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@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
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customer-held recovery code R. The hub stores only the opaque blob + a non-reversible password hash;
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neither Felhom nor a hub compromise can open it. Cross-validated live: fork-4 validation (blob →
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recover → decrypted the real repo) and the offsite arc (auto-confirm on hash match).
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v0.127.0/v0.88.0 (TASK 2026-07-13): the PRIMARY path is the controller wizard — the customer runs
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the ceremony themselves; the CLI remains the operator fallback. Mechanics validated by
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audits/SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13.md (all five GO).
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-->
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## When a ceremony runs
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@@ -15,45 +18,82 @@
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`pending` until the hub-verified auto-confirm.
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3. **Any new unrecoverable secret / suspected R exposure**: re-ceremony (R cannot be retro-fitted —
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it is never retained).
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4. **Stale-blob warning** (v0.127.0, Scenario F): the controller re-checks the hub blob's password
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hash on every report ACK even in the `escrowed` state. If the CURRENT blob does not cover the
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current offsite password (hash mismatch, or a hash-less superseding blob — e.g. a CLI ceremony
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run without the staged secret), the Távoli mentés card shows "A letétben lévő helyreállítási
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csomag nem fedi a jelenlegi távoli mentési jelszót" and offers a re-ceremony. Runs are NOT
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blocked (offsite copies still protect against non-total loss); the fix is one wizard run.
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## Prerequisites (check BEFORE scheduling with the customer)
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- **Agent version:** ≥ v0.79.0 (the ceremony records `restic_pw_sha256` — older agents produce a blob
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auto-confirm can never match).
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- **⚠ No-PBS hosts: the ceremony CANNOT run — and that is now POLICY, not a gap.** The previously
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documented "identity-only mode (≥ v0.80.0)" was NEVER implemented — v0.80.0's actual feature was
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seeding `escrow.pbs_storage_id` on PBS hosts. `escrow-create` hard-requires a PBS storage id +
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its key file (drill-proven 2026-07-12, finding F-6 of DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12.md).
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**Operator decision 2026-07-12 (DR-tier-by-default, decision 4): identity-only escrow is
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formally PARKED — F-6 is closed by policy, not by implementation.** Every install ships the
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full DR plumbing (host-install ≥ v1.15.0); activation is the hub's per-customer DR-tier flag
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(default ON), and offsite backup REQUIRES that flag (hub v0.51.0 enforces the coupling:
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"Offsite backup requires the DR tier"). A box therefore always reaches the ceremony THROUGH
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the tier: WG peer → PBS-DR descriptor applied → ceremony. Revisit identity-only ONLY if a
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customer class demands lean-tier offsite — this line is here so a future session knows the
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absence is a decision, not an oversight.
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- **Host packages:** `age` must be installed (identity wrap dependency; installed by host-install
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since v1.15.0 — drill finding F-10 closed. Pre-v1.15.0 boxes: `apt-get install -y age`).
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- **K gate (PBS hosts):** `escrow.pbs_storage_id` set and the key file present
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(`cfg.Backup.PBSEncKeyPath(<id>)`).
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- **Staged secret (offsite):** offsite enabled → `EscrowState="pending"` on the controller and the staged
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password file present on the agent (`escrow-stage/restic_repo_password` — pushed automatically at
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enable; re-saving the offsite config re-pushes it if missing).
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- The customer is present/reachable: R is displayed ONCE and must land in their hands.
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## PRIMARY PATH — the controller wizard (customer-driveable, agent ≥ v0.88.0, controller ≥ v0.127.0)
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The customer (or the operator in the customer's session) opens **Távoli mentés →
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"Helyreállítási kód létrehozása"** (`/backup/escrow`) and clicks through:
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1. **Preflight** — the wizard checks: PBS storage id configured, DR tier applied, `age` present,
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hub upload target configured, the FELHOM_ESCROW sudo grant listed (list-mode probe), staged
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secret (informational). Red rows block the start.
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2. **Warnings** — the R-is-final copy; a re-ceremony additionally shows the supersede warning
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("a korábbi kód érvényét veszti…").
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3. **Re-auth** — the dashboard password, typed again (rides the login rate-limiter).
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4. **Run** — the controller RE-STAGES the current offsite password first (when offsite is
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configured; a staging failure ABORTS the start — a ceremony without the staged secret would
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mint a hash-less blob), then triggers the agent's local-API job. The agent runs
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`sudo -n felhom-agent --config /etc/felhom-agent/agent.json --selftest=escrow-create --upload
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--output=json` — ONE fixed argv, byte-matched by sudoers (spike §2.2).
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5. **Reveal** — R is delivered by a ONE-SHOT claim: displayed exactly once in the browser,
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`Cache-Control: no-store`, never rendered server-side, never logged, wiped agent-side the
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moment it is claimed. Unclaimed R expires after **10 minutes** → the ceremony is VOID and a
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re-run supersedes it (nothing is lost — the blob is already on the hub; the old R simply never
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existed for it).
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6. **Typed-back** — the customer re-types two random words of R (client-side check), ticks the
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"felírtam" confirmation, finishes.
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Then the existing **auto-confirm** flips `pending → escrowed` hands-free within one report cycle
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(hash match in the ACK) and wipes the staged copy — same as ever.
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**Supersede/void semantics:** every new ceremony's blob REPLACES the hub blob; the previous R keeps
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opening only the previous blob (pre-existing offsite history). An unclaimed/void R requires nothing
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but a re-run. An agent restart mid-ceremony or pre-claim loses R safely (in-memory by design) — the
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wizard reports it honestly; re-run.
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### F1 threat model (operator ruling 2026-07-13 — carried verbatim into the product)
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R is displayed in the customer's browser, which means it transits the Cloudflare tunnel ONCE at
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the reveal moment (TLS end-to-end, `no-store`, one-shot). **This is an accepted, documented risk**
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— the same trust class as the claim code and the login password, which already ride the same
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channel: an adversary positioned to read this leg already owns the dashboard session and the box.
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The agent→controller leg (local API, pinned TLS) never leaves the box. A LAN-direct delivery
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variant (à la plex.direct) is PARKED, not forgotten — revisit only if the trust class of the
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tunnel changes.
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## OPERATOR FALLBACK — the CLI (text mode, unchanged)
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## The ceremony (ONE command, on the host, as the agent's operator context)
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```bash
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felhom-agent --selftest=escrow-create --upload
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```
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- `--storage <pbs-storage-id>` only if `escrow.pbs_storage_id` isn't configured (the PBS DR
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apply-bridge seeds it automatically). No-PBS hosts: see the prerequisite warning above — the
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ceremony refuses without a PBS key; identity-only mode does not exist yet.
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- What it does, in order: generates a fresh **R** (EFF-wordlist passphrase; entropy printed) → seals K
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(if present, via proxmox-backup-client re-key) and the IdentityBundle (age-under-R; the staged restic
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password auto-injected; the live WG key auto-captured if present) → **self-verifies by recovering its
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own blob** ("an escrow you haven't recovered isn't an escrow") → uploads the opaque blob +
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`restic_pw_sha256` to the hub → **wipes the staged secret**.
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- Output hygiene: the ONLY secret ever displayed is R. Nothing else in the output is sensitive; the
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command is safe to run over a screen-share EXCEPT the R moment.
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- On the host, over SSH, as before; output byte-identical to the historical text mode. R is
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printed once inside the write-it-down banner.
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- `--storage <pbs-storage-id>` only if `escrow.pbs_storage_id` isn't configured.
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- **⚠ Staged-secret rule:** when offsite is configured, ensure the staged secret is present
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(re-save the offsite config to re-push it) BEFORE a CLI run — a CLI ceremony without it uploads
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a hash-less blob, which trips the Scenario-F stale warning and can never auto-confirm.
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- `--output=json` exists for the wizard's job runner (machine mode: ONE JSON object with R on
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stdout, humans to stderr). Never run json mode by hand into a terminal you are screen-sharing.
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## Prerequisites (the wizard preflight checks these for you)
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- **Agent ≥ v0.88.0** (wizard endpoints + `--output=json`); ≥ v0.79.0 for `restic_pw_sha256`.
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- **⚠ No-PBS hosts: the ceremony CANNOT run — POLICY, not a gap.** Identity-only escrow is
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formally PARKED (operator decision 2026-07-12, DR-tier-by-default decision 4); every install
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ships the full DR plumbing (host-install ≥ v1.15.0), activation is the hub's per-customer
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DR-tier flag (default ON), and offsite backup REQUIRES that flag. A box always reaches the
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ceremony THROUGH the tier: WG peer → PBS-DR descriptor applied → ceremony.
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- **Host packages:** `age` (installed by host-install since v1.15.0).
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- **K gate (PBS hosts):** `escrow.pbs_storage_id` set and the key file present.
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- **Sudo grant:** the `FELHOM_ESCROW` alias in `/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent` (ships with
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host-install ≥ v1.16.0 via the canonical sudoers fetch; on older installs re-ship the sudoers
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with the agent deploy).
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- The customer is present: R is displayed ONCE and must land in their hands.
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## R handling — the rules to say out loud to the customer
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1. R is displayed **once**; the system keeps no copy anywhere. Write it down / password manager /
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@@ -69,8 +109,9 @@ Within one report cycle the hub serves the blob's presence + hash in the ACK; th
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`sha256(local repo password)` and flips `pending → escrowed` on its own, wiping the agent-staged copy.
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**Verify remotely:** the customer page / report shows `escrow_state: "escrowed"` with zero manual clicks;
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the next scheduled offsite run proceeds and snapshots appear. Hash-mismatch warning instead → the blob
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does not cover the CURRENT password (stale blob) → re-run the ceremony; do NOT manual-confirm around it.
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(The manual confirm endpoint exists solely as a deprecated fallback for pre-hash legacy blobs.)
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does not cover the CURRENT password (stale blob) → re-run the ceremony (wizard); do NOT manual-confirm
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around it. (The manual confirm ENDPOINT exists solely as a deprecated fallback for pre-hash legacy
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blobs; its button is gone from the card since v0.127.0.)
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## Recovery (the other half — operator-assisted, sketch)
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Total loss → the customer's R + the hub blob:
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@@ -82,6 +123,10 @@ secrets writer) → restore through the real endpoints. Live-proven end-to-end 2
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password opened the production repo).
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## Do NOT
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- Run a ceremony unattended or pipe its output to a log (R would land in it).
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- Pipe the CLI ceremony's output to a log or run it unattended (R would land in it). The wizard's
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machine mode is exempt BY DESIGN: its pipe terminates in the agent's in-memory one-shot holder,
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nowhere else.
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- Manual-confirm a hash-mismatch; skip the self-verify; retain or transmit R on Felhom systems.
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- Treat the SFTP credential as escrow-worthy (it's regenerable access; only the ENCRYPTION secrets ride R).
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- Run a CLI ceremony on an offsite-configured box without the staged secret (hash-less blob →
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stale warning; the wizard's re-stage-first makes this impossible from the UI).
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