09 §3 decisions 308-312: D83, D84, D85 ruled (operator, 2026-11-15 12:49); the rows carry the fix shape

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@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ Newest first. CC's pick is in the „Pick" column. Each row also has its full te
| # | Row | Question | Pick (why) | The other option costs | If you do nothing | Blocked |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D85 | R-1379 | Should the hub read the end dates of its own five public names each day and warn you 14 days before? | **Yes** (small; the same check that is built for a box's certificate; a hub name that ends takes every box's link down) | no: you keep the five dates in your own list | nobody warns you before a hub name ends | — |
| D84 | R-1374 | When a household removes an app with „delete backup data”, do that app's off-site copies leave outside the weekly deletion cap? | **Yes — their own allowance, only for copies the hub agreed to** (the hub's own 30-day check does the cap's job here; under the cap one big removal stops every clean-up for weeks) | they count: no new rule, but a refused window and your one-shot grant at each large removal | the design stays a design; the off-site copies of removed apps stay for ever | the build of D72 |
| D83 | R-1370 | Below 200 GB of system disk: does the installer refuse, or warn? | **Refuse, with one named flag for you** (a warning on an install that nobody watches is read by nobody; the flag keeps demo-hp possible) | warn: a 128 GB box installs and stops its local copies months later | the installer takes any disk; the 200 GB is only a sentence | the build of D75 |
| D66 | R-1365 | Should a security-watch source that stays down mail again every 7 days, as an open notice does? Today it mails once, then only the Monday summary lists it. | **Yes** (a real outage then cannot be forgotten; the seven pins that can never be read no longer count, so it stays quiet when all is well) | no: one line in a long Monday mail stays the only reminder | a source that stays down mails once; the Monday list still shows it | — |
| D38 | R-1235 | Put the newest golden (637 MB) into the nightly release copy on ep0 too? | **Yes** (a new install after a DooPlex loss needs it; it fits under the 3 GB cap) | leave it out: after a loss, no new install until a golden is rebuilt and vouched | the same | — |
| D37 | R-1236 | Raise Gitea's memory limit from 1 GiB to 2 GiB? It was killed for memory 4 times in 17 days, once during today's release. | **Yes** (DooPlex has the RAM; a DooPlex change, so yours) | keep 1 GiB: a restart in release hours fails box updates and CI for a minute | the same | — |
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ or a household. The ruling: a delete removes them, with one exception — the de
| `os_host_settings`, `os_reports`, `os_kernel_notices` | the box | the box is deleted | `store.DeleteHost`, in its one transaction |
| the hub's own alarm marks that name the box (`hub_settings`, `os_alarm:<kind>:<box>…`) | the box | the box is deleted | the same transaction; matched on the whole id between colons, so a box whose id only starts with this id keeps its marks |
| `offsite_keys`, `offsite_windows`, `offsite_abandon_requests` | the household | the household is deleted (the purge leg, after the outside legs) | `store.PurgeCustomerResidue`; counted in the delete dialog's residue |
| `operator_actions` (the operator's own action log) | the household | **one year after the deletion**, with `events` and `notification_log` | `store.PruneDeletedCustomerAudit`. *Decided by CC unattended — the operator may reverse:* it is an audit record of the same kind as the other two, and the one-year rule (decision 181) is the design's rule for those; the other option, at once, loses „who did what” on the day of the deletion |
| `operator_actions` (the operator's own action log) | the household | **one year after the deletion**, with `events` and `notification_log` | `store.PruneDeletedCustomerAudit`. *Decided by CC unattended on 2026-11-14; accepted by the operator on 2026-11-15 (`09` §3 decision 311):* it is an audit record of the same kind as the other two, and the one-year rule (decision 181) is the design's rule for those; the other option, at once, loses „who did what” on the day of the deletion |
| **`host_deletions`, `customer_resets`** — the delete journal | both | **never** | the ruling's one exception: an id and timestamps, no personal data. The privacy text must say so (proposed, not published) |
**Rows left by boxes and households deleted before this release** (Peti's box, the test boxes of 2026-11): the daily
@@ -1265,6 +1265,31 @@ Recorded before the work (`audits/space-list-2026-11-10/README.md` §5 held the
Hetzner and the mail service are read from source and documents only: no hub database read, no account call.
*Operator, 2026-11-10 12:22.*
### 2026-11-15 (12:49, operator, planning chat) — D83, D84, D85; CC's unattended decision accepted; the privacy sentence waits
308. **D83 = refuse, with one named flag for the operator.** An appliance install on a system disk below 200 GB
(200 × 10⁹ bytes) stops before it changes anything; `--accept-small-disk` goes on, prints the cost and records it;
a BYO host is warned only (`16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14.5, option A). **Cost of the other option
(warn):** a small box installs and stops its local copies months later, and nobody reads a warning on an install
that nobody watches. R-1370. *Operator, 2026-11-15 12:49.*
309. **D84 = yes: the off-site snapshots of an ended app have their own allowance, outside the weekly cap, only for
snapshot ids the hub agreed to — and the household gets ONE mail at the moment it presses „delete backup data”,**
naming the app, the end date and how to take it back. The mail is the reviewer's addition, accepted by the
operator: the page alone does not warn a household whose login someone else uses. **Cost of the other option
(they count toward the cap):** a refused window and the operator's one-shot grant at each large removal
(`07-backup-architecture.md` §8.2f). R-1374. *Operator, 2026-11-15 12:49.*
310. **D85 = yes: the hub reads the end dates of its own five public names each day and warns the operator 14 days
before.** The five names of `08-alarm-ladder.md` §12.2, row DH20, are the list; the operator's yes to that list is
given. **Cost of the other option:** the operator keeps five dates in a list of his own, and a hub name that ends
takes every box's link down. R-1379. *Operator, 2026-11-15 12:49.*
311. **CC's unattended decision of 2026-11-14 is accepted:** the operator's action log (`operator_actions`) of a
deleted household goes one year after the deletion, with the other audit rows (`05-hub-architecture.md` §14.2;
decision 181's rule). *Operator, 2026-11-15 12:49.*
312. **The privacy sentence is not published until the delete journal keeps an id that is not a name.** An id of a
household or a box can be a name (one deleted box carried its owner's first name), so „an identifier and the
time” is not yet „no personal data”. The design is `05-hub-architecture.md` §14.3; nothing is built for it.
*Operator, 2026-11-15 12:49.*
### 2026-11-14 (16:06, operator) — D82: a household's box may remove its old kernels
307. **D82 = yes: a household's box (ring 1) may remove its old kernels by itself — after two REAL removals at night on
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@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-1263** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Small items from review round 2:** a LOCAL restore's put-back mails the operator „its off-site restore FAILED” (`felhom-controller/controller/cmd/controller/main.go:1514-1518`, shared via `restore_unit.go:517-518`); Remove — even „keep my data” — deletes undeclared volumes labelled with the app's project, which no tier holds (`internal/stacks/delete.go:763-764`, R-1117); the capped copy's `--delete` reads the source in the daemon's mount view, the emptiness check in the controller's (`tier2.go:834` vs `:464`); stale comments — `felhom-agent/internal/localapi/backup_cap.go:15` („keep-last”) and `restore_crash_putback.go:32` (names a test file that does not exist); the qBittorrent password goes to whatever answers the DNS name `qbittorrent` (`upwatch/explain.go:94,108-113`); kept-copy Remove has a check-to-remove gap (`tier2_kept.go:92-111`); the release-copy restore check trusts hashes stored on ep0 (`runbooks/total-loss-of-dooplex.md`); rrsync without `-munge`/`-wo` (`audits/day-2026-10-23/08-release-copy-D33.txt:6`). | OPEN | — | fix in each repo's next attended pass | CC |
| **R-1294** | Backup & restore | P3 | **demo-hp's weekly off-site clean-up was refused by its own guard on 2026-10-26 (window 16): the plan would remove 209 of 359 snapshots, above the week's cap (179) — nothing was deleted, and each refused week adds to the next plan.** Seen in the operator mailbox during the 2026-10-26 release run (03:17Z, `offsite_prune_guard_refused`, error; details `count_before 359, count_after 359, outcome guard-refused`). The cap refusal is kept on purpose (R-824, R-867 closed the false ones); the open question is whether a store that once exceeds the cap can ever prune again by itself, or refuses every week while it grows. demo-hp is the Tier-0 box with many hand-made backups (sweeps, probes). Earlier cap refusals: demo-hp 2026-10-03 (window 1), demo-felhom 2026-10-05 (window 3). **2026-11-11:** the End-dates list leans on this row (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md` DB05). | **OPEN — the grant is SET (D55 = 260, `09` §3 decision 268)**: 2026-10-26 19:10:31Z through the operator's one-purpose token `cc-d55-window`, read back `max:260`; it is used at demo-hp's next window request (after its nightly off-site run, ~03:15Z). Close when that window prunes; then the operator revokes the token. **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 evening: CC could NOT set the D54 grant — `POST /offsite/window-grant/demo-hp` (`max_remove=220`) with CC's hub token answered **403 „missing scope offsite:write"** (the hub log shows the refusal; nothing granted). The plan also grows: restic's dry-run 2026-10-26 18:56Z still 359 copies / plan 209 / default cap 179 (before tonight's run); a simulation of the keep rule adds ~14 per night (14 of 18 groups back up nightly), so ~223 at the night of 10-27 and ~237 at 10-28 — a cap of 220 would be refused again. STATUS D55: the operator grants it, with the cap. The grant opens the box's NEXT window request, which comes after its next nightly off-site run. Ruled D54 = prune once (`09` §3 decision 266). **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 (read only, `audits/r1294-offsite-cap-2026-10-26/`): the plan is HONEST (restic's own dry-run: keep 150, remove 209; every removal 7–30 days old; every app keeps ≥ 9 or its last copies; the bulk is one test day, 2026-10-16, 152 snapshots). It can NOT recover by itself: the cap is half the store and grows ~49/week while the plan grows ~84/week. Only demo-hp has this shape (demo-felhom and Tester 1 pruned normally 10-26). The pick is STATUS D54. **Earlier:** OPEN **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place O1, listed from documents only (the off-site box was not read in this run — second pass). **2026-11-10:** the endings list leans on this row (`documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` EC23-7). | — | read the guard's cap rule (controller off-site prune) against demo-hp's snapshot list: is the plan honest (old, superseded) or not; if honest, say how such a store gets back under the cap (an attended one-time prune, or a cap that follows the store) — a design question for the operator if it changes what a box may delete | CC |
| **R-1362** | Backup & restore | P3 | **With the internet down, the Backups page takes over 2 minutes (135 s and 145 s measured; 5 s with only the hub down).** Walked 2026-11-03 on Tester 1: every other page answers at once on the home network. The page waits on something off-site inside its handler; a household that lost its line and opens exactly this page sees a hang. `audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/outage-wan.log` | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | name the wait with a timing, then give it a short deadline and show „the off-site state could not be read" | CC |
| **R-1374** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Four kinds of copy are kept with no end named, and nobody is reminded of them.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EC02, EC23, EC18, EC27; read in source; 9202 has no off-site store, so not measured). (1) **Off-site snapshots of a removed app**: the removal keeps them by ruling (closed R-474), and the weekly clean-up keeps the last snapshots of each app for ever (`internal/backup/offbox_window.go:80-82`), also for an app that is gone. No rule says when they end. (2) **A whole restore from the second drive** moves the old files beside the restored ones (`internal/backup/tier2_whole.go:52`, `:132`, `:345`); nothing removes them later and no page lists them. (3) **Exported app files** stay in the export folder of the drive; the pages can start, list and read an export, none deletes one, and nothing ages it (`internal/web/handler_export.go:30-87`). **Members (answers marked N):** EC02-4, EC23-4, EC18-4, EC27-4. | OPEN — **2026-11-14 (night build):** the design for part (1) is written, not built: `07-backup-architecture.md` §8.2f (the record, the date shown before the press, the take-back button, the deletion inside the weekly window after the hub agrees, 14 edge cases, the texts in Hungarian and English as a proposal). One open decision is in it: do the ended apps' snapshots count toward the window's weekly cap (CC's pick: no). Parts (2) and (3) are not touched. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D72 = yes, by the household's own choice; `09` §3 decision 292).** Not built. | — | Controller (D72): when the household pressed „delete backup data” for an app, its off-site copies end 30 days later, at the next clean-up after that day (the number of a restore copy, D62); when the household kept the backups, the off-site copies stay. The page shows the end date before anything is deleted — write that into `07-backup-architecture.md` before the build. Parts (2) and (3): a delete on the export page; a line on the kept-data page for the files a whole restore set aside. | CC |
| **R-1374** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Four kinds of copy are kept with no end named, and nobody is reminded of them.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EC02, EC23, EC18, EC27; read in source; 9202 has no off-site store, so not measured). (1) **Off-site snapshots of a removed app**: the removal keeps them by ruling (closed R-474), and the weekly clean-up keeps the last snapshots of each app for ever (`internal/backup/offbox_window.go:80-82`), also for an app that is gone. No rule says when they end. (2) **A whole restore from the second drive** moves the old files beside the restored ones (`internal/backup/tier2_whole.go:52`, `:132`, `:345`); nothing removes them later and no page lists them. (3) **Exported app files** stay in the export folder of the drive; the pages can start, list and read an export, none deletes one, and nothing ages it (`internal/web/handler_export.go:30-87`). **Members (answers marked N):** EC02-4, EC23-4, EC18-4, EC27-4. | OPEN — **2026-11-15 12:49 — RULED (D84 = yes; `09` §3 decision 309).** Fix shape for part (1): the five parts of `07` §8.2f, with the ended apps' own allowance outside the weekly cap (only for ids the hub agreed to) and ONE mail to the household at the press of „delete backup data” (the app, the end date, how to take it back). Earlier: OPEN — **2026-11-14 (night build):** the design for part (1) is written, not built: `07-backup-architecture.md` §8.2f (the record, the date shown before the press, the take-back button, the deletion inside the weekly window after the hub agrees, 14 edge cases, the texts in Hungarian and English as a proposal). One open decision is in it: do the ended apps' snapshots count toward the window's weekly cap (CC's pick: no). Parts (2) and (3) are not touched. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D72 = yes, by the household's own choice; `09` §3 decision 292).** Not built. | — | Controller (D72): when the household pressed „delete backup data” for an app, its off-site copies end 30 days later, at the next clean-up after that day (the number of a restore copy, D62); when the household kept the backups, the off-site copies stay. The page shows the end date before anything is deleted — write that into `07-backup-architecture.md` before the build. Parts (2) and (3): a delete on the export page; a line on the kept-data page for the files a whole restore set aside. | CC |
| **R-1385** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Two timed jobs can meet with no lock and no order (12 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W3, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`). MEASURED on the night of 2026-11-11: on Tester 1 and the N100 the whole-guest backup started at about 05:30 local, the minute of the off-site proof restore (CC09-5); on demo-hp one whole-guest backup started at 02:30:38, with the dump leg; on the N100 the whole-guest backup starts about 5 minutes later each day. From source: the controller's auto-update default is the minute the whole-guest gate opens (CC11-5); the second-drive copy and the abandon sweep wait only for the clock (CC02-5, CC19-5, CC21-5); the PBS verify can run beside a backup (CA13-5, CA04-5); the timers on DooPlex and ep0 are not ordered against the hub's copies (CH05-8, CH24-5, CH25-3, CH26-5, CH26-6; from documents only, not measured). No harm was seen; the durations are from small test stores. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Measure one night with a large store on Tier 0 (as a task), then decide per pair: a shared flag, a fixed offset, or „harmless, written down”. | CC |
## Storage & devices — 15 rows (P3 6, P4 9)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-1367** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host journal fills a small system disk: 61% of its lines are `pam_unix(sudo:session)` open/close pairs from the agent's sudo calls.** MEASURED 2026-11-09, one hour, same on demo-hp and the N100: ~14,000 journal lines, ~8,500 of them sudo session lines; the top commands are `smartctl -a` (1,074 per hour — one every ~3 s), `lxc-info -n` (662), `mkdir -p` (540), `lvs` (537), `pct exec` (~520). The journal grows by journald's default cap (10% of the filesystem, max 4 GB): the N100 sits at 4 GB, demo-hp was 3.8 GB on 2026-11-07 and reached 0.7 GB again two days after a vacuum to 500 MB. On a 39 GB root that space is what the whole-guest local copy needs (R-548). | OPEN — filed 2026-11-09 **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place H7: the N100 (4.28 GB, 74 files) and Tester 1 (4.29 GB, 81 files) sit at the journal's own cap; Tester 1 writes about 150 MB a day. Lines written by `sudo` are 92 / 92 / 90 % of all lines in one hour — this counts three lines for each call (the command and the session pair), while this row's 61 % counts the session pair only: the same fact, counted two ways. No rank change is proposed: the journal stops at its own cap (about 4.3 GB), so it costs space and log history, not safety. | — | Agent, through the signed config bundle: `Defaults:felhom-agent !pam_session` (and `!syslog` only if the command log has no reader — check the audit trail's needs first) in the sudoers file; a journald cap drop-in (e.g. `SystemMaxUse=500M`) on the host; and read why `smartctl -a` runs every ~3 s (the SMART poll's interval or a loop). Red-proof each in the agent's tests; measure the line rate after on demo-hp. Evidence: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/demo-hp-images-2026-11-09/journal-noise.txt` (off-git) | CC |
| **R-1368** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Five places on the host's system disk only grow: nothing deletes them and no rule says how many to keep.** MEASURED 2026-11-10 on demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` places H5, H6, H9, H12, H13). (1) **Old kernels** (`/lib/modules`, `/boot`): 8 / 8 / 3 kernels = 8.15 / 8.15 / 3.05 GB. The ring-0 boxes got 7 kernels in 37 days and no kernel was ever removed: the update wrapper refuses a plan that removes a package (`11-os-updates.md` rule R4), and nothing runs `apt autoremove` (searched: architecture folder, both registers, runbooks, three source trees — 0 hits). The N100's system disk grew 4.6 GiB in 26 days, about a kernel a week. (2) **The agent's self-update folder** `/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate`: 49 / 48 / 33 binaries = 740 / 724 / 509 MB, one for each agent version the box ever got; no document names the folder. (3) **Guest template archives** `vzdump-lxc-9100-*` in `/var/lib/vz/dump`: 1 / 4 / 1 = 0.65 / 2.56 / 0.65 GB. (4) **Old agent binary copies** `/usr/local/bin/felhom-agent.bak-*`: 1 / 11 / 0 files, up to 155 MB. (5) **Logs of failed whole-guest backup runs** in the dump folder (small; 9 on demo-hp). **Members (answers marked N):** H5-3, H5-4, H6-3, H9-3, H9-4, H9-8, H12-3, H12-4, H13-3, H13-4. | NARROWED — **2026-11-15 06:35 — the FIRST real night removal: the N100, by itself, at 05:58 CET.** 8 kernels before, 2 after (it kept 7.0.14-26 and 7.0.14-28, the running one), 6 packages purged in 35 s, 6.81 GB gained (the wrapper's own figure; 65.1 GB free after), 0 left-over paths; the default kernel and the pinned file are unchanged (the file's time is still 2026-11-08); the hub's „Kernel step” cell reads „cleaned”; 0 failed units, 9 of 9 containers healthy, clock +0.06 s to DooPlex. demo-hp had a QUIET night (2 installed, nothing to remove) — it does not count; its 6 old kernels went on 2026-11-10 at 13:51, by day. **D82 count: the N100 1 of 2, demo-hp 0 of 2.** demo-hp can count only after two more kernels arrive (it holds 2 and keeps 2). Evidence: `audits/night-build-2026-11-14/E/`. Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 16:06 — RULED (D82, `09` §3 decision 307): a household's box may remove its old kernels, after two REAL night removals on each ring-0 box (the N100 and demo-hp); quiet nights do not count. Count so far: the N100 0, demo-hp 0 (the Tester 1 removal of 2026-11-14 was started by hand and is not a night). It needs a later agent release to switch it on.** Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 (release 2a): the old-kernel part is BUILT — agent 0.174.0, vouched 15:21 CET (`11` §5.11.1 `[FACT — built]`).** A ring-0 box removes its old kernels at night by the wrapper's own rule. On boxes: a real removal on Tester 1 (3 → 2 kernels, 1.12 GB, 8.5 s; the default, the pinned file, the generators and the state file unchanged; a second run removed nothing; one clean restart) — started by hand with a ring-0 mark set for the test on the operator's yes, because a night cannot be started by day (R-1394); dry runs on demo-hp (nothing to remove; refusals P1, P2, P3) and the N100 (6 of 8 will go). **LEFT for this part: the step by the agent at night — read the N100's and demo-hp's night of 2026-11-15; then a ruling for ring-1 boxes (D82).** Evidence `audits/release-2a-2026-11-14/`. The other four places of this row are unchanged. Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 12:22 — RULED (D67 = yes, as a separate step; `09` §3 decision 286):** the box may remove old kernels by itself; rule R4 stays as it is for update plans; the clean-up is its own step with its own narrow rule (old kernel packages only, only after a good boot on the newest kernel). **2026-11-10:** the endings list leans on this row (`documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` EA01-4, EA23-4, EA24-4, EA26-4). **2026-11-10 — the kernel part's fix shape is PROVEN by hand on demo-hp** (`documentation/audits/kernel-cleanup-spike-2026-11-10/`; design `11-os-updates.md` §5.11.1, not built): the rule removed 6 of 8 kernels and nothing else, 6.4 GB gained, boot settings unchanged, one orderly reboot back on the same kernel, a second run removed nothing. Not proven: a box whose running kernel is not its newest; a boot of the kept old kernel. **2026-11-10 — part (2) FIXED IN SOURCE, NOT RELEASED** (felhom-agent `776025c8`): after an update that ended well the agent removes every staged binary but the running version's; nothing is removed while an update is pending. `TestPrune_*` (6 tests, one runs the wrapper's real commit and rollback verbs), red seen three times. A box cleans its folder at the first good update after the release that carries it. Part (4), the `.bak-*` copies, is not reached (root-owned, made by a person). Parts (1), (3), (5) stay open. **2026-11-10 14:46 UTC — the kept old kernel boots:** on demo-hp the one-shot flag booted 7.0.14-26-pve to a healthy Line truncated
| **R-1369** | Box system & updates | P3 | **When a disk is full there is no written way out: no runbook and no self-repair, for the host system disk, the thin pool, the guest disks or a data drive.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`, question 7). One missing runbook, seen from 21 places; the search of the runbooks folder for a disk-full procedure gave 0 hits (`evidence/searches.txt` S6). The alarms exist (hub: 90 / 95 % host disk, 85 / 90 % thin pool; controller: 85 / 95 % on the data volume and each drive) but they end in a mail, not in a step. For three small places nobody wrote what fails when they are full (EFI partition, host and guest temp folders). **Members (answers marked N):** H1-7, H2-7, H5-7, H9-7, H10-5, H10-7, H12-7, H13-7, H15-5, G1-7, G2-7, G7-7, G12-7, G13-7, G14-7, G17-5, D1-7, D2-7, D3-7, D6-7, D7-7, D8-7, D9-7, D10-7. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 (afternoon) — the runbook is written:** `documentation/runbooks/disk-full.md`, five parts, each hand step marked PROVEN (date and evidence; all on demo-hp) or NOT PROVEN. Still open: one rehearsal of the whole runbook on demo-hp; the NOT PROVEN steps (copies on a former target, template archives, the `.bak-*` binaries, the guest root disk); what fails when the EFI partition or a temp folder is full. | — | Docs: one runbook „a disk is full” with one section per disk (host system disk, thin pool, guest root, data volume, data drive): what to look at first, what is safe to delete (the places of R-1368 and R-1367), what is never deleted by hand (household data, the kept-data rulings). Rehearse it once on demo-hp. | CC |
| **R-1370** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host's system disk has no space budget: no document says how much the host's own files may take, and the installer's sizing rule covers the guest only.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` place H1, answer H1-3; search S5 — 0 hits). Today: demo-hp 58 % of 41 GB, N100 38 % of 101 GB, Tester 1 34 % of 63 GB — and the parts that grow are the journal (R-1367), old kernels and agent binaries (R-1368), old backup copies (R-1087) and the local whole-guest copy (R-548). Second half, known but with no row until now: on a small disk the guest's own guards read the guest's 70 GiB while the thin pool behind it holds 54 GiB (demo-hp: 102 GiB promised on a 53.9 GiB pool, 70.67 % used), so only the hub's thin-pool alarm stands before a full pool. **Member:** H1-3. | OPEN — **2026-11-14 (night build):** the open point of D75 has a written design with a pick, not built: `16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14.5 — refuse below 200 GB on an appliance install, with one named flag for the operator; warn only on a BYO host; 8 edge cases. It waits for the operator's yes. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 12:22 — RULED (D69 = yes; `09` §3 decision 288):** the section goes inside `16-storage-physical-identity.md`, no new document. **2026-11-10 (afternoon) — the section is written:** `16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14 (45 places, the list „no limit, by ruling”, the budget, the open design points); `PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md` §N.5 keeps it true. The budget from measured numbers: the root needs about 14 GB when the whole-box copies go to a backup drive, and 28–54 GB at keep 3 when they do not. **D75 (for the operator):** the smallest system disk Felhom accepts. CC's pick: 128 GB only with a backup drive, 200 GB without one. The other option, 128 GB always, lets a box with many apps and no backup drive stop its local copies. With no ruling the installer accepts any disk. Open after the ruling: the installer's refusal. **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D75 = one number, 200 GB, with or without a backup drive; `09` §3 decision 295).** This replaces CC's two-step pick. **Open, not ruled:** what the installer does below 200 GB — refuse, or warn. demo-hp (128 GB) stays as a test box. `16` §14.3 carries the ruling. | — | Design first: what the installer does below 200 GB (refuse, or warn) — a later session. Then the installer. | CC |
| **R-1370** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host's system disk has no space budget: no document says how much the host's own files may take, and the installer's sizing rule covers the guest only.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` place H1, answer H1-3; search S5 — 0 hits). Today: demo-hp 58 % of 41 GB, N100 38 % of 101 GB, Tester 1 34 % of 63 GB — and the parts that grow are the journal (R-1367), old kernels and agent binaries (R-1368), old backup copies (R-1087) and the local whole-guest copy (R-548). Second half, known but with no row until now: on a small disk the guest's own guards read the guest's 70 GiB while the thin pool behind it holds 54 GiB (demo-hp: 102 GiB promised on a 53.9 GiB pool, 70.67 % used), so only the hub's thin-pool alarm stands before a full pool. **Member:** H1-3. | OPEN — **2026-11-15 12:49 — RULED (D83 = refuse, with one named flag; `09` §3 decision 308).** Fix shape: the installer reads the size of the disk that holds the `pve` volume group before any change; below 200 × 10⁹ bytes an appliance install stops with the designed sentence; `--accept-small-disk` goes on, prints the cost, records `small_disk: true`; a BYO host is warned only; a size that cannot be read refuses on an appliance and names the flag (`16` §14.5). Earlier: OPEN — **2026-11-14 (night build):** the open point of D75 has a written design with a pick, not built: `16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14.5 — refuse below 200 GB on an appliance install, with one named flag for the operator; warn only on a BYO host; 8 edge cases. It waits for the operator's yes. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 12:22 — RULED (D69 = yes; `09` §3 decision 288):** the section goes inside `16-storage-physical-identity.md`, no new document. **2026-11-10 (afternoon) — the section is written:** `16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14 (45 places, the list „no limit, by ruling”, the budget, the open design points); `PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md` §N.5 keeps it true. The budget from measured numbers: the root needs about 14 GB when the whole-box copies go to a backup drive, and 28–54 GB at keep 3 when they do not. **D75 (for the operator):** the smallest system disk Felhom accepts. CC's pick: 128 GB only with a backup drive, 200 GB without one. The other option, 128 GB always, lets a box with many apps and no backup drive stop its local copies. With no ruling the installer accepts any disk. Open after the ruling: the installer's refusal. **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D75 = one number, 200 GB, with or without a backup drive; `09` §3 decision 295).** This replaces CC's two-step pick. **Open, not ruled:** what the installer does below 200 GB — refuse, or warn. demo-hp (128 GB) stays as a test box. `16` §14.3 carries the ruling. | — | Design first: what the installer does below 200 GB (refuse, or warn) — a later session. Then the installer. | CC |
| **R-984** | Box system & updates | P4 | **Host and agent hardening, low risk each: the backup-target route has no role check; the unsigned guest spec has no size bounds; signed ops have no maximum validity; the guarded mkfs does not refuse LVs, zvols or RAID devices; the local API is reachable from the LAN by a static route; a sudoers inspect pattern is wider than needed; install passes secrets on the command line; guest settings files are world-readable; the host offers rpcbind and DNS on the LAN.** Fix each in its own small change. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN | — | Batch into hardening work | CC |
| **R-979** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Controller updates are trusted by registry tag alone (no digest, no signature), and the Update button offers any newer tag, even an unvouched one; the built-in traefik, cloudflared and FileBrowser images are also pinned by tag only.** Whoever can push to the registry decides what runs. Fix: pin by digest from the hub's vouched list; offer only vouched versions. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN — design-proposal | — | Design note, then build | CC |
| **R-974** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A compromised host agent can likely become root on the host through the root wrapper that applies PBS settings: the wrapper accepts a folder path inside the agent's own writable tree and then acts on it as root.** Static (the symlink behaviour was reasoned, not run). Same class as R-861. Fix: a fixed root-owned folder, and refuse symlinks before any root action. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN | — | Fix the wrapper with a test on a throwaway box | CC |
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
| **R-1363** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A household's mail ends with raw JSON: `Megjegyzés: {"avail_gb":5.192043304443359,"band":"warning",...}`.** Seen in the walks of 2026-11-02 (`audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/mail-fill-household.txt`, `mail-crash-household.txt`). `api/handler.go` adds the details as the „Megjegyzés" line; a golden pins it (`mail_golden_test.go`), so it was once wanted. The sentence itself is right and Hungarian. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | drop the line from a household's mail, or render known fields in words; the operator's mail keeps it | CC |
| **R-1365** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A security-watch source that stays down mails once and never again; after that only one line of the Monday summary says so.** An open advisory reminds every 7 days, a failed source does not (`08` §11 [DESIGN], „once per streak"). The cost was seen 2026-10-28 → 11-02: one mail, then a week of silence. With the seven pins that can never be read now a stated GAP (R-1334), a streak means a real outage. | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — D66 | D66 | on yes: `plan()` mails a streak again every 7 days, with a test seen failing; `08` §11's line changes | operator (decision), CC (build) |
| **R-1371** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **Seven places have no space alarm, and the host-disk alarm that does exist goes to the household.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`, question 6). (1) **The guest root disk has no watcher.** The controller watches `/` and the system data path, but inside its container both are the data volume (measured on all three boxes, `evidence/extra/controller-fs-view.txt`); the 32 GiB guest root disk, which holds `/opt/docker/stacks`, is not a target. Closed row R-521 says it is — true only before the two volumes were merged; capability-map row C13 („warned before a filesystem fills — per filesystem”) does not hold for this one filesystem (the map's status is not changed here). (2) **The same filesystem is two targets**, and warnings are de-duplicated by path, so two warnings for one full disk are expected (read from source, not proved live; the comment at `cmd/controller/main.go:2694-2707` says the opposite). (3) **`host_disk_critical` and `storage_fill_critical` are mailed to the household by default** (`hub/internal/claim/engine.go:229-243`), but only the operator can free a host disk; the seed list was chosen as „critical only” and the question „can this reader act on it” was not asked. No architecture document names the host-disk event (search S4; `08-alarm-ladder.md` names the thin-pool one). (4) Small places with no alarm: EFI partition, temp folders, guest system log, guest package cache. **Members (answers marked N):** H10-6, H15-6, G1-6, G13-6, G15-6, G16-6, G17-6. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 12:22 — RULED (D68 = operator only; `09` §3 decision 287):** the household is not mailed about a host disk it cannot free. **2026-11-10 — parts (2) and (3) FIXED IN SOURCE, NOT RELEASED.** (2) felhom-controller `844f19f1`: one fill target per filesystem (`system.FilesystemKey`; the container's `/` is an overlay with its own device number, so the identity is taken from a Docker-kept file — `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/evidence/extra/fs-identity.txt`); `TestR1371_*`, red seen three times; not proven on a box. (3) hub source, no build: `host_disk_warning` / `host_disk_critical` are operator-only and the critical is not seeded; `storage_fill_*` reaches a household only for `usb`, `local-dir`, `nfs`, `cifs` (`notify.operatorOnlyFor`; `08-alarm-ladder.md`); `TestD68_*`, red seen three times. Parts (1) and (4) stay open: who watches the guest root disk is a design point in `16-storage-physical-identity.md`. **2026-11-10 (afternoon) — two design points added** (`16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14.4): a drive in the backup role reports as `usb` or `local-dir`, so the household gets the `storage_fill` mail for a drive it must not clean by hand; the hub's first list for a household still holds `storage_fill_critical` until the box sends its own list (not measured on the running hub). Also noted: the closed row R-521 and `felhom-controller/controller/cmd/controller/r521_f7_rootfs_test.go:29,36` call the watched path „the guest's root filesystem”; it is the container's `/`, an overlay on the data volume. The guest's real root disk is the one part (1) says nobody watches. **2026-11-10 (release run) — parts (2) and (3) RELEASED** (`documentation/audits/release-space-fixes-2026-11-10/`). (2) controller 0.352.0, global floor 15:31 UTC: on scratch guest 9202 one fill sent TWO warnings on the version before and ONE on the new one (so the double warning is now seen on a box, not only read from source); Tester 1, demo-hp and demo-felhom each check 2 filesystems where they checked 3. (3) hub 0.180.0 live since 15:12 UTC, Synced/Healthy; proof = the `TestD68_*` tests and the deployed commit. **Not proven on the running hub:** that a household which saved its own alarm list before no longer gets the host-disk type — the pages that show a household's list refuse a token (by design, `05` §17) and no test alarm was made (`16` §14.4). **Still open:** (1) the guest root disk has no watcher (design point); (4) the small places; a real fill on a household's box. | — | Controller: add the guest root disk as a fill-watch target, de-duplicate targets by filesystem, correct the comment; red-proof with two paths on one filesystem. Hub: after the pick, route the two host-disk events. Docs: name the host-disk alarm and its reader in `08-alarm-ladder.md`. | CC |
| **R-1379** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **An end date exists and nobody is warned before it (18 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T1, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; dates measured read-only on three boxes and from public certificates). No alarm fires before any of these ends: the box's web certificate (DB01-5, DB01-7: Traefik renews by itself; a renewal that fails is silent until the day), the hub address certificate (DH20-5), the operator tokens with a 90-day life (DH22-5), a node's Tailscale key (DH30-5), Debian's package keys (DB16-5), the 30-day restore copy (DB24-5), the end of OS security support (DB17-5), app and tunnel-client images (DB18-5, DB19-5), the local-API certificate (DB03-5), and the outside accounts: mail key, domains, Cloudflare, Hetzner, GitHub and Gitea tokens (DH23-5, DH24-5, DH27-5, DH28-5, DH29-5, DH31-5, DH32-5). Decision D77 in `STATUS.md` asks if the product warns 14 days before. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes, D77 (`09` §3 decision 298). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: the two warnings are LIVE** (hub 0.182.0, controller 0.353.0). The three test boxes' reports carry their web certificate's end date and issuer (read from a copy of the live database: 2026-12-31, 2027-01-02, 2027-01-19); the hub's end-date check set its baseline at the start. **Not seen:** no real certificate or token 14 days from its end, so no warning was seen. The other sixteen stay a design table; D85 is not ruled. Earlier: NARROWED — the two ruled warnings are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub warns the operator 14 days before an operator token ends and 14 days before a box's web certificate ends (the box reads the date from its own store and sends it in its report) — `08-alarm-ladder.md` §12.1. The other sixteen are a design table there (§12.2): one is small and waits for a yes (the hub's own five public names), one is a design question (a household's Cloudflare token), the rest stay the operator's list. Not seen on a box or a deployed hub. OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the box reads its web certificate's date, the hub reads its tokens' dates, one operator alarm 14 days before. The outside accounts stay a list the operator reads (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/README.md`). | CC |
| **R-1379** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **An end date exists and nobody is warned before it (18 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T1, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; dates measured read-only on three boxes and from public certificates). No alarm fires before any of these ends: the box's web certificate (DB01-5, DB01-7: Traefik renews by itself; a renewal that fails is silent until the day), the hub address certificate (DH20-5), the operator tokens with a 90-day life (DH22-5), a node's Tailscale key (DH30-5), Debian's package keys (DB16-5), the 30-day restore copy (DB24-5), the end of OS security support (DB17-5), app and tunnel-client images (DB18-5, DB19-5), the local-API certificate (DB03-5), and the outside accounts: mail key, domains, Cloudflare, Hetzner, GitHub and Gitea tokens (DH23-5, DH24-5, DH27-5, DH28-5, DH29-5, DH31-5, DH32-5). Decision D77 in `STATUS.md` asks if the product warns 14 days before. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes, D77 (`09` §3 decision 298). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-15 12:49 — RULED (D85 = yes; `09` §3 decision 310).** Fix shape: once a day the hub opens a TLS connection to each of its five public names (`08` §12.2 row DH20; the list is configuration), reads the end date, and raises the operator-only alarm 14 days before, per name; a name that cannot be reached is a line in the daily ledger, not an end-date alarm. Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-15: the two warnings are LIVE** (hub 0.182.0, controller 0.353.0). The three test boxes' reports carry their web certificate's end date and issuer (read from a copy of the live database: 2026-12-31, 2027-01-02, 2027-01-19); the hub's end-date check set its baseline at the start. **Not seen:** no real certificate or token 14 days from its end, so no warning was seen. The other sixteen stay a design table; D85 is not ruled. Earlier: NARROWED — the two ruled warnings are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub warns the operator 14 days before an operator token ends and 14 days before a box's web certificate ends (the box reads the date from its own store and sends it in its report) — `08-alarm-ladder.md` §12.1. The other sixteen are a design table there (§12.2): one is small and waits for a yes (the hub's own five public names), one is a design question (a household's Cloudflare token), the rest stay the operator's list. Not seen on a box or a deployed hub. OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the box reads its web certificate's date, the hub reads its tokens' dates, one operator alarm 14 days before. The outside accounts stay a list the operator reads (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/README.md`). | CC |
| **R-1383** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A job on a timer does not run, gives up, or loses its state at a restart, and nobody is told (23 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W1, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; read in source, times measured read-only on three boxes). The four worst: the guest-power watchdog gives up with one journal line (CA07-7, CA07-8); a signed job that is refused or runs out stays silent, so an agent update never arrives (CA09-4, CA09-7); the hub's daily checks are skipped with no trace when the hub is down at their minute (CH02-4, CH02-8, CH11-4, CH16-4); an operator mail waiting for a retry is lost at a hub restart, and a household mail is never retried (CH04-4, CH04-7, CH04-8, CH03-7). The others: CA13-7, CC07-7, CC12-4, CC19-7, CC20-4, CH07-4, CH09-4, CH14-4, CH26-7, CH27-4, CH27-8. Beside R-1361 (a lost event) and R-1186 (the silent off-site skip); not the same gaps. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 299). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: LIVE** (hub 0.182.0, agent 0.175.1 vouched). Seen on the running hub: the daily-check ledger has its first records, the lost-mail scan ran at the start („none”), the „Security profiles” cell is filled for the three test boxes, the „Kernel clean-up” cell shows the N100's night. **Tests only, not seen on a box:** a refused signed job told, a guest-power give-up told, a lost operator mail told, a skipped daily check told. Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 (night build, second part):** the two things release 2a did not tell are built, not released: the System page has a cell for the kernel clean-up (removed, kept, space gained) and one for the security-profile refresh (the kernel, how many profiles changed, any failed service it restarted) — `11` §5.11.1, §5.12. On the way a display defect was fixed: a clean-up hid a kernel that fell back the night before in the „Kernel step” cell. NARROWED — the four worst cases are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the operator is told when a hub daily check's slot passed while the hub was down, when an operator mail was never sent, when a box did not take a signed job in two hours, when a box refused a signed job (with the cause), and when the guest-power watchdog gave up (`05` §16.6, `08-alarm-ladder.md`). Tests only; not deployed, not seen on a box. LEFT: the other 15 answers of the class; a household mail is still never retried (R-1361); the kernel clean-up and profile-refresh detail (next part of release 3). OPEN — **2026-11-14 (release 2a), two more things the hub does not tell:** (1) a kernel clean-up that removed kernels shows only as „cleaned <time ago>” in the System page's „Kernel step” cell — what was removed, kept and gained is stored and shown nowhere; (2) the security-profile refresh sends nothing to the hub at all, also when it restarted a failed service (it did on the N100). Both for release 3. Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): one hub alarm for the four worst cases (agent: watchdog give-up and refused job as events; hub: a start-up check „did my daily jobs run”, and the mail retry kept across a restart). | CC |
| **R-1396** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The agent now names WHY its trust in Proxmox is wrong, and the hub does not tell the operator yet.** Found 2026-11-14 night (release 2b, built). The agent's host report carries a `proxmox_trust` stanza (`mode`, `problem`, `detail`, the CA copy's end date; `03-host-agent.md` §12a). Two gaps: (1) the hub does not read the stanza — a box whose CA copy does not verify, ends within 30 days, or whose move failed is said only in the box's journal; (2) a box that is fully blind (neither the pinned certificate nor the CA copy works) sends NO host report, because the report starts with a call to Proxmox — that case reaches the operator only as „host stale” after 45 minutes, with no cause. With release 2b a pinned box heals itself at the first failed call, so (2) needs both ways to fail at once. | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: gap (1) is LIVE and was seen from a real event** (hub 0.182.0): Tester 1 reported `ca_copy_unavailable` for the minutes between its agent update and its root-files update; the hub mailed the operator only, named the cause, and said „no problem any more” at the next report. That alarm was FALSE (the pin worked) and agent 0.175.1 no longer raises it. **LEFT: gap (2), the fully blind box** — a box whose trust does not work sends no report, so a staged wrong CA copy can raise no alarm (it also repairs itself at the agent's start, seen on demo-hp). Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 night: gap (1) is BUILT, not deployed** — the hub reads `proxmox_trust` and raises one operator-only `proxmox_trust_problem` per (box, cause), and `proxmox_trust_ok` at the recovery (hub `main` after v0.181.0; the wire-contract gate asked for the receiver in the same push as the sender). **LEFT: gap (2), the fully blind box.** Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-14 | — | hub: an operator-only event from `proxmox_trust.problem` (raise once per cause, clear when it is empty), and the mode on the System page; agent: send a report without the Proxmox part when the failure is one of trust (a design choice: what the hub does with a report that has no guests) | CC |
| **R-1397** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **One call of the agent to Proxmox is answered 500 during a fresh install, and the agent logs no ERROR line.** Seen 2026-11-15 on the fresh test box (golden 0.353.0, agent 0.175.1): Proxmox's own access log holds `PUT /api2/json/pools/felhom` → 500 at day-0, between 102 calls answered 200; the install ended „SUCCESS”, the guest is in the pool's box and one app installed; the agent's journal has 0 ERROR lines. Not read: which call it is in the agent, whether it is retried, and whether the same line was there on earlier installs (`documentation/tests/golden-0.353.0-2026-11-15/fresh-install/`). | OPEN — filed 2026-11-15 | — | read the pool call in the agent's day-0 path: is the 500 an expected „already a member” answer, and is it logged | CC |