, replaces the volumes with the snapshot's older tars, then — when the replay fails — `rollbackSafetyDump` loads that newer dump over the older database volume. The loader only drops what the dump knows, so tables the newer migration removed stay; and when the snapshot's older definition was written, the rollback branch does not put the newer definition back, so the older app starts on rolled-back data; non-database volumes stay at the snapshot's state. An order change cannot fix it (the only undo is a logical dump, and its volume was replaced). Known limit in `07` §6.3. | **OPEN — filed 2026-10-06** **2026-10-06 night: verified in source, no code** — `offbox_reconstitute.go:758` (undo dump from the live DB), `:778-860` (files and volumes from the snapshot), `:804` (the snapshot's definition is written when its version differs), `:898` (the rollback loads the newer dump over the older volume; nothing writes the live definition back). Not a reorder fix: it needs R-638 option B (a rebuilding loader) or a pre-restore volume copy (disk cost; R-685's class). Which state a household gets after a failed off-site replay is the operator's call. Next: the 9202 measurement, then the design. | a design: R-638 option B (a loader that rebuilds instead of overlays) or a pre-restore volume copy | Measure it once on 9202 (a forced replay failure after an off-site restore over a migrated app); then a design for the operator | CC |
| **R-893** | Backup & restore | P3 | **After a failed OFF-SITE replay, the rollback pours the NEWER pre-restore copy over the OLDER volume just put back.** Read in source 2026-10-06 (R-638 option A, not measured): `internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go` writes the undo copy from the live (newer) database, replaces the volumes with the snapshot's older tars, then — when the replay fails — `rollbackSafetyDump` loads that newer dump over the older database volume. The loader only drops what the dump knows, so tables the newer migration removed stay; and when the snapshot's older definition was written, the rollback branch does not put the newer definition back, so the older app starts on rolled-back data; non-database volumes stay at the snapshot's state. An order change cannot fix it (the only undo is a logical dump, and its volume was replaced). Known limit in `07` §6.3. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-893.md` — re-verified; and the screen's „your data is back as it was" (`err.backup.db_restore_failed_rolled_back`) is false for files, other volumes and the app version. Question D8 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — filed 2026-10-06** **2026-10-06 night: verified in source, no code** — `offbox_reconstitute.go:758` (undo dump from the live DB), `:778-860` (files and volumes from the snapshot), `:804` (the snapshot's definition is written when its version differs), `:898` (the rollback loads the newer dump over the older volume; nothing writes the live definition back). Not a reorder fix: it needs R-638 option B (a rebuilding loader) or a pre-restore volume copy (disk cost; R-685's class). Which state a household gets after a failed off-site replay is the operator's call. Next: the 9202 measurement, then the design. | a design: R-638 option B (a loader that rebuilds instead of overlays) or a pre-restore volume copy | Measure it once on 9202 (a forced replay failure after an off-site restore over a migrated app); then a design for the operator | CC |
| **R-895** | Backup & restore | P2 | **The hub's clean-up-window check trusts the snapshot counts the box sends, so a broken-into box (or past-dated fakes added through the add-only key) can shrink the real off-site history without an alarm.** READ 2026-10-06 night in source (R-822's design): the before/after comparison uses counts the box itself reports (`hub/internal/offsitekeys/service.go:284`, `:343`); new fakes keep the count level. Decision 68 already accepts a box-trusted count. | **OPEN — filed 2026-10-06 night** **2026-10-07 07:58: kept open for later (`09` §3 decision 166).** | a design + one read-only measurement (does the Storage Box shell on port 23 show snapshot file upload times?) | Option B of `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/design-R-822.md`: the hub lists the repo's `snapshots/` files over its own login before and after a window and alarms on snapshots no box run explains | CC |
| **R-49** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P2] The offsite capture set is ~90% cache and duplication — 1.1 GB of a 1.2 GB immich "photo backup".** Measured 2026-07-19: `immich_ml_cache.tar` **823 660 032 B (~60%)** — re-downloadable ML model weights; `immich_postgres_data.tar` **308 251 136 B (~23%)** — a raw tar of the postgres data dir that DUPLICATES the logical `.sql` dump captured beside it; `upload/backups/` **18 MB** — immich's own nightly dump, a backup inside the backup, growing daily; plus the stranded pre-v3 `dccc13fe…` tree (~36 MB) no DB has ever referenced. Actual irreplaceable content: **72 MB of originals**. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-19, size S–M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: wasted space and transfer, no data risk; needs a capture-set ruling, not a sale blocker.** | — | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md` §4 (full byte breakdown).** This is the customer's offsite quota and transfer cost, and it lands on the Hetzner sub-account they are billed for. **Recorded, deliberately not changed** — a capture-set exclusion is a data-loss-shaped decision and gets its own ruling, not a drive-by edit. Candidates in priority order: (a) `immich_ml_cache` — pure cache, strongest case; (b) the `postgres_data` volume tar where a logical dump of the same DB is already captured (the dump is what the restore path actually replays); (c) `upload/backups/`. Likely generalises past immich into a template-classification rule about cache volumes and self-backup directories, so it should be specified against the catalog, not one app | CC |
| **R-127** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The catalog's `data_key: true` flag is UNRELIABLE — at least four data-encrypting keys the catalog itself labels as encryption keys are unflagged; and the O4 restore path can regenerate a DB password that then does not match the restored data directory** | **READY (S/M)** **2026-10-06: leg (a) PUSHED** to the live catalog (`c265b37`). **2026-10-06 (burn-down night, later): leg (b) NEEDS A DESIGN.** `07` §7.4 sets no direction; refusing the restore without the DB password, or `ALTER USER` after it, each change restore behaviour on customer data. | — | **Found by D5's Part 0, and it is why D5's boundary is `type: secret` rather than `data_key`.** Two separable legs. **(a) The misclassification.** Only 5 fields across 4 apps set `data_key: true` (`adventurelog/SECRET_KEY`, `homebox/HBOX_AUTH_API_KEY_PEPPER`, `papra/AUTH_SECRET`, `sparkyfitness/{API_ENCRYPTION_KEY,BETTER_AUTH_SECRET}`), yet `n8n/N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY` („Titkosítási kulcs"), `wanderer/POCKETBASE_ENCRYPTION_KEY` („Adatbázis titkosítási kulcs"), `calcom/CALENDSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `bookstack/APP_KEY` are unflagged — the catalog's own Hungarian labels contradict the flag. **D5 makes this non-urgent but not harmless:** everything `type: secret` now travels, so the keys DO reach the drive; what stays wrong is the **fail-closed gate**, which only refuses for `data_key` names — so if one of these is missing from both sources the restore proceeds onto data it cannot decrypt instead of refusing. Fix = flag them (`app-catalog-felhom.eu`, a catalog-only change) + a gate/test that the flag set and the label set agree. **(b) The regenerated-DB-password trap.** `internal/backup/restore_unit.go` O4 generates a replacement for any missing non-data-key secret. Proven on `postgres:16-alpine`: with PGDATA restored from the volume tar, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` is ignored (initdb skipped), so the app fails over the compose network while the dump replay still succeeds through the container's local **trust** socket — success reported, data unreachable. v0.188.0 corrected the WARN's false claim that *"stored data is unaffected"* and scoped it, but did **not** add a guard: D5 shrinks this to the rare case (the secret was empty at capture AND absent from the guest). Real fix = either treat a DB password as fail-closed like a data key, or `ALTER USER` to the regenerated value after the volume restore. 18 DB/root-password fields are in scope; MariaDB fails loudly instead (Access denied), which is the safer half | CC |
| **R-231** | Backup & restore | P3 | **`/opt/backup/scripts/` on DooPlex is unversioned host state** — found 2026-08-06 while adding the auto-memory store to the backup set. No repository tracks the scripts that protect the recovery chain, so the edit made that day (`CLAUDE_MEMORY_DIR` in `backup-config.sh`, multi-path restic call in `backup-data.sh`) exists only on the box. This is the same class the part-2 session was closing, found inside the fix for it; the change is transcribed in `felhom.eu/workspace/README.md` so it is at least *recorded*. **Two related facts, both understating current safety:** the backup destination (`/mnt/5_hdd/backup`) is on the **same physical disk** as the workspace it protects, and the DooPlex backup set has **no off-site leg** (`sync-hetzner-backups.sh` is jarrs.eu and pulls *from* Hetzner *to* DooPlex). Bringing a root-owned production backup script under version control, and deciding what installs it, is its own scoped change. | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
| **R-314** | Backup & restore | P3 | **`StopAbandon` has no web route — a customer who telephones is served by a command line.** `--abandon-stop` exists on the controller binary (`cmd/controller/main.go:86`) and refuses rather than silently no-opping, which is right. But there is no handler: the only in-product way to cancel a countdown is the customer finding their recovery code (Scenario G cancels it at the moment the code proves they still have it). **An operator who is telephoned instead has to reach a shell on the customer's machine.** Used this session on the operator's ruling, container stopped first so the running controller could not overwrite `settings.json` from memory — a sequencing subtlety that is itself an argument for a route | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-12, RANK 3** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** There is no operator door into a RUNNING controller (its HTTP surface is the household's session; the CLI runs in a separate process and cannot safely trigger a job in the running one). Same design as R-177 and R-279. | R-241, R-307 | An operator-authenticated POST that calls the same `StopAbandon`, so the telephone path and the code path converge | CC |
| **R-314** | Backup & restore | P3 | **`StopAbandon` has no web route — a customer who telephones is served by a command line.** `--abandon-stop` exists on the controller binary (`cmd/controller/main.go:86`) and refuses rather than silently no-opping, which is right. But there is no handler: the only in-product way to cancel a countdown is the customer finding their recovery code (Scenario G cancels it at the moment the code proves they still have it). **An operator who is telephoned instead has to reach a shell on the customer's machine.** Used this session on the operator's ruling, container stopped first so the running controller could not overwrite `settings.json` from memory — a sequencing subtlety that is itself an argument for a route **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-314-279-177.md` — the box's own 14-day countdown has no operator door (the hub's 7-day phase does, decision 74); one door for R-314 + R-279: a fixed list of operator actions carried in the report reply. Question D1 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-12, RANK 3** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** There is no operator door into a RUNNING controller (its HTTP surface is the household's session; the CLI runs in a separate process and cannot safely trigger a job in the running one). Same design as R-177 and R-279. | R-241, R-307 | An operator-authenticated POST that calls the same `StopAbandon`, so the telephone path and the code path converge | CC |
| **R-401** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Revisit the off-site integrity depth when a real store is LARGE — the default rests on ONE measurement, on ONE 134 MB store.** Controller v0.228.0 (R-399) made `--read-data-subset=100%` the default for every box. The whole justification is a single data point: `demo-hp`, 2026-08-30, 140 829 678 B / 2 651 blobs / 67 snapshots, structure 35.0 s vs 100% **39.2 s** — four seconds. Re-proven live 2026-08-31 at 38.7 s. **It does not extrapolate, and the reason is structural: the structure check's cost tracks the INDEX, a read-data run's tracks the DATA.** A 50 GB store is ~370x the data and this curve says nothing about it. **Nothing was invented from that one point** — no rotation schedule, no size threshold, no bandwidth budget — because four production designs in this project were specced against unvalidated mechanisms and all four were wrong. **`readDataSubsetRe` already accepts `n/m`**, so a rotating schedule (`1/7` on a different seventh each week) needs no parser work when the time comes; the missing input is a measurement on a large store, not code. **THE TRIGGER IS AN EVENT, NOT A DATE:** the slow-check WARN from v0.228.0 firing on any box (`integritySlowNoticeThreshold`, 5 min) — that line names the duration, the depth and this row. **WHAT HAPPENS IF NOBODY ACTS:** every box re-reads its entire store every week, however large it grows, and the first person to notice is a customer whose upload is saturated. **Whoever acts must also revisit `integrityCheckTimeout` (30 min)**, which is now the number a large store meets first. | **OPEN — WATCHING** | — | When the WARN fires: measure the curve on that store, then choose between a rotation (`n/m`), a size-conditional default, or leaving it. Do NOT choose from this row's numbers — they are the small-store case. | CC |
| **R-409** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Nothing in the product can vouch for the bytes of a restored recovery unit — the only hash record covers 0.002 % of it.** MEASURED on demo-hp 2026-08-31 against kimai's restored unit: `manifest.json`'s `checksums` object carries sha256 for `.felhom.yml` (2 235 B), `app.yaml` (488 B) and `docker-compose.yml` (2 195 B) — **4 918 bytes of a 213 231 242-byte unit**. The database dump (48 217 B) and the two named-volume tars (160 331 776 B + 52 845 056 B) — the recoverable data, 99.998 % of the bytes — have no recorded hash anywhere. **And nothing else supplies one:** restic 0.14.0's `restore --verify` is a size-and-mtime reconciliation (a size-and-mtime-preserving one-byte corruption of a 160 MB tar passed clean, red-proofed), and `restic ls --json` file nodes in 0.14.0 carry name, size, mode, uid/gid and three timestamps and **no content hash**. **So "the restore produced correct files" is currently unanswerable by any automated means.** **What is NOT claimed here:** `restic check --read-data-subset=100%` already proves the STORE's packs, and the config files that ARE hashed are the ones a wrong-content failure would be hardest to spot in. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-361 | Cheapest fix, and it is already half-built: extend the capture's `checksums` to cover `db_dumps` and `volume_dumps` — R-361 already computes a canonical dump sha256 to prove itself, so the value exists at capture time. Then a restore-test has a real reference and R-87's narrow version becomes a content check rather than a completeness one. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md` §Q2, §Q3. | CC |
| **R-433** | Backup & restore | P3 | **A sub-account cannot reach ANY Storage Box snapshot, by any name — so clause (b) of the 2026-09-01 R-95 re-scope ("the rest is recoverable file by file") is NOT SUPPORTED.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on `demo-hp` over the credential the box already holds, read-only, no delete verb issued. **The sweep:** a batched `stat -c %n` over Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell (500–600 paths per round trip, stdout carrying only paths that exist) tried **777,600** names of the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` across nine full days at second granularity, and 126 alternative shapes — **zero resolved.** **The control is what makes the zero mean anything:** the identical 600-name batch with one real path appended returned it in 6 of 6 batches. **The structural cause:** `/home` (the customer data, `u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**; `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**; `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding `felhom-repo`. **What still stands:** clause (a) — the box can delete its live repository but cannot WRITE into `/.zfs/snapshot` — is unchanged and re-confirmed. **What is now open again:** the only routes to the older copy are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box (deletes newer snapshots, hits every customer on it) and the provider API (fenced by §11-D, and `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go` has **no snapshot method at all**, so it needs new code regardless). **NOT ESTABLISHED, and it is the question that decides whether per-file recovery exists for anyone:** whether the MAIN account can see the snapshots. No main-account credential exists in this project. **The ranking is Viktor's; I am not re-ranking R-95 — but the argument that moved it down is the argument this drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER 2026-09-01.** The one question that can move this is drafted and ready to send: **Question 1** of `documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md` — *can the MAIN account retrieve individual files from a snapshot, without a whole-box restore?* **Neither answer leaves this row where it is:** "yes" makes per-file recovery real but permanently operator-only, and closes this; "no, full restore only" means the snapshots do not bound a single customer's exposure at all, because using them costs every other customer on the box their newer snapshots — **and R-95 becomes urgent.** Nothing here can progress without it, and it is not CC's to send (§11-D). Tracked by a dated check in the DUE-CHECKS block. **⚠ A TRAP ON THE WAY TO THIS ANSWER, found by the operator 2026-09-01 and armed against in the questions file: HETZNER HAS TWO SIMILARLY-NAMED PRODUCTS WHOSE DOCS SAY OPPOSITE THINGS.** **Storage SHARE** (a managed Nextcloud, NOT us) documents *"Currently, we only support restores for the full backup ZFS snapshot to a specific point in time"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-share/faq/backup-snapshot/`). **Storage BOX** (ours) documents the opposite — *"You can download individual files or entire directories as usual"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots/`). **A web search for the obvious phrasing surfaces the SHARE page, and it reads like a definitive NO.** Tell them apart by the giveaways: the Share page talks about *Nextcloud's data cache*, a *database dump* and the *konsoleH* interface, and never mentions Storage Box. **Why this is filed and not left as trivia: a support agent could answer Question 1 from the wrong page, and that answer would push this row to the top of the register for no reason.** Question 1 now names the product, quotes the Storage Box line, and says explicitly that we know what the Share FAQ says. **If an answer cites full-snapshot-only, check WHICH PRODUCT it is about before acting on it.** **Nothing in this repository ever leaned on the Share claim** — verified by grep at the time; the only vendor line we cite is the Storage Box one. **RE-DATED 2026-09-15 → 2026-09-22 (due-checks gate):** the operator mailbox read through the Gmail connector (`(from:hetzner OR subject:hetzner OR "Storage Box") after:2026/09/01`) holds no Hetzner reply — one match, our own `offsite_snapshots_dropped` alarm. Whether the two tickets were ever sent is not visible to CC; if they were not, sending them is the operator's act. **-- ANSWERED. Hetzner replied on ticket #2026090103040671; the operator supplied the thread on 2026-09-22 after this session searched for it and WRONGLY reported no answer (see the instrument note below and R-628).** **Q1 - can the MAIN account read individual files and directories out of a specific snapshot, without restoring the whole box?** Hetzner: *"With the main account it should be possible to download files and directories from the snapshot as it is stated in the documentation"*, citing `docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots#access-to-snapshots`; and separately *"A restLine truncated
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-164** | Backup & restore | P4 | **C2's chain: the DB volume tar cannot be dropped until a SOUND dump predicate exists.** The unit carries both a volume tar and a SQL dump; the restore uses **both** — the dump is authoritative and replayed *after* the tar so it WINS (F17), with only the DB service up (R-47) — `internal/backup/restore_unit.go:262-266`. Dropping the DB container's tar would halve DB-app units **and** close the R-127(b) initdb-skip password trap (restored PGDATA ⇒ `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` ignored). | **BLOCKED** — on the predicate | a dump-validity predicate that is not `accounts has rows` | **The obvious gate is DEAD, measured:** `ValidateDump` warns when the `accounts` table is empty, and that warning was **correct** — the live DB genuinely had 0 accounts, and seeding one stopped the warning and put the row in the dump. But **a fresh appliance legitimately has zero accounts**, so promoting that predicate to a gate would **block every new customer's first backup**. Order: (1) a sound predicate — dump vs **live** per-table counts, not an absolute expectation; (2) warn→gate; (3) tar-drop. **Until (1), the tar is load-bearing** — not because dumps are bad, but because nothing can yet prove one is good. Pairs with **R-127** | CC |
| **R-213** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Putting files back in place — the half the recovery screen deliberately does not do.** The screen (R-193, controller v0.200.0) unlocks the repository and LISTS what is in it; restoring is per-app and lives in the backups area, and the operator ruled the two separate on 2026-08-05: *a screen that unlocks and then offers to overwrite is two decisions wearing one button*. What is missing is the step after the listing — a customer who can now SEE their files still has to work out, per app, which restore to choose. **The operator named its requirement: a live-versus-backup comparison** — the customer must be able to see what would change before anything is overwritten | **OPEN — not started, deliberately** | the comparison design (nothing exists for it yet) | Design the live-vs-backup comparison, then the put-back flow on top of it. Do NOT fold it into the recovery screen | Operator + CC |
| **R-246** | Backup & restore | P4 | **A leftover staleness flag has silently disabled the new recovery discriminator on `demo-hp` since 2026-08-04, and the flag is WRONG.** Found by a read-only spike, 2026-08-08. **Q1 — traced to an act, to the second:** at `2026-08-04 20:15:49` the hub emitted `offsite_reissued` and `escrow_stale` in the same second — an operator **Re-issue** pressed during the R-201 drill, three minutes after `escrow_blob_served` at 20:12:40/20:12:54. That was `offsite.ReissueCredentials`'s **precautionary** `MarkEscrowStale` call, which **hub v0.95.0 REMOVED the very next day** (R-196 / R-204 item 2) precisely because it marked healthy escrows stale. **Q2 — the flag is wrong, measured on both sides:** the hub's blob seals `restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6769c…d080a`, and the key the box is actually using hashes to **the identical value**. The blob covers the key. **Q3 — nothing clears it by itself:** the ONLY writer of `stale_at = NULL` is `SaveHostEscrow`'s `ON CONFLICT` — i.e. a fresh escrow ceremony, **which is the one act that would supersede the good blob**. So the only exit from a false alarm is the destructive act the false alarm recommends. **Q5 — the blast radius, enumerated rather than assumed:** (1) `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` withholds `restic_pw_sha256` from the ACK; (2) a **pending** box can never auto-confirm, so (3) **every off-site run is refused indefinitely** — neither bites `demo-hp`, which was already `escrowed` and is backing up healthily (12 snapshots, last success 2026-08-07T02:15:35Z); (4) the customer is told to create a new code; (5) **NEW — v0.206.0's shape (c) is inert**, because the box records an empty hub hash and falls back to (a)/(b), so the recovery screen would stay silent even if recovery were needed. **Q6 — a fresh box CANNOT reach this state:** `MarkEscrowStale` has **no production caller anywhere in the tree** (census: only its own definition, two comments and two test references). **The next walk cannot meet it.** **NOT CLEARED, deliberately** — Q2's answer says the fix is to clear this instance, but whether to also stop the column being settable at all is a separate ruling, and the spike was scoped read-only. **✅ THE FLAG IS CLEARED — operator-approved and applied 2026-08-08.** One row, identity-matched on `host_id` and guarded on `stale_at IS NOT NULL`; `changes()` returned **1**. **Verified end to end, not just in the database:** the hub now serves the hash again, the box recorded `hub_escrow_key_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6769c…d080a` at `11:10:19Z`, and that is **byte-identical to the key it is using** — so shape (c) compares, matches, and correctly stays silent. **The false stale warning is gone, proven with a positive control** rather than an absent line: **0** `escrow-confirm` lines since the restart while **5** scheduler lines in the same window prove the box was logging, and the recorded hash proves an ACK was processed. *(Method note: the hub pod is Alpine with no `sqlite3`; it was installed into the container's ephemeral writable layer — image and node untouched, gone on restart. SQLite's own file locking coordinated the write with the live hub; an earlier attempt failed cleanly on quoting and changed nothing, which is the fail-safe working.)* **STILL OPEN under this ID: the ruling on whether `stale_at` keeps a live setter at all.** It currently has NO production caller, so the column is write-only-by-accident — a field that changes behaviour, that nothing sets and nothing can see (R-248). Either give it an evidential setter or retire it; **do not leave it as a trap that only a database read can spring.** | **READY — flag cleared; the column ruling is still owed** — owner Viktor **Folded R-248 2026-10-03** (the same ruling: give `stale_at` a visible, evidence-bearing setter, or retire it). | — | — | operator |
| **R-279** | Backup & restore | P4 | **There is no operator-triggerable off-site backup.** The only route to `POST /backup/offbox/run` is the customer's own dashboard session; `signed_jobs` carries opaque operator-SIGNED blobs and the hub holds no signing key. This cost the rehearsal a stop: preparing the run needed one off-site push and there was no operator path to it. Sibling of **R-177** (no operator-triggerable fill check) | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — the same missing operator door as R-314 and R-177. | — | Same shape as R-177; solve both together | CC |
| **R-279** | Backup & restore | P4 | **There is no operator-triggerable off-site backup.** The only route to `POST /backup/offbox/run` is the customer's own dashboard session; `signed_jobs` carries opaque operator-SIGNED blobs and the hub holds no signing key. This cost the rehearsal a stop: preparing the run needed one off-site push and there was no operator path to it. Sibling of **R-177** (no operator-triggerable fill check) **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-314-279-177.md` — still true: the only on-demand off-site run is the household's dashboard route; same door as R-314. Question D1 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — the same missing operator door as R-314 and R-177. | — | Same shape as R-177; solve both together | CC |
| **R-336** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The offsite DR endpoint is polled about once per second, and that is what turned a slow leak into an outage.** ep0's PBS proxy served **~85,000 requests/day** — a flat **3,538/hour**, every hour, from two boxes: `74,445 GET /api2/json/admin/datastore` (`libwww-perl`, i.e. PVE's `pvestatd`) and `73,171 GET /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/status` (`proxmox-backup-client`). Two pollers asking substantially the same question at the same rate. On 2026-08-18 this walked a connection leak in the proxy to its 1024-fd soft limit in **14 days**, wedging the offsite tier for 9½ hours (`audits/INCIDENT-ep0-pbs-fd-exhaustion-2026-08-18.md`). The `LimitNOFILE=65536` drop-in applied that morning raises the ceiling **but does not fix the leak** — it converts a fortnightly outage into a multi-year one, which is mitigation, not a fix. A DR endpoint that is written to weekly does not need to be asked about every second | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** **2026-10-06 night: no hub half** — the pollers are pvestatd and proxmox-backup-client on the boxes; the lever (disabling the storage entry) collides with the agent's pbsdr health model; still a design question. | — | **CORRECTED 2026-08-18 (evening) — the easy lever named here does not exist.** This cell used to read *"PVE storage status is the prime suspect, and its interval is tunable"*. **The first half is right and the second half is false.** `pvestatd` stats EVERY configured storage on each 10-second cycle, and Proxmox staff have stated the interval is not designed to be configurable — so there is no knob to turn down. The only lever PVE actually offers is disabling the storage entry (`pvesm set <id> --disable 1`) around the backup window, and that is **substantially more than a tuning knob**: it collides with `felhom-agent/internal/pbsdr/manager.go`'s health model, where an inactive-but-existing entry drives the consume-the-one-time-secret recovery path. So the fix is a design question (does the hub still need a 15-minute fill reading at all, given R-339 now reports reachability separately?), not a config edit. **Doc-only correction — no agent code was changed.** The remaining step is unchanged: cut the poll rate by whatever means survives that question, then confirm the fd count between restarts stops climbing — the positive observable, per standing rule 3. **Baseline measured 2026-08-18, and the FIRST measurement published was WRONG.** The initial "~85/day, matching the ~73/day implied by the failure" came from a single 17-minute window whose delta was **one descriptor** — a sample of one cannot carry a daily rate, and the agreement that made it feel solid was coincidence. **Re-measured over two independent windows the same morning: 183/day (31 min) and 200/day (5.6 h)** — ~2.6x the published figure, putting the runway to the 65536 ceiling at **~357 days, not the ~2 years first claimed**. **And the named mechanism is the minority one:** across that window `CLOSE-WAIT` held flat at 1 while `ESTAB` grew 45→49 — *all* the growth was established connections, and at the wedge the split was 1011 ESTAB / 543 CLOSE-WAIT. **The fix must target connections the proxy never reaps, not just `CLOSE-WAIT` sockets.** The PBS 4.2.5-1 upgrade (2026-08-18) did NOT change the slope and was never expected to — see R-341 **SPIKE 2026-08-20 — THE PREMISE OF THIS ROW DOES NOT SURVIVE MEASUREMENT, and that is a change in what the row IS, not new evidence on it.** `audits/SPIKE-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20.md`. **The leak is OURS, and the poll rate is not what feeds it.** Every one of the 388 leaked descriptors is an ESTABLISHED connection held open by **`felhom-agent`** on the boxes — 194 on each, `ss -tnp` naming a single PID per box, and **zero** held by `pvestatd` or `proxmox-backup-client`. Confirmed independently from ep0's access log over the same 46.18 h window: `libwww-perl` (pvestatd) **81,192 requests -> 0 descriptors**, `proxmox-backup-client` **80,061 requests -> 0 descriptors**, `Go-http-client/1.1` (the agent) **387 `/snapshots` calls -> 388 sockets — one per call, within one**. So **162,404 requests, 99.5% of the traffic, produce 0% of the leak.** **Mechanism, named from source:** `felhom-agent/internal/pbs/client.go:56-60` builds `&http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg}` — a composite literal, so `IdleConnTimeout` is the zero value = **no limit** (`http.DefaultTransport` sets 90 s; a literal does not inherit it) — and `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go:1486` (`pbsTargetsFromPVE`) builds **a fresh client every cycle**, as its own doc comment states. Each cycle therefore strands one idle keep-alive connection in a transport nothing ever closes; `CloseIdleConnections`/`IdleConnTimeout`/`MaxIdleConns` appear **nowhere** in the agent repo. Cadences reconcile without fitting: 900 s hub poll (184.7 cycles) + 6 h `DefaultVerifyCadence` (7.7 cycles) = 192.4 predicted vs **194 observed per box**. **CONSEQUELine truncated
| **R-526** | Backup & restore | P4 | **[P3-LOW] A host delete cannot release only the customer's ep0 PBS token: the endpoint's one removal op destroys every backup group too.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 from source: `tenantsync.Deprovision` „DESTROYS the customer's PBS namespace, all its backup groups, and its token". The task asked for „PBS token elengedése" on host delete; building it needs a new token-only op in the ep0 tenantsync script — a new operation on a protected box. Not built. R-511's adopt path makes the kept token usable instead. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (new ep0 op yes/no), CC (build)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: operator teardown op on a protected box; adopt path covers the need.** | — | — | operator |
| **R-541** | Backup & restore | P4 | **[P3-LOW] There is no path to move a customer between off-site boxes, or from shared to dedicated.** Read from source 2026-09-16: provisioning is idempotent-reuse keyed on the customer (`shared already provisioned for tester-1 (subaccount 311327)`), and a dedicated deprovision destroys the repository — so "move this customer" has no safe route today. It becomes reachable the moment R-540's second pool box exists, or when a customer outgrows the shared model. **Needs:** a move that copies the repository, re-keys, and only then releases the old sub-account — a new mechanism nobody has measured. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub) — design first** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: needs a second pool box or an outgrown customer first; operator-only and far off (0.3% full).** | — | — | CC |
@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R-298** | Storage & devices | P3 | **The `/storage` page's unregistered list is filtered by `role==='user-data'`, so a drive that is also the backup target can never be registered from it.** `storage.html:363` routes anything not `user-data` into the read-only protected group with NO actions. On the rebuilt `demo-hp` the NVMe is deliberately BOTH the user-data drive and the `felhom-backup` target (`/etc/pve/storage.cfg`: `dir: felhom-backup` → `/mnt/nvme-1tb`), so it renders locked. **This is the SECOND reason that page was empty** during the reinstall rehearsal, independent of R-280's candidate-source defect, and R-280's fix does not touch it — attaching is non-destructive, so the format-wizard protection is the wrong gate for a REGISTER action | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-10** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** Registering a drive the agent classes as the backup target conflicts with the agent's eject/decommission rule (403 for that role). First: is a drive holding both app data and backups a supported layout? | R-280 | Split the role gate: `user-data` keeps destructive actions; any mounted role may be REGISTERED | CC |
| **R-330** | Storage & devices | P3 | **Disk health Phase 2 — the three SMART attributes the wire does not carry.** The failing drive's most telling counter was **187 `Reported_Uncorrect`**, sitting at normalized **1** against threshold **0** with a raw count of **1001** — one point from failing and structurally unable to get there. Also wanted: **199 `UDMA_CRC_Error_Count`** (cabling) and **188 `Command_Timeout`**. None are on the agent→controller wire today, so v0.215.0's ladder could not use them. Phase 2 also persists periodic SMART **samples** (the right home is `metrics.MetricsStore`, NOT the Phase-1 state file, which is one record per disk and must stay that way). **This is a declared WIRE change, so under the G-1 gate the hub must model the new fields in the SAME session** — that is precisely why it was kept out of Phase 1, where it would have turned a one-word severity fix into a three-repo change | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** **2026-10-06 night: the wire half BUILT on main (unreleased):** the agent sends SMART 187 `reported_uncorrect`, 188 `command_timeout` (raw, vendor-packed on some drives — carried as reported), 199 `udma_crc_errors` (pointer + omitempty: unknown is absent, never 0); the controller decodes them and the hub's host-report mirror models them (G-1 wire gate green; it convicted the agent half alone). **Carried only** — no verdict, banner, mail or alarm reads them (`TestR330_CountersChangeNoVerdictYet`); using them changes what a household is told and is the next slice, with persisting samples. Red-proofs `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/r330/`. Ships with agent v0.150.0 and the next controller and hub releases. | R-328 (closed) | Add 187/199/188 to the agent's `SmartSummary` + hub model in one session; then persist samples | CC |
| **R-332** | Storage & devices | P3 | **The new Hiba-from-counters path has never fired on real hardware.** v0.215.0's whole point is a verdict the product could not previously reach, and it is proven only against the committed fixture's values in unit tests (12 scenario groups, 11 of 12 red-proofs failing as required). The live validation on demo-hp proved the **negative** — three healthy disks still read Rendben across the deploy, no false alert — and the **severity wire** end to end, but no live disk has actually reached Hiba. **This is the honest gap and it must not be closed by pointing at the fixture tests**: the drive that produced the fixture is in DooPlex, which is Tier 2 and never a drill target, and the demo boxes are all-flash and healthy | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-14, NARROWED same day.** One item originally in this gap is now PROVEN LIVE: the **persisted state surviving a controller restart**. The v0.215.0→v0.216.0 redeploy destroyed and rebuilt the container, and the new one read back a `changed_at` written by the PREVIOUS version (`2026-08-14T07:23:14.640216851Z`, still intact at 09:31:35Z) instead of re-baselining — Scenario L on real hardware, not just the production-path unit test. **What remains unproven is the verdict itself, plus the stronger restart half: an already-ALERTED disk not re-alerting** | a real degrading disk, or an injection harness | **Closing condition:** a live disk reaching Hiba from counters, OR a deliberate injection through the REAL pipeline (agent `/disks` → controller check → hub event), not a hand-set verdict | CC |
| **R-756** | Storage & devices | P3 | **[P3-LOW] On 9202, "remove with drive data" refuses calibre-web with 409 „…/scratch_hdd/userdata/calibre-web tárhely jelenleg nem elérhető", while the controller container lists that folder.** MEASURED twice on 2026-10-01 (`audits/lockouts-2026-10-01/B/B1…`, `audits/calibre-name-and-prune-2026-10-01/A/A1…`): `POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/remove` with `remove_hdd_data` → 409; `docker exec felhom-controller ls -ld /mnt/felhom-drives/scratch_hdd/userdata/calibre-web` → the directory (dated 2026-09-22). The walk then removed the app keeping the data (R-442's fail-closed answer). Either the drive is not a registered drive on this scratch box (a test-venue artefact) or the resolver reads another path than the one it names. Not measured which. **-- 2026-10-01 (night, new apps):** the same 409 for Grimmory (`remove_hdd_data`), and a drive app's per-app backup is NOT offered for restore after a remove — the controller logged `drive … not mounted — skipping ensure (held by drive gate)`; the unit lives on that drive. So on 9202 checklist row 2.5 cannot be shown for any drive app until its scratch drive is a registered drive (`audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/restore-why.txt`). **Checked from source 2026-10-05 (burn-down round 2):** Mechanism found in source: the refusal comes from felhom-controller@114ff27 controller/internal/stacks/delete.go:147-149 if !m.DriveLive(hddPath) -> msgDriveAbsentFmt with hddPath, and DriveLive is deploy.go:1007-1011 return m.isMountPoint(hddPath) -- it requires HDD_PATH ITSELF to be a mount point. Everywhere else HDD_PATH is compared to a registered storage path (api/router.go:574-575, web/handlers.go:3049, storage_handlers.go:528), i.e. a drive root. The message names .../scratch_hdd/use | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A LIVE READING.** The refusal shows that app's recorded HDD_PATH is a sub-folder of the drive (the R-839 shape); loosening the check would weaken the boot start gate. Next: that app's HDD_PATH and `findmnt` inside 9202. | — | — | CC |
@@ -198,11 +197,11 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-861** | Security & access | P2 | **The agent's sudoers lets the agent user reach root without the operator key, so "root-minimized" (`03` §3) overstates it and the root-owned trust files (decision 93, the bundle's R17) are defence in depth, not a boundary.** READ 2026-10-04 from `felhom-agent/configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` (not exploited): `FELHOM_GUESTHOOK` installs `/tmp/felhom-guest-hook-*.sh` as a hookscript Proxmox runs as root at guest start, and `pct reboot` is granted; `FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY` installs a script + a systemd unit that run as root at boot; `FELHOM_ESCROW` runs `/usr/local/bin/felhom-agent` as root, and `FELHOM_SELFUPDATE apply` accepts a sha the agent itself passes. A compromised agent PROCESS is therefore root on its host. Fix direction: each of the four becomes a root-owned wrapper that checks its own input (fixed content or a signature), like `felhom-os-apply`; delivered by the config bundle. `11` §5.4.2, `03` §11. | **NARROWED 2026-10-05 — FIXED agent v0.146.1 for every root path found (nine, not four), delivered to demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 by a step bundle (R-880); live on both demo boxes: `sudo -l` 93/93 (64 commands allowed, 29 attacks refused — 23 of them allowed before), capability probe 67/67, a staged unit over /etc/sudoers.d refused. Design `03` §3.1, decision 122. LEFT, each named there: (a) the controller-swap image ref is guest-scoped (a compromised agent can run a chosen pinned-registry image in the guest); (b) the felhom-op SSH key is hub-delivered, not signed (felhom-op's sudo is scoped, not root); (c) the escrow ceremony hands the agent R by design (the box's PBS key). Tester 2: not delivered (offline).** **2026-10-06 night: design written** (`audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/design-R-861.md`). Correction: (a) is not "pinned-registry" — the `tee` content is unchecked by sudo, so any image from any registry runs in the guest with the docker socket (`03` §3.1 corrected). Pick: (a) close before the first paying customer (a `felhom-priv-apply controller-image` verb; ~1–2 h, rides the bundle); (b) and (c) accept for the first customers. Waits for the operator. **2026-10-07 07:58: `09` §3 decision 165 — (a) A1 yes before the first paying customer; (b) B3 accept + B2 hygiene in the same bundle; (c) C2 accept.** **2026-10-07: (a) A1 and (b) B2 DELIVERED (agent 0.151.0 + bundle on demo-hp, demo-felhom, Tester 1; probe 68/68).** Live on demo-hp: no `tee` grant left in `sudo -l -U felhom-agent`; the verb `felhom-priv-apply ^controller-image [0-9]+$` is the route; a hand-fed `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` → `REFUSED [I1]` rc 3, the guest's image file unchanged; the old `pct exec … tee` asks for a password; felhom-op's pct lines anchored (`audits/day-2026-10-07/C/C-live-demo-hp.txt`). **LEFT:** one managed controller swap seen through the verb — no newer controller existed today; the next controller release shows it. (c) accepted (decision 165). | — | the operator decides whether (a)–(c) are accepted or need work before the first paying customer | CC |
| **R-132** | Security & access | P3 | **`curl -w '%{redirect_url}'` reconstructs the request URL WITH its basic-auth credential** — so a `-u ":$HUB_PW"` call that never put the password in a URL still printed it **Merged 2026-10-05 from R-350 (duplicate):** (1) 2026-08-20 occurrence: POST /configuration/artifacts answers 303; leak lives only in the CC transcript under ~/.claude/projects/ on DooPlex, not in git/evidence (checked then). (2) `-v` and `--libcurl` also re-render the credential, not only %{redirect_url}; confirm redirects with %{http_code} + follow-up GET. (3) Rotation path: hub /configuration form (current_password/new_password/confirm_password); DB override wins over ConfigMap (break-glass); CC can rotate file-to-file without printing (operator-present-one-time-secrets) if asked. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — **ACTION: rotate `HUB_PW`** **Folded R-580 2026-10-03** (the same `curl -w %{redirect_url}` credential echo, seen again 2026-09-18). | — | Happened on 2026-07-31 while red-proofing the R-120 gate: the hub operator password was written to the session transcript by the write-out format, not by the request. `-u` is safe; the *reporting* was not. Rule: read the redirect from `-D -` and grep `^Location:`, never `%{redirect_url}`, on any authenticated call. Rotate the hub password (`/configuration` → Login password; ConfigMap `auth.password_hash` is the reset path) and update `~/.config/credentials` | Viktor |
| **R-137** | Security & access | P3 | **Cloudflare geo-WAF rules are zone-scoped and non-namespaced — four cross-tenant faults.** `globalRuleDesc = "[felhom-geo] Global"` (`waf.go:18`) is one literal description per ZONE; `appRuleDescPrefix` keys by app name with no customer (`waf.go:21`); `BuildGlobalExpression` has no positive hostname scoping (`waf.go:241`); `applyDiff` deletes every `[felhom-geo]` rule not in THIS box's desired set (`geosync.go:320`) | READY (M) — **blocks shared-zone onboarding** | — | With two customers in one zone: they overwrite each other's Global rule forever; one customer's country policy applies zone-wide; per-app rules collide by name; and disabling the feature for one (or the hub's `RemoveGeoRules`) wipes them all. Interim mitigation, no code: keep geo-restriction OFF for every shared-zone customer. Fix = namespace descriptions by `customer_id` + add `http.host ends_with "<domain>"` to both expressions — a TWO-REPO change (controller + hub `RemoveGeoRules`). Same audit §5.1 | CC |
| **R-138** | Security & access | P3 | **A shared-zone `cf_api_token` is a zone-wide DNS-write capability on a customer's box** — written 0600 to `/opt/docker/stacks/traefik/.env` (`controller/internal/infra/infra.go:123`) | READY (S) **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** No notion of a „shared zone” exists anywhere; the token is typed into the hub form, so the guard belongs on the hub side with that notion defined. | — | Today each box holds a token for a zone nobody else uses, so the blast radius is one customer. Under a shared customer zone, one compromised tester box could repoint every other tester's DNS. The ACME path is already switchable — an empty token selects HTTP-01 (`traefik.yml.tmpl`) — so the fix is policy plus a guard that refuses to hand a shared-zone customer a zone-scoped token. Same audit §5.2 | CC |
| **R-138** | Security & access | P3 | **A shared-zone `cf_api_token` is a zone-wide DNS-write capability on a customer's box** — written 0600 to `/opt/docker/stacks/traefik/.env` (`controller/internal/infra/infra.go:123`) **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-138.md` — the shared-zone premise is gone (own domain per customer, `01` §7), but nothing enforces it and an account-wide token has the same reach; option B (hub refuses a duplicate or nested domain) needs no decision and also covers R-415. Question D6 on STATUS's decision sheet. | READY (S) **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** No notion of a „shared zone” exists anywhere; the token is typed into the hub form, so the guard belongs on the hub side with that notion defined. | — | Today each box holds a token for a zone nobody else uses, so the blast radius is one customer. Under a shared customer zone, one compromised tester box could repoint every other tester's DNS. The ACME path is already switchable — an empty token selects HTTP-01 (`traefik.yml.tmpl`) — so the fix is policy plus a guard that refuses to hand a shared-zone customer a zone-scoped token. Same audit §5.2 | CC |
| **R-255** | Security & access | P3 | **The check that would catch a fourth secret-in-the-body covers 4 of 27 pages, and the cheap gate that covers all 36 templates is blind to the shape that actually shipped.** Filed 2026-08-08 while closing R-254, **because a partial guard reported as complete is worse than no guard — it stops the next person looking.** **Two nets, both measured.** **(1) `scripts/secret_in_markup_gate.py`** reads all 36 templates and convicts any `{{ … }}` naming a secret unless allowlisted with a reason. It catches `{{.RetrievalPassword}}` and `{{.InitialCreds.Password}}`, **and it catches a launder through a local variable** because the assignment itself names the secret (`{{$v := .InitialCreds.Password}}` is convicted — verified). **It is blind to a secret arriving under a NEUTRAL PAGE-DATA KEY** — `data["Tagline"] = creds.Password` then `{{.AppInfo.Tagline}}` passes it cleanly, also verified. **That is exactly the shape of R-254 site two** (`value="{{$val}}"` inside an `{{if eq .Type "secret"}}` branch), so the gate **would not have caught one of the three instances it was written for.** **(2) The runtime body assertion** — render the page and grep the response for a sentinel — catches every shape, including that one (demonstrated on the same planted leak the gate missed). But it needs each page's data to be constructible in a test, and **only 4 of 27 page templates have that today**: `settings_security`, `app_info`, `deploy`, `backups_restore` — the four that were touched by R-249/R-252/R-253/R-254 and therefore got their own tests. **The other 23 pages have no runtime coverage at all.** **What closing this needs, so the cost is not re-estimated:** a per-page data fixture for the remaining 23 (most need a wired `Server` — `stackMgr`, `backupMgr`, agent seams), then one table-driven test that renders each with a sentinel substituted for every string in its data and asserts the sentinel is absent. **That is real scaffolding, which is why it was NOT built inside R-254's session** rather than half-built and declared done. | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
| **R-338** | Security & access | P3 | **`demo-hp` is not on the R-50 island at all, and `operations/nodes.md` states that it is.** The page records both fleet boxes as island-migrated 2026-07-25. True of `felhom-pve`; **false of `demo-hp`**, whose `agent.json` has `listen_addr: 192.168.0.87:8443` — the customer LAN address — and **no `island_bridge`/`island_guest_addr` keys at all**, whose guest 9201 has `net0` only (no `eth1`), and whose `vmbr9` exists with **zero members**. The controller's `controller.yaml` points at the LAN address, so the box works; this is inventory drift, not breakage. **Two costs.** A session trusting the page addresses the wrong endpoint — that happened on 2026-08-18 and the resulting timeout was briefly read as a fault. And the agent's local API is **bound to the customer LAN on this box** rather than to a point-to-point island, which is the exposure R-50 was built to remove — so a documented security property is claimed for a box that does not have it **Checked from source 2026-10-05 (burn-down round 2):** nodes.md:86-88 still claims demo-hp is on the R-50 island (`local_api` on 169.254.253.1:8443/vmbr9, guest eth1). git blame: that claim dates from e6b5fa1e (2026-07-30); the 2026-09-21 edit bcdd5b20 re-read addresses but only reworded the lan_resolver clause -- the island claim was NOT re-verified after the reprovision. Agent config path /etc/felhom-agent/agent.json (felhom-agent cmd/felhom-agent/main.go:171), island keys island_bridge (internal/config/config.go:246). | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Decide which is true: migrate `demo-hp` to the island, or correct `nodes.md`. Leaving both is the one option that keeps the doc lying | Viktor decides; CC executes |
| **R-616** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The catalog credentials are stored in PLAINTEXT in the box's catalog clone and are printed by an ordinary `git remote -v`.** FOUND 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while pointing it at a private drill catalog. `Syncer.buildRepoURL` injects `username:token` into the HTTPS URL, and `git clone` persists that URL as the clone's `origin`, so `<data>/catalog-cache/.git/config` holds the token in the clear and **any** diagnostic that prints the remote leaks it — which is what happened in this session's own transcript, and is the same shape as R-580 (`curl -w '%{redirect_url}'`). `maskRepoURL` exists and is used for the LOG lines, so the masking intent is already there; the stored remote is the half that was missed. **INERT ON THE FLEET TODAY** — the live catalog is public and `git.token` is empty on every real box — which is exactly why it should be fixed before it is not: the day the catalog goes private, every box carries a readable credential and every support session that runs `git remote -v` prints it. **Fix shape:** store the remote WITHOUT credentials and supply them per-fetch (a credential helper, `http.extraHeader`, or `GIT_ASKPASS`), and a test asserting the clone's stored `origin` contains no `@`. **Operator action from tonight, unrelated to the fix:** the Gitea `admin` token used for the drill repo was printed by that command and must be rotated. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/05-9202-follows-drill.txt` (redacted). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller); one operator action (rotate the Gitea admin token)** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): FIXED on controller `main`** (`28a5203`; the catalog clone stores no credentials; the token is supplied per fetch; R-615's repo comparison ignores credentials on both sides, so a token never re-clones (`TestR616_TokenSetSameRepoNoRecloneOriginClean`) and a credentialed origin is cleaned at the next pull. The operator's Gitea admin token rotation (the row's second half) is still owed). Ships with the next controller release; close after delivery. **2026-10-06: DELIVERED** in controller v0.298.0 (the clone stores no credentials). Left: the operator's Gitea admin token rotation. | — | — | CC + operator |
| **R-717** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] opengist and wishlist keep their sign-up switch only in their own database — the box closes them with the address block alone.** MEASURED 2026-09-29: opengist `disable-signup` is an admin-panel setting (no env, no CLI); wishlist `system_config.enableSignup` (Prisma). Their blocks are case-insensitive and refused every trick shape (`audits/signup-lock-2026-09-29/B/`). **Fix direction:** an `after_setup` command that sets the database value (wishlist: a Node/Prisma one-liner; opengist: needs its sqlite with the app stopped). **-- 2026-10-06 (afternoon): NEEDS A DESIGN.** The controller's `after_setup` command form runs only when the lock is SET (`internal/stacks/after_setup.go` `applyNativeLock`, `lock && len(spec.Command) > 0`); the household's 15-minute window lifts only the env form. A database switch closed by a command would stay closed through the window, so the household could not let a family member sign up. Needs a lift command (an `open` twin) in the controller first. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC** **2026-10-06: NARROWED to opengist.** Controller v0.301.0 gives `after_setup` an `open_command`; **wishlist uses it, proven live on 9202** (after the setup the switch read closed and a stranger got 401 "invite only"; inside the window open and a family member signed up, users 1 → 2; at the window's end the close ran again 10 s later, a stranger 401, users stayed 2) — `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`E/. **Opengist cannot:** its container has no sqlite tool and no script runtime, and its CLI has no settings command; it keeps the address block alone. | — | Opengist only: needs a way to write its setting (a helper container in the template, or an upstream CLI/env switch) — a design. If nothing: opengist stays closed by the address block alone | CC |
| **R-717** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] opengist and wishlist keep their sign-up switch only in their own database — the box closes them with the address block alone.** MEASURED 2026-09-29: opengist `disable-signup` is an admin-panel setting (no env, no CLI); wishlist `system_config.enableSignup` (Prisma). Their blocks are case-insensitive and refused every trick shape (`audits/signup-lock-2026-09-29/B/`). **Fix direction:** an `after_setup` command that sets the database value (wishlist: a Node/Prisma one-liner; opengist: needs its sqlite with the app stopped). **-- 2026-10-06 (afternoon): NEEDS A DESIGN.** The controller's `after_setup` command form runs only when the lock is SET (`internal/stacks/after_setup.go` `applyNativeLock`, `lock && len(spec.Command) > 0`); the household's 15-minute window lifts only the env form. A database switch closed by a command would stay closed through the window, so the household could not let a family member sign up. Needs a lift command (an `open` twin) in the controller first. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-717.md` — opengist reads `disable-signup` from its database on every request (no stop needed); the measured address block holds; two stale comments fixed (controller `a40729a`). Question D5 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC** **2026-10-06: NARROWED to opengist.** Controller v0.301.0 gives `after_setup` an `open_command`; **wishlist uses it, proven live on 9202** (after the setup the switch read closed and a stranger got 401 "invite only"; inside the window open and a family member signed up, users 1 → 2; at the window's end the close ran again 10 s later, a stranger 401, users stayed 2) — `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`E/. **Opengist cannot:** its container has no sqlite tool and no script runtime, and its CLI has no settings command; it keeps the address block alone. | — | Opengist only: needs a way to write its setting (a helper container in the template, or an upstream CLI/env switch) — a design. If nothing: opengist stays closed by the address block alone | CC |
| **R-775** | Security & access | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Grimmory: a stranger's 5 wrong sign-ins lock EVERY visitor out of the web login for 15 minutes — so Grimmory was not published.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on 9202 (drill catalog, v3.4.1, through traefik): after 5 wrong tries for `admin` every further sign-in answered 429 — the household's right password AND a different name — and stayed 429 for 10+ minutes of retries. Read in the jar: `AuthRateLimitService` — Caffeine `expireAfterWrite(ofMinutes(15))`, `MAX_ATTEMPTS 5`, keys `login:ip:` and `login:user:`; Spring `forward-headers-strategy: native` takes the address from X-Forwarded-For, and behind the tunnel every visitor is the tunnel container's address (R-753) — the wger shape (R-752), with no setting to change it. Everything else in the checklist passed (bench + box step v3.4.1 → v3.5.0, gate by its own probe, OPDS through traefik); two smaller findings for the publishing session: on a reinstall over the first install's kept books, a new upload was saved to the drive but not added to the library (`box/grimmory/reinstall-c1.txt`, not investigated); and the remove + restore round trip (2.5) cannot be shown on 9202 for a drive app — its backup lives on the scratch drive, which is not a registered drive (R-756). The template waits in `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/wip/grimmory/`. **Needs (operator):** (A) publish with a sentence on the page that wrong guesses by others can lock the login for 15 minutes (MEASURED: during the lock an e-reader's OPDS feed still answered 200 with its own login, wrong 401 — `box/grimmory/opds-under-lock.txt`), or (B) wait until the box passes each visitor's real address (R-753). `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/throttle.txt` **-- 2026-10-01 (evening):** option B's precondition SHIPPED (controller v0.286.1, R-753): Grimmory's Tomcat RemoteIpValve walks from the right and counts `172.16.0.0/12` as a proxy (READ in source, Spring Boot 4.1.1 — not yet measured with Grimmory's own lock), so `login:ip:` becomes per visitor; `login:user:` still lets a stranger lock the public name `admin` 15 min. A third route was spiked and passed: Grimmory behind the permanent family gate with its e-reader paths excepted (R-780). Recommendation: publish behind the family gate if R-780 is built; otherwise B with a measured 3.6. **UPDATE 2026-10-02 — NARROWED, Grimmory PUBLISHED behind the family gate:** a stranger cannot reach Grimmory's web sign-in at all (6 tries through the simulated tunnel: the gate's 401, then the household signs in 200 — `audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/A/items.txt`), and the e-reader exceptions keep Grimmory's own login. The 2.5 round trip now WORKS on 9202 (`audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/B/box/life.txt`). **What is left:** a family member past the gate can still lock a NAME (the admin's) for 15 minutes with 5 wrong tries — hard-coded in Grimmory; and the reinstall-over-kept-books finding (`new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/reinstall-c1.txt`) is still not investigated. | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: Grimmory is now behind the family gate; only a family member can still lock a name.** | — | — | CC |
| **R-782** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Two side observations of the R-753 sweep, inferred, not measured:** glance's seeded `glance.yml` has no `auth:` block (the dashboard is public to anyone with the address), and homepage's `/api/*` refuses a Host not in `HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS`, which the template does not set (widgets may 400). **Needs:** measure both on 9202; glance: decide whether a public link dashboard is intended (the setup gate does not cover it after setup). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **2026-10-06 night: homepage fixed on catalog branch `night-held-2026-10-06`** (`093e5ed`): `HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=${SUBDOMAIN}.${DOMAIN}`; bench: `/api/services` 400 → 200. Glance measured: public (`GET /` 200 with no login, no auth block, `/login` 404) — whether it gets a login is the operator's question; the row stays open for it (`cat/R-782-red.txt`). | — | — | CC |
| **R-831** | Security & access | P3 | **The Hetzner storage API token (`HETZNER_TOKEN`, the storage project's token in `Secret/storagebox`) was printed into the 2026-10-03 session transcript** — CC read the gitignored `manifests/storagebox.secret.yaml` and its redaction pattern missed the quoted value. It can create, reset and delete Storage Box sub-accounts. Not rotated by the operator's choice (decision 73). **Rotation, whenever chosen (3 steps):** create a new token in the storage project in the Hetzner console → patch `Secret/storagebox` key `HETZNER_TOKEN` in `felhom-system` and `kubectl rollout restart deployment/hub` → delete the old token in the console. Rule for sessions: never print a file that holds secrets — read the one field needed. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rotation is his call** **Not rotated by the operator's rulings (2026-10-04 „keep using the current one"; 2026-10-05 option B) — restated 2026-10-05 18:23; the steps stay here.** | — | rotate when chosen | operator |
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-836** | Box system & updates | P2 | **A new host kernel that hangs before userspace stays the GRUB default: `--next-boot` is not a one-shot on these hosts.** MEASURED 2026-10-04 on demo-hp (operator's word, 2 reboots): both demo hosts boot UEFI + GRUB without proxmox-boot-tool ESPs; installing a kernel makes it the default at once; `kernel pin <new> --next-boot` writes an ordinary `GRUB_DEFAULT`, and `proxmox-boot-cleanup.service` clears it only after a boot reaches userspace. With the old kernel pinned FIRST, the fallback after a good boot worked (new 60 s, old 76 s). READ FROM THE CODE, not measured: a hang leaves the new kernel default on every power cycle. Only `softdog` runs (useless before userspace); demo-hp's `sp5100_tco` ships unloaded, untested. Fix direction for the slow lane: GRUB's own one-shot (`GRUB_DEFAULT=saved` + `grub-reboot`) with the old kernel saved — to be measured, including Secure Boot (ON on demo-hp). `audits/os-updates-spike-2026-10-04/partH/` | **NARROWED 2026-10-04 (os-host-lane Part E, operator's word before each of 2 reboots) — GRUB's own one-shot is NOT a one-shot here either.** `GRUB_DEFAULT=saved` (old kernel saved) + `grub-reboot <new>`: boot 1 → new kernel, **Secure Boot ON and fine**; but GRUB could not clear `next_entry` (`grub-reboot` itself warns: *environment block on lvm device … will remain the default until manually cleared*; `/boot` is ext4 on LVM `pve-root`), so boot 2 (no command) → **the new kernel again**. `kernel.panic = 0`: a panic leaves the host stopped (R-851). `sp5100_tco` LOADS and answers (`SP5100 TCO timer`, 60 s, inactive, nowayout 0; read from sysfs, never opened, unloaded) — a hardware watchdog exists on demo-hp, but nothing arms it before userspace. demo-hp left on 7.0.14-20 with that as the saved default. **LEFT (fix direction):** a GRUB env block GRUB can write (on the ESP, vfat) or a userspace "boot good" step that rewrites the default, plus arming `sp5100_tco`; to be measured before the kernel slow lane. `audits/os-host-lane-2026-10-04/partE/` **READY — owner: CC + operator (reboots).** **2026-10-07 07:58: raised P3 → P2 (`09` §3 decision 164 — the kernel lane before the first paying customer); the spike runs with the operator present.** **2026-10-07 SPIKE DONE (operator present; 24 reboots, 2 power cycles; `audits/kernel-spike-2026-10-07/DESIGN-kernel-lane.md`).** On Tester 1 (VM), demo-felhom and demo-hp (Secure Boot on): **a one-shot flag in a GRUB env block on the ESP (vfat) WORKS** — new kernel once, then the old one; a panicking new kernel (`panic=10`) falls back with no person. **UEFI `BootNext` WORKS too.** **A hardware watchdog armed by systemd during the reboot FAILS on all three** (i6300ESB, Intel TCO, AMD SP5100): the reset clears the timer, so a FROZEN new kernel needs a power cycle. Pick: the ESP flag + lockup-to-panic kernel options (unmeasured). Two operator questions in the design (night restarts and the household; a freeze needs a person). Boxes left clean on a healthily booted default. **2026-10-07 14:43 — `09` §3 decision 172: the kernel lane is YES — option A (the ESP one-shot flag) with option C (lockup → panic) on the one-shot entry; a box may restart at night; the household is mailed the day before (what to do if it is not back: unplug, plug back in); each kernel set is operator-approved after ring 0; a frozen new kernel needing a power cycle is ACCEPTED for the first customers. BUILD STARTED 2026-10-07 (the kernel-lane arc).** **2026-10-07 evening: BUILT and proven by hand** — agent v0.152.0 + hub v0.143.0 (`11` §5.11), delivered to demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1. Tester 1 (`audits/kernel-lane-2026-10-07/E/RESULT.md`): a forced panic on the one-shot → back on the old kernel by itself (fell_back, 0 unclean boots counted); a held guest → judged 20 min → ONE self-revert → old kernel; a healthy boot → 7.0.14-22 the default. The household mail went out for demo-felhom 18:12 (Gmail). Option C UNMEASURED (no test_lockup module). **WHERE IT STOPPED (next session):** the ring-0 NIGHT run (Part E3) — tonight demo-felhom refuses the told 7.0.14-20 (R-898, safe); 7.0.14-22 is due on both demo boxes for the night 2026-10-08→09 (mail 2026-10-08 daytime); read back the morning of 2026-10-09; then approve the set on the System page and deliver to the Tester 1 box as ring 1 by a signed os_kernel_step (Part E4 — Tester 1 already runs 7.0.14-22, so the ring-1 proof needs the NEXT kernel). **2026-10-07 evening (decision 176): the night run moved to TONIGHT 7→8.** Pre-night fixes delivered (agent v0.153.0 — ring 0 stages exactly the told kernel, R-898 closed; controller v0.303.0 — the first capture after a boot waits for the drive, R-897 closed; hub v0.143.1 — Reply-To on household mails). Armed at 19:05: demo-felhom due 7.0.14-20 (household told 18:12), demo-hp due 7.0.14-22 (told 18:38; demo-hp's day-old apt lists refreshed by a report-only pass with its updates switched oLine truncated
| **R-899** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A daytime whole-guest backup moves the 24 h cadence past the night window, so the next night has no whole-guest backup — and with it no OS leg and no kernel step.** SEEN 2026-10-08: demo-hp's last whole-guest backup was a morning press at 2026-10-07 08:49:53; due again 2026-10-08 08:49, after the window [04:30, 08:30) closed → no backup, no night leg; the household had been told „tonight" (18:38) and nothing happened (harmless: no change). The kernel lane recovers by itself (a new mail after 20 h, step the next night, inside the 3-mail limit), but every daytime press costs one night. Fix direction (a design, not taken): the cadence counts nights, not 24 h (due when the last whole-guest backup is older than ~20 h at the window's start), or a press does not reset the night's cadence. `audits/kernel-night-2026-10-07/readback/demo-hp-why-no-step.txt` | **VERIFY — fixed on main 2026-10-08, ships with tomorrow's controller + agent releases** (operator ruling 2026-10-08 07:12, option A, `09` §3 decision 177: every night takes its own). Controller `6d07ca2`: a durable ledger (last successful press / last successful scheduled run per tier); a tier the agent calls „not due" because of a press is still due inside tonight's window, never by the safety valve (`TestR899_*`, red-proved). Agent `4c69c25`: a press arrives as `trigger=manual` and runs no OS leg; the after-boot kernel reports carry the saved ring instead of „ring 1". The household mail case („tonight" for a night whose backup cannot start because of a press) is removed by the rule; no hub change. `07` §6.1. | — | Release controller + agent tomorrow; read back the first night after a daytime press; then close | CC |
| **R-862** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Tester 2 cannot take the config bundle until one by-hand bootstrap is done: its `felhom-os-apply` (agent 0.142.0) predates the bundle mode, and no signed job can write a root file on it.** FOUND 2026-10-04 (R-840 build, Part C): the route reaches every box installed from installer 1.31.0 on, and the demo boxes (bootstrapped by CC); Tester 2 has every root file of agent 0.142.0 (installer 1.30.0) and lacks only the R-858 wrapper fix, which matters only for a Docker step it gets solely from a signed job. CC has no route to Tester 2 (its door admits only the operator's WireGuard peer; `felhom-op` cannot become root). The steps: `runbooks/config-bundle.md` "Tester 2". Then CC signs the bundle and reads it back. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — the operator said (2026-10-04 ~19:05) he will try through his tunnel **2026-10-07 07:58 (`09` §3 decision 170): the operator believes Tester 2 never set up the off-site backup (no escrow); the laptop may stay off for days; the tester plans to add an HDD.** **2026-10-07 (Part H, read only):** in Tester 2's last 10 notifications (2026-10-05 09:16 → 2026-10-07 06:58) the household got 0 mails, the operator 10 (host_down ×9, expected_dbdump_missed ×1); control: the household channel shows on the other three customers. So the household is not mailed daily while the box is off; no row (`audits/day-2026-10-07/H/`). | the operator's WireGuard tunnel | the operator runs the three bootstrap commands; CC sends the bundle | operator |
| **R-35** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Config-apply should not end the customer's session.** The offsite config push bumped `config_version` 10→11 at 16:54:58 and the controller self-restarted (container `StartedAt` 16:54:59Z, back up 16:55:02); in-memory sessions died with it and **customer zero was force-logged-out mid-flow**. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size S, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** Hot-apply needs a per-setting ruling; persisting sessions puts login tokens on disk (and into the whole-guest archive, `07` §5). Next: the operator's pick between them. | — | Direction: **hot-apply the offbox target** (no restart for a config the running process can adopt), or **persist sessions** across restart. The restart itself is by design — the collateral is not. Evidence `controller-log-full.txt` | CC |
| **R-35** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Config-apply should not end the customer's session.** The offsite config push bumped `config_version` 10→11 at 16:54:58 and the controller self-restarted (container `StartedAt` 16:54:59Z, back up 16:55:02); in-memory sessions died with it and **customer zero was force-logged-out mid-flow**. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size S, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-35.md` — wider than the row: every controller update and crash restart also logs the household out; the family gate already keeps its sessions on disk. Question D4 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** Hot-apply needs a per-setting ruling; persisting sessions puts login tokens on disk (and into the whole-guest archive, `07` §5). Next: the operator's pick between them. | — | Direction: **hot-apply the offbox target** (no restart for a config the running process can adopt), or **persist sessions** across restart. The restart itself is by design — the collateral is not. Evidence `controller-log-full.txt` | CC |
| **R-78** | Box system & updates | P3 | **`local_api` authority ruling — auto-reconcile vs detect-only** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-25, size M, roadmap state `idea (deferred OUT of R-77 on purpose)`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **An OWED OPERATOR DECISION, not a defect — moved because an owed ruling hidden among feature ideas is the shape this session exists to remove.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | R-77 ships detection because the fix is genuinely undecided, and **both directions can lose customer-visible function**. **Direction 1 (today):** `controller.yaml` wins and drift is silent → the 2026-07-25 island migration blinded the whole fleet's control plane for 17.5 h (drive gate, guest-reboot recovery, quiesce/backup all degrade). R-77 makes that loud but does not stop it recurring. **Direction 2 (`bootstrap.json` wins, auto-reconcile on boot):** a guest whose `controller.yaml` is CORRECT and whose `bootstrap.json` is stale — a half-completed re-provision, a hand-repaired guest, a setup-wizard box — gets a **working channel clobbered on the next restart**, fleet-wide and silently, during a routine deploy. That is not obviously better than the bug. Needs a spike: which writer is authoritative per field (endpoint vs fingerprint vs token — `mergeLocalAPI` replaces the whole block, so they cannot be reconciled independently today), whether the agent side should stamp a generation/mtime so 'newer wins' is even expressible, and whether reconcile should require an operator ack. Until then the drift alert plus a manual edit is the supported path. | CC |
| **R-242** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A controller release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered until a golden carries it — and nothing enforces that.** R-239 is the symptom; this is the mechanism, recorded **2026-08-07** and deliberately **NOT built** (the task that found it scoped it as a record-only item). **Two releases went out without a golden and the gap was invisible until a walk measured it from the customer's side**: v0.204.0 (R-237) and v0.205.0 (R-234) were written, tested, pushed, and CHANGELOG'd, and every one of those steps passed while a machine installed that night received neither. The register said CLOSED; the fleet said otherwise. **Nothing in the release path knows a golden exists.** The version bump, the image push, the CHANGELOG entry and the register closure are all repo-local; the manifest's `golden_version` is edited by a separate operator act, in a different repo, with no link back. **Proposed shapes, cheapest first — the choice is the operator's and is not taken here.** (a) **A release-path checklist step** — one line in the controller's end-of-session checklist: *a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not finished until a golden carries it or a register row says why not.* Costs nothing, catches nothing mechanically. (b) **A gate in `repo_gates.py`** comparing the manifest's `golden_version` against the newest released controller and FAILING (or warning) past a tolerance of one minor. Mechanical, runs on every push, and would have fired the morning after v0.204.0. (c) **A hub-side checker** — the hub already knows every box's running controller version from `/hosts` and the vouched golden from the manifest; a periodic comparison against the newest published image would catch drift the repo cannot see, including a vouch that was made and then rolled back. **Earliest catch: (b).** It fires on the push that creates the gap, before any box is installed, and it needs no live fleet. **(c) catches strictly more but only after boxes exist.** (a) is worth doing regardless because it is free. **Not built. No gate was written this session.** **⚠ IT RECURRED WITHIN A DAY, WHICH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR BUILDING IT.** Controller **v0.206.0** shipped the R-241 fixes on 2026-08-07 while the vouched golden still carried **0.205.0** — so a machine installed on the morning of 2026-08-08 would have received neither. Third occurrence of the shape in three days (R-111/R-115/R-120 are the older family). **✅ SHAPE (b) BUILT 2026-08-08 — `scripts/golden_currency_gate.py`, registered in `repo_gates.py` as gate 7.** **It was shown FAILING against that exact state before anything was baked**, which is its red-proof and the reason its own introducing push needed `--no-verify` (stated in the session report rather than worked around): `newest released controller : 0.206.0 / newest golden baked : 0.205.0 → CONVICTED`. **IT IS `--fast`, AND THAT FORCED ITS DESIGN:** both `.githooks/pre-push` AND CI run `repo_gates.py --fast`, so a non-fast gate would run in NEITHER — the R-29 census failure this runner exists to end. **THEREFORE IT CHECKS THE BAKE, NOT THE VOUCH**, because the vouched version lives only in the hub's `hub_settings` with no copy in git, and putting a copy there would create a second source of truth that can drift — a green gate over a false claim being the worst outcome available. **A bake without a vouch still passes: that half is NOT closed and stays on this row.** It also compares versions rather than behaviour, so a release changing nothing customer-visible trips it too — accepted deliberately, because judging that by hand is what failed three times and the cost of a false trip is one bake; a waiver belongs here, never in a habit of bypassing. **VOUCHED 2026-08-08 with the operator's approval** — golden `0.206.0` / sha `c85230b4…108e`; `agent_version` and `min_agent` both stayed `0.127.0`, and `wrapper_sha256` was carried through explicitly because the handler clears it when omitted. **The gate was CONVICTED before the bake and OK after it** — red→green on the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real. **⚠ THE GATE FIRED FOR REAL, 2026-08-08 — and it was right.** Controller **v0.207.0** (R-249/R-252/R-253) is released, tested and pushed, and **no golden carries it** — the newest bake is 0.206.0 — so `golden_currency_gate.py` FAILED, saying exactly the true thing: *a machine installed right now would receive v0.206.0*. **The `felhom.eu` push therefore used `git push --no-verify`, declared here, in the commit message and in the session report.** A bypass and NOT a waiver, deliberately: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that *deliberately needs no golden*, and this one needs one. **Owed: bake golden 0.207.0 and vouch it** (`RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1; the vouch is a three-field change). **This row's own remaining half is unchanged — nothing gates the VOUCH itself.** **✅ THE OWEDLine truncated
| **R-468** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] THE GOLDEN WAIVER — goldens on a cadence, not per release (operator ruling 2026-09-13).** 25 goldens in 26 days in August, almost one per release, because `golden_currency_gate.py` trips on every release by design and the only honest ways past it were a bake or a declared `--no-verify` (thirteen by 2026-09-01, R-404/R-417). **The ruling: bake WEEKLY, and always before any drill or fresh install.** Every release still raises the FLOOR, so both demo boxes keep getting each release in ~20 s; only the golden — which protects a fresh install and nothing else — moves to a cadence. **The mechanism (built 2026-09-13):** `documentation/tests/golden-waiver. **⚠ CORRECTED THE SAME DAY (R-472): between bakes the floor does NOT carry a release — the hub holds any floor above the vouched golden (publish-train rule 1), so releases between bakes reach the demo boxes only by hand-deploy.**yml`, four lines (`issued`, `expires`, `reason`, `register_row: R-468`), read by the gate. While valid, a golden BEHIND the record makes the gate print a loud ADVISORY and exit 0; when it expires the gate is red again until someone bakes or renews. **The 14-day cap is enforced by the gate, not the runbook** — a longer, undated, unparseable, reason-less or row-less waiver is INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never 0 and never silently ignored. **It never covers a golden that is UNRECORDED (R-385)** — that is not a cadence choice. **A dated waiver cannot be forgotten; it just expires** — the difference from R-242's original rule, which recurred the day after it was written. Tests: `scripts/test_golden_currency_gate.py` cases 5–15 (E/F/G/H, a 15-day, absent, unparseable, bad-row and empty-reason waiver each 2; the R-421 decoy — a file saying only `expires` — 2). **This is a PRE-CUSTOMER arrangement: the first external install retires it** (delete the file in that commit). Cadence written into `RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.2 and the `felhom.eu` end-of-session checklist. **Does NOT touch R-242's open half (nothing gates the VOUCH).** | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (renew ≤ 14 days or bake); retire at the first external install** | — | — | CC |
@@ -229,15 +228,14 @@ stopping line that lies.
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R-243** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **A box in the R-241 state silently stops backing up off-site, and NO ALARM OF ANY KIND FIRES.** Found by the R-241 spike (2026-08-07) as a by-product; **not part of the walk's finding and not previously filed.** The R-241 state is self-locking in a second, worse way than the recovery-journey dead end: `escrow_state` is stuck `pending` forever (the auto-confirm flips only on a hash match, and the hash cannot match a key the box minted itself), and `runOffboxBackup` returns at the escrow gate (`offbox.go:743`) before touching anything. **So off-site backups never run again — and the hub never notices.** All three signals that could catch it are excluded, each for its own individually-correct reason, verified in the hub this session: `offsite_stale` — `isStale` (`monitor/offsite.go:135`) returns false unless `EscrowState == "escrowed"`, and its own comment reads *"Pending/disabled = normal onboarding, never stale"*, so the box is classified as **still being set up, forever**; `offsite_delivery_stuck` — `monitor/offsite_delivery.go:91` skips the `applied` shape, and delivery genuinely IS applied (the credential was consumed and the target is in every report); `backup_failed` — never fires, because nothing fails: the run returns `nil` before it starts. **Three correct exclusions leaving one state unobserved.** This is the same class as the workspace `CLAUDE.md` "presence is not success" rule, one level up: **the absence of a failure is being read as the presence of a working tier.** **Partly subsumed by R-241's fix** — a box that recovers leaves this state — but **not for a box that does not**, and the alarm gap is what makes "does not" survivable indefinitely. **Not fixed; no code written.** **⚠ UPDATED 2026-08-07 (v0.206.0) — the STATE this row describes can no longer be entered, but the ALARM GAP is untouched and the row stays open.** R-241's mint guard means a box no longer mints a key over a sealed package, so it no longer arrives in the "escrow stuck pending against a self-minted key" state by itself. **What replaces it is a state that is VISIBLE rather than silent:** the box declares `offsite.state=awaiting_recovery_key` and the customer is offered the recovery screen. **But the hub still raises nothing for it**, and for the same three reasons: `isStale` needs `escrowed`, the delivery checker skips the `applied` shape, and `backup_failed` needs a run that never happens. **So a box whose customer never acts still stops backing up off-site with no operator signal** — the difference is that the customer can now see it and act, where before nobody could. **The remaining work is an operator-side signal for a box held in `awaiting_recovery_key` past some age**, and it is deliberately not bundled into R-241's fix. **⚠ MEASURED ON A REBUILD, 2026-08-07 (fifth walk) — the gap is real for the state this row describes, and NOT for the state a rebuild produces.** 88 seconds after the walk5 guest was destroyed and rebuilt, the hub emitted `offsite_delivery_stuck` (**warning**) and wrote an **operator-channel** `notification_log` row recording `offsite_credential_restaged` / status **REFUSED** with an accurate reason — *"the credential was applied and worked; the target was lost afterwards … a guest rebuild does, R-193"*. So on the **regressed-apply** shape the operator IS told, promptly and correctly, and this row's *"skips the applied shape"* does not apply. The gap stands for a box that reaches the held state **without** a prior working tier in its report history. **Recorded so the row is not read wider than it measures.** | **VERIFY — built on hub main 2026-10-08 (`b119301c`), ships with tomorrow's hub release.** New operator-only `offsite_escrow_pending` (warning): off-site ON, escrow not done, no successful off-site run for 7 days (CC picked 7 days, `09` §3 decision 179 — operator may reverse); weekly re-send, persisted, clears with an info line. `08` §6.3. **Expected to fire for Tester 2 on the first sweep after the deploy** (hub read 2026-10-08: off-site on, escrow `pending`, never a success). | — | Deploy hub tomorrow; confirm the Tester 2 mail arrives (positive control); then close | operator |
| **R-528** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Docker does not report an OOM kill inside a Felhom LXC guest: `OOMKilled` stays false and no `oom` event fires, so the v0.243.0 OOM line is not proven live.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 on scratch 9202 (Docker 29.8.0): Paperless capped at 128M restarted 11 times with `OOMKilled=false` and zero `docker events --filter event=oom`; a memory hog inside the running container was killed (rc 137) with the same silence (`E2-oom-signal-measure-9202.txt`). BIGNIGHT VM 333 did read `oomkilled=true`, so the shape differs by case. **Fix shape:** the agent reads the guest container cgroups' `memory.events oom_kill` counters (host-side, reliable), or the controller alarms on a restart-count trend **RE-MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the DRILL box (fresh install, nested VM 334, Docker in an LXC guest, controller 0.243.0), so the finding is not a property of one machine:** the Paperless webserver was capped at 128 M with `docker update --memory`; it restarted 9-10 times, and all three signals stayed silent - `OOMKilled=false` on every inspect, `docker events --filter event=oom` EMPTY for the whole window, the container's cgroup not visible from inside the guest, and `dmesg` unreadable there. Identical to scratch 9202. So the v0.243.0 OOM line cannot fire on ANY Felhom box as shipped, on either host. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-m1-oom.txt`. | **READY — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: CC** **2026-09-17 (chaos night): an OOM WAS detected on a fresh box, and named precisely.** On `tester-1-022354` (controller 0.245.0, guest 9201, 6 GB RAM) immich’s Postgres was killed by the memory limit during its reverse-geocoding import, and the controller pushed `app_oom` (warning, operator-only): „Alkalmazás memóriája elfogyott: immich (immich-postgres) — egy folyamatát a memóriakorlát leállította” — naming the app AND the exact container. The visible consequence was `write CONNECTION_CLOSED immich-postgres:5432` and twelve restarts of immich-server. So on THIS box the OOM scan works and was the fastest route to the diagnosis; recorded here rather than filed as a new row. Evidence: `audits/evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/round-2.txt`. **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): a one-page design proposal (no code) is in `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-05/design-R-528.md`** — for the operator. **2026-10-06: STOPPED BEFORE ANY CODE — the measurement contradicted the design** (decision 155 said A then C). On scratch 9202, Docker 29.8.2, the `OOMKilled` flag was TRUE in all four shapes tried: a child process killed while the container kept running (`oom_kill` 0 → 3, flag true) and three main-process kills (exit 137, flag true); an `oom` event each time. The false flags of 2026-09-15 were on Docker 29.8.0. Cost read for the record: one exec read of 21 containers on demo-hp = 1.6 s. `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`C/. **2026-10-06 18:24: operator ruling, option A (decision 157):** nothing is built; the row stays open as a WATCH for a box whose Docker reports a false flag. **Added:** a Docker engine set may not be approved until it reports a memory kill correctly on the boxes that ran it (built in this row's next session). **2026-10-06 (night): the Docker-approval memory-kill check is BUILT** — hub v0.140.0 (LIVE: the approval waits for a passing `oom_check` on every ring-0 box; a failed, errored or missing one blocks) and the agent's wrapper (`felhom-agent` `acccb66`, unreleased — ships as v0.150.0 after the 2026-10-07 read-back). Proven by hand on demo-hp's guest: `OOMKilled=true`, exit 137, the `oom` event — seen only with an events window ending after the run (the wrapper waits 2 s). `audits/readback-2026-10-07/`F/. | — | Release agent v0.150.0 + bundle and deliver it; then the row is a WATCH only | CC |
| **R-79** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **`report.Issues` / `report.Warnings` are English on customer-facing surfaces** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-26, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — the issues and warnings travel to the hub as sentences; changing them is the two-repo spike the row itself names. | — | **Whole-surface, not a one-off** (DIAG §6): every producer is English — `"SSD/HDD disk usage critical"`, `"Docker: %v"`, `"Protected container not running: %s"`, and all six `Warnings` strings. They render on the customer's Hungarian dashboard, and the `health_critical` path has reached the **customer** email channel three times historically. Deliberately NOT bundled into R-77: a copy sweep across every producer would have buried two safety fixes in string churn, and the seam is not obvious — translate at the producer, or at the render/notification boundary where operator-English and customer-Hungarian already diverge? Pick the seam in a spike; the strings are mechanical after. | CC |
| **R-79** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **`report.Issues` / `report.Warnings` are English on customer-facing surfaces** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-26, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-79.md` — half stale: the dashboard seam was built by R-516; six producers still show raw text (option A, no decision — CC builds); the household's health mail carries the raw details JSON (option B needs a word). Question D3 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — the issues and warnings travel to the hub as sentences; changing them is the two-repo spike the row itself names. | — | **Whole-surface, not a one-off** (DIAG §6): every producer is English — `"SSD/HDD disk usage critical"`, `"Docker: %v"`, `"Protected container not running: %s"`, and all six `Warnings` strings. They render on the customer's Hungarian dashboard, and the `health_critical` path has reached the **customer** email channel three times historically. Deliberately NOT bundled into R-77: a copy sweep across every producer would have buried two safety fixes in string churn, and the seam is not obvious — translate at the producer, or at the render/notification boundary where operator-English and customer-Hungarian already diverge? Pick the seam in a spike; the strings are mechanical after. | CC |
| **R-211** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **Prometheus has no config-reloader — a rules change reaches the pod and is never read** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | Found while verifying R-205 rather than by looking for it. The `mon-system/prometheus` Deployment runs **one** container (`prom/prometheus:v3.12.0`) with **no `configmap-reload`/`prometheus-config-reloader` sidecar**. After the ArgoCD sync the updated `node-housekeeping-alerts.yml` was present **inside the pod** (`grep -c "and on(instance)"` → 3 on the mounted symlink) while the Prometheus **rules API still served the old expression** — for **4+ minutes**, with no error anywhere. It only took effect after an explicit `POST /-/reload`. **The consequence is general, not specific to R-205: every rule edit in this repo since the stack was built has silently not applied until something happened to restart the pod** — so "committed and synced" has never meant "in force", and ArgoCD reporting `Synced/Healthy` is true and beside the point. `--web.enable-lifecycle` IS already set, so the fix is small: add a reloader sidecar watching the ConfigMap, or a `checksum/config` pod annotation so a rules change rolls the pod. **Same class as the four *built-but-never-wired* seams** — the control exists, nothing walks it | CC |
| **R-333** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **Two disk-health questions the deploy raised and did NOT act on.** **(a) The 55/60 °C bands are SPINNING-DISK bands applied to NVMe.** They were adopted unchanged from the operator's Prometheus config so the two systems cannot disagree — a deliberate, stated decision — but **measured on demo-hp 2026-08-14 the healthy Toshiba KXG50PNV1T02 NVMe idles at 53 °C, two degrees below Figyelmeztetés and seven below Hiba**, and NVMe routinely exceeds 60 °C under load with no fault whatever. As it stands a healthy customer NVMe under sustained write can be reported as **Hiba** — the single worst outcome this feature can produce. **(b) The agent runs bare `smartctl -a -j` with no `-n standby`** (`felhom-agent/internal/storage/hostops.go:368`), so every poll WAKES a spun-down drive; going 6h → hourly multiplies that by six. demo-hp is all-flash so the cadence measurement could not reveal it, and it was recorded rather than acted on per the task's own instruction. Mitigating datum from the fixture: the failing drive logged only **3375 load cycles in 60505 hours** (~one per 18h), i.e. that duty cycle barely spins down at all | **READY (S each) — NEW 2026-08-14** | — | (a) split the temperature bands by device class, or drop them for NVMe and rely on `critical_warning`; (b) add `-n standby` to the agent's smartctl invocation (an agent change, so fold it into R-330's session) | Viktor decides (a); CC does (b) |
| **R-340** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The new reachability check does not touch the surface that actually failed.** R-339 reports when the hub cannot READ ep0 — but the read it performs is the `usage` op, which is `proxmox-backup-manager` plus `df` over SSH, and therefore rides the **local API daemon**. The 2026-08-18 incident explicitly CLEARED that daemon: `proxmox-backup.service` was healthy throughout, and it was the **HTTPS proxy on 8007** that was wedged with a full accept queue. **So R-339's check would have returned green for all 9 h 37 m of that outage.** It closes the case where ep0 is unreachable *as a host*; it does not close the case that actually happened. This is not a defect in R-339 — it is the honest boundary of what it watches, recorded so a future reader does not mistake a green box gauge for a working off-site tier | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | a tenantsync endpoint-script version bump (the op is added on ep0, so it needs the same version-gated rollout `ErrUsageUnsupported` already models) | Add a **health op** to `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` that probes `https://127.0.0.1:8007/` on ep0 and reports the proxy's fd count and listen-queue depth, then surface it as a third signal. **Overlaps the connections spike (R-336's remaining half): both want the same observations from ep0, so whichever runs SECOND must reuse the first's evidence rather than re-measuring a protected machine twice** **REUSE, per this row's own instruction — the connections spike ran FIRST (2026-08-20) and already produced most of what the health op wants; do not re-measure a protected machine a third time.** Available in `audits/evidence-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20/`: the proxy **fd count** and its type breakdown (`lsof` + `/proc/<pid>/fd`), the **listen-queue depth** (`ss -lnt` — `Recv-Q 0`, `Send-Q 1024`), the **ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split**, the **per-peer** connection histogram, a **31-minute persistence diff** of full 4-tuples, and a **46.18 h** slope with Poisson bounds. What the health op would still add beyond these: a loopback `GET https://127.0.0.1:8007/` probe — the observation that distinguished "process problem" from "network problem" on 2026-08-18 and the one thing this spike did NOT take, because it is the surface R-339 cannot see. **And this spike sharpens what the op should report:** a rising **ESTAB** count is the live signal (CLOSE-WAIT was **0**, not merely flat), and per **R-344** the fd ceiling that matters may be the **agent's**, not only ep0's. | CC |
| **R-388** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **PRODUCT DECISION (not a defect): the customer notification model is the wrong shape, and the settings page grows by one toggle per detector.** The operator's framing, recorded verbatim 2026-08-23: *"A customer should be notified only about things they can act on or are responsible for — the drive they unplugged, the storage they filled. **A failed backup is our incident, not theirs.** The intended shape is that we detect it, we tell them we noticed and are dealing with it, and they are not handed an error they cannot solve. The subscription should feel like being looked after, not like being on call."* Today's page is the opposite shape — one switch per detector, and it **grew from 12 to 15 in a single session** (one new alarm plus two compound toggles split into four). That growth is the argument, not an aside: a page that grows per detector keeps asking a household to make engineering decisions. | **OPEN — DIRECTION, operator's call** | a decision on scope; nothing here is a bug | Recorded as a dated **[DESIGN — DIRECTION]** entry at `documentation/architecture/08-alarm-ladder.md` §8, marked plainly as *not current behaviour*. **Deliberately NOT implemented in the session that recorded it.** `app_start_failed` defaulting OFF is consistent with the direction and reversible either way, but was ruled on its own merits and does not pre-judge the redesign. | Viktor |
| **R-435** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The snapshot-drop detector is blind to a single-app deletion — the exact shape the box can produce.** `snapshotDropFraction = 0.5` and `snapshotDropFloor = 5` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go`) require a fall of MORE than half the previous count. demo-hp's baseline is **69** across 9 apps, so ~35 snapshots must go before it speaks; **one app's tag is ~9 and is invisible.** `offbox.go:1388` runs `forget --prune` **grouped by host,tags** — a per-tag wipe is precisely the shape a faulty retention or a targeted deletion produces. **This is deliberate, not accidental:** the constant's own comment argues the insensitivity, and *"a detector that cries wolf is switched off within a fortnight"* is a lesson this project paid for. **So this row is NOT a demand to lower the threshold.** It is a demand that the blind spot be written where the operator reads it, because "an unexplained fall is noticed within a day" (R-431, and `STATUS.md`) is true only of falls above half. **Discovered by arithmetic while planning the drill's Phase 2/3 pairing, which could not have worked:** Phase 2 deletes one app and Phase 3 expects the alarm to fire. **LIMITATION NOW WRITTEN INTO THE ALARM'S OWN DOCUMENTATION, hub v0.111.1** — the comment above `snapshotDropFraction` in `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go` now states what the detector does NOT see, with the demo-hp arithmetic and the `forget --prune` grouping that makes the blind spot sit on the most likely single-app failure. **It also says explicitly that the numbers must NOT be lowered to "fix" this** and that per-app detection needs a SECOND signal keyed on the per-tag count. **The row stays OPEN because documenting a blind spot is not covering it** — and because `STATUS.md` and R-431 both still say "noticed within a day", which is true only of falls above half. | **OPEN — documented in code v0.111.1; the coverage gap itself is unclosed** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** Covering one-app deletions needs per-app snapshot counts from the controller and a per-tag threshold measured on real counts — two repos, a mechanism nobody has measured. | — | — | CC |
| **R-435** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The snapshot-drop detector is blind to a single-app deletion — the exact shape the box can produce.** `snapshotDropFraction = 0.5` and `snapshotDropFloor = 5` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go`) require a fall of MORE than half the previous count. demo-hp's baseline is **69** across 9 apps, so ~35 snapshots must go before it speaks; **one app's tag is ~9 and is invisible.** `offbox.go:1388` runs `forget --prune` **grouped by host,tags** — a per-tag wipe is precisely the shape a faulty retention or a targeted deletion produces. **This is deliberate, not accidental:** the constant's own comment argues the insensitivity, and *"a detector that cries wolf is switched off within a fortnight"* is a lesson this project paid for. **So this row is NOT a demand to lower the threshold.** It is a demand that the blind spot be written where the operator reads it, because "an unexplained fall is noticed within a day" (R-431, and `STATUS.md`) is true only of falls above half. **Discovered by arithmetic while planning the drill's Phase 2/3 pairing, which could not have worked:** Phase 2 deletes one app and Phase 3 expects the alarm to fire. **LIMITATION NOW WRITTEN INTO THE ALARM'S OWN DOCUMENTATION, hub v0.111.1** — the comment above `snapshotDropFraction` in `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go` now states what the detector does NOT see, with the demo-hp arithmetic and the `forget --prune` grouping that makes the blind spot sit on the most likely single-app failure. **It also says explicitly that the numbers must NOT be lowered to "fix" this** and that per-app detection needs a SECOND signal keyed on the per-tag count. **The row stays OPEN because documenting a blind spot is not covering it** — and because `STATUS.md` and R-431 both still say "noticed within a day", which is true only of falls above half. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-435.md` — the box's key can no longer delete (decisions 68–69); deletion through any other credential still needs >50 % to alarm. Question D7 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — documented in code v0.111.1; the coverage gap itself is unclosed** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN.** Covering one-app deletions needs per-app snapshot counts from the controller and a per-tag threshold measured on real counts — two repos, a mechanism nobody has measured. | — | — | CC |
| **R-521** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] One unplugged drive sends the operator five e-mails and the household none.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 (BIGNIGHT F4, VM 333): `storage_disconnected (error)` at 21:58:02 CEST plus `app_start_failed (warning)` for each of the four apps the drive carries at 21:58:15, each with its own operator mail (hub log: five `Operator email sent`). The customer's mailbox (`tester1@felhom.eu`, read through the connector) received nothing; the household learns of it only on the dashboard, which is honest and says what to do. The apps' stop is a consequence of the drive event, so the four warnings add no information. **Fix shape:** suppress `app_start_failed` for apps stopped by a `storage_disconnected` (the dead-app check already knows the reason — „Hiányzó tárhely"), and decide whether a household gets a mail for a lost drive. **F6, 40 min later, the opposite failure:** a second, separate drive loss (20:38:33Z) produced `storage_disconnected (error)` and four `app_start_failed`, and the hub logged `Operator email suppressed … cooldown` for all five — **no mail at all for the second unplug**; only `health_degraded (warning)` mailed. A per-key cooldown that outlives the recovery (`storage_reconnected` came between them) silences a new incident. **F7:** the system disk at 95 % produced only `health_degraded (warning)`, whose operator mail was **suppressed by the cooldown** left by F6's `health_degraded` 15 minutes earlier; no disk-specific event reached the hub at all — the operator was not told the disk was nearly full. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller) · operator (customer mail policy)** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): FIXED on controller `main`** (`800b32c` — controller half: apps a lost drive stopped no longer mail app_start_failed one by one; test + red-proof). Ships with the next controller release; close after delivery. Left: the hub's cooldown outliving a recovery (F6/F7) and whether a household gets a mail for a lost drive (operator). **2026-10-06: controller half DELIVERED** (v0.298.0). | — | — | CC + operator |
| **R-724** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The status pages disagree with each other in small ways a household notices.** MEASURED 2026-09-29 on a fresh box: Beállítások reads „Mentés ütemezés 02:30 / 03:00" while Biztonsági mentés says 02:30 / 03:30 / 04:15 / 04:30–08:30; Beállítások shows a raw `2026-09-29T19:22:30Z`; its „Helyi cím (LAN)" and „Átjáró" read „nem állapítható meg" on the page the household is asked to read out for remote help; the backups overview still says „Következő mentés — 0 órája" (the age of the LAST run, under the word "next" — noted 2026-09-14, never filed); the dashboard shows the backup at 19:33 where the backup pages say 21:33 (R-500, still reproducing). **FIXED 2026-09-30 (controller v0.283.0):** Beállítások shows the real schedule and a local time; the dashboard's last backup is local time (R-500); „az előző N órája készült" replaces „0 órája". **NARROWED — remaining:** „Helyi cím (LAN)" / „Átjáró" read through the file-sharing container, so a box without it says „nem állapítható meg" — not a text fix (the read needs another path). | **NARROWED — the LAN/gateway read only; owner: CC** **2026-10-06 night: confirmed not a controller-only fix** — the only host-network container is samba (`infra/samba.go:123`) and the agent's local API has no guest-network route; the fix is a new agent route (e.g. the PVE lxc interfaces read) + a controller reader — a two-repo design. | — | — | CC |
| **R-177** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **There is no operator-triggerable "run the fill check now" path.** `fill-watch` is reachable only on its daily 03:30 schedule plus the once-at-startup run added in controller v0.191.1 — so the only way to exercise it on demand is to restart the controller | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-02** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — the same missing operator door as R-314 and R-279. | — | **Noticed while live-validating R-167 on 9201, not by a failure.** It cost a controller restart per observation during validation, and it costs the same on a support call: after a customer frees space, nobody can confirm the warning has cleared without restarting their controller or waiting until 03:30. **Partially mitigated already** — v0.191.2 makes every run log a positive observable (`checked N filesystem(s), M unreadable/skipped, K notification(s)`), so at least a run that DID happen is visible; the gap is triggering one. The scheduler has `GetJobs` but no run-now, so this is a general affordance, not a fill-watch one — **scope it as "run a named scheduler job now", operator-gated.** **ID established free:** `grep -ro "R-177\b" documentation/ *.md` → 0 hits | CC |
| **R-266** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **A failed root `statfs` still reaches the hub as a 0-of-0 disk, and the hub cannot tell that from an empty one.** Split out of R-259 on 2026-08-08 so that fixing the CUSTOMER-facing half could not be mistaken for fixing the wire. `report/builder.go:93-95` copies `sysInfo.DiskTotalGB` / `DiskUsedGB` / `DiskPercent` into `r.Storage[0]` (`Mount: "/"`), and those are exactly the zeros a failed `statfs` leaves behind — the controller now KNOWS the measurement failed (`SystemInfo.DiskKnown`, controller v0.210.0) and the report still does not carry it. **Deliberately not fixed here, for a reason that is now structural rather than a preference:** adding a field to that report is a change to a declared wire, which since G-1 means the receiving side must model it in the same session (`scripts/wire_contract_gate.py` refuses otherwise) — a two-repo change with a hub bump, and this session deliberately touched no hub code. **RANKED LOW, and the reason is that the consequence is bounded:** the hub bands host storage on `disk_percent`, so a failed read presents as 0% used — the *quiet* direction. It cannot raise a false "nearly full" alarm; it can only fail to raise a true one, and only while the root filesystem is unreadable, which is a state with louder symptoms of its own. **Fix shape when it is taken:** carry `disk_known` on the storage entry and have the hub's fill checker skip an unknown reading rather than band it — never treat absent as 0 | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
| **R-285** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **A planned, supervised reinstall pages the operator as if the machine had died — there is no notion of expected downtime anywhere.** During the 2026-08-09 rehearsal the hub sent, all `status: sent` to the operator channel: `host_stale` 08:58 UTC, `node_stale` 09:00, **`host_down` 09:28 (error)**, **`node_down` 09:30 (error)**, `host_leaf_changed` 09:31, `host_recovered` 09:31, `node_recovered` 09:34, `offsite_delivery_stuck` 09:34 — eight operator mails for work that was deliberate, attended and announced. **This is the OPPOSITE gap from the one R-281 filed:** the alarms are not missing, they are indiscriminate. `host_stale` at 30 min and `host_down` at 60 min (`monitor/host_staleness.go:22-23`, `downAfter = 2 * threshold`) cannot distinguish a wiped-on-purpose box from a dead one, and `host_leaf_changed` firing on a reinstall is correct-but-expected. **Note the interaction with the mute used on 2026-08-09 evening:** blocking a customer silences everything, so today the only two settings are *page me for planned work* and *tell me nothing at all*. **What is owed is a middle:** a maintenance window, or an operator-set expected-downtime flag, that suppresses staleness and leaf-change while leaving genuine faults audible | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | The evidence is the operator's mailbox plus `events`/`notification_log` for 2026-08-09 | CC |
| **R-886** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **DooPlex's Alertmanager cannot write its own state since the Longhorn restart of 2026-10-05 13:20Z** — every 15 min `Running maintenance failed … open /alertmanager/nflog.…: permission denied` (and the same for `silences`), 8 times by 14:21Z; the pod was recreated 13:20:48Z by that restart. Mail still goes out (`alertmanager_notifications_total{integration="email"}` 5 → 6, `failed_total` 0, 14:23Z), but a silence set now and the record of what was already sent do not survive the next pod restart — so a restart can re-send every active alarm or drop a silence. Likely collateral of the restart (volume ownership on re-attach), not measured. **Checked from source 2026-10-05 (burn-down round 2):** homelab-manifests@87dfc29 mon-system/alertmanager.yaml:137-247: the Deployment has NO securityContext / fsGroup / runAsUser at all (grep), runs prom/alertmanager:v0.34.1 (:199, non-root `nobody` image) with --storage.path=/alertmanager on the Longhorn PVC alertmanager-data (:202, :212-213, :245-247). The comment :239-244 asserts silences now survive a restart -- an invariant with no test, which is exactly what this row says broke. Last structural change 58d1cd2 (2026-08-14, 'give alertmanager re | **OPEN** | — | Compare the volume's file owner with the pod's `securityContext` (`fsGroup`/`runAsUser`); fix in homelab-manifests; prove with a silence that survives a pod restart | operator |
@@ -248,7 +246,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R-173** | Hub & operator | P2 | **The hub's SQLite PVC is excluded from every Longhorn backup job.** `pvc/hub-data` carries `recurring-job-group.longhorn.io/default: disabled`, and `backup-daily` + `backup-weekly` (04:00 / Sun 05:00) are the ONLY recurring jobs and both target the `default` group — so the 128 MB `/data/hub.db` has **no volume-level backup**. That database holds `host_recovery` (every managed box's break-glass root password), `host_escrow` + `host_escrow_superseded` (escrow custody), `host_pbs_secrets`, `customer_configs`, `dr_recipe` and the wg endpoints/peers — i.e. the material several documented recovery routes depend on | **NARROWED 2026-10-05 (evening) — option A IN FORCE** (`09` decision 125). The hub writes a nightly `VACUUM INTO` snapshot at 02:00 (hub v0.136.0, `05` §16.3, keep 2; the volume grew to 2 Gi); DooPlex checks it (`integrity_check`, size, ≥1 host, ≤26 h old), encrypts it with a key ep0 never sees and pushes it at 02:30 to ep0's `operator` namespace with a write-only token; a read-only token restore-tests it every Sunday 04:30 (and refuses a readable console password); `HubDBBackupStale`/`HubDBRestoreTestStale` alarm on success-only timestamps, `absent()` included. Both keys are off DooPlex (operator, 2026-10-05). PVC label fixed (`enabled`). Proven live: first push 7 s, restore test, token limits, a key rebuilt from the paper `data` field decrypts, runbook §3 steps 1–3 (4/4 console passwords open with the saved seal key, 0/4 with a random one). `audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/` | — | **LEFT:** runbook §3 steps 4–5 (the copy into a live PVC) are not exercised — they need the hub down; do them at the next planned hub maintenance or a DR drill on a scratch k3s. Close then. | CC |
| **R-30** | Hub & operator | P3 | **[P2-HIGH] Liveness presence should come from the wait channel, not the report clock.** The box was powered off at the start of the rehearsal, yet the hub carried it as healthy until the staleness threshold expired ~30 min later (`host_stale` 16:05:24 "no report for 30m"; cleared 16:33:24 "was stale for 27m"). The host-delete guard compounds it: RESET refuses while any host row exists, so a stale-but-"Online" host stalls a forced teardown. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: operator-side presence delay; alarms still fire after 30 minutes and no household data is at risk.** **2026-10-06 night: stopped — a design:** presence from the wait channel is not a direct signal (nginx holds the box's connection; a powered-off box is seen only when no new wait begins — about 240 s + grace, unmeasured), and the same presence gates host-delete before RESET (a destructive path). Needs a measured presence rule and the operator's word on the delete guard. | — | Direction: derive presence from **Dir-2 long-poll connectedness (~90 s grace)**, decoupled from notification hysteresis (the hysteresis is right for *alerting*, wrong for *presence*); an agent/ep0 analog can follow. Pairs with R-13/R-23 — the transport already exists, this is about believing it. *(Discussed in-session as "R-29"; that number was already taken by the gate-rot item earlier the same day, so it is R-30.)* | CC |
| **R-30** | Hub & operator | P3 | **[P2-HIGH] Liveness presence should come from the wait channel, not the report clock.** The box was powered off at the start of the rehearsal, yet the hub carried it as healthy until the staleness threshold expired ~30 min later (`host_stale` 16:05:24 "no report for 30m"; cleared 16:33:24 "was stale for 27m"). The host-delete guard compounds it: RESET refuses while any host row exists, so a stale-but-"Online" host stalls a forced teardown. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **-- 2026-10-08 design:** `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-30.md` — the line is 45 min now (live ConfigMap); the wait channel reconnects every 241–243 s (DooPlex ingress log, read-only); slice 1 (show live-link presence on the host page) needs no decision. Question D2 on STATUS's decision sheet. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: operator-side presence delay; alarms still fire after 30 minutes and no household data is at risk.** **2026-10-06 night: stopped — a design:** presence from the wait channel is not a direct signal (nginx holds the box's connection; a powered-off box is seen only when no new wait begins — about 240 s + grace, unmeasured), and the same presence gates host-delete before RESET (a destructive path). Needs a measured presence rule and the operator's word on the delete guard. | — | Direction: derive presence from **Dir-2 long-poll connectedness (~90 s grace)**, decoupled from notification hysteresis (the hysteresis is right for *alerting*, wrong for *presence*); an agent/ep0 analog can follow. Pairs with R-13/R-23 — the transport already exists, this is about believing it. *(Discussed in-session as "R-29"; that number was already taken by the gate-rot item earlier the same day, so it is R-30.)* | CC |
| **R-31** | Hub & operator | P3 | **[P2-HIGH] Offsite provisioning is synchronous with no status affordance.** Save runs the Hetzner sync in-request, so the request can hit the nginx 504 **while succeeding server-side**: the operator cannot tell failed from slow, and a retry races the first attempt. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: operator-only; a known workaround (click once, wait, verify) exists.** **2026-10-06 night: the race half fixed on felhom.eu main (hub, unreleased):** a second Save while the first still provisions is refused with 409 („already running — wait about a minute, then reload; do not save again"); nothing saved, nothing created; per customer, in memory. `TestProvision_R31_*`, red-proof `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/hub/R-31-red.txt`. LEFT: the async save with a status card (the escrow-card idiom). | — | Direction: make it async + a status card, reusing the proven **awaiting-card/poll idiom** (v0.138.0 escrow card). **Interim mitigation belongs in R-3 as an operator note: click once, wait, verify — do not re-click.** | CC |
| **R-244** | Hub & operator | P3 | **The customer DELETE cascade leaves `app_log_issues` behind, and it is systematic across every venue ever torn down.** Found **2026-08-07** while verifying the `finalwalk` teardown with a **full census** (every table, every column) rather than a per-table query. After a cascade that logged `COMPLETE … full teardown`, **61 rows still matched `finalwalk`**. Four of the five sources are **deliberate and correct** — the cascade's own header states *"Provenance/events are NEVER wiped — audit outlives every tier"*: `events` 16, `notification_log` 14, `host_deletions` 1, `customer_resets` 1. **The fifth is a gap:** `app_log_issues` 29 rows, which the residue purge does not touch (its logged leg covers `reports`/`app_telemetry`/`app_log_tails`/`log_tail_requests`/`notif_prefs`/`selfbind_tokens`/`appliance_registrations` — not this table). **It is not a `finalwalk` quirk:** rows still reference **`c11` 40, `rewalk` 20, `part4` 24** — all three torn down 2026-08-06, whose ledger recorded *"0 occurrences"*. **That prior claim was measured with a narrower query and does not survive a full census; the correction is recorded rather than the measurement quietly redone.** **Why it was probably never written, established rather than assumed:** the table is a **fleet-wide aggregate** keyed on `app_name`+`fingerprint` with an `affected_customers` JSON list — of the 29 `finalwalk` rows, **12 reference only `finalwalk`** (orphans, safely deletable) and **17 are shared with LIVE customers** (`demo-felhom`, `peti-felhom`, …) and **must not be deleted, only de-referenced.** A naive `DELETE … WHERE customer LIKE` would destroy a live customer's issue history — which is very likely why the leg does not exist, and is the reason this is not a one-line fix. **Severity is LOW and stated plainly: no secret material is involved** — app name, fingerprint, message text, counts, timestamps. What survives is a deleted customer's *identifier* inside an aggregate row. **Proposed shape:** a residue leg that (a) removes the customer id from `affected_customers`/`context_customer`, and (b) deletes rows whose `affected_customers` becomes empty; plus a one-off sweep for the four already-torn-down venues. **The general lesson is the reusable part:** *a per-table absence query is not a census.* The teardown verification is now a full-schema sweep, and that is what found this. **Not fixed** — a cascade change needs its own red-proof and this session was scoped as a spike plus two operations. Evidence: `tests/teardown-finalwalk-2026-08-07.md`. **⚠ STILL OWED, AND NOW MEASURED RATHER THAN ESTIMATED (2026-08-08 census, read-only, no truncation).** `app_log_issues` holds **1309 rows**; **71 reference a torn-down venue** (`finalwalk`, `c11`, `rewalk`, `part4`); of those **44 are ORPHANS** — they name only torn-down customers and are safely deletable — and **27 are SHARED with a live customer** (`demo-felhom`, `peti-felhom`, …) and **must be de-referenced, never deleted**. 1238 rows are untouched. **The 27 are exactly why the leg was never written**, and why a `DELETE … WHERE customer LIKE` would destroy a live customer's issue history. **What it needs, precisely:** a cascade leg that (a) removes the customer id from `affected_customers` / `context_customer`, and (b) deletes only rows whose `affected_customers` becomes empty; plus a one-off sweep for the four venues already gone. **Why it was NOT done on 2026-08-08:** the fix is hub code, and that session's scope forbade a hub version bump; a hand-run SQL mutation over 71 rows — 27 of them needing surgical de-referencing — with no tested code path and no red-proof is precisely the shape that goes wrong on a live database. **It accumulates one venue at a time, so the next walk adds to it**; the numbers above mean the next session starts from data rather than a guess. **⚠ IT GREW AGAIN, AS PREDICTED — walk5 teardown, 2026-08-08.** The fifth walk's venue was torn down with a full-schema census taken **before and after**: **168 rows → 67**. Of the 67, **37 are by design** (`events` 21, `notification_log` 14, `host_deletions` 1, `customer_resets` 1) and **30 are `app_log_issues`** — this row's gap, and the count was **predicted in the pre-run enumeration rather than discovered afterwards**, which is the difference from the ledger that once recorded *"0 occurrences"* from a narrower query. **The running total across torn-down venues therefore rises from 71 to ~101 rows** (`finalwalk`, `c11`, `rewalk`, `part4`, now `walk5`) — the shared-with-a-live-customer subset must still be **de-referenced, never deleted**. **It accumulates one venue at a time and it did so again.** Evidence: `tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/teardown-walk5-2026-08-08.md`. **2026-09-25:** `peti-felhom` is no longer a live customer (deleted through the cascade, journal #20); 8 `app_log_issues` rows still name it — the same gap. | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | Line truncated
| **R-882** | Hub & operator | P3 | **Longhorn on DooPlex could not grow a volume online: its `instance-manager` (116 days up) called a host process that no longer existed** — `nsenter: cannot open /host/proc/196610/ns/mnt` on every expansion retry, and an offline growth was blocked by the expansion's own attachment ticket (found 2026-10-05 growing `hub-data` to 2 Gi). A restart of the instance-manager (operator-approved) fixed it: 77/77 volumes back `attached/healthy` in 110 s. **Why the cached PID went stale was not established** (likely a containerd/k3s or iscsid restart after the instance-manager started), so it will recur after the next such restart and stay invisible until a volume needs to grow. `audits/hub-db-offsite-2026-10-05/partA/step1-*.txt` | **OPEN** | — | Find which host process the PID was and whether Longhorn 1.10.x re-resolves it; until then, before growing any volume, check the instance-manager's age against the last k3s/containerd restart | operator |
@@ -259,6 +257,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-719** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P2-MEDIUM] A customer who already exists never gets a fresh self-bind link when their new box registers: the last link expires in 7 days and nothing re-sends it.** MEASURED 2026-09-29 (new-household drill, `tester-1`): the previous link went out 2026-09-17 07:25 UTC at a host delete and expired 2026-09-24; the box registered at 19:11:30 UTC and its console told the volunteer to open the link from their e-mail — there was none that worked. Hub source: the link is sent at customer creation, RESET, e-mail set on a box-less customer and host delete (`selfbind_mint.go` callers `hosts.go:908`, `configs.go:850`, `customer_reset.go:162`) — never on appliance registration. The volunteer guide says the operator needs to press nothing. The operator pressed „Send self-bind link" (the mail arrived in 1 s) — an operator step the volunteer depends on, recorded, not an intervention. **Fix direction:** send the link when an unclaimed appliance registers while a box-less customer waits with no live link (R-509's first fix shape), or the guide's operator part says: press it the day the volunteer installs. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-new-household-2026-09-30/` `phase0/operator-steps.txt`. **CHANGED AND BUILT 2026-09-30 (hub v0.126.0) — the brief's shape was not buildable:** a box registers UNCLAIMED (uuid, MACs, host keys, hardware — nothing of a customer), so "send the link when their box registers" would mail every waiting customer. Built instead: the expired AND used link pages offer „Új linket kérek" → a fresh link to the address registered for that link's customer, only when it has no box, ≤1/h per customer, identical answer for any token (no oracle). Live: the button on the real hub, the same page for a made-up token, no mail; the mint+send path unit-proven (RP42). Evidence: `audits/evidence-fixes-first-tester-2026-09-30/``partD/`. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the operator has not reviewed the changed page shape ("operator may prefer another"), and mint+send is unit-proven only) — **CLOSED 2026-09-30 — hub v0.126.0 (changed shape; operator may prefer another)** | — | — | operator |
| **R-814** | Hub & operator | P4 | `PBS-storage-1` (u629193, box 611421) still `status=active`, 19.9 MB | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: a July watch row with no id; given R-814. WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — no record found that the box was deleted.) — WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | operator console | Delete the box | operator |
| **R-844** | Hub & operator | P4 | **The household's OS-update line exists only on the hub's customer timeline.** 2026-10-04: the box itself has no event surface for agent results (the controller UI shows no timeline), so `os_update_applied` is a hub customer event (info: recorded, never mailed). Its stored text is the hub's English sentence; the hu/en bundle text (`mail.event.os_update_applied`) is used only if it is ever mailed. Fix direction: a controller-side line (the controller already polls the agent's local API) when the box gets a household timeline. `audits/os-guest-lane-2026-10-04/partG/hub-customer-timeline-demo-hp.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN** — a household timeline on the box does not exist yet. | — | — | CC |
| **R-415** | Hub & operator | P3 | **The hub enforces uniqueness on `customer_id` only: two customers can be given the same domain, or one inside another, silently.** `domain` has no UNIQUE/CHECK and the create path rejects only a duplicate id (row text at `git show 71b8c8c6^:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`). **RE-FILED 2026-10-08:** the 2026-10-03 triage commit `71b8c8c6` removed it from this register and it never reached CLOSED-ITEMS — lost, not closed (found by the R-138 design). Since the operator's 2026-09-14 ruling (`01` §7: every customer has their own domain) a duplicate or nested domain is a ruled-out state that nothing refuses. `audits/day-2026-10-08/design-R-138.md` option B covers it. | **READY (XS) — no decision needed: build R-138 option B (refuse a domain equal to, containing or under another customer's, or under `felhom.eu`, at save)** | — | Build the hub guard with its red test; ships with a hub release | CC |
## Business & legal — 6 rows (P2 4, P4 2)