operator rulings 2026-10-05 18:23: 43 burn-down rows closed as accepted (292 -> 249); R-124 kept (fix now), R-698 kept (operator's known risk); R-831/R-870 not rotated; R-887 one runner online — the stale-registration guess was wrong
gates / gates (push) Successful in 1m36s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 1m36s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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**Ready for the first real tester (Tester-2): yes. Tester 2 (a laptop, off at night) was offline again; nothing was
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sent to it.**
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**Updated 2026-10-05 (night, the burn-down session): every box of ours healthy (nothing was changed on any box). The
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open-items list went from 336 to 292. Report: `REPORT-burndown-2026-10-05.md`.**
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**Updated 2026-10-05 (late night, burn-down round 2 — in progress): 249 open rows after your answer (was 292).**
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## Your answer to the burn-down list (2026-10-05 18:23), recorded
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- **43 rows closed as accepted by you**, each with its reason from the list.
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- **R-124 stays open and is fixed in this session** (a recovery step that fails during a real recovery).
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- **R-698 stays open as a known risk** (a backup keeps an app's image name, not the image). It is yours; nobody works on it now.
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- **R-831 and R-870** (the printed tokens) stay as they are, by your earlier rulings; the rows keep their steps.
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- **R-887** (the CI jobs that never ran): your screenshot shows ONE runner, online. My „old copy of the runner" guess was
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wrong; the row says so.
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## Tonight, later (2026-10-05, night): the list got shorter
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@@ -19,76 +27,13 @@ open-items list went from 336 to 292. Report: `REPORT-burndown-2026-10-05.md`.**
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it; it is gone, and a test keeps it gone.
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- **You got 5 „CI failed" mails tonight — my fault, fixed.** The new test gate ran one of today's test suites on the CI
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machine for the first time; it uses a different `date` tool, and 9 tests failed. Fixed; CI is green again (job 1360).
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- **A separate CI fault on DooPlex (new row R-887):** two CI jobs were never run and were marked failed after ~10 minutes, with no log and no mail. One re-run passed; the other was again never picked up. It looks like a leftover runner registration, but I cannot see the runner list. If you do nothing: now and then a CI run reads „failed" without testing anything. Fix: Site Administration → Runners, remove any offline duplicate of `felhom-gates-runner`.
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- **A separate CI fault on DooPlex (new row R-887):** two CI jobs were never run and were marked failed after ~10 minutes,
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with no log and no mail. (The „old runner copy" guess was wrong — see above.)
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- **A new rule, so the list stops growing:** a small problem found during work (about 30 minutes) is fixed in that
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session and never added to the list. Every report now states four numbers: rows before, after, opened, closed.
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**The numbers:** 336 before → **292 after**; 1 opened (the CI fault below); 45 closed.
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**Needs you:**
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1. **The list below: 45 rows I would close as „accepted".** Answer per row, or „all as picked". If you do nothing,
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they stay open and the list stays at 292.
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2. **Two leaked tokens to rotate** (R-831, R-870, at the end of the list). If you do nothing, whoever has those
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transcripts keeps that access.
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3. Earlier tonight's items are unchanged (pin the other „latest" apps on DooPlex; Alertmanager's file permissions).
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4. **Look at the CI runners** (Gitea → Site Administration → Runners; R-887): remove any offline duplicate of
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`felhom-gates-runner`. If you do nothing, some CI runs fail without running.
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## Your list: rows I would close as 'accepted' (burn-down 2026-10-05) - answer per row, or 'all as picked'
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Each line: what it is. What fixing costs. What happens if we never fix it. **My pick.** I closed none of these.
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- **R-93** - A choice between two test fixtures that no longer exist. Fix: a new fixture (a design job). If never: nothing breaks. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-124** - The disaster-recovery recipe writes the backup-server namespace as the word 'root'; the server wants an empty name, so one pasted command fails. Fix: a change across hub and agent. If never: an operator doing a manual restore drops one option once; no data risk. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-161** - The check that app data lands where backups see it runs by hand, not on every push. Fix: CI starting ~53 apps per push. If never: a bad template can ship until the next periodic check. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-162** - If Docker ran on an unusual storage driver, one catalog check would blame the wrong thing. Fix: ~1 h for a driver nobody runs. If never: nothing; the check still fails safely. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-169** - CI reports after a push lands instead of blocking it (no pull requests here). Fix: a pull-request workflow for every change. If never: a forbidden --no-verify push could land broken code until the CI mail. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-194** - A removed storage permission can still look present for minutes (Proxmox cache). Fix: a new probe in the agent. If never: the self-repair notices up to ~16 min late, then repairs. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-210** - 193 old controller/hub images sit only on DooPlex (~27 GB). Fix: a careful delete on DooPlex. If never: 27 GB stays used; ~199 GB is free. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-284** - An 'almost full' warning reported on an empty disk was a misreading; the page never shows it there. Fix: nothing to fix. If never: nothing. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-346** - A warning about a mistake nobody has made (the audit found 0 cases). Fix: nothing left. If never: nothing today. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-367** - One old 312 KB database dump sits on the demo-hp test box under an old folder name. Fix: a hand delete on a demo box. If never: a small file stays on a test box. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-371** - The weekly off-site backup sends no 'done' message (failures and staleness already alarm). Fix: a new event in two repos. If never: success stays silent, as now. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-372** - An idea to show 'second copy never made' apart from 'second copy failed' to the operator. Fix: a design and a new state end to end. If never: the existing loud warning stays. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-374** - A July audit says three borderline cases were left out but never named them. Fix: hours to guess which three. If never: nobody can re-judge them; later sweeps exist. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-393** - A proposed tool to log every small decision an unattended run makes. Fix: a small project. If never: the bigger decisions are already recorded under the rules file. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-420** - The felhom.eu gate runner cannot mark a gate as advisory only. Fix: add it when one is needed. If never: nothing today. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-424** - The roadmap gate cannot tell a real defect filed as an idea from an idea. Fix: no mechanical fix exists. If never: a person must read the roadmap. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-445** - The hub's memory suggestion for an app can use samples from a short test install. Fix: a hub change (~1-2 h). If never: a misleading suggestion for up to 7 days after a test install. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-460** - BookStack's uploaded files cannot be checked automatically after an upgrade. Fix: an upstream change or a browser step. If never: upgrades stay half-checked automatically. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-503** - Letting the installer pick the disk when there is only one (you ruled no). Fix: reversing your rulings. If never: a person keeps choosing the disk. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-527** - A catalog 'locked after install' flag does nothing visible (all settings are read-only anyway). Fix: delete it everywhere, or build an edit page. If never: nothing a household meets. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-532** - Vaultwarden shows a sign-up form although sign-up is off; the server refuses it. Fix: an upstream fix. If never: a stranger sees a form that fails. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-551** - The escrow 'waiting for the agent' screens are tested but never seen on a real box. Fix: a token setup on the scratch box. If never: small chance the live page differs; the state lasts ~17 min. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-610** - A power cut inside a sub-second startup phase was never measured (same code as the measured phase). Fix: a new fault injector and a drill. If never: nothing new would be learned. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-654** - Old opengist /login bookmarks answer 404 after an upstream move. Fix: one help-text line. If never: a household re-bookmarks once. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-687** - Three live proofs a scratch box cannot give, and one log line 20 minutes off. Fix: special test venues. If never: the tests stay the proof. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-688** - Deleting a customer does not remove their Cloudflare tunnel and DNS; the dialog says so. Fix: a new Cloudflare step in the delete. If never: you remove them by hand, guided by the dialog. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-768** - Grimoire is not offered (upstream rules out public use); the row only watches upstream. Fix: a re-read each catalog campaign. If never: nothing; Karakeep covers bookmarks. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-793** - Four apps contain paid-edition code that is off; the row says never turn it on. Fix: nothing (the rule lives in the licence audit). If never: nothing unless someone enables it. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-796** - MeTube's browser 'send' helpers cannot pass the family gate. Fix: a new token design. If never: households paste links in the page. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-797** - Catalog CI cannot run one gate rule; it says 'not checked' and the push hook checks it. Fix: a CI checkout of a second repo. If never: only a forbidden bypass could skip it. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-804** - plant-it's image no longer exists; the template is already marked not installable. Fix: hide the template (small). If never: nothing. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-190** - A storage permission vanished once in August; the agent now restores it and mails you. Fix: hours of live experiments. If never: one mail per recurrence; it self-repairs. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-412** - A rare race can push one hollow off-site copy of one app; the next night repairs it. Fix: a change at the backup/push boundary plus a drill. If never: rarely, one app's off-site copy is hollow for a day; the second-drive copy stays good. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-458** - A pinned (frozen) app can get a newer health check, which can only cause a false alarm. Fix: a fiddly change on the sync path. If never: maybe one false alarm one day. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-584** - Helper scripts with the shared demo password were left in a demo box's /tmp. Fix: a wrapper tool. If never: demo-password litter on throwaway boxes. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-586** - The ISO bootstrap harness runs at each ISO release, not on every push. Fix: Docker-capable CI. If never: a break is caught at the next ISO release. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-698** - A backup records an app's image name, not the image; restoring a version deleted upstream fails. Fix: a mirror or much more backup space. If never: that restore fails; the household uses another copy or version. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-738** - The update's health check sees only the front page, so data broken behind it passes. Fix: a per-app data check in every template. If never: catalog tests keep catching it before release. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-778** - A box that rolls back below controller 0.286 trusts a forged address in the login counter. Fix: a patch release or a rollback rule. If never: a short window until the next update. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-783** - Three wrong SparkyFitness logins block sign-in for everyone for ~10 s. Fix: an upstream setting. If never: a persistent stranger can annoy the household. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-853** - After a boot, the box's versions reach the hub up to ~15 min late. Fix: a new agent mode and release. If never: one report late; nothing lost. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-700** - A drive move keeps the app's records: fixed in controller v0.276.0 with tests; never seen live on a two-drive box. Fix: a live two-drive move. If never: the tests stay the proof. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-704** - A fresh install drops an old update hold: fixed in v0.278.0 with tests; not seen live. Fix: a live install with a leftover hold. If never: the tests stay the proof. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-706** - Removing an app with its backups also deletes its off-site test copy: fixed in v0.279.0 with tests; not seen live. Fix: a live remove with an off-site copy. If never: the tests stay the proof. **Pick: close.**
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- **R-723** - No 'box recovered' alarm in a new box's first hour: fixed in hub v0.126.0 with tests; not seen at a real first install. Fix: watch the next real install. If never: the tests stay the proof. **Pick: close.**
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**Not 'won't do' - these need YOU (leaked tokens; my pick is KEEP until you rotate):**
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- **R-831** - the Hetzner storage API token was printed into one session transcript. Rotate it (~10 min). If never: whoever gets that transcript can manage Storage Box sub-accounts.
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- **R-870** - Tester 1's two Cloudflare tokens were printed into one transcript. Rotate them (~15 min), or close when Tester 1 is retired. If never: someone could change that test zone's DNS.
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## Tonight (2026-10-05, evening): the hub database off DooPlex; the cut-backup check on the scratch box
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**Decisions:** none of mine. Yours (`09` 125–127): ep0 for the copy; the scratch-box restart allowed; the agent's three
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@@ -26,6 +26,58 @@
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---
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## 2026-10-05 (late night) — burn-down round 2: the operator's answer (43 accepted), small rows fixed with releases
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The full text of every row below: `git show e8c56c44:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` (the commit before each closing commit; the burn-down evidence table is `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/`).
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| Row | What | Closed | Evidence |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| **R-93** | `drill-r50` is both a blocked customer and the only drift fixture **FACT 2026-09-13 (R-461): the fixture is GONE — `qm list` is empty on both demo boxes, so neither option is available and the row's p (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A choice between two test fixtures that no longer exist. Fix would cost: a new fixture (a design job). If never: nothing breaks. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-161** | **The volume-persistence gate is enforced by CONVENTION, not automatically.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The check that app data lands where backups see it runs by hand, not on every push. Fix would cost: CI starting ~53 apps per push. If never: a bad template can ship until the next periodic check. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-162** | **`docker diff` is the gate's only witness, and its failure mode is quiet.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: If Docker ran on an unusual storage driver, one catalog check would blame the wrong thing. Fix would cost: ~1 h for a driver nobody runs. If never: nothing; the check still fails safely. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-169** | **CI can only report, because there is no gate in the road.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: CI reports after a push lands instead of blocking it (no pull requests here). Fix would cost: a pull-request workflow for every change. If never: a forbidden --no-verify push could land broken code until the CI mail. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-194** | **PVE's permission cache delays every grant-state verdict by an unknown amount, so "the agent can read it" and "the ACL exists" are not the same measurement.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A removed storage permission can still look present for minutes (Proxmox cache). Fix would cost: a new probe in the agent. If never: the self-repair notices up to ~16 min late, then repairs. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-210** | **Which of the 345 local images may be deleted — 131 controller tags and 62 hub tags exist ONLY on this box and are not recoverable by `docker pull`** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: 193 old controller/hub images sit only on DooPlex (~27 GB). Fix would cost: a careful delete on DooPlex. If never: 27 GB stays used; ~199 GB is free. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-284** | **„A kiválasztott tárhely majdnem megtelt." on a store that is 93 % FREE — an apparent inverted threshold.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: An 'almost full' warning reported on an empty disk was a misreading; the page never shows it there. Fix would cost: nothing to fix. If never: nothing. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-346** | **`ActiveEnterTimestamp` answers a different question than the one a slope measurement asks, and on ep0 right now it is wrong by 5 h 56 m.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A warning about a mistake nobody has made (the audit found 0 cases). Fix would cost: nothing left. If never: nothing today. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-367** | **The database dumps already written under the wrong name are stranded, and nothing will ever collect them.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: One old 312 KB database dump sits on the demo-hp test box under an old folder name. Fix would cost: a hand delete on a demo box. If never: a small file stays on a test box. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-371** | **The off-site tier is the only backup tier that announces nothing on success.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The weekly off-site backup sends no 'done' message (failures and staleness already alarm). Fix would cost: a new event in two repos. If never: success stays silent, as now. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-372** | **A Tier-2 copy that has NEVER been produced because its source path is missing is not surfaced prominently to the operator.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: An idea to show 'second copy never made' apart from 'second copy failed' to the operator. Fix would cost: a design and a new state end to end. If never: the existing loud warning stays. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-374** | **Three C1 refusal cases were judged borderline, left unfiled, and never named — so nobody can re-open the judgement.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A July audit says three borderline cases were left out but never named them. Fix would cost: hours to guess which three. If never: nobody can re-judge them; later sweeps exist. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-393** | **A decision-log skill for unattended runs was considered and deliberately deferred.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A proposed tool to log every small decision an unattended run makes. Fix would cost: a small project. If never: the bigger decisions are already recorded under the rules file. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-420** | **`controller_gates.py` could not express a NON-BLOCKING gate before 2026-09-01** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The felhom.eu gate runner cannot mark a gate as advisory only. Fix would cost: add it when one is needed. If never: nothing today. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-424** | **`one_register_gate.py`: a real defect parked under the roadmap state `idea` is invisible to it.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The roadmap gate cannot tell a real defect filed as an idea from an idea. Fix would cost: no mechanical fix exists. If never: a person must read the roadmap. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-445** | **[P3-LOW] Hub app telemetry survives the app's removal, so a 15-minute throwaway now sets a FLEET-WIDE memory recommendation.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The hub's memory suggestion for an app can use samples from a short test install. Fix would cost: a hub change (~1-2 h). If never: a misleading suggestion for up to 7 days after a test install. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-460** | **[P3-LOW] BookStack's FILE half cannot be seeded or verified without a browser, so its upgrades can only ever be auto-proven for the DATABASE.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: BookStack's uploaded files cannot be checked automatically after an upgrade. Fix would cost: an upstream change or a browser step. If never: upgrades stay half-checked automatically. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-503** | **[P3-LOW] SPIKE (not built): an install-time disk rule for the public ISO — "exactly one internal disk → install; otherwise stop in Hungarian".** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Letting the installer pick the disk when there is only one (you ruled no). Fix would cost: reversing your rulings. If never: a person keeps choosing the disk. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-527** | **[P3-LOW] The catalog flag `locked_after_deploy` is read by no controller code — every setting is read-only after install whatever the catalog says.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A catalog 'locked after install' flag does nothing visible (all settings are read-only anyway). Fix would cost: delete it everywhere, or build an edit page. If never: nothing a household meets. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-532** | **[P3-LOW] Vaultwarden's `/api/config` still says `disableUserRegistration:false` with signups off, so the web vault shows a register form that the server then refuses.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Vaultwarden shows a sign-up form although sign-up is off; the server refuses it. Fix would cost: an upstream fix. If never: a stranger sees a form that fails. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
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| **R-551** | **[P3-LOW] No Tier-0 box can put the escrow ceremony in the state R-546 fixes — paused AND connected to its agent — so the readiness branches are proven only by tests.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The escrow 'waiting for the agent' screens are tested but never seen on a real box. Fix would cost: a token setup on the scratch box. If never: small chance the live page differs; the state lasts ~17 min. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-610** | **[P2-MEDIUM] The power cut AFTER the new version has started was never measured — R-520 closed on the safe half only.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A power cut inside a sub-second startup phase was never measured (same code as the measured phase). Fix would cost: a new fault injector and a drill. If never: nothing new would be learned. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-654** | **[P3-LOW] opengist 1.15 moved every page under `/-/` — a household's `/login` bookmark answers 404 after the update.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Old opengist /login bookmarks answer 404 after an upstream move. Fix would cost: one help-text line. If never: a household re-bookmarks once. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-687** | **[P3-LOW] Part 7's live proof has four gaps a scratch box cannot close, and one observability gap.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Three live proofs a scratch box cannot give, and one log line 20 minutes off. Fix would cost: special test venues. If never: the tests stay the proof. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-688** | **[P3-LOW] The customer delete says it removes the tunnel and zone, but no leg of it calls Cloudflare.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Deleting a customer does not remove their Cloudflare tunnel and DNS; the dialog says so. Fix would cost: a new Cloudflare step in the delete. If never: you remove them by hand, guided by the dialog. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-768** | **[P3-LOW] Grimoire is not built: upstream rules out public exposure and publishes no image for its current line.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Grimoire is not offered (upstream rules out public use); the row only watches upstream. Fix would cost: a re-read each catalog campaign. If never: nothing; Karakeep covers bookmarks. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-793** | **[P3-LOW] Enterprise / BUSL code ships inside four open images — Cal.com and Docmost (EE folders, off without a key), Outline (BUSL-1.1: no commercial "Document Service"), meilisearch v1.36 in Wanderer (EE modules).** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Four apps contain paid-edition code that is off; the row says never turn it on. Fix would cost: nothing (the rule lives in the licence audit). If never: nothing unless someone enables it. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-796** | **[P3-LOW] MeTube's "send to MeTube" helpers (browser extensions, bookmarklets, phone apps) cannot work behind the family gate.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: MeTube's browser 'send' helpers cannot pass the family gate. Fix would cost: a new token design. If never: households paste links in the page. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-797** | **[P3-LOW] `check-family-gate.py` rule 3 (a family_gate template needs a baked golden ≥ 0.287.0) is checked only where the felhom.eu sibling exists — CI's single clone cannot.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Catalog CI cannot run one gate rule; it says 'not checked' and the push hook checks it. Fix would cost: a CI checkout of a second repo. If never: only a forbidden bypass could skip it. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-804** | **[P3-LOW] plant-it's image is gone from Docker Hub: `msdeluise/plant-it:0.10.0` answers "pull access denied … repository does not exist".** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: plant-it's image no longer exists; the template is already marked not installable. Fix would cost: hide the template (small). If never: nothing. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-190** | **A storage ACL that demonstrably WORKED in the morning was gone by mid-morning, and nothing recorded its removal.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A storage permission vanished once in August; the agent now restores it and mails you. Fix would cost: hours of live experiments. If never: one mail per recurrence; it self-repairs. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-412** | **A recovery unit lost DURING an off-site run — after its own dump leg, before its push — is shipped hollow and the run reports success.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A rare race can push one hollow off-site copy of one app; the next night repairs it. Fix would cost: a change at the backup/push boundary plus a drill. If never: rarely, one app's off-site copy is hollow for a day; the second-drive copy stays good. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-458** | **[P3-LOW] `.felhom.yml` keeps flowing to an app whose compose file is FROZEN, so a frozen app can receive a health check written for a version it is not running.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A pinned (frozen) app can get a newer health check, which can only cause a false alarm. Fix would cost: a fiddly change on the sync path. If never: maybe one false alarm one day. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-584** | **[P2-MED] Credential-bearing probe scripts were left in a live guest's `/tmp` for hours, across three releases.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Helper scripts with the shared demo password were left in a demo box's /tmp. Fix would cost: a wrapper tool. If never: demo-password litter on throwaway boxes. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-586** | **[P2-MED] The ISO bootstrap harness captured the console to a FILE, so each banner erased the one before it — two checks were RED for two days and nobody saw.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The ISO bootstrap harness runs at each ISO release, not on every push. Fix would cost: Docker-capable CI. If never: a break is caught at the next ISO release. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-738** | **[P2-MEDIUM] Every wger update that brings database migrations leaves wger broken, and the guarded Update reports `done`.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: The update's health check sees only the front page, so data broken behind it passes. Fix would cost: a per-app data check in every template. If never: catalog tests keep catching it before release. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-778** | **[P3-LOW] A box that rolls back to a controller ≤ 0.285 after v0.286 keeps the new traefik (an old controller never rewrites a running traefik) — and the old `clientIP` believes the LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For, which a stranger then writes: the dashboard's login counter becomes dodgeable until the box moves forward again.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A box that rolls back below controller 0.286 trusts a forged address in the login counter. Fix would cost: a patch release or a rollback rule. If never: a short window until the next update. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-783** | **[P3-LOW] SparkyFitness: three wrong sign-ins by anyone shut EVERY visitor out of sign-in for ~10 s — a stranger retrying every 10 s keeps the household out.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Three wrong SparkyFitness logins block sign-in for everyone for ~10 s. Fix would cost: an upstream setting. If never: a persistent stranger can annoy the household. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-853** | **After a boot the box's versions and crash facts reach the hub up to ~15 minutes late.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: After a boot, the box's versions reach the hub up to ~15 min late. Fix would cost: a new agent mode and release. If never: one report late; nothing lost. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-700** | **[P2] A drive move unpinned the app — its next start took the catalog's newest version, past the ladder.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A drive move keeps the app's records: fixed in controller v0.276.0 with tests; never seen live on a two-drive box. Fix would cost: a live two-drive move. If never: the tests stay the proof. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-704** | **[P3-LOW] The box's crash-loop stop (decision 28) outlives the app: after remove and reinstall, the new install is still held.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: A fresh install drops an old update hold: fixed in v0.278.0 with tests; not seen live. Fix would cost: a live install with a leftover hold. If never: the tests stay the proof. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-706** | **[P3-LOW] Removing an app "with its backups" leaves its off-site verification copy on the drive.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: Removing an app with its backups also deletes its off-site test copy: fixed in v0.279.0 with tests; not seen live. Fix would cost: a live remove with an off-site copy. If never: the tests stay the proof. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
| **R-723** | **[P3-LOW] A fresh box sends the operator two mails on day one that describe nothing wrong.** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-10-05 — ACCEPTED BY THE OPERATOR (ruling 2026-10-05 18:23, the burn-down list) | Reason on the list: No 'box recovered' alarm in a new box's first hour: fixed in hub v0.126.0 with tests; not seen at a real first install. Fix would cost: watch the next real install. If never: the tests stay the proof. Evidence of the verdict: `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/partA-table.md`. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-10-05 (night) — the burn-down: stale rows closed with evidence, small rows fixed (rule: fix small, do not file)
|
||||
|
||||
The full text of every row below: `git show ab2b3049:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md` (the commit before each closing commit; the burn-down evidence table is `audits/burndown-2026-10-05/`).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ match what the reader sees is how an instrument stops being believed (R-421). It
|
||||
stopping line that lies.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Install & onboarding — 15 rows (P3 9, P4 6)
|
||||
## Install & onboarding — 14 rows (P3 9, P4 5)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -129,12 +129,11 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-554** | Install & onboarding | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Delete the first-boot setup wizard — obsolete by design, still reachable.** OPERATOR DECISION 2026-09-17 (localisation starter, decision 4: „out of scope, obsolete"). `02-controller-module-map.md` L56 calls `internal/setup/` obsolete; `cmd/controller/main.go` L322 still enters it when `setup.NeedsSetup(cfg)` — `customer.id` empty after bootstrap ingestion, or a `.needs-setup` marker (`internal/setup/setup.go` L17-25). Ingestion leaves `customer.id` empty on a missing/invalid `bootstrap.json`, a failed hub pull, or a failed merge/write/reload (`internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` L109-163) — so a box whose first boot cannot reach the hub shows a household an 8-page wizard (95 Hungarian strings, its own template set and CSRF). **Fix shape:** decide what such a box shows instead (a single „cannot reach Felhom yet, retrying" page — needs no decision beyond copy), then delete `internal/setup/` and `runSetupMode`; red-proof that a failed ingestion renders the waiting page, not a 404. **Check first** whether any drill/golden path still relies on `.needs-setup`. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-310** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **Two small edges on the installer, neither costing more than a moment.** (1) The R-297 operator-named refusal states the vouched version twice in consecutive sentences (*"…but the vouched golden is 0.213.0. The vouched golden is 0.213.0."*). (2) `--uninstall` reads its typed vmid confirmation from `/dev/tty` and `--force` deliberately does **not** bypass it, so teardown cannot be scripted without a pty — correct for an irreversible destroy, but undocumented; it surfaces as `line 891: /dev/tty: No such device or address` and an rc=1 that looks like a failure rather than a refusal to proceed unattended | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-12, RANK 4** | R-297 | Drop the duplicated sentence; add one runbook line naming the pty requirement | CC |
|
||||
| **R-494** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **NARROWED 2026-09-14 by operator ruling → [P3-LOW] the hub COULD create the tunnel at customer creation, for a domain already on Cloudflare. Not blocking: every customer has their own domain and the operator creates the tunnel per day-0 A.1 (`architecture/01-topology-and-trust.md`).** *Original finding, kept:* **[P1-HIGH] A new customer's dashboard has NO reachable address unless the operator hand-makes a Cloudflare tunnel — the link in the setup-code mail is dead.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 on a fresh install from the public ISO (drill intervention **I1**): the claim mail points at `https://felhom.drill0242.felhom.eu`; that name has **no A and no AAAA** record (`dig @1.1.1.1`, control `felhom.enkisfelhom.hu` resolves); the hub has **no tunnel- or DNS-creation code** (`hub/internal/cloudflare/` holds only geo-rule removal; `cf_tunnel_token` is a pasted, optional form field, `configs.go:1478`) — day-0 runbook A.1 makes it a manual Cloudflare-dashboard step that nothing on the customer-create page asks for; the box's own split-horizon resolver on the appliance LAN IP answered `google.com` but not the dashboard name at 13:27:39Z; the agent applied the record at **13:27:44Z** (`lanresolver: applied split-horizon record … ip=192.168.0.158`, 3 m 46 s after the controller started), so the box CAN answer the name — **but only to a device that uses the box as its DNS server, and no document, screen or mail tells a household to do that**; the router and the installer-offered DNS answer nothing. The page was reachable only at the guest's LAN address with the name forced (`curl --resolve …:443:192.168.0.158`). **A volunteer could not have done that.** **What it needs:** an operator ruling — the hub creates the tunnel and DNS at customer creation, or the product gives a household a LAN address that works with no DNS change. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: operator-side automation; the operator creates the tunnel by hand per the day-0 runbook.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-503** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **[P3-LOW] SPIKE (not built): an install-time disk rule for the public ISO — "exactly one internal disk → install; otherwise stop in Hungarian".** Offered to the operator 2026-09-14 and **not chosen**: the 2026-07-31 ruling (a person chooses the disk) stands. Recorded so a reversal starts from measurements, not from the offer. **What must be measured first:** (1) whether the Proxmox auto-installer's HTTP answer mode can serve a per-machine answer from posted system info without network being a precondition a volunteer can miss; (2) whether USB transport is reliably visible in sysfs (`/sys/block/*/device` path, `removable`) where udev properties were measured blind (SPIKE-universal-iso-1 §3.2); (3) whether any refusal can be shown in Hungarian without modifying the Proxmox installer squashfs. **Reverses two rulings if built — needs an operator word.** | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (ruling), CC (spike)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: an unchosen idea that would reverse two rulings.** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-504** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `iso.felhom.eu` cannot show an index page on its own — its root returns 404, and the download page lives on the website instead.** MEASURED 2026-09-14: `https://iso.felhom.eu/` and `/index.html` → 404; only named objects answer. The host is an R2 bucket behind a custom domain; whether R2 would serve an uploaded `index.html` at `/` was **not measured** (uploading anything to the public bucket is a publication). The ISO v1.27.0 task puts the Hungarian download page at `felhom.eu/letoltes` (published with the ISO, after the operator's yes). **Remaining:** a redirect from `iso.felhom.eu/` to that page needs a Cloudflare rule the session has no credential for. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (Cloudflare rule)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: households are sent to the website's download page; the bare address is cosmetic.** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-725** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Small copy slips on the first-hour path.** MEASURED 2026-09-29: the self-bind PAGE says the passphrase was received „a beállításkor" while the mail and console say „a Felhom üzemeltetőjétől" (R-497 unified the mail and console, not the page); the recovery-code wizard addresses the household formally („Írja fel", „adja meg") while every other screen says „te"; the console's linked banner ends „a doboz össze van kötve. V" (a stray glyph); a gated app answers a phone app's API call with English JSON „this app is waiting for its first setup" (the browser gets the Hungarian gate page). **FIXED 2026-09-30:** the recovery wizard speaks „te" (controller v0.283.0; formal ceiling 18 → 17); the bind page says „a Felhom üzemeltetőjétől kaptál" (hub v0.126.0). **NARROWED — remaining:** the console's stray „V" (the installer/agent's banner, not these repos' text); the gate's English JSON to a phone app (the app shows its own error; left, deliberately); and the expired bind page still says „kérj újat az ügyfélszolgálattól" ABOVE the new „Új linket kérek" button (hub copy, next hub release). | **NARROWED — three small copy items; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: three small copy slips left; nothing blocks the household.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-881** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **The installer's uninstall does not remove `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply`** (added to the bundle by agent v0.146.1, R-861), and its comment still says the guest hook is agent-installed at runtime (`scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` ~line 1679) — since v0.146.1 the hook is a bundle file. Found 2026-10-05 while checking the installer against the new bundle. | READY | — | Add the file to the uninstall list and fix the comment at the next installer tag | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Apps & catalog — 33 rows (P3 13, P4 20)
|
||||
## Apps & catalog — 25 rows (P3 12, P4 13)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -146,53 +145,40 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-613** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] `uptime-kuma` parks on its setup wizard with no login and no monitors, and the box tells the household it is HEALTHY.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202. On first boot uptime-kuma 2.4.0 sits at `SETUP-DATABASE` (`Waiting for user action...`) and its main socket.io server never starts. **The controller's `http :3001` probe sees the wizard's 302 and records the app as running and healthy.** So a monitoring app that cannot be logged into, and is monitoring nothing, is presented to the customer as fine. Passed through its own front door for the drill with `POST /setup-database {"dbConfig":{"type":"sqlite"}}`. **This is the health-check class the catalog skill already warns about — a probe that proves the PORT answers, not that the APP works** — and it is worth a row because the failure direction is a false GREEN, which no alarm will ever catch. **Needs: a healthcheck for this template that fails while the wizard is up** (the catalog `REUSE.md` maps the families), and a sweep for other templates whose probe would pass on a setup wizard. **— UPDATE NIGHT 2026-09-21:** the update night could not seed `uptime-kuma` for the same reason and left it out rather than faking it. **— FIXED 2026-09-23 night for uptime-kuma (catalog `a5a729a`):** `UPTIME_KUMA_DB_TYPE=sqlite` — the database choice is made, the wizard never appears, the real server starts (`/api/entry-page` → `entryPage`, `/metrics` 401), the database lands in `/app/data` (the backed-up volume). Red-proofed on 9202 through the product: before, the box read `running` over `setup-database`; after, the real server. (A first "after" run used a stale template — R-607's lag — and is kept.) **Still open:** the sweep for other templates whose probe passes on a setup wizard. | **READY — P3, narrowed to the sweep; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2->P3: uptime-kuma fixed; only a sweep of other templates remains.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-676** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Watch: immich's first start restarted 12 times — decision 28's crash-loop stop (6 in 10 min) would stop it.** From the 2026-09-17 chaos night (DB connection dropped during the first-start geocoding import on a 6 GB guest; it did not recover that night). No healthy app in any drill evidence restarts on a first start (1831 samples, 40 live containers), so the threshold stands; this row exists so the first immich install under v0.269.x is watched. `audits/night-2026-09-24/A3/40-first-start-restarts.txt` **2026-09-25 night (read from source, v0.271.0): a DEPLOY's first start is NOT covered by decision 28's suppression** — `Deploying` clears when `compose up -d` returns (`deploy.go` "Clear deploying flag"), and `ObserveUnhealthy` then samples the app; an automatic update's step, verify and undo ARE covered (`Updating`, pinned by `TestD28_NoCrashLoopStopDuringAnAutomaticStep`). So a first start that restarts ≥ 6 times in 10 min is stopped — which R-676 already accepts for a broken first start; a healthy slow first start would be stopped too. **-- 2026-09-30: the first-start restarts are explained.** immich's first-start geodata import OOM-kills its database at 512M on a guest with no swap (R-732, measured: 61–104 kills); the 2026-09-17 chaos-night case (DB connection dropped during the import on a 6 GB guest) fits it. Fixed in the catalog (`56c4888`, 768M). The watch itself (decision 28 on a DEPLOY's first start) is unchanged. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC (watch)** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-682** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A Remove interrupted by a controller kill leaves the app half-removed: containers gone, the app still listed as installed (and held).** MEASURED 2026-09-24 on 9202 (chaos round 9): the kill 2 s after the Remove press answered the household `502 Bad Gateway`; after the restart `chaoscrash` read deployed, stopped, `unhealthy_stop`, with NO container left. Pressing Remove again completed it cleanly (200, only the catalog template left). Recoverable by the household's own second press; nothing tells them to press it. **Fix direction:** the remove journals its intent and finishes (or says it was interrupted) at boot, as the update does. `audits/night-2026-09-24/E/round-09*.json`, `E/round-09b-remove-again.txt` | **READY — P3; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-704** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The box's crash-loop stop (decision 28) outlives the app: after remove and reinstall, the new install is still held.** Measured 2026-09-28 on 9202: calcom crash-looped at 08:22 and 08:28 (`unhealthy_stop`, `crash_loop`, trip 2, recorded 08:28:59Z); it was then REMOVED through the product twice and installed fresh twice (09:14:51Z the last). At 09:45 the new, healthy install's Update was refused `409 held` with the crash-loop sentence („…újra és újra összeomlott…"), and `GET /api/stacks/calcom` carried the old `hold_reason` while `state=running`. Start lifted it (`the unhealthy stop is LIFTED by Start`). So a household that removes a crash-looping app and installs it again (the obvious fix) finds its updates refused for a crash of a previous install. Not measured: whether the nightly update leg also skips it; whether other holds (restore hold) behave the same. **Fix direction:** the remove clears the app's box-set holds, as `DeleteAppBackupPrefs` clears its backup preferences (R-474). Evidence: `audits/pg-calcom-claper-2026-09-28/box/calcom/hold.txt`, `…/box/calcom/move.txt`. **-- 2026-09-28 later: SECOND and worse instance, then FIXED in controller v0.278.0.** demo-hp's fresh nextcloud (installed 10:13) carried an UPDATE hold from a nextcloud of 2026-09-13 (set before v0.242.0 made removals clear update holds; nothing ever swept it). At the manual off-site run (15:17) the backup leg logged `Skipping volume dump for nextcloud — the app is HELD stopped`, captured no unit, and pushed a snapshot that `carried NO database dump and NO volume tar` — a freshly installed app silently NOT backed up. **Fix:** a removal also clears the crash-loop stop (`settings.ClearUpdateHold`), and a new install (plain or "use my kept data") drops a leftover update/crash-loop hold of an app that is not installed (`Router.dropLeftoverHold`); restore holds (R-379) untouched. Red-proofed RP4–RP6 (`audits/kept-offsite-2026-09-28/redproofs/`). Floor 0.278.0. **STILL OPEN: live proof of the install-time drop** (a box with a leftover hold on an uninstalled app). | **WATCHING — P2; owner: CC (install-time drop, live)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-757** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A template that gains a generated `secret` field makes the box INVENT that value for apps already installed — for calibre-web a login name the app never got.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on demo-hp: 9 minutes after catalog `e9f50b5` (decision 61) synced, the controller logged `InjectMissingFields … injected missing fields: ADMIN_USER` (deploy.go:1337) and the app page's reveal returned a 10-character name that was NOT calibre-web's login (the app had kept its own name; `after_install` runs only after a fresh install). The page did not list the field, but the reveal answers it, and the password field's text now says "the user name above". demo-hp was fixed by renaming the app's user to the box's recorded name (credentials file updated). Any other installed calibre-web gets the same made-up name at its next sync while its login stays `admin` (no other box has one today: N100 none, Tester-2 not registered). **Needs:** InjectMissingFields must not invent a value an app has to have been GIVEN (a field consumed only by `after_install`), or such a field needs an "installed apps: ask" path. `audits/calibre-name-and-prune-2026-10-01/A/A2…, A3…` | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-758** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Eight templates declare a `mem_limit` that is not the sum of their compose limits, and no gate checks it.** FOUND 2026-10-01 by `scripts/onboarding_gaps.py` (the new-app checklist's gap page, row 5.3): adventurelog 384M vs 896M, bookstack 512M vs 768M, calcom 768M vs 1792M, claper 384M vs 640M, kimai 384M vs 640M, nextcloud 1024M vs 1664M, outline 768M vs 1152M, zipline 512M vs 768M — every one UNDER the sum, so the deploy screen and the box's capacity figure (`09` decision 22) read less memory than the app may take. REUSE.md §2 says `mem_limit` = the sum. The compose limits are what Docker enforces, so no app is starved by this; the figure the household and the capacity check read is wrong. **Needs:** the eight figures corrected (a template change: needs its own session, no image move), and a static gate (`--fast`) with a decoy, so a new app cannot repeat it. `app-catalog-felhom.eu/onboarding/EXISTING-APPS-GAPS.md` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-762** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] wger serves no CSS or JavaScript and no uploaded photo: every static file and every `/media/` file answers 404.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on 9202 (drill catalog, the live template `82fff32`, wger 2.7), found by checklist rows 1.7 and 2.8: the login page links `/static/css/workout-manager.css`, `/static/bootstrap-compiled.css` — both 404 through traefik; the static root inside the container is empty (4 KB). A progress photo posted to `/api/v2/gallery/` answered 201 and the file is on the media volume, but `GET /media/gallery/…png` answers 404 signed in, without a session, and straight at the app inside the container. **Cause, read in the image:** the entrypoint runs `collectstatic` only when `DJANGO_DEBUG == "False"` and the template sets no `DJANGO_DEBUG`; and wger serves `/media/` only in development (`urls.py:393` „served like this during development only”) — upstream's production setup puts nginx in front for `/static` and `/media`. So the household gets an unstyled app and photos that never show. The same lines stand since the template was written (the 2026-09-29 template too). Not checked: whether any box runs wger (on 2026-09-30 none reported to the hub). **Needs:** `DJANGO_DEBUG=False` (collectstatic) and something that serves `/static` + `/media` (upstream's nginx sidecar, or the gunicorn switch of R-755 plus a static server), proven on the bench and on 9202 with a page that loads its CSS and a photo read back. Owner decides together with R-755 (same server question). `audits/new-app-checklist-2026-10-01/C/C8-signup-guest-media-static.txt`, `C/C4-seed-photo-size.txt` **-- 2026-10-01 (operator):** wger is `lifecycle: hidden` until this and its twin are fixed (catalog `55b8c8a`; read back on 9202: not on the app list, mealie control present). **Merged 2026-10-05 from R-755 (duplicate):** `templates/wger/docker-compose.yml` still sets no `WGER_USE_GUNICORN` — the gunicorn switch is the same server question. | **READY — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: wger is hidden from installs and no box runs it; needed only before it is offered again.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-774** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Two things the new apps' pages do not show yet: Karakeep's mail-ON path is unproven, and its official phone app reports crashes to its makers.** READ/MEASURED 2026-10-01: Karakeep's `smtp_mapping` (plaintext :2526, as Cal.com) was proven only with mail OFF (a fresh install boots) — 9202 has no hub, so the relay cannot be exercised there; the official mobile app ships Sentry crash reporting with a hard-coded DSN (`apps/mobile/app/_layout.tsx`, FIT.md). **Needs:** one password-reset mail from Karakeep on a hub-enabled box (demo-hp 9201, a throwaway install); and a sentence on the page about the phone app (copy, freeze). `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/bench/karakeep-mail-off-boot.txt` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-76** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **FileBrowser-created folders break the setgid chain, and a drop-zone's mode is not stable** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-26, size S, roadmap state `idea (surfaced by the R-75 spike, 2026-07-26)`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | Two related findings from `audits/SPIKE-catalog-data-paths-2026-07-26.md` P3/P5, both **pre-existing** and deliberately left alone by that spike. **(a)** FileBrowser Quantum 1.3.3 creates files `0644` and folders `0755` and does **not** propagate the setgid bit — even though the entrypoint wrapper's `umask 002` really is in effect (`/proc/1/status` `Umask: 0002`). Group inheritance itself works (a file uploaded into a 2775 group-100 dir landed group 100, not the process gid 1000), so the convention's *group* half holds and only its *mode* half is lost. The consequence is proven with a control: inside a UI-created `0755` folder a gid-1000 process's file landed group **1000**, while the identical write into the 2775 parent landed group **100**. So **any folder a customer creates through FileBrowser breaks the shared-group chain one level down.** Latent today — every userdata-touching catalog app that declares an identity declares uid/gid **1000**, the same uid FileBrowser runs as, so owner permissions mask it; it bites the day a content app runs as a different non-root uid with gid 1000. The comment at `infra/infra.go:156` is right that the image ignores `-e UMASK` but does not say t | CC |
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| **R-284** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **„A kiválasztott tárhely majdnem megtelt." on a store that is 93 % FREE — an apparent inverted threshold.** Calibre-Web's deploy page rendered `<option value="/mnt/sys_drive" data-free-percent="93">` alongside „Tárhely (sys_drive) — **64.2 GB szabad**" and the warning „A kiválasztott tárhely majdnem megtelt." 93 % free read as 93 % used is the obvious candidate, and `checkStorageSpace(this)` is the function to look at. **Not confirmed by reading the code** — reported as measured output only. A capacity warning that cries wolf on an empty disk is one a customer learns to click past | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: Probably not a defect: the warning is hidden by default and shown only when free space is below 20%; the measurement likely read raw HTML without running scripts — felhom-controller/controller/internal/web/templates/deploy.html:622,808) — **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Check `checkStorageSpace`'s comparison against `data-free-percent`; add a render test per branch | CC |
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| **R-527** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The catalog flag `locked_after_deploy` is read by no controller code — every setting is read-only after install whatever the catalog says.** FOUND 2026-09-15: `stacks/metadata.go` parses it; `grep -rn LockedAfterDeploy` finds no reader; `deploy.html` renders „Az alábbi beállítások csak olvashatók" for every field. Recorded as the design in `02-controller-module-map.md`; the flag is a seam never wired. **Fix shape:** remove the flag from the catalog, or wire an editable-after-install allow-list (a bigger change). | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: the row says nothing reads the flag, but deploy.go reads LockedAfterDeploy into LockedFields; the row may be stale or describe only the page — felhom-controller/controller/internal/stacks/deploy.go:400,1348-1371) — **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: every field is already read-only; no harm.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-532** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Vaultwarden's `/api/config` still says `disableUserRegistration:false` with signups off, so the web vault shows a register form that the server then refuses.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 in the E.1 spike. Cosmetic: the server refuses (400). A household following the invite-first card is not affected; a stranger sees a form that fails. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog/upstream note)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: cosmetic; the server refuses correctly.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-567** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The two drive wizard pages (/storage/init, /storage/attach) do not highlight the Tárhely menu group — the sidebar reads as if the household left the storage section.** FOUND 2026-09-17 by slice 1 release C: the release C parity cases first used page name `storage` for the wizards; re-captured with the handler's real page name (`storage_handlers.go` `storageWizardPageHandler` passes the TEMPLATE name, `storage_init`/`storage_attach`, as `Page`) the fixtures lost `nav-group is-open` and the `active` link. Present since the wizards shipped; not caused by localisation. **Fix shape:** pass `Page` `storage` (or teach the layout's storage group both names), with a render assertion that /storage/init carries the open storage group. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: cosmetic navigation polish.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-577** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] A guest SHARE visitor has no way to pick a language, and the household's setting is the wrong default for them.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by localisation slice 2 release C (R-557, controller v0.254.0): every other page a person can reach now carries a language globe — the dashboard (the household's setting), and the sign-in and claim pages (the visitor's own cookie). The two guest share pages (`launcher_shared`, `launcher_share_password`) deliberately do NOT, and `TestGuestSharePagesHaveNoGlobe` pins that so it stays a decision rather than an oversight. **Why it is the operator's and not CC's:** a share visitor is a stranger the household sent a link to, and what language they are shown is a promise the SHARE FEATURE makes, not an implementation detail. The `felhom_lang` cookie already built would fit them exactly (display-only, their own browser, never the household's setting). **Fix shape, if the operator says yes:** add `{{template "lang_globe" .}}` to both shells with the anonymous form, and one render case per page per language. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (the decision), CC (the change)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: feature decision for the operator; Hungarian default works today.** | — | — | operator |
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| **R-619** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] A `type: password` deploy field is MANDATORY however `required` reads, and the `deploy-fields` contract says the opposite — so any caller that trusts it is refused.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while widening the update drill. `GET /api/stacks/grafana/deploy-fields` serves `{"env_var":"GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD","type":"password","generate":"password:16","required":false}`; a deploy carrying only the two `required:true` fields is refused **400** „a(z) „Admin jelszó" mező kitöltése kötelező — használja a Generálás gombot…". **The BEHAVIOUR is right and is a decision, not a bug:** `deploy.go:305-312` refuses a `password` field with no caller value on purpose — *"We never silently auto-generate — the user needs to know their password"* — which is the opposite of the `secret` case one branch above, where a generated value the customer never sees is exactly correct. **The defect is the CONTRACT.** `.felhom.yml` declares `required: false`, the API serves that verbatim, and nothing on the wire distinguishes "optional because the box will generate it" (`secret`) from "optional in the template and mandatory in the code" (`password`). A person using the deploy page never meets this because the page renders a Generálás button; **anything that is not that page does**, which now includes this drill harness and would include `09` §6.2's unattended caller the day it deploys anything. **Fix shape (smallest that keeps the decision):** serve `required: true` for `type: password` in the deploy-fields response — one place, derived rather than stored, so templates need no edit — and a test asserting a `password` field always reaches the wire as required. Alternatively state it in the field's `description`, which is weaker because it is prose. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/apps/grafana/log.txt` (the refusal) and `batchA.log`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: only non-page callers (test harness) meet it; the deploy page works.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-644** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `gokapi` on scratch guest 9202 is crash-looping — 329 restarts by 2026-09-23 07:51 UTC, *password does not appear to be a SHA-1 hash* — and the controller still lists it deployed.** OBSERVED at the start of the 2026-09-23 session, not caused by it. The twenty-eight walk's teardown (2026-09-22) removed a `gokapi` container left by R-633 by name; a `gokapi` is running again, recorded `deployed: true`. Not investigated (scope). Likely the R-633/R-634 shape — a restore-then-remove race leaving a record — and a scratch-box fact, not a customer one; filed so the next drill does not read it as its own. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC; investigate before the next drill on 9202** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: seen only on a scratch test guest; the row itself calls it not a customer fact.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-654** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] opengist 1.15 moved every page under `/-/` — a household's `/login` bookmark answers 404 after the update.** MEASURED 2026-09-23 night: 1.13 serves `/login`, `/register`, `/all`; 1.15.2 answers **404** on all three and serves `/-/login`, `/-/register`, `/-/all`; `/` redirects to `/-/all`. The app, its data and its probe (`/healthcheck`) are fine, and a household arriving at the root lands correctly — only a deep link breaks. 1.15 also marks its session cookie `Secure`. **Needs:** a line in opengist's `app_info` if the operator wants households told; nothing in the product. Evidence: `apps/opengist-oldfixture/`, `apps/opengist/`. | **READY — P3; owner: operator (copy decision) / CC (writes it)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: only an old bookmark breaks; the app's front page still works.** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-707** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P2] 37 apps still start with a login a stranger can take (`09` §3 decision 45).** Audit of all 53 apps: `app-catalog-felhom.eu/FIRST-ADMIN.md` (class, fix route, status, measured or read). Open: **3 hard-coded defaults** — calibre-web (`admin / admin123`, measured working on demo-hp and 9202; its own `cps.py -s` route needs a generated password WITH a special character — our generator is letters+digits, a controller change), mealie (`changeme@example.com / MyPassword`), wger (`admin / adminadmin`); **34 open first-run screens** (the first visitor creates the admin: actualbudget, adventurelog, audiobookshelf, calcom, docmost, emby, ghost, gitea, gramps-web, home-assistant, homebox, immich, jellyfin, komga, n8n, navidrome, opengist, outline, papra, plant-it, radarr, rallly, recipe-importer, romm, seerr, sonarr, sparkyfitness, tandoor, termix, uptime-kuma, vikunja, wanderer, wishlist, zipline). **Stale notes:** romm's `default_creds` `admin / admin` answers 401 on demo-hp (like a wrong password) — the page now warns with a login that does not exist; zipline's looks stale too. **Measured on demo-hp 2026-09-28 (read-only):** bookstack's default still logs in on the INSTALLED app (the fix is for new installs; the page now warns). Each fix: route (a) env or (b) the app's own CLI/API via `after_install:`, proven on 9202 with the default failing and the generated password working; route (c) a page sentence. Several sessions (operator, 2026-09-28). **2026-09-29 (controller v0.280.0, catalog `d0e7e2e`):** every class-3 app fixed — mealie, wger, calibre-web by `after_install` (calibre-web with the new `password:24:special`), proven on 9202 fresh installs (`audits/login-gate-2026-09-29/D/`); the setup gate (decision 46, spike PASSED) built and live on immich, n8n, audiobookshelf (probes measured) and uptime-kuma (button) (`…/C/`); romm's and zipline's stale notes removed. **Left: 30 class-4 apps** — gate each (probe measured on 9202 where one exists — 11 upstream candidates listed in `…/B/B-VERDICT.md` §3; the button otherwise). **2026-09-29 afternoon (controller v0.281.0, catalog `6faf432`):** 28 more class-4 apps gated — 32 of 34 — each proven on 9202 (`audits/gate-rollout-2026-09-29/`B): stranger → gate page / 401, household reached the first-setup screen, the gate opened (9 by a measured probe, the rest by the press), the app answered after. seerr, outline, rallly: gated, their opening needs a media server / e-mail (not proven). **Left:** wanderer (R-714); plant-it is not installable. | **NARROWED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — seerr, outline and rallly are gated, but the gate OPENING is not proven (needs a media server / e-mail)) — **CLOSED — 2026-09-29 (the rest → R-714)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-718** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] "Close sign-up now" restarts an app with its own switch, and the card does not say so.** MEASURED 2026-09-29 on demo-hp: pressing it on adventurelog recreated its backend (~30 s, one 500 on its login page). The window's card says the app restarts; the close card does not. **Fix direction:** the close card and the gate-open moment say "the app restarts once" where `after_setup.env` exists. **ALSO MEASURED 2026-09-29 (new-household drill):** the gate-open press on a fresh vikunja restarted it for its own switch — the front door answered 404 for ~2 s and nothing said so. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a short unannounced restart; copy polish only.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-760** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] vikunja's compose has no healthcheck, and nothing says why.** FOUND 2026-10-01 by `scripts/onboarding_gaps.py` (row 4.1): two services in the catalog have no compose `healthcheck:` — `adventurelog-frontend` (deliberate, a comment cites R-655: the image brings its own) and `vikunja` (no comment). Not measured: whether the vikunja image declares its own `HEALTHCHECK`. The controller's probe still runs (`healthcheck.checks` in `.felhom.yml`), so the badge is not blind; Docker's own health state is. **Needs:** read the image's config; either a compose healthcheck of the family the image has (REUSE.md §2), or a comment saying why none. `app-catalog-felhom.eu/onboarding/EXISTING-APPS-GAPS.md` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the box's own health probe still runs; only Docker's health state is blind.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-764** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] wger sends no mail: its mail backend is the console, so a password-reset mail never leaves the box, and the template maps no SMTP.** READ 2026-10-01 inside the app on 9202 (checklist row 7.1): `EMAIL_BACKEND django.core.mail.backends.console.EmailBackend`; the settings read `ENABLE_EMAIL`, `EMAIL_HOST`, `EMAIL_PORT`, `FROM_EMAIL` …; the template carries no `smtp_mapping`. The household's admin can reset another member's password in the app; a member who forgets theirs and asks wger by e-mail gets nothing, and the page does not say so. Not measured: what wger shows after a reset request. **Needs:** an `smtp_mapping` (vaultwarden's shape, a fresh install with mail OFF booting — REUSE.md §2), or the page saying mail is not available. `audits/new-app-checklist-2026-10-01/C/C2-static-reads.txt` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: wger is hidden and no box runs it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-768** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Grimoire is not built: upstream rules out public exposure and publishes no image for its current line.** READ 2026-10-01: SECURITY.md „Public-network exposure is not a supported Grimoire mode”; docs/06-remote-access.md „General REST routes remain loopback-only and tokenless”; v1.x has no published image (the compose builds from source; Docker Hub is the old 0.x). Karakeep covers the bookmark need. **Reopens if** upstream publishes an image and supports authenticated remote use. `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/FIT.md` | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (re-read at the next catalog campaign)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a declined app idea, watched only.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-769** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Pinchflat is not built: upstream is paused (no release in 2026, last push 2025-12-16) and its last release has no image tag.** READ 2026-10-01: ghcr's newest version tag `v2025.6.6`, `latest` amd64 only; runs as root by default; an unanswered 30 GB yt-dlp memory report (#866); third parties call it unmaintained (community-scripts #15968). Forks with images exist (Pinchflat-NGX, MorganKryze). **Needs:** the operator's word on a fork (a new upstream), after the YouTube sentence (R-767). `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/FIT.md` | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a new-app idea waiting on a decision.** | — | — | operator |
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| **R-770** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Invidious — fit check only; the recommendation is not to build it.** READ 2026-10-01: playback needs `invidious-companion` (rolling `latest`, no version tags); PostgreSQL 14 (EOL 2026-11); `registration_enabled: true` by default; upstream: a bot check means „your IP is blocked from YouTube”, a 429 can last 24 h, triggered by „someone on your network” — on our boxes that IP is the household's. One bad period in 2026 (March, ~2 weeks). No report found of a family's other devices being bot-checked (inference). **Needs:** the operator's go / no-go. `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/FIT.md` | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a new-app idea waiting on a decision.** | — | — | operator |
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| **R-771** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] moonlight-web — fit check only; not buildable through an HTTP-only tunnel at usable latency.** READ 2026-10-01: two unrelated projects (MrCreativ3001/moonlight-web-stream, the original; linckosz/moonlight-web); both need Sunshine/Apollo/Wolf on a gaming PC on the LAN and WebRTC over UDP (40000-40100/udp; linckosz recommends host networking and sends telemetry by default); both have a WebSocket fallback (high latency, all video through the tunnel); a logged-in user controls the PC's desktop. **Needs:** the operator's go / no-go (LAN-only use would need a different publishing model). `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/FIT.md` | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a new-app idea waiting on a decision.** | — | — | operator |
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| **R-796** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] MeTube's "send to MeTube" helpers (browser extensions, bookmarklets, phone apps) cannot work behind the family gate.** READ 2026-10-02 (`audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/B/metube-reads/reads-2026.09.29.txt`): they call `/add` from another site and carry no family login; the template sets no CORS origin and MeTube has NO exception by design (an exception on an app with no login would be an open door). The household pastes links in the page (first_steps). **Needs:** nothing unless households ask; a way would be a per-member token the gate accepts on `/add` only — a design question, not a fix. | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a design idea only if households ask.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-798** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Grimmory's template sets `SWAGGER_ENABLED=false`, which v3.5.0 does not read (it reads `API_DOCS_ENABLED`, default false).** READ 2026-10-02 (`audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/B/grimmory-reads/upstream-v3.5.0.txt`). Harmless today — the API docs are off by default. **Needs:** remove the dead line or set the right name, on the next Grimmory step. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: harmless dead setting.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-804** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P3-LOW] plant-it's image is gone from Docker Hub: `msdeluise/plant-it:0.10.0` answers "pull access denied … repository does not exist".** MEASURED 2026-10-02 on the bench, logged in (`audits/persistence-sweep-2026-10-02/A/sweep/batch-*.txt`, plant-it). The app is already `lifecycle: abandoned` (not offered for new installs); a box that runs it could no longer reinstall or restore it from images. **No box runs it** (read 2026-10-02). **Needs (operator):** keep the abandoned template as it is, or hide it entirely. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the app is already abandoned and no box runs it.** | — | — | operator |
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## App updates — 15 rows (P3 9, P4 6)
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## App updates — 10 rows (P3 7, P4 3)
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| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| **R-440** | App updates | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] 23 catalog image pins float, so an update is not reproducible.** `compose pull` on a moving tag fetches whatever upstream published that day. **MEASURED 2026-09-01 over `app-catalog-felhom.eu` @ `29edad9c5bf4`: 79 `image:` lines across 53 apps, 66 distinct; 23 of those lines carry a tag with no patch version.** `postgres:16-alpine` (8 apps), `redis:7-alpine` (6), `mariadb:11.6` (2), plus one each of `postgres:15-alpine`, `postgis/postgis:16-3.5-alpine`, `mariadb:11.4`, `mariadb:12.3`, `ghcr.io/claperco/claper:2.5`, `ghcr.io/thomiceli/opengist:1.13`, `wger/server:2.6`. **A 24th is arguable and is recorded rather than rounded away:** `ghcr.io/immich-app/postgres:16-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0` pins both extensions exactly but leaves the PostgreSQL patch floating. A customer pressing Frissites can therefore swap their DATABASE ENGINE build with no catalog change and no record; two boxes updated on two days end up different. **Severity MEDIUM on its own; it becomes BLOCKING the moment a pre-update copy exists**, because "what did we upgrade from and to" must be recordable and today it is not — which is also why R-440 must be read next to the digest discipline in Rule 10 of the spike. **MEASURED LIVE 2026-09-01 — the floating pins have ALREADY moved, with a passing control.** Running digests on demo-hp compared against what the registry serves for the same tag today: **`mariadb:11.4` MOVED** (`sha256:4f1d8d20...` -> `sha256:611a2fcc...`) and **`mariadb:12.3` MOVED** (`sha256:a02fe89c...` -> `sha256:dd9b303a...`), while `postgres:16-alpine`, `redis:7-alpine`, `mariadb:11.6` and `opengist:1.13` were SAME — **and both fully-pinned CONTROLS (`rommapp/romm:5.0.0`, `privatebin/pdo:2.0.5`) were SAME.** So on a box with ZERO visible drift by tag, pressing Frissites today silently swaps the DATABASE ENGINE build under `romm` and `bookstack`, with no catalog change and no record. **Compounding fact found while reading:** the recovery unit records `ImagePins` but the manifest comment says *"image NOT stored - re-pulled on restore"*, so a RESTORE of a floating-pinned app also re-pulls whatever is current — the same non-reproducibility on the recovery path. **HALF OF THE ANSWER SHIPPED 2026-09-02 (controller v0.233.0, slice 1): `app.yaml.installed_images` now records, per compose SERVICE, the reference AND the repo digest each container was actually created from — so "what did we upgrade FROM" is answerable on any box that has taken one lifecycle action since the upgrade.** What is still missing is the other half: comparing that digest against what the registry serves for the same tag TODAY, which needs a network call the render path deliberately does not make (see R-446). **The row therefore stays OPEN and its rank is unchanged** — recording a digest does not make a floating pin reproducible; it makes the drift measurable after the fact. `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` **— NIGHT 2026-09-23:** every image moved tonight (and the 21 backfilled moves) carries its resolved digest in the catalog's test record; the floating pins themselves still float until the box pulls by digest (`09` §6.4 part 6). **-- MEASURED 2026-09-30 on demo-hp 9201: a fresh install or a guarded Update renders `name:tag@sha256` from the ladder (`digest.go` `RenderWithLadderDigests`) — 9 of 20 services there run such a definition (adventurelog, docmost, paperless-ngx). The other 11 run TAG-ONLY definitions: bookstack, kimai, opengist, privatebin, romm were installed before v0.269.0 and not updated since, and `CarryDigests` (`digest.go:141`) keeps only a digest the running definition already has; bentopdf and calibre-web have no ladder at all. So a re-pull of those (a restore) takes whatever the tag serves that day. `audits/pg-last-six-2026-09-30/E/E2-digests-demo-hp.txt`.** **-- 2026-09-30 (evening):** calibre-web now has a ladder entry (`53a4a1d`), so a new install or a guarded Update renders its tested digest; bentopdf still has none. `audits/more-night-apps-2026-09-30/` **Merged 2026-10-05 from R-446 (duplicate):** the household-visible consequence — for these apps the „Naprakész" badge can never turn „behind" (`felhom-controller controller/internal/stacks/updateorder.go:96` returns false with no catalog digests / no test date); R-740 (same-tag re-test) is closed, so floating-tag drift for laddered apps is handled. | **NARROWED 2026-09-30 — floating only for (1) apps with no ladder entry and (2) apps installed before v0.269.0 until their next guarded Update; owner: CC.** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: narrowed to apps with no ladder entry and pre-v0.269 installs; each guarded update fixes the latter.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-458** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] `.felhom.yml` keeps flowing to an app whose compose file is FROZEN, so a frozen app can receive a health check written for a version it is not running.** The v0.235.0 render freezes `docker-compose.yml` for a pinned app once the catalog moves past its version, but copies `.felhom.yml` **verbatim in every case** (`Syncer.copyTemplates`). **The asymmetry is deliberate and both directions were considered:** `.felhom.yml` carries no image, and it carries `catalog_since` — the single input the update badge uses to say *„Frissítés elérhető — N napja"* — so freezing it would silently withhold the one number that tells a customer they are behind, i.e. it would break slice 2 to protect slice 3. **What it costs:** the file also carries the controller-side `healthcheck:` block and resource hints, so a template updated for a newer version can hand a frozen app a probe written for software it is not running. **THE FAILURE DIRECTION IS A FALSE ALARM, NEVER DATA LOSS** — the app keeps running; at worst it renders as degraded and, if it persisted, could reach the dead-app alarm path. That is the same class as R-330's false e-mails, which is why this is a row and not a footnote. **Not fixed now, and the reason is that the cheap fix is wrong:** freezing the whole file breaks the badge, and freezing only the `healthcheck:` key means the syncer would have to parse and re-assemble a customer-facing metadata file — new surface on the one path that touches every app on every box every 15 minutes. **What would settle it:** whether any catalog `healthcheck:` has ever been changed in the same commit as an `image:` line (measurable from the catalog's own history, no box needed). If the answer is "never", the exposure is theoretical and the row can be closed by measurement instead of by code. Owner: **CC.** `architecture/09-update-architecture.md` §5.4, §8.5 **— UPDATE NIGHT 2026-09-21:** **MEASURED 2026-09-21 (update night), leg B9, and the row's risk is NARROWER than it states.** A `.felhom.yml`-only change (a health check for a path only a newer version would serve) was pushed to a FROZEN `bentopdf` — installed `v2.8.6`, catalog ahead. §5.4's asymmetry is confirmed live: the new `.felhom.yml` reached the box while the compose `image:` line stayed `v2.8.6`. **But no false alarm was produced**: ten samples over two minutes all read `state=running` with the front door at `200`. The reason is the probe's own semantics, not luck — `healthprobe.go:258-261` treats **any response** as healthy for `type: http`, and the bogus path answers 404, which is a response. **So this row's false-alarm risk exists only for `type: api` probes carrying an `expect` block**, where the status is compared; for every `type: http` template and every `type: api` without `expect`, a newer version's path is invisible to the probe. The row's actual claim — the failure direction is a false alarm, never data loss — stands and is now measured. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/21-B9-frozen-app-newer-felhomyml.md`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-462** | App updates | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Widen the upgrade harness beyond three apps — and the cost is dominated by FIXTURES, not by machine time.** The R-449 harness works and is proven by a red negative control (`audits/SPIKE-upgrade-test-2026-09-06.md` §1). **Costed with this run's REAL numbers rather than an estimate:** a successful edge takes **6.4 s – 305.1 s, median 71.8 s**; a FAILING edge takes **556 s**, roughly **8×**, because a negative is only honest if it waits out the full settle window; 3 apps / 11 images cost **5.07 GB**, so 53 apps naively extrapolate to **~90 GB** and, at the median, about an hour of harness time for one edge each. **THAT EXTRAPOLATION UNDERSTATES THE REAL COST BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE, and that is the point of this row.** Two of the three apps needed a bespoke non-browser seed route; one needed two attempts and a discarded approach; one (bookstack) can only ever be half-proven (R-460). **Fixture time scales with apps and does not amortise.** **The decision this row is really asking for is scope, not schedule:** all 53, or only the apps a customer would lose data from, or only apps whose catalog transition is a MAJOR. **Recommended shape, NOT a design — the operator picks:** start with the apps that carry a database, because §3 measured that the abort question only ever bites there. Owner: **VIKTOR rules on scope, CC implements.** `audits/SPIKE-upgrade-test-2026-09-06.md` §5 **ROW CORRECTED 2026-09-21: the scope is NOT open and this row said it was.** It read *"VIKTOR rules on scope"*; the operator ruled on 2026-09-13 (`09` §3 decision 6) that the upgrade test goes to **ALL** apps through the nightly rotation, explicitly *not* "database apps first". What is open is the WORK, not the scope. An ORDER inside that ruling — the 15 database services first, because that is where a wrong answer costs data rather than uptime — is costed as a drill brief in `09` §6.4: legs A–E ≈ **21–34 CC-hours** plus ~25–30 GB on a scratch host, with legs C (a PostgreSQL `pg_upgrade` rehearsal) and E (one automatic night on a throwaway) the two that unblock a decision. **-- UPDATE NIGHT 2026-09-21:** **The count moved from 3 apps to 21 EDGES ACROSS 19 APPS.** The update night walked real within-a-major upstream edges on scratch guest 9202 through the product's own guarded Update, each app seeded and read back through its OWN front door with a negative control on every readback: **14 proven, 3 failed, 4 inconclusive**. Proven: actualbudget, audiobookshelf, bookstack, docmost, grafana, home-assistant, mealie, n8n, navidrome, papra, privatebin, romm, vikunja, and nextcloud's MariaDB engine major. **Ten of the fourteen printed a verbatim migration line**, so the database really was rewritten and the data still read back. Box-side fixtures for 20 apps now exist at `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/fixtures.py`, and four (actualbudget, navidrome, audiobookshelf, vikunja) are ported into `app-catalog-felhom.eu/scripts/upgrade_fixtures.py` with seven new EDGES (U1-U7) so the same edges can be run on the harness venue **with their ABORT step**, which the box deliberately does not offer. **OWED, stated so it is not mistaken for done:** the U1-U7 harness RUNS (the code is in, the runs are not), and fixtures for the four inconclusive apps, of which two (vaultwarden, zipline) cannot be seeded at all while the catalog rightly closes their sign-up (see R-624). **-- 2026-09-23, the RomM lesson is IN THE HARNESS:** `upgrade-test.py` v2 runs every edge that read back under light load for `--soak` seconds (default 600) and reads the kernel's `oom_kill` counter host-side; a kill or restart turns `proven` into `failed`, a peak over 80 % of the limit adds `memory_tight`. **Red-proof:** romm 5.0.0 → 5.3.0 on the template AS PROMOTED (512M, four workers) — seeded, migrated, read back, and then **OOM-killed at +76 s** under four light callers, verdict `failed` (Docker's own OOMKilled read true here; restarts stayed 0, which is why the walk never saw it). Ten minutes is ample for this failure; demo-hp's first kill came at two hours only because nothing was loading it. Evidence `audits/update-rulings-2026-09-23/harness/`. **— NIGHT 2026-09-23:** the bench and the box now share ONE fixture set — the box walk's fixtures run on the bench through `upgrade_boxport.py` (ported verbatim into the catalog), plus a new wishlist fixture and fixes for opengist 1.15, komga (`/api/v2/users/me`) and nextcloud (wait for `occ status`). 14 apps / 15 edges tried; 12 proven on both venues and published with their test records (`audits/DRILL-night-2026-09-23.md` Part C). **-- 2026-09-30 (day brief): three new front-door fixtures (sparkyfitness, rallly, outline; catalog `e6f3ec2`) and five apps moved on both venues — the three PostgreSQL conversions (R-463) plus bookstack 26.05.5 → 26.09.1 and kimai apache-2.57.0 → 2.67.0 (upstream dropped the `apache-` prefix; the plain tag's digest equals `apache`'s,Line truncated
|
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| **R-469** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] REMOVE THE ENGINE-MAJOR RULE when Slice 4 (R-448) ships — a tracked act, not a lapse.** Since 2026-09-13 `app-catalog-felhom.eu` `CLAUDE.md` rules that *until the Update button takes a verified backup as its precondition, no template may move a database-engine image across a major version* (four MariaDB, eleven PostgreSQL services), and `scripts/check-engine-major.py` (fourth row of `catalog_gates.py`, run by `.githooks/pre-push` with the push range) refuses one, naming the rule and this expiry. **Why the rule:** every `mariadb:` sidecar now carries `MARIADB_AUTO_UPGRADE=1` (R-459), so a MariaDB major move CONVERTS the customer's datadir on the next Update; PostgreSQL converts nothing and refuses to start (R-463). Either way a customer-data event with no backup in front of it. **Honest limit, not re-filed:** the gate needs a parent commit and CI fetches at `--depth 1` — the R-452 gap — so on a shallow clone the runner skips it out loud and only the hook bites. **When R-448 ships:** delete the CLAUDE.md rule, the gate's row and the gate, in one commit that cites this row; then close this. **2026-09-13 — UNBLOCKED, NOT LIFTED.** R-448 shipped in controller v0.237.0/v0.238.0 (slice 4): an update now refuses without a restorable, proven Tier-2 copy, backs up first when it is stale, takes a safety dump, and holds an app that does not come up — the precondition this rule was waiting for. **The rule stays in force until someone deliberately removes it**, which is a separate act (and is worth weighing against R-475: an app with no Tier-2 copy cannot be updated at all, so the guard does not yet cover every app a major engine move would touch). **HALF-LIFTED 2026-09-21, catalog `5ff36d098cbc`.** Slice 4 shipped 2026-09-13, so the rule's own expiry condition is met — **for MariaDB**: the four `mariadb:` sidecars have both halves they need, a verified backup in front of the Update (any tier since v0.239.0) and `MARIADB_AUTO_UPGRADE=1` whose conversion the harness WATCHED run on E3/E3b with the seeded data read back after. **PostgreSQL and MySQL stay refused** — postgres performs no `pg_upgrade` and REFUSES to start on an older major's datadir across eleven templates (R-463); a backup is a route BACK, not a conversion. The refusal text now cites R-463 instead of the shipped R-448. **R-450's second half is enforced in its place:** a MariaDB major must be the ONLY image move in its template in that commit (the bookstack `0b73e5e` shape — two migrations behind one edge). The gate now PRINTS what it allowed, by name — a lifted rule that goes quiet is a lifted rule nobody can audit. Two new decoy cases; two red-proofs, each seen to fail; 40 cases green. **What remains of this row:** the PostgreSQL half, which is R-463's to clear — see `09` §3b **Q5**. **-- NARROWED 2026-09-25 (evening), catalog `6a4a5f0`, `09` §3 decision 35:** the PostgreSQL half now passes ONE app at a time — only a template whose ladder entry for the step is proven on BOTH venues and carries `engine_conversion` (the box converts it, controller v0.273.0), as the only image move in its commit. Every other PostgreSQL app stays refused; the postgis family is judged now (it was not). CLAUDE.md rule text updated the same commit. Decoys + red-proof: `audits/night-2026-09-26/C/`. | **NARROWED** — **PARTLY CLOSED 2026-09-21 — MariaDB lifted; the PostgreSQL half stands until R-463** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-607** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A forced catalog sync answers „nincs változás" while the cache DOES change, and `catalog_images` stays stale until a separate rescan — so the update badge can be wrong for a window nobody bounds.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on scratch guest 9202 (controller v0.260.0) while proving R-524. A real catalog move was pushed, `POST /api/sync` was invoked, and it answered **„nincs változás"** — yet the box's own cache file `<data>/catalog-cache/templates/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml` **had moved to the new tag**. `Stack.CatalogImages` as served by the API stayed at the OLD value until a separate `POST /api/stacks/rescan`. **WHY IT MATTERS AND WHY IT IS NOT COSMETIC:** `CatalogImages` is the single input `stacks.CatalogOrder` compares against (v0.260.0), so for that window the badge answers from a stale catalog — it can read „Naprakész" on an app that IS behind, which is the exact failure §5.6 of `09` was written to prevent, arriving by a different door. **It also cost a measurement:** the session that found it nearly recorded a `tag-ok` badge as proof of the R-524 ahead arm when the badge was in fact stale; the honest reading came only after the rescan. **An instrument that can report an old value as a current one is not a measurement.** **TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS, and the row does not conflate them:** (a) why the sync REPORTS no change when the working tree moved — a wrong sentence, possibly a comparison against the wrong ref; (b) whether `CatalogImages` is refreshed by the sync at all or only by `ScanStacks` on its own timer — if the latter, the staleness window is the scan interval and is bounded but unstated. **Neither was isolated** — this row records the observation, not a diagnosis. **Also observed in the same run, NOT diagnosed and folded in here rather than filed twice:** a removed app leaves `applied-compose.yml` behind in its stack directory. Stated as observed; it was not established whether that is intended. **Fix shape:** first reproduce with a loop that pushes a tag, syncs, and reads `catalog_images` on a timer, so the window is a NUMBER before anything is changed. Evidence: `audits/update-arc-2026-09-21/06-sync-after-bump.txt` and `16-r524-sync-box-ahead.txt`. **— UPDATE NIGHT 2026-09-21:** **Seen again 2026-09-21 (update night), a dozen times in one session, and for the first time with a USER-VISIBLE consequence rather than a measurement one.** On `mealie` the bump was pushed, `POST /api/sync` AND `POST /api/stacks/rescan` were both run, and the badge still read the up-to-date one (HU „Naprakesz", EN "Up to date") — the catalog had not reached `catalog_images` yet. The guarded Update was then pressed and **reported „Frissitve" after 2.1 seconds having moved nothing at all**: pinned, installed, the live compose line and `docker inspect` all still read `v3.20.1`. That is honest given a stale cache — the pin is written from *the catalog's current definition*, which was still the old one — but what the household sees is a button that says it updated them and did not. **A NUMBER, at last, which is what this row asks for:** the night's harness was changed to poll `catalog_images` until the pushed reference appears and to report how long that took; those figures are each edge's `badge_catchup_seconds`, and here they are: **4.4 s, 4.4 s, 4.5 s, 4.5 s — and 29.0 s.** The four fast ones are one sync+rescan round; the 29-second one (`nextcloud`, an engine-sidecar bump) needed **additional** sync+rescan rounds before `catalog_images` carried the pushed reference. **So the window is not a fixed scan interval — it varies by roughly 7x between edges on the same box in the same hour**, which is why a caller (or a household) cannot know when the badge is safe to read. Before tonight this row had no number at all; it now has five, and they disagree with each other, which is itself the most useful thing about them. Every drill-catalog bump of the night was followed by `POST /api/sync` answering „Sablonok naprakészek — nincs változás" while the box's cache HAD moved, with `catalog_images` staying stale until a separate `POST /api/stacks/rescan`. The night's harness therefore rescans unconditionally after every sync, which is a workaround and not a fix. **The window was still never measured as a NUMBER** — that is what the row asks for and what remains owed. **— NIGHT 2026-09-23, measured twice more:** for an INSTALLED app the stack directory's compose is the applied one, so waiting on it for a drill commit took ~7 min (chaos rounds 2 and 4); the badge's own `catalog_images` caught up in seconds. And twice a fresh box walk deployed a STALE template (the uptime-kuma "after" run, the opengist re-walk) because the deploy ran before the sync reached the file — the walks now wait for the box's template to show FROM. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-615** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Pointing a box at a different app catalog by `git.repo_url` alone is INERT — the box keeps fetching from the repository it first cloned.** FOUND 2026-09-21 by reading `sync.go` **before** running it, which is the only reason the update night's drill catalog worked at all. `Syncer.gitCloneOrPull` (`controller/internal/sync/sync.go:274-306`) clones **only when `<data>/catalog-cache/.git` is absent**; on every later cycle it runs `git fetch --depth 1 origin <branch>` + `git reset --hard origin/<branch>` **against the remote stored in the clone**, which `buildRepoURL` wrote at clone time. Changing `git.repo_url` in `controller.yaml` and restarting therefore changes **nothing**: the sync keeps pulling the old catalog and reports success. Measured: after the repoint, `git -C <data>/catalog-cache remote -v` still read `app-catalog-felhom.eu`; the box only followed the drill repo once the cache directory was removed. **Why it matters beyond a drill:** this is the one knob that would move a box to a different or a staged catalog — for a migration, a per-customer catalog, or a rollback of the catalog itself — and it silently does not work. **Nothing is wrong with the CACHING**, which is right; what is missing is that a changed `repo_url` must invalidate the clone. **Fix shape:** on start, compare `git.repo_url` with the clone's `origin` and re-clone when they differ (or `git remote set-url` + a full fetch); log which happened. A test that changes `repo_url` under an existing cache and asserts the next sync reads the NEW repo — it fails today. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/04-9202-config-pre.txt`, `05-9202-follows-drill.txt`. **-- 2026-10-01 (night, new apps):** the other direction measured on 9202: after `repoint restore` a DRILL-only template (grimmory) stayed OFFERED on the app list, because its `/opt/docker/stacks/grimmory` folder (written by the drill sync) remained; removing the folder by hand ended it (`audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/B/B9-restore-live.txt`). Older drill folders (`chaoscrash`, `chaosoom`, `chaosoomb`) sit there too. The drill teardown should list and remove stack folders the live catalog does not have. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-683** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Watch: after a power cut during an update's health check, the hold named an HOUR-OLD second-drive copy, not the one the update's own backup should have just made.** 2026-09-24 chaos round 3 (nextcloud, `backup_max_age: 1m`): no `backing-up` phase was seen and the hold named Tier 2 at 13:04 for an update pressed at 14:04; the pre-cut controller log was lost with the container (the runner now saves it at arm time — R-320). Round 11, the same action without a power cut, named a fresh 14:34 copy and logged the Tier-2 copy. The sentence was TRUE (it named the copy it offered); the question is why the update did not back up first. Not reproduced; watch the next power-cut drill. `audits/night-2026-09-24/E/round-03*.json`, `E/round-11-controller-pre.log` | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC (watch)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-738** | App updates | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Every wger update that brings database migrations leaves wger broken, and the guarded Update reports `done`.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 on scratch guest 9202 (drill catalog): wger 2.6 → 2.7 through the product's guarded Update ended `done` in 72.8 s (health: the front page answers); the web login then answered **500** (`no such column: core_userprofile.time_zone`), still 500 a minute later, **12 migrations unapplied** (`manage.py showmigrations`). Cause, read from the image: `entrypoint.sh` runs `manage.py migrate` only when `DJANGO_PERFORM_MIGRATIONS=True`; the template does not set it (a fresh install works because `wger bootstrap` builds a new database). The harness caught it: the box verdict is `failed`, and no ladder entry was written. No box reporting to the hub runs wger (hub `/apps`, same day). **Also a product gap:** the guarded Update's health check cannot see an app whose front page serves while its data is unusable — the fixture's read-back is what saw it. **Fix:** `DJANGO_PERFORM_MIGRATIONS=True` in the template (the image's own switch for it), then the step again on both venues. `audits/more-night-apps-2026-09-30/box/wger/` **-- FIXED 2026-09-30:** catalog `7a4ff48` sets `DJANGO_PERFORM_MIGRATIONS=True`; the same 2.6 → 2.7 step then ran the migrations (`Applying …` in the log) and read back on 9202 (46.2 s) and on the bench (proven, 0 kills); published `4ad32aa`. The product-side gap (a health check that sees only the front page) remains, as a note: the fixture's read-back caught it, the box could not. | **NARROWED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the guarded Update's health check reads only the front page, so it cannot see an app whose front page serves while its data is unusable) — **CLOSED 2026-09-30 — catalog `7a4ff48` + `4ad32aa`** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-785** | App updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] SparkyFitness is pinned 11 releases and a major behind upstream (v0.17.3; upstream v1.7.3, v1.6.0 dated 2026-07-24).** READ 2026-10-01 (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/C/bench/C1-previous-tag.txt`). **Needs:** an update walk 0.17 → 1.x through the ladder (bench + box), after R-784 is decided. | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (after R-784)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-460** | App updates | P4 | **[P3-LOW] BookStack's FILE half cannot be seeded or verified without a browser, so its upgrades can only ever be auto-proven for the DATABASE.** MEASURED 2026-09-06 while building the R-449 harness. BookStack's API needs a token that is only mintable through its web UI, and its HTTP login is unusable headlessly for a second, independent reason: `APP_URL` comes from the template as `https://${SUBDOMAIN}.${DOMAIN}`, so the app marks its session and XSRF cookies **`secure`**; curl over plain http stores neither and **every login POST returns 419 Page Expired**, which looks exactly like a wrong password. The container serves no TLS. **The database half IS provable** — the harness seeds with `php artisan bookstack:create-admin` and reads back with a DIFFERENT artisan command that must find the record, carrying its own negative control on every call. **What is unprovable is an uploaded image or attachment**, i.e. exactly the half a customer would notice. **THIS IS A FACT ABOUT THE APP, NOT A DEFECT IN THE HARNESS**, and it is recorded because Slice 6 needs to know which apps can be auto-verified and which can only be partly verified — nobody had that list before. **Deliberately NOT worked around:** planting a file in the volume would make the test pass while proving nothing, which is R-156's exact failure. **What would remove it:** a headless token route (upstream), or accepting a browser-driven step for this app alone, which DooPlex cannot run. Owner: **CC.** `audits/SPIKE-upgrade-test-2026-09-06.md` §6 **-- UPDATE NIGHT 2026-09-21:** bookstack's edge was walked again on 2026-09-21 and is again **half-proven**: the database half read back through `php artisan` with its own negative control, the file half untouched. The limitation is unchanged and is now measured on the box as well as on the harness. Two more apps joined the same class tonight for a different reason (R-624). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a limit of test coverage for one app, not a defect a household meets.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-610** | App updates | P4 | **[P2-MEDIUM] The power cut AFTER the new version has started was never measured — R-520 closed on the safe half only.** R-520 (CLOSED 2026-09-21) cut in `pulling`, where **nothing had run**: the pin goes back and that is the easy case. Its own last lines said the `starting` cut was "NOT measured and does not re-open this row", and no row carried it. The dangerous case is the cut AFTER the new version has started and may already have migrated the customer's data — where `RecoverUpdates` (`stacks/update.go:909`) marks the app Updating and RESUMES rather than rolling back. **That behaviour was READ from the source and never observed.** **CLOSED 2026-09-21 — measured THREE times on guest 9202, controller v0.260.0**, with three different apps and two different cut mechanisms: vikunja 2.3.0→2.6.0 and uptime-kuma 2.4.0→2.5.0 by `pct stop` (a real power cut), and wishlist v0.66.0→v0.67.0 by restarting ONLY the controller container (exactly what a self-update does). **All three ended HONEST:** the recovery line appeared, the update resumed, each app came up on the NEW version, and in every case all FOUR version observables agreed — `pinned_images`, `installed_images`, the live compose `image:` line, and `docker inspect` of the running container (digests matched too). No hold, no stuck `Updating`, no surviving journal, no retry loop. The seeded data read back through each app's own front door for the two where a post-cut read-back was taken. **THE DANGEROUS CASE WAS GENUINELY EXERCISED, and the proof is a log line, not an assumption:** vikunja's own log shows `Ran all migrations successfully` and `Vikunja version v2.6.0` at **12:28:26.881 UTC — 0.64 s after the cut decision and ~0.4 s before the guest stopped answering.** The 2.6.0 schema migration had ALREADY been applied to the customer's SQLite database when the power went. Recovery resumed FORWARD, so old-binary-on-migrated-database never happened — **but this branch is one step from it: had the cut landed a second earlier, in `pinning` or `pulling`, the 2.3.0 pin would have been put back onto a 2.6.0 database.** That is not a defect today; it is the reason §4's "no automatic rollback" ruling is right, and it is now evidence rather than argument. **INSTRUMENT LIMIT, stated because it bounds the claim:** `starting` lasts well under a second on this box. Three attempts across two cut mechanisms (`pct stop` returning in 3.0–3.8 s; a controller restart in 1.7 s) ALL landed in `verifying`. No phase was faked. **`RecoverUpdates` handles `starting` and `verifying` in ONE branch, so all three runs exercise the same recovery arm** — the arm under test. A cut that lands inside `starting` itself remains unmeasured and would need an in-process fault injector. Evidence: `audits/update-arc-gaps-2026-09-21/` 04, 05, 07. | **NARROWED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — a power cut landing INSIDE the `starting` phase is unmeasured (all three cuts landed in `verifying`); needs an in-process fault injector) — **CLOSED 2026-09-21 — measured three times** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-618** | App updates | P4 | **[P1-HIGH] THREE apps are presented to the household as UNHEALTHY while they are working perfectly — and because the guarded Update waits on that same probe, a SUCCESSFUL update ends by STOPPING the working app and sending the household to a restore they do not need.** **RANK RAISED FROM P2 TO P1 BY A LIVE MEASUREMENT taken the same night, and the escalation is the whole point:** tandoor's Update 2.6.13 → 2.6.15 was pressed at 21:16:47 and entered `verifying` at 21:17:46. At **21:18:28** the NEW version was `Up 25 seconds` and answering **HTTP 200** on `/accounts/login/` through the household's own front door — while the controller, probing port 8080 where nothing listens, could not see it. `verifying` therefore cannot pass, the full `update.health_timeout` is spent, `Manager.failAndHold` runs `compose down`, and the app is STOPPED. **Nothing is lost** — the data is in the volumes and the restore works — **but one wrong port number in a template converts every successful update of that app into an outage plus an unnecessary restore, for every household running it.** Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/14-tandoor-serving-while-verifying.txt`. MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 (controller v0.261.0, catalog `f5f6a152b513`). Two shapes, one class: **(a) `tandoor` — the WRONG PORT.** `.felhom.yml` probes `port: 8080`; the container listens on **80 and nothing else** (`ss -ltn` inside it), the compose's own traefik label routes to 80, its own docker healthcheck reads `healthy`, and `/accounts/login/` answers **200** through the household's real front door. `GET /api/stacks/tandoor` nevertheless reads `state: "unhealthy"`. **(b) `zipline` — the WRONG PATH.** `.felhom.yml` probes `/api/health`, which zipline 4.6.1 answers **404 `Route GET:/api/health not found`**; **the compose healthcheck in the very same file uses `/api/healthcheck` and is correct and green.** `/dashboard` answers 200. The controller reads `unhealthy`. **This is the MIRROR of R-613** — that is a probe that passes on a broken app (a false GREEN, which no alarm catches); this is a probe that fails on a working app (a false RED). **IT DOES NOT ALARM, AND THAT SETS THE RANK:** `08-alarm-ladder.md` §4 puts `unhealthy` deliberately in the NOT-down set, so no dead-app event and no customer mail follows — the damage is what the household READS, plus anything that gates on `state`. **IT ALREADY COST A MEASUREMENT TONIGHT:** this drill's harness waited for `state == "running"` and hung for its full budget on tandoor, an app that was up the whole time. An instrument waiting for a wrong answer looks exactly like a slow app. **THE GATE THIS WANTS IS CHEAP AND STATIC, AND THAT IS THE FINDING'S REAL VALUE.** Both halves of the answer live in the same template: compare the `.felhom.yml` probe's port and path against the compose's **own** `healthcheck: test:` URL. A sweep of all 53 templates on that rule was run tonight and returns **five** disagreements: `tandoor` (PORT — **CONFIRMED live**), `zipline` (PATH — **CONFIRMED live**), `wger` (PORT, probe 80 vs compose 8000 — **CONFIRMED live the same night**), `home-assistant` (PATH, `/api/` vs `/manifest.json` — **NOT MEASURED**), and `adventurelog` (a FALSE POSITIVE of the sweep's own regex — it reads `running` live). **So the rule finds both real defects, with two candidates and one false positive out of 53** — a good enough signal for a fast gate, provided it reports candidates rather than convictions and a person or a runtime check resolves them. The earlier, cruder rule (probe port vs the *traefik* port) is strictly worse: it clears zipline and convicts adventurelog. **AND A SECOND FIX SHAPE, ON THE CONTROLLER SIDE, WORTH CONSIDERING BESIDE THE CATALOG ONE:** in both confirmed cases the container's OWN docker healthcheck was **green** the whole time. A `verifying` phase that is about to stop a working app could ask that too — if the compose declares a healthcheck and docker reports `healthy`, the app is alive whatever our probe thinks. That does not excuse a wrong probe, but it turns this failure direction from an outage into a wrong label. It is a design question, not a defect, and is raised here rather than decided. **Needs:** fix tandoor's port (80), zipline's path (`/api/healthcheck`) and wger's port (8000) — **all three are now CONFIRMED live, none is a guess**; add the static gate with a decoy each way (R-421) — a template whose probe agrees must not read as a disagreement, and vice versa. **THE GATE'S RULE WAS THEN SHARPENED BY READING `healthprobe.go` RATHER THAN ASSUMING IT, and the sharpening REMOVED a false conviction.** `type: http` treats **any** response as healthy (`healthprobe.go:258-261`), and `type: api` with **no** `expect` block does the same (`:265-268`); only `type: api` WITH `expect.status` cares about the path or the code. So a PATH difference is a candidate only for the third shape, while a PORT difference isLine truncated
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| **R-621** | App updates | P4 | **[P2-MEDIUM] A held update DESTROYS the evidence of why it failed: `failAndHold` runs `compose down`, the failing containers are removed, and their output is gone before anyone — household, operator or the next session — can read it.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 on a REAL upstream edge: `adventurelog v0.12.1 → v0.13.0`. The new backend applied **nine Django migrations successfully** and then never listened; the update held after the full 5-minute health wait. **`Manager.failAndHold` (`stacks/update.go:723`) calls `updateCompose(dir, env, "down")`**, which removes the containers rather than stopping them, and nothing captures their logs first. Within seconds the box's own log recorded `Logs result for adventurelog: 0 bytes returned (empty)` and `docker ps -a` held nothing at all. **What survives is the WHAT and not the WHY:** the controller line `update adventurelog FAILED after the new version was started: not healthy: not healthy within 5m0s (last: state unhealthy)` and the household's sentence, both of which say the app did not come up and neither of which says the migrations ran and the server then failed to bind. **This is R-320 ("evidence off the machine before the teardown") as a PRODUCT behaviour rather than a session habit** — the teardown here is the product's own, it is correct to perform (a half-started new version must not keep running), and it happens before anyone can look. **Why it matters beyond a drill:** the hold sentence sends the household to a restore, and after the restore the only remaining question is *should I press Update again?* — which nobody can answer, because the one artefact that would say so no longer exists. It also makes every future held update unreportable to an upstream project. **Fix shape:** capture `compose logs --no-color --tail N` into the stack directory (beside `applied-compose.yml`, which already travels with the stack) IMMEDIATELY before the `down`, and surface it on the app page's hold panel or at least through the existing `/api/stacks/<n>/logs` fallback. Bounded size, written once per hold. A test that holds an app and asserts the captured file is non-empty — it fails today. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/apps/adventurelog/why-it-failed.txt`, `state-after-hold.txt`. **FIXED in v0.262.0.** `failAndHold` now writes each service's log into `<stackdir>/hold-logs/<ts>/compose-logs.txt` (`compose logs --no-color --tail 400`) **before** the `down` that destroys them, best-effort by design: a hold must never fail because its evidence could not be written. This is what `adventurelog` cost — nine migrations ran, the app never bound its port, and the only log that could have said why was gone before anyone looked. | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the fix shape also said to show the captured hold log on the app page's hold panel; the row does not say that was done) — **CLOSED 2026-09-22 — v0.262.0: the hold keeps the app's own log before stopping it** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-687** | App updates | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Part 7's live proof has four gaps a scratch box cannot close, and one observability gap.** (1) **W+5h reached with steps left** is proven by unit test only (`TestLeg_NoStepAtOrAfterW5h`) — the leg starts at W+105m and would need a 3-hour leg live; (2) **the off-site leg FAILING** before the update leg: 9202 has no off-site tier, so only the "no target" path ran live — failure and panic are `TestChainUpdateLeg_EveryPath`; (3) **a `files_may_change` step WITHOUT a whole copy**: both drill apps given the mark (wishlist, navidrome, romm) turned out whole on 9202 by the backup side's truth table (why, per app, is not logged — see the observability gap), so only "with a copy" ran live; (4) **the full-system gate waiting** cannot run on 9202 (no agent), and **did not occur on the demo boxes' real night either** (2026-09-25: both legs ended by 04:19, before the gate opened at 04:30, and no whole-box backup was due on either box) — unit + red-proof only (`TestD20_GateWaitsForTheLeg`). **Also cosmetic:** a leg with no steps reports `"steps": null` to the hub, not `[]`. **Observability:** when the leg TAKES a `files_may_change` step it does not log which whole copy allowed it (only the skip says why). `audits/night-2026-09-25/C/` **-- NARROWED 2026-09-25 (controller v0.273.0):** the cosmetic `"steps": null` → `[]` and the taken `files_may_change` step's missing log line are FIXED (red-proofed, `audits/night-2026-09-26/F/`). Items (1)–(4) stay; (4) did not occur on 2026-09-25 either (demo-felhom's whole-box backup ran at 07:29, three hours after its leg; demo-hp had none due). **-- 2026-09-28 (night 27/28):** (4) did not occur again — on demo-hp the leg ended 04:23:54 and the whole-guest backup began 04:37:06, after the gate opened at 04:30; demo-felhom's backup ran at 07:36 (`audits/evidence-golden-0276-2026-09-28/phaseD2-night-read.txt`). **-- 2026-09-30 (by day, demo-hp 9201): item (4) PROVEN LIVE.** The night chain pressed by hand, the window moved to W = now − 2h05m the moment the leg started, `quiesce.poll_interval` 1m: `[quiesce] full-system backup due and inside its window, but the automatic update leg is running … deferring` at 11:35:11 and 11:36:11 UTC while bookstack (55.1 s) and kimai (75.1 s) stepped; the leg's end line at 11:36:29; the backup quiesced at 11:37:11 (the first poll after), job done 11:47:19, the agent's `backup: completed` 9.98 GB. Config and window put back and read back (`audits/pg-last-six-2026-09-30/C/`). **Found, cosmetic, manual chain only:** the deferral names the moved window's W+5h (16:29) while the manual leg's own deadline was its start + the leg length (16:49). | **OPEN — P3, gaps (1)–(3) + the manual-chain deferral text; item (4) proven live 2026-09-30; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the gaps are covered by unit tests; left is live-proof completeness and one log text.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-734** | App updates | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The harness marks immich `files_may_change` because immich rewrites six 13-byte `.immich` folder markers at every start.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 on the bench (v3.2.2 → v3.2.4): the bind-tree hash of `appdata/immich` changed; the only changed files were `{encoded-video,library,backups,profile,thumbs,upload}/.immich`, rewritten at each start — no household file. The mark is honest by the harness's rule and the ladder writer copies it (never edited by hand), so immich's v3.2.4 night step needs a fresh WHOLE copy (decision 13); on a box without one the night leg skips it and a person presses. The 2026-09-23 immich entry did not carry it (`files_changed []`). **Needs:** a decision whether app-owned marker files are excluded from the file hash (a per-template ignore list, or a size/name rule), or the mark stays. **-- 2026-09-30 (evening):** the harness now NAMES the files behind the mark (`files_changed_detail`, catalog `5b1972b`); on immich's step `0b82…` re-proof it named exactly the six `.immich` markers again. calibre-web's step (v4.0.6 → v4.0.8) carries the mark too, and the named files are its LIBRARY DATABASE: `media/books/metadata.db`, `metadata.db-shm`, `metadata.db-wal` changed; the book file did not (bench names re-run, `A/calibre-names/`). That is household data (the template's backup class `mandatory` holds DB and books as one unit), so the mark is right there and the night leg takes that step only with a fresh whole copy. On 9202 the same step changed no file in that folder (per-file hashes before/after) — not explained. `audits/more-night-apps-2026-09-30/` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (harness); the rule change needs a word** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the effect is an update that waits for a press; no data risk.** | — | — | CC + operator |
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## Backup & restore — 51 rows (P2 8, P3 21, P4 22)
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## Backup & restore — 48 rows (P2 8, P3 19, P4 21)
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| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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@@ -214,7 +200,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-362** | Backup & restore | P3 | **A data drive detached mid-restore is reported as „permission denied".** Observed 2026-08-21 23:15: the guest-visible bind was unmounted 4 s into a scratch restore; the restore correctly failed and wrote nothing to the wrong place, but said „A visszaállítás sikertelen: restore dir: mkdir /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups: permission denied". The controller has a drive-state concept (`IsDisconnected`, used by both backup legs) and the restore path never consults it. **A correct refusal that misdescribes why sends the reader at a permissions problem that does not exist.** Creditable in the same test: the agent re-bound the drive 5 s later, unaided. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | — | Consult drive state when a restore path operation fails on ENOENT/EACCES and name the drive. | CC |
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| **R-401** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Revisit the off-site integrity depth when a real store is LARGE — the default rests on ONE measurement, on ONE 134 MB store.** Controller v0.228.0 (R-399) made `--read-data-subset=100%` the default for every box. The whole justification is a single data point: `demo-hp`, 2026-08-30, 140 829 678 B / 2 651 blobs / 67 snapshots, structure 35.0 s vs 100% **39.2 s** — four seconds. Re-proven live 2026-08-31 at 38.7 s. **It does not extrapolate, and the reason is structural: the structure check's cost tracks the INDEX, a read-data run's tracks the DATA.** A 50 GB store is ~370x the data and this curve says nothing about it. **Nothing was invented from that one point** — no rotation schedule, no size threshold, no bandwidth budget — because four production designs in this project were specced against unvalidated mechanisms and all four were wrong. **`readDataSubsetRe` already accepts `n/m`**, so a rotating schedule (`1/7` on a different seventh each week) needs no parser work when the time comes; the missing input is a measurement on a large store, not code. **THE TRIGGER IS AN EVENT, NOT A DATE:** the slow-check WARN from v0.228.0 firing on any box (`integritySlowNoticeThreshold`, 5 min) — that line names the duration, the depth and this row. **WHAT HAPPENS IF NOBODY ACTS:** every box re-reads its entire store every week, however large it grows, and the first person to notice is a customer whose upload is saturated. **Whoever acts must also revisit `integrityCheckTimeout` (30 min)**, which is now the number a large store meets first. | **OPEN — WATCHING** | — | When the WARN fires: measure the curve on that store, then choose between a rotation (`n/m`), a size-conditional default, or leaving it. Do NOT choose from this row's numbers — they are the small-store case. | CC |
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| **R-409** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Nothing in the product can vouch for the bytes of a restored recovery unit — the only hash record covers 0.002 % of it.** MEASURED on demo-hp 2026-08-31 against kimai's restored unit: `manifest.json`'s `checksums` object carries sha256 for `.felhom.yml` (2 235 B), `app.yaml` (488 B) and `docker-compose.yml` (2 195 B) — **4 918 bytes of a 213 231 242-byte unit**. The database dump (48 217 B) and the two named-volume tars (160 331 776 B + 52 845 056 B) — the recoverable data, 99.998 % of the bytes — have no recorded hash anywhere. **And nothing else supplies one:** restic 0.14.0's `restore --verify` is a size-and-mtime reconciliation (a size-and-mtime-preserving one-byte corruption of a 160 MB tar passed clean, red-proofed), and `restic ls --json` file nodes in 0.14.0 carry name, size, mode, uid/gid and three timestamps and **no content hash**. **So "the restore produced correct files" is currently unanswerable by any automated means.** **What is NOT claimed here:** `restic check --read-data-subset=100%` already proves the STORE's packs, and the config files that ARE hashed are the ones a wrong-content failure would be hardest to spot in. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-361 | Cheapest fix, and it is already half-built: extend the capture's `checksums` to cover `db_dumps` and `volume_dumps` — R-361 already computes a canonical dump sha256 to prove itself, so the value exists at capture time. Then a restore-test has a real reference and R-87's narrow version becomes a content check rather than a completeness one. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md` §Q2, §Q3. | CC |
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| **R-412** | Backup & restore | P3 | **A recovery unit lost DURING an off-site run — after its own dump leg, before its push — is shipped hollow and the run reports success.** **CORRECTED 2026-09-01 04:22, and the first wording of this row OVERSTATED it.** As first filed it claimed the hollow unit sat in the store for a whole cycle because "the volume-dump leg runs on the backup schedule, not on capture". **That is wrong, and measuring it overnight is what showed it:** the off-site run has its OWN pre-push dump leg — *"Stopping calibre-web for safe volume dump"*, *"Volume dump: calibre-web/calibre-web_calibre_web_config -> 877.5 KB"* — so a unit that is hollow when a run starts is **REPAIRED before it is pushed**. Proven twice: `opengist` (2026-08-31 21:0x) and `calibre-web` (2026-09-01 04:15) both went in hollow and came out complete, and the snapshot pulled back from the store (`6fee3b5a`) holds the volume tar and all 17 userdata files. **WHAT REMAINS REAL, and it is narrower:** the one hollow snapshot that DID reach the store (`35ba9fe7`, opengist) was created when the unit was destroyed **inside** a run that had already completed opengist's dump leg — so the push shipped what the capture had just rebuilt empty, and logged *"backed up opengist (… 0 mandatory path(s))"*, **a success line over a backup holding none of the app's data**. That race is real, it was observed, and the success wording is wrong either way. **The R-403 mirror guard holds throughout** — proven live: *"unit leg SKIPPED … The copy was PRESERVED rather than replaced with an empty one"*, secondary byte-identical. | **NARROWED** — **LEG 1 CLOSED 2026-09-01 (controller v0.232.0) — LEG 2 STILL OPEN, LOW** | R-403, R-87, R-413 | **LEG 1 IS DONE:** a per-app push whose unit carried no database dump and no volume tar now logs at WARN and says what it did not carry, using the existing `unitIsHollow` predicate. Wording only — no guard, and the capture is untouched (08 §8.2). Pinned by `TestR412a_EmptyPushDoesNotReadAsAPlainSuccess`, which asserts the hollow line carries the words, the SOUND line does not, and neither is at INFO; red-proofed by restoring the single unconditional line. **LEG 2 IS STILL OPEN and is the remaining work on this row:** whether the push should RE-READ the unit it is about to send, or whether the race window is small enough to accept. Two separable things. (1) The success line: a per-app push that carried no dumps and no tars should not read as a plain success — that is a wording fix in the run's own reporting, not a new guard. (2) The race: decide whether the push should re-read the unit it is about to send, or whether the window is small enough to accept. **Do NOT guard the capture** (08 §8.2). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-soak-2026-08-31/phase2-guard-interactions/` and `phase5-mutated-cycle/09-what-reached-the-store.txt`. | CC |
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| **R-433** | Backup & restore | P3 | **A sub-account cannot reach ANY Storage Box snapshot, by any name — so clause (b) of the 2026-09-01 R-95 re-scope ("the rest is recoverable file by file") is NOT SUPPORTED.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on `demo-hp` over the credential the box already holds, read-only, no delete verb issued. **The sweep:** a batched `stat -c %n` over Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell (500–600 paths per round trip, stdout carrying only paths that exist) tried **777,600** names of the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` across nine full days at second granularity, and 126 alternative shapes — **zero resolved.** **The control is what makes the zero mean anything:** the identical 600-name batch with one real path appended returned it in 6 of 6 batches. **The structural cause:** `/home` (the customer data, `u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**; `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**; `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding `felhom-repo`. **What still stands:** clause (a) — the box can delete its live repository but cannot WRITE into `/.zfs/snapshot` — is unchanged and re-confirmed. **What is now open again:** the only routes to the older copy are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box (deletes newer snapshots, hits every customer on it) and the provider API (fenced by §11-D, and `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go` has **no snapshot method at all**, so it needs new code regardless). **NOT ESTABLISHED, and it is the question that decides whether per-file recovery exists for anyone:** whether the MAIN account can see the snapshots. No main-account credential exists in this project. **The ranking is Viktor's; I am not re-ranking R-95 — but the argument that moved it down is the argument this drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER 2026-09-01.** The one question that can move this is drafted and ready to send: **Question 1** of `documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md` — *can the MAIN account retrieve individual files from a snapshot, without a whole-box restore?* **Neither answer leaves this row where it is:** "yes" makes per-file recovery real but permanently operator-only, and closes this; "no, full restore only" means the snapshots do not bound a single customer's exposure at all, because using them costs every other customer on the box their newer snapshots — **and R-95 becomes urgent.** Nothing here can progress without it, and it is not CC's to send (§11-D). Tracked by a dated check in the DUE-CHECKS block. **⚠ A TRAP ON THE WAY TO THIS ANSWER, found by the operator 2026-09-01 and armed against in the questions file: HETZNER HAS TWO SIMILARLY-NAMED PRODUCTS WHOSE DOCS SAY OPPOSITE THINGS.** **Storage SHARE** (a managed Nextcloud, NOT us) documents *"Currently, we only support restores for the full backup ZFS snapshot to a specific point in time"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-share/faq/backup-snapshot/`). **Storage BOX** (ours) documents the opposite — *"You can download individual files or entire directories as usual"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots/`). **A web search for the obvious phrasing surfaces the SHARE page, and it reads like a definitive NO.** Tell them apart by the giveaways: the Share page talks about *Nextcloud's data cache*, a *database dump* and the *konsoleH* interface, and never mentions Storage Box. **Why this is filed and not left as trivia: a support agent could answer Question 1 from the wrong page, and that answer would push this row to the top of the register for no reason.** Question 1 now names the product, quotes the Storage Box line, and says explicitly that we know what the Share FAQ says. **If an answer cites full-snapshot-only, check WHICH PRODUCT it is about before acting on it.** **Nothing in this repository ever leaned on the Share claim** — verified by grep at the time; the only vendor line we cite is the Storage Box one. **RE-DATED 2026-09-15 → 2026-09-22 (due-checks gate):** the operator mailbox read through the Gmail connector (`(from:hetzner OR subject:hetzner OR "Storage Box") after:2026/09/01`) holds no Hetzner reply — one match, our own `offsite_snapshots_dropped` alarm. Whether the two tickets were ever sent is not visible to CC; if they were not, sending them is the operator's act. **-- ANSWERED. Hetzner replied on ticket #2026090103040671; the operator supplied the thread on 2026-09-22 after this session searched for it and WRONGLY reported no answer (see the instrument note below and R-628).** **Q1 - can the MAIN account read individual files and directories out of a specific snapshot, without restoring the whole box?** Hetzner: *"With the main account it should be possible to download files and directories from the snapshot as it is stated in the documentation"*, citing `docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots#access-to-snapshots`; and separately *"A restLine truncated
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| **R-540** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The hub knows exactly ONE off-site pool box, so there is no rule for what happens when it fills.** Read from source 2026-09-16 while making off-site the default: `HETZNER_POOL_BOX_ID` is a single value, and every shared customer becomes a sub-account on that box. With off-site now ON for every new customer (hub v0.116.0) the box fills faster, and the fill warning (80%/90% of the box, `monitor/offsite.go`) tells the operator it is filling but nothing says which box a new customer should land on. **Needs a selection rule** (least-full, or explicit per-customer), not a bigger box. No customer is at risk today: the pool box read 0.3% full (2.7 GB of 1 TB), Σ shared quota 150 GB, oversub 0.15x. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-545** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] There is no product action that un-configures an off-site target — only one that re-starts an ORPHANED repository.** FOUND 2026-09-16 while exercising R-543's paused state on the scratch guest: `POST /backup/offbox/config` configures a target and can disable it (`enabled` unchecked), but nothing removes it. `POST /backup/offbox/reset` refuses unless `OffboxOrphaned()` is true („Az offsite tároló nincs elárvult állapotban."), and it means „start a new remote backup, set the old history aside" — not „forget this destination". So a household that sets up the wrong NAS, or a box being handed to someone else, keeps the host, user, path, ssh key and minted repo password on disk with no route to clear them; a disabled target still holds its secrets in `data/offbox/`. **Why P3 and not higher:** a disabled target runs nothing and the secrets are 0600 on the box's own disk, so nothing leaks and no copy is lost. **Fix shape:** a „Távoli cél törlése" action beside the config form that clears the target and shreds `data/offbox/`, REFUSING while the hub holds a sealed package for this box (the R-241 rule — dropping the key would orphan the history that package protects). Teardown for this session's proof had to clear it out-of-band for exactly this reason, which is the measurement. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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@@ -222,14 +207,13 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-552** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] An interrupted-restore notice for an app that is then REMOVED stays on the restore page for ever.** FOUND 2026-09-17 by CC reviewing its own controller v0.246.0 (R-550) during live validation. The per-app notice (`Manager.opInterrupted`, persisted in `restore-status.json`) is cleared in exactly one place — `BeginRestoreOp` for that app (`internal/backup/opstatus.go`) — and `removeStack` (`internal/api/router.go`) never touches the restore record. So a household that answers „A visszaállítás megszakadt … indítsd el újra" by REMOVING the app instead of restoring it keeps a „Megszakadt visszaállítás" card about an app that no longer exists. Measured shape, not hypothetical: on 9201 the notice cleared only when homebox was restored again (08:54:50Z, card count 0) — the teardown deliberately took that path before removing it. **Fix shape:** `removeStack` clears the app's notice (a `ClearInterruptedRestore(stack)` beside the existing update-hold clear, R-491's precedent), with a wiring test. Not fixed in v0.246.0: found after the release was built; one release per repo per session. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-645** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Lifting an update hold by the operator CLI lets the recovery unit be re-captured with the FAILED new definition within seconds — the copy the hold sentence names is overwritten.** MEASURED 2026-09-23 on 9202 during the undo bake-off: docmost was held at 07:59:16Z after a failed 0.95.0 → 0.96.0 update; `--clear-restore-hold docmost` + the controller restart it requires ran at ~07:59:23Z, and at **07:59:26Z** the controller logged *Recovery unit captured for docmost* — the unit's `compose/docker-compose.yml` now named `docmost/docmost:0.96.0`, the version that had just failed. The hold sentence had pointed the household at that unit („saját meghajtó, … 09:55"). The hold is what keeps the nightly legs off a held app (`isHeld`, v0.238.1); once it is lifted by hand, the checksum-gated refresh sees a changed definition and captures it. **Who it hits:** an operator who lifts a hold to inspect or repair, before restoring. With the undo (R-637) a failed update no longer holds unless the undo also fails, so the path is rarer — it does not go away. Candidate shapes, none chosen: the CLI refuses to lift an UPDATE hold (only a restore lifts it); or the lift also puts the pin back; or the capture skips an app whose pin is not what it is running. Evidence: `audits/undo-bakeoff-2026-09-23/docmost-40-undoF.txt` (the invalid run) and README §"Three things". **-- 2026-09-23 (controller v0.263.0):** the undo never reads the unit, so this no longer affects the automatic undo; it still affects an operator who lifts a hold by hand before restoring. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-675** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The unit-only restore's refusal for a file app still points to „Fájlok visszaállítása" instead of the second drive's whole restore.** `missingFileLegsRefusal` predates decision 26 (v0.269.0); when a whole copy exists on the second drive the sentence should name it. | **READY — P3; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-698** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A backup stores the image's NAME, not the image — a restore of a version its maker has deleted cannot start.** `RecoveryManifest.image_pins` ("image NOT stored — re-pulled on restore"); since controller v0.275.0 each data file also records its running `ref@digest`, and a restore brings the data back AT ITS OWN VERSION (`07` §6.6) — so a restore asks for exactly the old image. **Measured 2026-09-26** (`audits/version-travel-2026-09-26/A7/`, registry HEADs, no pulls): the catalog's 42 ladder `ref@digest` pairs all resolve (200); an invented digest answers 404 on Docker Hub and ghcr.io (negative control). Not measured: the digests recorded on boxes (older than any ladder entry), how often makers delete versions, the catalog's 66 digest-less compose lines. **Options (decide nothing yet):** (a) keep — a restore of a deleted version fails at the pull and the household uses the next copy or a newer version; (b) mirror every INSTALLED image into the DooPlex registry, restore falls back to it — storage + bandwidth on DooPlex, a new part on the recovery path; (c) mirror only ladder-named versions — bounded, misses pre-ladder boxes; (d) `docker save` into the unit — hundreds of MB per app per copy on every tier. **-- 2026-09-30 late (decision 53):** a box now keeps only an app's running and previous image; a restore to an older version re-pulls it — as every restore already did. The limit above is unchanged. | **OPEN — P3; owner: operator (a decision), CC measures** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-706** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Removing an app "with its backups" leaves its off-site verification copy on the drive.** Measured 2026-09-28 on demo-hp: after a full off-site restore of nextcloud (which leaves the downloaded copy in `backups/offsite-restore/nextcloud`, ~1 GB, by design, for the household to inspect), `POST /api/stacks/nextcloud/remove` with `remove_backups: true` removed the unit and listed `backup_paths_removed` WITHOUT the verification copy; it stayed until the restore page's own delete (`POST /backup/offbox/verify-copy/delete`, 302 `scratch_deleted`). A household that removes an app to free space keeps 1 GB it cannot see on the app list. **Fix direction:** the removal with backups also deletes the app's verification copy (the same `DeleteOffsiteRestoreCopy`). Evidence: `audits/kept-offsite-2026-09-28/E/E9-teardown.txt`. **-- 2026-09-28 evening: FIXED in controller v0.279.0** — a removal with its backups also deletes the verification copy and lists it among the removed paths (`TestR706_…`, red-proofed RP7). Not yet seen live (needs a full off-site restore then a removal). | **WATCHING — P3; owner: CC (live)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-698** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A backup stores the image's NAME, not the image — a restore of a version its maker has deleted cannot start.** `RecoveryManifest.image_pins` ("image NOT stored — re-pulled on restore"); since controller v0.275.0 each data file also records its running `ref@digest`, and a restore brings the data back AT ITS OWN VERSION (`07` §6.6) — so a restore asks for exactly the old image. **Measured 2026-09-26** (`audits/version-travel-2026-09-26/A7/`, registry HEADs, no pulls): the catalog's 42 ladder `ref@digest` pairs all resolve (200); an invented digest answers 404 on Docker Hub and ghcr.io (negative control). Not measured: the digests recorded on boxes (older than any ladder entry), how often makers delete versions, the catalog's 66 digest-less compose lines. **Options (decide nothing yet):** (a) keep — a restore of a deleted version fails at the pull and the household uses the next copy or a newer version; (b) mirror every INSTALLED image into the DooPlex registry, restore falls back to it — storage + bandwidth on DooPlex, a new part on the recovery path; (c) mirror only ladder-named versions — bounded, misses pre-ladder boxes; (d) `docker save` into the unit — hundreds of MB per app per copy on every tier. **-- 2026-09-30 late (decision 53):** a box now keeps only an app's running and previous image; a restore to an older version re-pulls it — as every restore already did. The limit above is unchanged. | **OPEN — P3; owner: operator (a decision), CC measures** **Operator ruling 2026-10-05 18:23: kept OPEN as a known risk to a household's restore; owner the operator; not worked on in the burn-down.** | — | — | operator |
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| **R-729** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] An off-site target, once saved on the page, cannot be removed through the product.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 on 9202: `/backup/offbox/config` refuses an empty address and no route clears the target; the session removed its throwaway target from `settings.json` by hand, with the controller stopped (harness teardown on a scratch guest). A household that tries its own NAS and gives up keeps a disabled target forever. **Fix direction:** a „Távoli mentési cél törlése" press that clears the target (never the repository). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-10** | Backup & restore | P4 | T-6E-1: DB-dump dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW, confirmed in 6E) **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-15, size XS, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **T-6E-1, confirmed in CAMPAIGN-6E.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | One-line hardening; batch with the next controller task | CC |
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| **R-91** | Backup & restore | P4 | Old 13 GB datastore copy at `/srv/pbs-felhom` on ep0's root disk | WATCHING | demo-felhom's first **post-migration** PBS backup | Delete once it lands; fix `CONTEXT.md:1018` same commit | CC |
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| **R-99** | Backup & restore | P4 | Server-side prune **never removes** a phantom snapshot. Confirmed it does NOT count them toward `keep-last` (dry-run kept 2 real + the phantom) so there is **no retention/data-loss bug** — but one accumulates per aborted upload, forever | READY (S) | — | Decide a cleanup path. Deletion on a **customer** datastore is a separate ruling — detection shipped, removal deliberately not automated | CC |
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| **R-104** | Backup & restore | P4 | **An interrupted offsite run leaves an exclusive restic lock the existing self-heal cannot reach.** `resticStep` has `unlock --remove-all` (`internal/backup/offbox.go:634-648`) but `ensureOffboxRepo`'s probe fails first, `classifyResticProbe` (`:77-93`) has no lock case → `"other"` → fail-fast; `ClassifyOffsiteFailure` likewise, so the operator is told *„A távoli mentés ismeretlen okból nem sikerült"* for a precisely-known, self-healable condition **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-28, size S, roadmap state `READY — 2026-07-28`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. ****PARTLY STALE, checked against live source 2026-08-22 — migrated as written per the task rule, with the staleness named rather than edited away.** The self-heal this row calls unreachable was built: `resticStep` escalates to `unlock --remove-all` and retries once (`internal/backup/offbox.go:763-768`), and `unlockStale` runs before every off-site run and restore (`:1274`, `offbox_restore.go:261`). Its premise that the probe fails first is also doubtful: the probe is `restic cat config`, a read that takes no lock. **What REMAINS true:** `ClassifyOffsiteFailure` (`offbox.go:179-193`) still has no lock case, so if a lock ever did survive both layers the customer would still be told an unknown reason. Re-rank on that basis, not on the original text.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | **Was C9-F3.** Reachable by any interruption — container restart, OOM, network drop, host reboot mid-backup. The tier stays dead until a human runs `restic unlock --remove-all`. Flips: the offsite row in map §C; `07` §8 row 15 | CC |
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| **R-124** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The recipe spells PBS's root namespace `"root"`, but the PBS API spells it `""`** and no namespace is literally named `root` — an operator pasting the field into `pct restore --ns root` gets a failure | READY (XS) | — | Pre-existing wire convention (`ToHub` has normalised empty→`"root"` since slice 6), deliberately NOT changed under R-106 so the field's meaning did not shift mid-fix. Documented at `hub.PBSRootNamespace`. Affects only a box with no `namespace` line — **no real customer today**, all three are per-customer. Fix = emit `""` + rely on `namespace_state`, or emit a `--ns`-ready form | CC |
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| **R-124** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The recipe spells PBS's root namespace `"root"`, but the PBS API spells it `""`** and no namespace is literally named `root` — an operator pasting the field into `pct restore --ns root` gets a failure | READY (XS) **Operator ruling 2026-10-05 18:23: kept OPEN and fixed in burn-down round 2** — a recovery step that fails during a real recovery is the worst time to find it. | — | Pre-existing wire convention (`ToHub` has normalised empty→`"root"` since slice 6), deliberately NOT changed under R-106 so the field's meaning did not shift mid-fix. Documented at `hub.PBSRootNamespace`. Affects only a box with no `namespace` line — **no real customer today**, all three are per-customer. Fix = emit `""` + rely on `namespace_state`, or emit a `--ns`-ready form | CC |
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| **R-164** | Backup & restore | P4 | **C2's chain: the DB volume tar cannot be dropped until a SOUND dump predicate exists.** The unit carries both a volume tar and a SQL dump; the restore uses **both** — the dump is authoritative and replayed *after* the tar so it WINS (F17), with only the DB service up (R-47) — `internal/backup/restore_unit.go:262-266`. Dropping the DB container's tar would halve DB-app units **and** close the R-127(b) initdb-skip password trap (restored PGDATA ⇒ `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` ignored). | **BLOCKED** — on the predicate | a dump-validity predicate that is not `accounts has rows` | **The obvious gate is DEAD, measured:** `ValidateDump` warns when the `accounts` table is empty, and that warning was **correct** — the live DB genuinely had 0 accounts, and seeding one stopped the warning and put the row in the dump. But **a fresh appliance legitimately has zero accounts**, so promoting that predicate to a gate would **block every new customer's first backup**. Order: (1) a sound predicate — dump vs **live** per-table counts, not an absolute expectation; (2) warn→gate; (3) tar-drop. **Until (1), the tar is load-bearing** — not because dumps are bad, but because nothing can yet prove one is good. Pairs with **R-127** | CC |
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| **R-213** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Putting files back in place — the half the recovery screen deliberately does not do.** The screen (R-193, controller v0.200.0) unlocks the repository and LISTS what is in it; restoring is per-app and lives in the backups area, and the operator ruled the two separate on 2026-08-05: *a screen that unlocks and then offers to overwrite is two decisions wearing one button*. What is missing is the step after the listing — a customer who can now SEE their files still has to work out, per app, which restore to choose. **The operator named its requirement: a live-versus-backup comparison** — the customer must be able to see what would change before anything is overwritten | **OPEN — not started, deliberately** | the comparison design (nothing exists for it yet) | Design the live-vs-backup comparison, then the put-back flow on top of it. Do NOT fold it into the recovery screen | Operator + CC |
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| **R-246** | Backup & restore | P4 | **A leftover staleness flag has silently disabled the new recovery discriminator on `demo-hp` since 2026-08-04, and the flag is WRONG.** Found by a read-only spike, 2026-08-08. **Q1 — traced to an act, to the second:** at `2026-08-04 20:15:49` the hub emitted `offsite_reissued` and `escrow_stale` in the same second — an operator **Re-issue** pressed during the R-201 drill, three minutes after `escrow_blob_served` at 20:12:40/20:12:54. That was `offsite.ReissueCredentials`'s **precautionary** `MarkEscrowStale` call, which **hub v0.95.0 REMOVED the very next day** (R-196 / R-204 item 2) precisely because it marked healthy escrows stale. **Q2 — the flag is wrong, measured on both sides:** the hub's blob seals `restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6769c…d080a`, and the key the box is actually using hashes to **the identical value**. The blob covers the key. **Q3 — nothing clears it by itself:** the ONLY writer of `stale_at = NULL` is `SaveHostEscrow`'s `ON CONFLICT` — i.e. a fresh escrow ceremony, **which is the one act that would supersede the good blob**. So the only exit from a false alarm is the destructive act the false alarm recommends. **Q5 — the blast radius, enumerated rather than assumed:** (1) `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` withholds `restic_pw_sha256` from the ACK; (2) a **pending** box can never auto-confirm, so (3) **every off-site run is refused indefinitely** — neither bites `demo-hp`, which was already `escrowed` and is backing up healthily (12 snapshots, last success 2026-08-07T02:15:35Z); (4) the customer is told to create a new code; (5) **NEW — v0.206.0's shape (c) is inert**, because the box records an empty hub hash and falls back to (a)/(b), so the recovery screen would stay silent even if recovery were needed. **Q6 — a fresh box CANNOT reach this state:** `MarkEscrowStale` has **no production caller anywhere in the tree** (census: only its own definition, two comments and two test references). **The next walk cannot meet it.** **NOT CLEARED, deliberately** — Q2's answer says the fix is to clear this instance, but whether to also stop the column being settable at all is a separate ruling, and the spike was scoped read-only. **✅ THE FLAG IS CLEARED — operator-approved and applied 2026-08-08.** One row, identity-matched on `host_id` and guarded on `stale_at IS NOT NULL`; `changes()` returned **1**. **Verified end to end, not just in the database:** the hub now serves the hash again, the box recorded `hub_escrow_key_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6769c…d080a` at `11:10:19Z`, and that is **byte-identical to the key it is using** — so shape (c) compares, matches, and correctly stays silent. **The false stale warning is gone, proven with a positive control** rather than an absent line: **0** `escrow-confirm` lines since the restart while **5** scheduler lines in the same window prove the box was logging, and the recorded hash proves an ACK was processed. *(Method note: the hub pod is Alpine with no `sqlite3`; it was installed into the container's ephemeral writable layer — image and node untouched, gone on restart. SQLite's own file locking coordinated the write with the live hub; an earlier attempt failed cleanly on quoting and changed nothing, which is the fail-safe working.)* **STILL OPEN under this ID: the ruling on whether `stale_at` keeps a live setter at all.** It currently has NO production caller, so the column is write-only-by-accident — a field that changes behaviour, that nothing sets and nothing can see (R-248). Either give it an evidential setter or retire it; **do not leave it as a trap that only a database read can spring.** | **READY — flag cleared; the column ruling is still owed** — owner Viktor **Folded R-248 2026-10-03** (the same ruling: give `stale_at` a visible, evidence-bearing setter, or retire it). | — | — | operator |
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@@ -237,7 +221,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-279** | Backup & restore | P4 | **There is no operator-triggerable off-site backup.** The only route to `POST /backup/offbox/run` is the customer's own dashboard session; `signed_jobs` carries opaque operator-SIGNED blobs and the hub holds no signing key. This cost the rehearsal a stop: preparing the run needed one off-site push and there was no operator path to it. Sibling of **R-177** (no operator-triggerable fill check) | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Same shape as R-177; solve both together | CC |
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| **R-336** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The offsite DR endpoint is polled about once per second, and that is what turned a slow leak into an outage.** ep0's PBS proxy served **~85,000 requests/day** — a flat **3,538/hour**, every hour, from two boxes: `74,445 GET /api2/json/admin/datastore` (`libwww-perl`, i.e. PVE's `pvestatd`) and `73,171 GET /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/status` (`proxmox-backup-client`). Two pollers asking substantially the same question at the same rate. On 2026-08-18 this walked a connection leak in the proxy to its 1024-fd soft limit in **14 days**, wedging the offsite tier for 9½ hours (`audits/INCIDENT-ep0-pbs-fd-exhaustion-2026-08-18.md`). The `LimitNOFILE=65536` drop-in applied that morning raises the ceiling **but does not fix the leak** — it converts a fortnightly outage into a multi-year one, which is mitigation, not a fix. A DR endpoint that is written to weekly does not need to be asked about every second | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | **CORRECTED 2026-08-18 (evening) — the easy lever named here does not exist.** This cell used to read *"PVE storage status is the prime suspect, and its interval is tunable"*. **The first half is right and the second half is false.** `pvestatd` stats EVERY configured storage on each 10-second cycle, and Proxmox staff have stated the interval is not designed to be configurable — so there is no knob to turn down. The only lever PVE actually offers is disabling the storage entry (`pvesm set <id> --disable 1`) around the backup window, and that is **substantially more than a tuning knob**: it collides with `felhom-agent/internal/pbsdr/manager.go`'s health model, where an inactive-but-existing entry drives the consume-the-one-time-secret recovery path. So the fix is a design question (does the hub still need a 15-minute fill reading at all, given R-339 now reports reachability separately?), not a config edit. **Doc-only correction — no agent code was changed.** The remaining step is unchanged: cut the poll rate by whatever means survives that question, then confirm the fd count between restarts stops climbing — the positive observable, per standing rule 3. **Baseline measured 2026-08-18, and the FIRST measurement published was WRONG.** The initial "~85/day, matching the ~73/day implied by the failure" came from a single 17-minute window whose delta was **one descriptor** — a sample of one cannot carry a daily rate, and the agreement that made it feel solid was coincidence. **Re-measured over two independent windows the same morning: 183/day (31 min) and 200/day (5.6 h)** — ~2.6x the published figure, putting the runway to the 65536 ceiling at **~357 days, not the ~2 years first claimed**. **And the named mechanism is the minority one:** across that window `CLOSE-WAIT` held flat at 1 while `ESTAB` grew 45→49 — *all* the growth was established connections, and at the wedge the split was 1011 ESTAB / 543 CLOSE-WAIT. **The fix must target connections the proxy never reaps, not just `CLOSE-WAIT` sockets.** The PBS 4.2.5-1 upgrade (2026-08-18) did NOT change the slope and was never expected to — see R-341 **SPIKE 2026-08-20 — THE PREMISE OF THIS ROW DOES NOT SURVIVE MEASUREMENT, and that is a change in what the row IS, not new evidence on it.** `audits/SPIKE-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20.md`. **The leak is OURS, and the poll rate is not what feeds it.** Every one of the 388 leaked descriptors is an ESTABLISHED connection held open by **`felhom-agent`** on the boxes — 194 on each, `ss -tnp` naming a single PID per box, and **zero** held by `pvestatd` or `proxmox-backup-client`. Confirmed independently from ep0's access log over the same 46.18 h window: `libwww-perl` (pvestatd) **81,192 requests -> 0 descriptors**, `proxmox-backup-client` **80,061 requests -> 0 descriptors**, `Go-http-client/1.1` (the agent) **387 `/snapshots` calls -> 388 sockets — one per call, within one**. So **162,404 requests, 99.5% of the traffic, produce 0% of the leak.** **Mechanism, named from source:** `felhom-agent/internal/pbs/client.go:56-60` builds `&http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg}` — a composite literal, so `IdleConnTimeout` is the zero value = **no limit** (`http.DefaultTransport` sets 90 s; a literal does not inherit it) — and `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go:1486` (`pbsTargetsFromPVE`) builds **a fresh client every cycle**, as its own doc comment states. Each cycle therefore strands one idle keep-alive connection in a transport nothing ever closes; `CloseIdleConnections`/`IdleConnTimeout`/`MaxIdleConns` appear **nowhere** in the agent repo. Cadences reconcile without fitting: 900 s hub poll (184.7 cycles) + 6 h `DefaultVerifyCadence` (7.7 cycles) = 192.4 predicted vs **194 observed per box**. **CONSEQUENCE — RE-RANK.** The remaining step recorded above ("cut the poll rate, then confirm the fd count stops climbing") **would have produced a null result and read as a failed fix.** Cutting the Proxmox poll rate remLine truncated
|
||||
| **R-365** | Backup & restore | P4 | **An overdue abandonment countdown renders its past due-date in the future tense.** With the terminal step due and the daily sweep not yet run, the card reads „A kérésed szerint a korábbi távoli mentéseidet **2026-08-20** napján véglegesen töröljük" — on 2026-08-21. The window is up to ~29 h in production (due moment → next 05:10 sweep). | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Say "due, will run at the next daily sweep" once the date has passed. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-367** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The database dumps already written under the wrong name are stranded, and nothing will ever collect them.** R-355's fix sends `paperless-ngx`'s dump to the right place from now on; it does not move the ones already written. On `demo-hp` that is `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/paperless/db-dumps/paperless-postgres.sql` (312 381 B, 2026-08-22 07:38, the last pre-fix cycle). **Nothing deletes them and that is by design, not by luck:** the F5 stale-primary prune (`backup.go:1248`) skips any directory whose name is not a deployed app, under the guard *"an undeployed app's last backup is still its restore point"* — verified still present after the fix. They are equally invisible to the off-site push, which resolves paths from the app's own unit. **They CAN be adopted, by hand:** move the file to `…/primary/paperless-ngx/db-dumps/paperless-ngx-postgres.sql` and it becomes a readable restore point for that app. **It is deliberately not automatic.** The adopted dump would sit beside volume tars taken at a different time, i.e. an INCOHERENT pair — the exact shape R-43/R-44's coherence stamp exists to make visible — and a controller that silently relocates a customer's data on upgrade is a migration, not a fix. **Filed rather than done**, because whether a stale orphan is worth adopting at all is a judgement about one machine's history, not a rule. | **OPEN — LOW** | follows R-355 | Decide per box: adopt (and say the pair is skewed), or delete deliberately. Neither on an upgrade path. | Viktor rules, CC executes |
|
||||
| **R-375** | Backup & restore | P4 | **A PBS datastore signal was noted and explicitly not filed.** `audits/REPORT-ep0-pbs-upgrade-2026-08-18.md:171`: *"Likely the namespace-scoped token lacking datastore-level audit. Not filed; noted here."* Recorded so the note has a number and stops depending on someone re-reading that report. **Age when filed: 4 days.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Confirm the cause on ep0 the next time it is touched; it is a read-only check. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-526** | Backup & restore | P4 | **[P3-LOW] A host delete cannot release only the customer's ep0 PBS token: the endpoint's one removal op destroys every backup group too.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 from source: `tenantsync.Deprovision` „DESTROYS the customer's PBS namespace, all its backup groups, and its token". The task asked for „PBS token elengedése" on host delete; building it needs a new token-only op in the ep0 tenantsync script — a new operation on a protected box. Not built. R-511's adopt path makes the kept token usable instead. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (new ep0 op yes/no), CC (build)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: operator teardown op on a protected box; adopt path covers the need.** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-541** | Backup & restore | P4 | **[P3-LOW] There is no path to move a customer between off-site boxes, or from shared to dedicated.** Read from source 2026-09-16: provisioning is idempotent-reuse keyed on the customer (`shared already provisioned for tester-1 (subaccount 311327)`), and a dedicated deprovision destroys the repository — so "move this customer" has no safe route today. It becomes reachable the moment R-540's second pool box exists, or when a customer outgrows the shared model. **Needs:** a move that copies the repository, re-keys, and only then releases the old sub-account — a new mechanism nobody has measured. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub) — design first** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: needs a second pool box or an outgrown customer first; operator-only and far off (0.3% full).** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
@@ -248,7 +231,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-832** | Backup & restore | P4 | **ep0's copy in a place outside both Hetzner and the operator's home (roadmap).** Today DooPlex (the operator's home) holds it (decision 71). A Hetzner Storage Box would share a provider with ep0 and with every household's file backups, and cannot run PBS, so the copy could not be verified or restored from directly. | **DEFERRED — later, if the product grows** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-878** | Backup & restore | P4 | **A catch-up (R-871) runs the database-dump leg in the DAY, and that leg stops an app with a volume for its copy — the household may notice the stop, and a large volume makes it longer.** MEASURED 2026-10-05 on demo-felhom: the catch-up at 08:25:02 stopped opengist, copied 182.5 KB, started it again — about 1 s, then a few seconds of `health: starting`; the night does exactly the same, unseen. Nothing measured for a large volume. Fix direction (if it matters): skip the volume copy of a running app in a DAYTIME catch-up and leave it to the next night, or warn. `audits/catchup-2026-10-05/partA/live-demo-felhom.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | measure a large volume first | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage & devices — 11 rows (P3 7, P4 4)
|
||||
## Storage & devices — 10 rows (P3 6, P4 4)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -257,14 +240,13 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-330** | Storage & devices | P3 | **Disk health Phase 2 — the three SMART attributes the wire does not carry.** The failing drive's most telling counter was **187 `Reported_Uncorrect`**, sitting at normalized **1** against threshold **0** with a raw count of **1001** — one point from failing and structurally unable to get there. Also wanted: **199 `UDMA_CRC_Error_Count`** (cabling) and **188 `Command_Timeout`**. None are on the agent→controller wire today, so v0.215.0's ladder could not use them. Phase 2 also persists periodic SMART **samples** (the right home is `metrics.MetricsStore`, NOT the Phase-1 state file, which is one record per disk and must stay that way). **This is a declared WIRE change, so under the G-1 gate the hub must model the new fields in the SAME session** — that is precisely why it was kept out of Phase 1, where it would have turned a one-word severity fix into a three-repo change | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** | R-328 (closed) | Add 187/199/188 to the agent's `SmartSummary` + hub model in one session; then persist samples | CC |
|
||||
| **R-332** | Storage & devices | P3 | **The new Hiba-from-counters path has never fired on real hardware.** v0.215.0's whole point is a verdict the product could not previously reach, and it is proven only against the committed fixture's values in unit tests (12 scenario groups, 11 of 12 red-proofs failing as required). The live validation on demo-hp proved the **negative** — three healthy disks still read Rendben across the deploy, no false alert — and the **severity wire** end to end, but no live disk has actually reached Hiba. **This is the honest gap and it must not be closed by pointing at the fixture tests**: the drive that produced the fixture is in DooPlex, which is Tier 2 and never a drill target, and the demo boxes are all-flash and healthy | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-14, NARROWED same day.** One item originally in this gap is now PROVEN LIVE: the **persisted state surviving a controller restart**. The v0.215.0→v0.216.0 redeploy destroyed and rebuilt the container, and the new one read back a `changed_at` written by the PREVIOUS version (`2026-08-14T07:23:14.640216851Z`, still intact at 09:31:35Z) instead of re-baselining — Scenario L on real hardware, not just the production-path unit test. **What remains unproven is the verdict itself, plus the stronger restart half: an already-ALERTED disk not re-alerting** | a real degrading disk, or an injection harness | **Closing condition:** a live disk reaching Hiba from counters, OR a deliberate injection through the REAL pipeline (agent `/disks` → controller check → hub event), not a hand-set verdict | CC |
|
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| **R-542** | Storage & devices | P3 | **[P3-LOW] `/api/disks/candidates` offers a REGISTERED, in-use drive under „initialize".** MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the fresh box (controller 0.244.0): after `/dev/sdb` was formatted, mounted at `/mnt/felhom-drives/adatlemez` and registered as the default data drive, the endpoint still listed it under `initialize` (and again under `attach` with `already_mounted: null`). **Customer-invisible today:** the Meghajtók page filters correctly — its „Nem regisztrált meghajtók" section lists none, and the drive shows as „Adatlemez · Alapértelmezett · Aktív". So the defect is in the raw endpoint that feeds a FORMATTING flow, not in the page. **It also misleads a session:** I read „not mounted" off this endpoint and briefly filed a false finding against the product (corrected in `audits/evidence-backup-promise-2026-09-16/phaseE-freshbox.txt`). **Fix shape:** exclude paths the controller has registered from `initialize`, and set `already_mounted` from the real mount state rather than null. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller/agent)** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-700** | Storage & devices | P3 | **[P2] A drive move unpinned the app — its next start took the catalog's newest version, past the ladder.** Found 2026-09-27 reading the code for R-697 (not seen on a box): `doFlipRedeploy` (the per-app and whole-drive move) persisted through the restore's fresh `app.yaml` write, which drops `pinned_images`, `desired_state`, `installed_images`, the update records and the kept conversion copies. Unpinned, the catalog syncer copies the catalog's compose verbatim (`sync.renderSource`'s table) and the next `up` runs the newest version — for a PostgreSQL app past its conversion step, i.e. a new engine on an old datadir. Pin adoption repairs it only at a controller restart. **-- 2026-09-27 (controller v0.276.0): FIXED** — `persistDriveFlip` changes `HDD_PATH` and nothing else; red-proofed (`audits/records-carried-2026-09-27/redproofs/RP3`, `RP4`). **STILL OPEN: the live proof** — no Tier-0 guest has two drives (9202 has one); prove a move on a box with a second drive, reading `pinned_images` before and after and the running image after the next sync. | **WATCHING — P2; owner: CC (live proof)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: the fix shipped and is red-proofed; only a live proof on a two-drive box is left.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-756** | Storage & devices | P3 | **[P3-LOW] On 9202, "remove with drive data" refuses calibre-web with 409 „…/scratch_hdd/userdata/calibre-web tárhely jelenleg nem elérhető", while the controller container lists that folder.** MEASURED twice on 2026-10-01 (`audits/lockouts-2026-10-01/B/B1…`, `audits/calibre-name-and-prune-2026-10-01/A/A1…`): `POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/remove` with `remove_hdd_data` → 409; `docker exec felhom-controller ls -ld /mnt/felhom-drives/scratch_hdd/userdata/calibre-web` → the directory (dated 2026-09-22). The walk then removed the app keeping the data (R-442's fail-closed answer). Either the drive is not a registered drive on this scratch box (a test-venue artefact) or the resolver reads another path than the one it names. Not measured which. **-- 2026-10-01 (night, new apps):** the same 409 for Grimmory (`remove_hdd_data`), and a drive app's per-app backup is NOT offered for restore after a remove — the controller logged `drive … not mounted — skipping ensure (held by drive gate)`; the unit lives on that drive. So on 9202 checklist row 2.5 cannot be shown for any drive app until its scratch drive is a registered drive (`audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/restore-why.txt`). | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-25** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Device-node TOCTOU hardening (drive init).** Graduate the controller v0.141.0 Observation: the `format → resolveEnrollUUID(path) → AssignDisk(uuid)` sequence has a narrow /dev-re-enumeration window (agent-guarded on the destructive format via anti-retarget durable-id; benign fs-UUID mount). Bind resolve+assign to the format's durable-id so the mount can't target a moved node. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-19, size S, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | From the v0.141.0 F6 commit's security-review finding (`felhom-controller` REPORT). Low real risk (single-operator, agent-guarded), but cheap to close | CC |
|
||||
| **R-331** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Disk health Phase 3 — growth-rate detection, and retiring the static 64.** The v0.215.0 count backstop (64 unreadable sectors → Hiba) is **a judgement from ONE drive**: the observed benign excursion peaked at 16 and cleared inside an hour, and the terminal run passed 64 at 13 Aug 11:28 and never came back. It is deliberately a backstop BEHIND the sustain rule, not the primary signal, but it is still a magic number tuned on a single sample and it will be wrong for some drive. With Phase 2's history the box can ask the question that actually matters — *is this count climbing, and how fast* — which distinguishes a drive with eight stable aging sectors from one adding forty a day, something no static threshold can do. Revisit 64 when that exists | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** | R-330 | Growth-rate rule over persisted samples; re-derive or delete the static 64 | CC |
|
||||
| **R-352** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Four screens state something untrue about where an app's data goes, and the configured default is consulted by nothing that places data.** Measured on `demo-hp` 2026-08-21. **(1)** **40 of 53** catalogue templates declare no data path (`grep -rl 'env_var: HDD_PATH' --include='.felhom.yml'` → 13; total 53); those apps get **no storage field and no default** — their data lands in a named Docker volume on the system drive. **(2)** `GetDefaultStoragePath()` has exactly **three** non-test callers — the metrics collector (`cmd/controller/main.go:410`), the dashboard SystemInfo panel (`web/server.go:733`) and `.fab` import landing (`handler_export_upload.go:154`). **The deploy route never reads it.** Its field comment `// new apps use this by default` (`internal/settings/settings.go:453`) has never been true — an invariant with no test pinning it. **(3)** The first-tier backup follows the data onto the same disk (`backup/backup.go:324-334` → `systemDataPath`), so data and nearest copy share one device for a customer doing nothing wrong — the posture Tier 2 refuses outright at `tier2.go:329`. **(4)** „1 alkalmazás használja" on the Drives page counts only `Env["HDD_PATH"] == path` (`web/handlers.go:2118`), so it can never include the 40-class; it truthfully means *„1 of the apps that CAN use a drive does"*. | **NARROWED** — **PARTLY CLOSED 2026-08-21** — visibility shipped; **placement OPEN** | — | **Shipped tonight (visibility only, no placement change, nothing migrated):** the deploy page now states where the app's data will live before the button is pressed, naming the system drive for the 40-class and the selected drive for the 13. **⚠ RE-FRAMED 2026-08-22 — THE FOUR MEASUREMENTS STAND; TWO OF THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THEM DO NOT.** (1) is a measurement and is correct, but "those apps get no storage field and no default" is not a deprivation: the architecture places **hot** data (DB/config/cache) on fast storage inside the guest and states that placement is **ENFORCED** (`documentation/architecture/01-topology-and-trust.md:150-152`). The 40 are all-hot apps; the 13 are the ones with **bulk** content, which belongs on an attached drive. There is no choice being denied. (3) **overstated one risk and understated a distinction.** Since R-165 the guest carries a small OS rootfs plus **ONE** data volume at `/var/lib/felhom`; `/var/lib/docker` and `/mnt/sys_drive` are two **binds of that same volume** (`felhom-agent/configs/build-golden.sh:29-40, 99`) — the `mp0`/`mp1` split assumed here was retired 2026-08-03. **Real risk:** a physical-disk failure loses the data and its first-tier copy together — which is what the off-site and whole-machine tiers exist for, and which is equally true of a drive-resident app whose unit sits beside its data by design. **Overstated risk:** a full data volume stopping the operating system — the OS rootfs is a separate volume and the capture floor refuses per app before exhaustion (`00-capability-map.md:94`), watched working 2026-08-21 with the volume at 99% and all 15 containers healthy. **The comparison to Tier 2's same-disk refusal (`tier2.go:329`) is withdrawn:** Tier 2 refuses a SECOND copy on the same disk; Tier 1's unit is meant to sit beside the data. **(2) and (4) are untouched and remain correct** — (2) is now filed on its own as **R-368** with its scope measured, and (4) needs no ruling: the count is honest and only easy to misread. **The specification for the rest is filed at `documentation/backlog/SPEC-app-data-placement-2026-08-21.md`** (corrected 2026-08-22, framing marked inline, measurements kept) and lists the five points a ruling must settle (compose-template vs controller, existing deployments, when the SSD is legitimately right, `IsDefault` must become true or go away *with a test*, and the Drives-page count). **An earlier recommendation to refuse deployment until a drive is registered was WITHDRAWN** — it assumed the customer had failed to choose; they had no choice to make. | **Viktor rules**, CC executes |
|
||||
| **R-568** | Storage & devices | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The dashboard's drive-health rows swap order between visits — the same two disks, listed in a different order a minute apart.** MEASURED 2026-09-17 on demo-hp 9201 during slice 1 release C's live proof: `/dashboard` fetched on 0.249.0 listed „KXG50PNV1T02 NVMe TOSHIBA 1024GB” then „SanDisk X600 M.2 2280 SATA 128GB”; fetched on 0.250.0 a minute later, the reverse (`audits/i18n-slice1-2026-09-17/C/live/hu-before-vs-after.txt`). `diskHealthRows` (`disk_health.go` L135–141) keeps the agent's response order and does not sort; the agent's order is therefore not stable. Cosmetic, but a household that reads „the second disk” finds a different one. **Fix shape:** sort the rows controller-side by a durable key (device path or serial), with a test that feeds two orders and expects one. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: cosmetic.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security & access — 31 rows (P2 2, P3 26, P4 3)
|
||||
## Security & access — 28 rows (P2 2, P3 23, P4 3)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +264,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-276** | Security & access | P3 | **RANK 2 — an uninstalled box keeps a live WireGuard tunnel into Felhom's off-site endpoint, and the teardown says nothing.** After `--uninstall` on demo-hp, `wg-quick@wg-felhom` is **enabled and active**, `/etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf` present, handshake to `167.233.158.164:443` **52 s old**, counters 5.86 GiB in / 2.48 GiB sent. It appears in **neither** the WIPED nor the KEPT list, though the BYO install disclosure names it prominently on the way in (*"an OUTBOUND WireGuard tunnel to the Felhom hub"*). A host told to leave Felhom retains a live network path into Felhom infrastructure, its hub-side peer registration intact, and nobody is told | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Tear the tunnel down and deregister the peer, or list it under KEPT with the reason and the removal command | CC |
|
||||
| **R-338** | Security & access | P3 | **`demo-hp` is not on the R-50 island at all, and `operations/nodes.md` states that it is.** The page records both fleet boxes as island-migrated 2026-07-25. True of `felhom-pve`; **false of `demo-hp`**, whose `agent.json` has `listen_addr: 192.168.0.87:8443` — the customer LAN address — and **no `island_bridge`/`island_guest_addr` keys at all**, whose guest 9201 has `net0` only (no `eth1`), and whose `vmbr9` exists with **zero members**. The controller's `controller.yaml` points at the LAN address, so the box works; this is inventory drift, not breakage. **Two costs.** A session trusting the page addresses the wrong endpoint — that happened on 2026-08-18 and the resulting timeout was briefly read as a fault. And the agent's local API is **bound to the customer LAN on this box** rather than to a point-to-point island, which is the exposure R-50 was built to remove — so a documented security property is claimed for a box that does not have it | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Decide which is true: migrate `demo-hp` to the island, or correct `nodes.md`. Leaving both is the one option that keeps the doc lying | Viktor decides; CC executes |
|
||||
| **R-350** | Security & access | P3 | **SECURITY — the hub operator password was printed in cleartext into a session transcript by CC, 2026-08-20. Rotation recommended.** **What happened:** vouching the artifact manifest used `curl -w '%{redirect_url}'` for confirmation. The hub answers `POST /configuration/artifacts` with a **303**, and curl renders the redirect target **with the basic-auth credentials re-attached** — so the URL it printed contained `http://:<HUB_PW>@10.43.52.34:8080/configuration?flash=artifacts_set`. The password was never read aloud from the credentials file, never echoed deliberately, and every other call in the session correctly printed only `${#HUB_PW}`; it arrived through curl's own output formatting, which is why the usual discipline did not catch it. **Blast radius, stated precisely rather than minimised:** the value is **not** in git, not in `CHANGELOG.md`/`REPORT*.md`/any committed file (checked), and not in the evidence directory — it is in the Claude Code session transcript under `~/.claude/projects/` on DooPlex, which is operator-readable and persists across sessions. The hub UI is reachable only on the k3s ClusterIP and via the operator's own routes, not from the internet. **The value is deliberately not recorded here; it is stored out-of-band in the usual credentials file.** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-20** | — | **Operator decides whether to rotate.** The hub's own `/configuration` password form does it (`current_password`/`new_password`/`confirm_password`), and per `hub-password-ui-2026-07-13` the DB override wins over the ConfigMap, which stays break-glass. CC can perform the rotation **file-to-file without printing the new value** (the `operator-present-one-time-secrets` convention) if asked — it did not do so unilaterally, because rotating a credential the operator holds in their own head or notes is their call, not CC's. **The reusable half, which matters more than this one password:** never use curl's `%{redirect_url}` (or `-v`, or `--libcurl`) against a basic-auth endpoint — all three re-render the credential. Confirm a redirect with `%{http_code}` and read the flash from a follow-up GET. | **Viktor decides**, CC executes |
|
||||
| **R-584** | Security & access | P3 | **[P2-MED] Credential-bearing probe scripts were left in a live guest's `/tmp` for hours, across three releases.** FOUND 2026-09-18 while cleaning up after slice 3's live proof: `probeB.sh`, `probeB2.sh`, `probeB3.sh`, `probeC.sh` and `probeD.sh` were still in demo-hp guest 9201's `/tmp` from slice 2's releases B, C and D earlier the same session, and all five carried the controller password INLINE (`-d "password=$PW"` with the value substituted). The standing rule in `.claude/rules/ui-hungarian.md` says exactly this: *delete any credential-bearing helper from `/tmp` (host AND guest) when done*. They were not deleted at the end of each phase; they were found by grepping my own litter for secret-shaped strings before removing it, which is a check that happened only because a later phase went looking. All five are shredded. **Why it is a row and not a note: the rule existed, was loaded, and was still not followed three times running — so the rule is not the mechanism.** The password is the shared demo one (Tier-0 boxes, `~/.config/credentials`), unchanged; rotating it is cheap and is the operator's call. **Fix shape:** never inline a credential in a helper — write it to a mode-0600 file and read it with curl's `@file` form, which this run did and which is why this run's own scripts were clean; and make the last act of a phase that pushed a script to a box the `shred -u` of it, the same way R-320 made evidence-copying the last act of a phase. | **READY - rank P2-MED; owner: CC (the mechanism), operator (whether to rotate)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2->P3: demo boxes and a shared demo password only; files shredded; the fix is process.** | — | — | CC + operator |
|
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| **R-587** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Two root-password files sit in the directory the public ISO is published FROM.** FOUND 2026-09-18 running the ISO release gate's credential criteria for slice 4: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/felhom-iso/out/` holds `felhom-pve-9.2-1-v1.24.0-nested-probe-generic.iso.rootpw.txt` and `felhom-pve-9.2-1-v1.25.0-nested-vm-generic-mkimage.iso.rootpw.txt` from 2026-07-22/23, mode 0600, left by two appliance-mode builds. **They are NOT on the bucket** — both `https://iso.felhom.eu/<name>` return **404**, against a control (`felhom-installer-1.28.0-pve9.2-1.iso.sha256`) that returns 200, so the check is real and not a dead probe. **The only thing keeping them off a PUBLIC bucket is the `--include "felhom-installer-<VER>*"` pattern in the publish command**, and they are named `felhom-pve-*`, so the pattern misses them by an accident of naming rather than by design. A publish typed without the include, or an include widened to `felhom-*`, uploads root passwords to a world-readable bucket. **Fix shape:** shred the two files (they are three months old and their VMs are long gone), and make the release build refuse to run — or the publish step refuse to start — while any `*.rootpw.txt` exists in the out directory. A pattern that protects by coincidence is not a control. **The two files were SHREDDED 2026-09-18** from the publish source directory, immediately before the 1.29.0 upload ran from it. The directory now holds no `*.rootpw.txt`. **The mechanism half is still open**: nothing stops the next appliance build leaving one there, and nothing refuses a publish while one exists — the `--include` pattern still protects by coincidence. | **OPEN** — **PARTLY DONE 2026-09-18 (files gone; the guard is not built) - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-616** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The catalog credentials are stored in PLAINTEXT in the box's catalog clone and are printed by an ordinary `git remote -v`.** FOUND 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while pointing it at a private drill catalog. `Syncer.buildRepoURL` injects `username:token` into the HTTPS URL, and `git clone` persists that URL as the clone's `origin`, so `<data>/catalog-cache/.git/config` holds the token in the clear and **any** diagnostic that prints the remote leaks it — which is what happened in this session's own transcript, and is the same shape as R-580 (`curl -w '%{redirect_url}'`). `maskRepoURL` exists and is used for the LOG lines, so the masking intent is already there; the stored remote is the half that was missed. **INERT ON THE FLEET TODAY** — the live catalog is public and `git.token` is empty on every real box — which is exactly why it should be fixed before it is not: the day the catalog goes private, every box carries a readable credential and every support session that runs `git remote -v` prints it. **Fix shape:** store the remote WITHOUT credentials and supply them per-fetch (a credential helper, `http.extraHeader`, or `GIT_ASKPASS`), and a test asserting the clone's stored `origin` contains no `@`. **Operator action from tonight, unrelated to the fix:** the Gitea `admin` token used for the drill repo was printed by that command and must be rotated. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/05-9202-follows-drill.txt` (redacted). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller); one operator action (rotate the Gitea admin token)** | — | — | CC + operator |
|
||||
| **R-717** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] opengist and wishlist keep their sign-up switch only in their own database — the box closes them with the address block alone.** MEASURED 2026-09-29: opengist `disable-signup` is an admin-panel setting (no env, no CLI); wishlist `system_config.enableSignup` (Prisma). Their blocks are case-insensitive and refused every trick shape (`audits/signup-lock-2026-09-29/B/`). **Fix direction:** an `after_setup` command that sets the database value (wishlist: a Node/Prisma one-liner; opengist: needs its sqlite with the app stopped). | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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@@ -290,17 +271,15 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
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| **R-763** | Security & access | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] On wger a stranger can make an account after the household's setup, and every anonymous visit to the dashboard creates a guest account.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on 9202 (live template `82fff32`), found by checklist row 3.4: after the admin existed, a stranger with no dashboard session `POST /en/user/registration` → 302, signed in with it → 302, read the API → 200; two anonymous `GET /en/dashboard` raised the user count from 2 to 4 (wger's middleware `create_temporary_user`, `utils/middleware.py:69`). Settings read inside the app: `ALLOW_REGISTRATION True`, `ALLOW_GUEST_USERS True` (the image defaults; the template sets neither). `GET /en/user/demo-entries` as a stranger answered 500. wger is FIRST-ADMIN class 3 (a known default login, fixed by `after_install`), so it never got decision 47's sign-up lock — it was not in R-711's list. Every crawler visit adds a user row to the household's database. **Needs:** per decision 47, close it after the first admin: `ALLOW_REGISTRATION=False` and `ALLOW_GUEST_USERS=False` (env switches the settings read — measure that the admin can still add family members, row 3.7), proven on 9202 as a stranger. `audits/new-app-checklist-2026-10-01/C/C8-signup-guest-media-static.txt` **-- 2026-10-01 (operator):** wger is `lifecycle: hidden` until this and its twin are fixed (catalog `55b8c8a`; read back on 9202: not on the app list, mealie control present). | **READY — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: wger is hidden from installs and no box runs it; needed only before it is offered again.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-775** | Security & access | P3 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Grimmory: a stranger's 5 wrong sign-ins lock EVERY visitor out of the web login for 15 minutes — so Grimmory was not published.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on 9202 (drill catalog, v3.4.1, through traefik): after 5 wrong tries for `admin` every further sign-in answered 429 — the household's right password AND a different name — and stayed 429 for 10+ minutes of retries. Read in the jar: `AuthRateLimitService` — Caffeine `expireAfterWrite(ofMinutes(15))`, `MAX_ATTEMPTS 5`, keys `login:ip:` and `login:user:`; Spring `forward-headers-strategy: native` takes the address from X-Forwarded-For, and behind the tunnel every visitor is the tunnel container's address (R-753) — the wger shape (R-752), with no setting to change it. Everything else in the checklist passed (bench + box step v3.4.1 → v3.5.0, gate by its own probe, OPDS through traefik); two smaller findings for the publishing session: on a reinstall over the first install's kept books, a new upload was saved to the drive but not added to the library (`box/grimmory/reinstall-c1.txt`, not investigated); and the remove + restore round trip (2.5) cannot be shown on 9202 for a drive app — its backup lives on the scratch drive, which is not a registered drive (R-756). The template waits in `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/wip/grimmory/`. **Needs (operator):** (A) publish with a sentence on the page that wrong guesses by others can lock the login for 15 minutes (MEASURED: during the lock an e-reader's OPDS feed still answered 200 with its own login, wrong 401 — `box/grimmory/opds-under-lock.txt`), or (B) wait until the box passes each visitor's real address (R-753). `audits/new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/throttle.txt` **-- 2026-10-01 (evening):** option B's precondition SHIPPED (controller v0.286.1, R-753): Grimmory's Tomcat RemoteIpValve walks from the right and counts `172.16.0.0/12` as a proxy (READ in source, Spring Boot 4.1.1 — not yet measured with Grimmory's own lock), so `login:ip:` becomes per visitor; `login:user:` still lets a stranger lock the public name `admin` 15 min. A third route was spiked and passed: Grimmory behind the permanent family gate with its e-reader paths excepted (R-780). Recommendation: publish behind the family gate if R-780 is built; otherwise B with a measured 3.6. **UPDATE 2026-10-02 — NARROWED, Grimmory PUBLISHED behind the family gate:** a stranger cannot reach Grimmory's web sign-in at all (6 tries through the simulated tunnel: the gate's 401, then the household signs in 200 — `audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/A/items.txt`), and the e-reader exceptions keep Grimmory's own login. The 2.5 round trip now WORKS on 9202 (`audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/B/box/life.txt`). **What is left:** a family member past the gate can still lock a NAME (the admin's) for 15 minutes with 5 wrong tries — hard-coded in Grimmory; and the reinstall-over-kept-books finding (`new-apps-2026-10-01/box/grimmory/reinstall-c1.txt`) is still not investigated. | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2→P3: Grimmory is now behind the family gate; only a family member can still lock a name.** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-776** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Right-walking catalog apps need ONE setting to see each visitor since v0.286 (R-753); without it they keep the tunnel's one address (a stranger can still trip their per-address limits for everyone).** READ in source (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/A/sweep/`): kimai `TRUSTED_PROXIES=127.0.0.1,172.16.0.0/12`; zipline `CORE_TRUST_PROXY=true` + `CORE_TRUSTED_PROXIES=172.16.0.0/12`; vikunja `VIKUNJA_SERVICE_IPEXTRACTIONMETHOD=xff`; nextcloud `TRUSTED_PROXIES=172.16.0.0/12`; n8n `N8N_PROXY_HOPS=2` (optional). BookStack `APP_PROXIES` measured this session (see its catalog commit). **Needs:** per app, the setting + checklist 3.6 re-measured on 9202 through the simulated tunnel (the BookStack shape, `audits/visitors-2026-10-01/tools/bookstack_36.py`). Count readers (calibre-web, tandoor, wger) stay as they are — a fixed count is wrong for one of the two paths. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-778** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A box that rolls back to a controller ≤ 0.285 after v0.286 keeps the new traefik (an old controller never rewrites a running traefik) — and the old `clientIP` believes the LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For, which a stranger then writes: the dashboard's login counter becomes dodgeable until the box moves forward again.** Reasoned from the code (old `claim.go` clientIP + v0.286 traefik trust), not measured. The floor never moves back; the window is the self-update's crash roll-back. **Needs:** decide whether that window matters (it closes at the next floor); if it does, a 0.285.x patch that reads the rightmost hop, or the self-update refusing to roll back across v0.286. | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-782** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Two side observations of the R-753 sweep, inferred, not measured:** glance's seeded `glance.yml` has no `auth:` block (the dashboard is public to anyone with the address), and homepage's `/api/*` refuses a Host not in `HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS`, which the template does not set (widgets may 400). **Needs:** measure both on 9202; glance: decide whether a public link dashboard is intended (the setup gate does not cover it after setup). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-783** | Security & access | P3 | **[P3-LOW] SparkyFitness: three wrong sign-ins by anyone shut EVERY visitor out of sign-in for ~10 s — a stranger retrying every 10 s keeps the household out.** MEASURED 2026-10-01 on 9202 through the simulated tunnel (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/C/box/sparky-box.txt`): better-auth's sign-in limit (3 per 10 s) is keyed on one address — it reads the LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For, whose chain the R-753 router reset removes, so its frontend nginx hands it traefik's address; the household from another address got 429 at 3 s and 10 s, in at 16 s. Not forgeable (a rotating forged address did not escape). better-auth's header setting is not exposed as an env by SparkyFitness. **Needs:** accept (10 s), or an upstream setting for better-auth's `ipAddressHeaders` + a right-walking reader. | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-831** | Security & access | P3 | **The Hetzner storage API token (`HETZNER_TOKEN`, the storage project's token in `Secret/storagebox`) was printed into the 2026-10-03 session transcript** — CC read the gitignored `manifests/storagebox.secret.yaml` and its redaction pattern missed the quoted value. It can create, reset and delete Storage Box sub-accounts. Not rotated by the operator's choice (decision 73). **Rotation, whenever chosen (3 steps):** create a new token in the storage project in the Hetzner console → patch `Secret/storagebox` key `HETZNER_TOKEN` in `felhom-system` and `kubectl rollout restart deployment/hub` → delete the old token in the console. Rule for sessions: never print a file that holds secrets — read the one field needed. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rotation is his call** | — | rotate when chosen | operator |
|
||||
| **R-870** | Security & access | P3 | **Tester 1's two Cloudflare credentials — the zone API token (`infrastructure.cf_api_token`) and the tunnel token (`infrastructure.cf_tunnel_token`) of the hub's `customer_configs` row `tester-1` — were printed into the 2026-10-04 night session's transcript** (not into any file): a read-only query selected `substr(config_json,1,400)`, and both values sit in the first 400 characters. Tester 1 is CC's disposable test customer (`enkicsifelhom.hu`). **Not rotated, by the operator's ruling of 2026-10-05 06:49 (option B).** **Rotation, whenever chosen (3 steps):** in the Cloudflare dashboard create a new API token for the `enkicsifelhom.hu` zone with the same permissions and refresh the Tester 1 tunnel's token (Zero Trust → Networks → Tunnels → the tunnel → refresh token) → hub → Configs → `tester-1` → Edit → the two Cloudflare fields → Save, then confirm on the box that cloudflared reconnected (`docker ps` health `healthy`) → delete the old API token. Rule for sessions (as R-831): never select a whole config row — name the fields, and never `config_json` without `json_extract` of a non-secret field. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rotation is his call (ruled: not now)** | — | rotate when chosen | operator |
|
||||
| **R-831** | Security & access | P3 | **The Hetzner storage API token (`HETZNER_TOKEN`, the storage project's token in `Secret/storagebox`) was printed into the 2026-10-03 session transcript** — CC read the gitignored `manifests/storagebox.secret.yaml` and its redaction pattern missed the quoted value. It can create, reset and delete Storage Box sub-accounts. Not rotated by the operator's choice (decision 73). **Rotation, whenever chosen (3 steps):** create a new token in the storage project in the Hetzner console → patch `Secret/storagebox` key `HETZNER_TOKEN` in `felhom-system` and `kubectl rollout restart deployment/hub` → delete the old token in the console. Rule for sessions: never print a file that holds secrets — read the one field needed. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rotation is his call** **Not rotated by the operator's rulings (2026-10-04 „keep using the current one"; 2026-10-05 option B) — restated 2026-10-05 18:23; the steps stay here.** | — | rotate when chosen | operator |
|
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| **R-870** | Security & access | P3 | **Tester 1's two Cloudflare credentials — the zone API token (`infrastructure.cf_api_token`) and the tunnel token (`infrastructure.cf_tunnel_token`) of the hub's `customer_configs` row `tester-1` — were printed into the 2026-10-04 night session's transcript** (not into any file): a read-only query selected `substr(config_json,1,400)`, and both values sit in the first 400 characters. Tester 1 is CC's disposable test customer (`enkicsifelhom.hu`). **Not rotated, by the operator's ruling of 2026-10-05 06:49 (option B).** **Rotation, whenever chosen (3 steps):** in the Cloudflare dashboard create a new API token for the `enkicsifelhom.hu` zone with the same permissions and refresh the Tester 1 tunnel's token (Zero Trust → Networks → Tunnels → the tunnel → refresh token) → hub → Configs → `tester-1` → Edit → the two Cloudflare fields → Save, then confirm on the box that cloudflared reconnected (`docker ps` health `healthy`) → delete the old API token. Rule for sessions (as R-831): never select a whole config row — name the fields, and never `config_json` without `json_extract` of a non-secret field. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rotation is his call (ruled: not now)** **Not rotated by the operator's rulings (2026-10-04 „keep using the current one"; 2026-10-05 option B) — restated 2026-10-05 18:23; the steps stay here.** | — | rotate when chosen | operator |
|
||||
| **R-134** | Security & access | P4 | **Two zone-resolvers disagree on depth.** The controller strips labels progressively (`controller/internal/cloudflare/zone.go:18`); the hub's `resolveZone` tries the exact name then `parentDomain`, which strips exactly ONE label (`hub/internal/cloudflare/unblock.go:115,136`) | READY (XS) | — | For a one-label Felhom-issued subdomain both work; for anything deeper the hub silently fails to find the zone while the controller succeeds — the geo-unblock would then no-op with a "no active zone found" error. One concept, two implementations. Same audit §2.6 | CC |
|
||||
| **R-525** | Security & access | P4 | **[P3-LOW] FileBrowser has its own login; putting it behind the dashboard session (traefik forwardAuth or Quantum proxy auth) is a new mechanism nobody has measured.** Filed 2026-09-15 by the P1-fixes task (B.5). R-513 closed the default-password hole with a generated password; a household still has two logins. **What it needs:** a spike on a scratch guest — forwardAuth to the controller session, and what FileBrowser Quantum does with a trusted header. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (spike)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: comfort feature needing a new unmeasured mechanism; the default password hole is closed.** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-779** | Security & access | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Part A's "two outside addresses seen as two" is proven through the simulated tunnel only; on the REAL tunnel the second outside address (ep0, one request allowed) was refused by Cloudflare's edge with 403 and never reached the box.** Measured 2026-10-01 19:51 UTC (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/A/L2-demo-hp-real-tunnel.txt`): no log line on demo-hp; demo-hp's box has no geo restriction in its settings, so a Cloudflare ZONE rule (country or bot, not read) refused a German datacenter address. DooPlex's own address on the real tunnel was seen as itself. **Needs:** one sign-in from a second Hungarian address (the operator's phone off wifi) while DooPlex is locked out — 2 minutes; and say which Cloudflare rule refused ep0. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (a phone), CC reads the logs** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a proof gap on the real tunnel; operator-only follow-up.** | — | — | CC + operator |
|
||||
| **R-879** | Security & access | P3 | **A copy of hub.db still holds secrets readable without any key:** each box's hub API key (`hosts.api_key`), each household's owner passphrase and API key (`customer_configs.retrieval_password`, `api_key`), and the PBS-DR token values (`host_pbs_secrets.value`, kept after use). Found 2026-10-05 while answering "what does a hub database backup now contain" (R-133 sealed the console passwords; the off-site passwords were sealed by R-821). A stolen database copy lets an attacker report as any box and read every owner passphrase. `05` §16.2 | READY | — | Seal or hash each with the same seal (the box keys and the passphrases are compared, so a hash may fit; the PBS token is served once, so it could be deleted after use) | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Box system & updates — 15 rows (P2 1, P3 13, P4 1)
|
||||
## Box system & updates — 12 rows (P2 1, P3 11)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -308,19 +287,16 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-862** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Tester 2 cannot take the config bundle until one by-hand bootstrap is done: its `felhom-os-apply` (agent 0.142.0) predates the bundle mode, and no signed job can write a root file on it.** FOUND 2026-10-04 (R-840 build, Part C): the route reaches every box installed from installer 1.31.0 on, and the demo boxes (bootstrapped by CC); Tester 2 has every root file of agent 0.142.0 (installer 1.30.0) and lacks only the R-858 wrapper fix, which matters only for a Docker step it gets solely from a signed job. CC has no route to Tester 2 (its door admits only the operator's WireGuard peer; `felhom-op` cannot become root). The steps: `runbooks/config-bundle.md` "Tester 2". Then CC signs the bundle and reads it back. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — the operator said (2026-10-04 ~19:05) he will try through his tunnel | the operator's WireGuard tunnel | the operator runs the three bootstrap commands; CC sends the bundle | operator |
|
||||
| **R-35** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Config-apply should not end the customer's session.** The offsite config push bumped `config_version` 10→11 at 16:54:58 and the controller self-restarted (container `StartedAt` 16:54:59Z, back up 16:55:02); in-memory sessions died with it and **customer zero was force-logged-out mid-flow**. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size S, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | Direction: **hot-apply the offbox target** (no restart for a config the running process can adopt), or **persist sessions** across restart. The restart itself is by design — the collateral is not. Evidence `controller-log-full.txt` | CC |
|
||||
| **R-78** | Box system & updates | P3 | **`local_api` authority ruling — auto-reconcile vs detect-only** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-25, size M, roadmap state `idea (deferred OUT of R-77 on purpose)`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **An OWED OPERATOR DECISION, not a defect — moved because an owed ruling hidden among feature ideas is the shape this session exists to remove.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | R-77 ships detection because the fix is genuinely undecided, and **both directions can lose customer-visible function**. **Direction 1 (today):** `controller.yaml` wins and drift is silent → the 2026-07-25 island migration blinded the whole fleet's control plane for 17.5 h (drive gate, guest-reboot recovery, quiesce/backup all degrade). R-77 makes that loud but does not stop it recurring. **Direction 2 (`bootstrap.json` wins, auto-reconcile on boot):** a guest whose `controller.yaml` is CORRECT and whose `bootstrap.json` is stale — a half-completed re-provision, a hand-repaired guest, a setup-wizard box — gets a **working channel clobbered on the next restart**, fleet-wide and silently, during a routine deploy. That is not obviously better than the bug. Needs a spike: which writer is authoritative per field (endpoint vs fingerprint vs token — `mergeLocalAPI` replaces the whole block, so they cannot be reconciled independently today), whether the agent side should stamp a generation/mtime so 'newer wins' is even expressible, and whether reconcile should require an operator ack. Until then the drift alert plus a manual edit is the supported path. | CC |
|
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| **R-190** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A storage ACL that demonstrably WORKED in the morning was gone by mid-morning, and nothing recorded its removal.** On demo-felhom, a `vzdump` by `felhom-agent@pve!agent` with `--storage felhom-backup` completed **OK at 04:44:50 CEST 2026-08-03** (task log read in full). From **09:24:56** the same path returned `HTTP 403 … missing privilege Datastore.Allocate at /storage/felhom-backup`, six times through the day, until the grant was re-applied by hand at 18:54. By ~14:50 `pveum acl list` showed **no row at all** for that path | **NARROWED** — **MITIGATION SHIPPED 2026-08-04** (agent **v0.124.0 → v0.124.1**) — **MECHANISM STILL OPEN** | — | **Why this is not just R-185 restated:** R-185's mechanism (the installer's Scenario-F arm resolves a pre-existing target without granting) explains a box that NEVER had the grant. This box HAD it and lost it, inside five hours, with the machine up throughout. **Ruled out, each by measurement:** a host reinstall (`uptime` = 12 days); any `pveum`/ACL/`user.cfg` activity in syslog between 04:00 and 10:00 (none); any ACL entry in `/cluster/log` (none). **Correlated, not established:** `host_leaf_changed` at 09:15 and `controller_started` at 09:19 — guest 9201 was reprovisioned nine minutes before the first 403. PVE removes ACLs at `/vms/<vmid>` when a guest is destroyed (`AccessControl::remove_vm_access`, the F-LEAK mechanism); whether any path can take a `/storage/<id>` row with it has NOT been established and is the first thing to check. **Why it matters more than the grant did:** a permission that can vanish silently makes every ACL-based guarantee on these hosts provisional, and the agent's new store-grant probe (v0.123.0) now detects the STATE but says nothing about the TRANSITION. **Worth pairing with:** whether the probe should report a grant it once had and no longer has as a distinct, louder signal than one it never had **THE ROW NOW REFLECTS THE MITIGATION, NOT THE CAUSE — stated plainly because the two are different things.** The box is resilient; the loss is still unexplained. **Mitigation:** when the store-grant probe finds the grant absent, the agent runs the EXISTING root wrapper (`felhom-backup-target-apply grant <id>`) and **re-reads once** to confirm — the pbsdr R-22 self-grant shape, including its restraint. **No new privileged surface:** the sudoers vector `grant *` already covers any storage id (confirmed in `configs/felhom-agent.sudoers`, not assumed), and the verb already grants BOTH user and token. The verb existed, was permitted, and had only ever been called at storage CREATION — the *built but never wired* shape in a verb rather than a seam, this project's seventh instance. Bounded at one attempt per tier per hour (a storage can be unreadable for reasons an ACL cannot fix; re-granting every cycle is a repair loop wearing a fix's clothes). **THE RECORD IS THE HALF THIS ROW IS ABOUT, and v0.124.0 got it wrong in production while every unit test passed.** It reported degraded for *one cycle* — meaning the probe call that repaired. But `probeAll` is invoked INDEPENDENTLY by the self-check log and by the collector building a host-report: on the box the repairing call was the log's (`09:39:34`, journal shows the repair and `degraded=1`) and the report three seconds later found the grant present and sent **`ok`**. The agent's journal had the record, the hub had nothing, and the operator would have learned nothing — the exact silence this row exists for, re-created inside its own mitigation. **v0.124.1** replaces it with a latch on TIME (20 min > the 900 s report interval), so at least one report must carry it. **PROVEN LIVE, twice, on demo-felhom** (grant deleted by hand, both rows): agent logs `store-grant: GRANT WAS MISSING AND HAS BEEN SELF-REPAIRED — investigate the loss (R-190) target=felhom-backup privilege=Datastore.AllocateSpace action="felhom-backup-target-apply grant felhom-backup" confirmed_by=re-read`; the ACL rows return; and on v0.124.1 the **host-report at 08:00:30Z carried `status=degraded`** with the explanation and the hub raised `agent_capability_degraded` and **e-mailed the operator** at 08:00:40. Nothing new was built to carry it — the hub's existing ok→degraded→ok edge is the channel, and the text rides `Feature` because that is the field the hub interpolates into the e-mail (`Reason` does not travel). **PART 3 — the single bounded pass at the mechanism, with the negatives named.** The lead §8.6 nominated is real as a CLASS and is documented in our own installer: *"`pveum user token remove` purges the token's ACL, so re-applying post-rotate is mandatory"*. **It does NOT fit this box.** A rotation purges ALL of the token's ACLs and mints a NEW secret; demo-felhom's token still authenticates with the same secret (`--selftest` OK), it retained its other three storage grants throughout, and only `felhom-backup` was refused. No installer run is evidenced (no 2026Line truncated
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| **R-242** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A controller release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered until a golden carries it — and nothing enforces that.** R-239 is the symptom; this is the mechanism, recorded **2026-08-07** and deliberately **NOT built** (the task that found it scoped it as a record-only item). **Two releases went out without a golden and the gap was invisible until a walk measured it from the customer's side**: v0.204.0 (R-237) and v0.205.0 (R-234) were written, tested, pushed, and CHANGELOG'd, and every one of those steps passed while a machine installed that night received neither. The register said CLOSED; the fleet said otherwise. **Nothing in the release path knows a golden exists.** The version bump, the image push, the CHANGELOG entry and the register closure are all repo-local; the manifest's `golden_version` is edited by a separate operator act, in a different repo, with no link back. **Proposed shapes, cheapest first — the choice is the operator's and is not taken here.** (a) **A release-path checklist step** — one line in the controller's end-of-session checklist: *a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not finished until a golden carries it or a register row says why not.* Costs nothing, catches nothing mechanically. (b) **A gate in `repo_gates.py`** comparing the manifest's `golden_version` against the newest released controller and FAILING (or warning) past a tolerance of one minor. Mechanical, runs on every push, and would have fired the morning after v0.204.0. (c) **A hub-side checker** — the hub already knows every box's running controller version from `/hosts` and the vouched golden from the manifest; a periodic comparison against the newest published image would catch drift the repo cannot see, including a vouch that was made and then rolled back. **Earliest catch: (b).** It fires on the push that creates the gap, before any box is installed, and it needs no live fleet. **(c) catches strictly more but only after boxes exist.** (a) is worth doing regardless because it is free. **Not built. No gate was written this session.** **⚠ IT RECURRED WITHIN A DAY, WHICH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR BUILDING IT.** Controller **v0.206.0** shipped the R-241 fixes on 2026-08-07 while the vouched golden still carried **0.205.0** — so a machine installed on the morning of 2026-08-08 would have received neither. Third occurrence of the shape in three days (R-111/R-115/R-120 are the older family). **✅ SHAPE (b) BUILT 2026-08-08 — `scripts/golden_currency_gate.py`, registered in `repo_gates.py` as gate 7.** **It was shown FAILING against that exact state before anything was baked**, which is its red-proof and the reason its own introducing push needed `--no-verify` (stated in the session report rather than worked around): `newest released controller : 0.206.0 / newest golden baked : 0.205.0 → CONVICTED`. **IT IS `--fast`, AND THAT FORCED ITS DESIGN:** both `.githooks/pre-push` AND CI run `repo_gates.py --fast`, so a non-fast gate would run in NEITHER — the R-29 census failure this runner exists to end. **THEREFORE IT CHECKS THE BAKE, NOT THE VOUCH**, because the vouched version lives only in the hub's `hub_settings` with no copy in git, and putting a copy there would create a second source of truth that can drift — a green gate over a false claim being the worst outcome available. **A bake without a vouch still passes: that half is NOT closed and stays on this row.** It also compares versions rather than behaviour, so a release changing nothing customer-visible trips it too — accepted deliberately, because judging that by hand is what failed three times and the cost of a false trip is one bake; a waiver belongs here, never in a habit of bypassing. **VOUCHED 2026-08-08 with the operator's approval** — golden `0.206.0` / sha `c85230b4…108e`; `agent_version` and `min_agent` both stayed `0.127.0`, and `wrapper_sha256` was carried through explicitly because the handler clears it when omitted. **The gate was CONVICTED before the bake and OK after it** — red→green on the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real. **⚠ THE GATE FIRED FOR REAL, 2026-08-08 — and it was right.** Controller **v0.207.0** (R-249/R-252/R-253) is released, tested and pushed, and **no golden carries it** — the newest bake is 0.206.0 — so `golden_currency_gate.py` FAILED, saying exactly the true thing: *a machine installed right now would receive v0.206.0*. **The `felhom.eu` push therefore used `git push --no-verify`, declared here, in the commit message and in the session report.** A bypass and NOT a waiver, deliberately: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that *deliberately needs no golden*, and this one needs one. **Owed: bake golden 0.207.0 and vouch it** (`RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1; the vouch is a three-field change). **This row's own remaining half is unchanged — nothing gates the VOUCH itself.** **✅ THE OWEDLine truncated
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| **R-274** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A local golden is adopted with NO version and NO checksum check, so a reinstall can silently come up releases behind.** `felhom-host-install.sh` step 7: `if [[ -n "$GOLDEN_VOLID" ]] && ! $FORCE_GITEA_GOLDEN; then log_skip "using local golden"; return 0; fi` — **the hub manifest's `golden.sha256`, whose entire purpose is to vouch from a different trust root than Gitea, is consulted only on the FETCH path.** A locally-present archive bypasses the vouch: no version compare, no digest, no warning. On demo-hp 2026-08-09 the preflight selected `local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9100-2026_08_03-07_33_00.tar.zst`, whose baked marker reads `felhom-controller:`**`0.192.0`**, against a vouched golden of **0.210.0** — 18 releases stale. **The sharp consequence:** 0.192.0 is **below 0.200.0, where R-193's off-site recovery SCREEN shipped**, so a customer reinstalled today returns on a controller that cannot run the recovery ceremony their data depends on; it is also born below the managed-update floor (0.200.0), and the updater's auto-target is the floor, never the newest. **It compounds with the teardown**, which deliberately keeps the old golden (*"golden vzdump left in place"*). This is the R-111/R-115/R-120 drift family one layer down: the R-120 gate guards what may be VOUCHED, nothing guards what an install TAKES. **OBSERVED 2026-08-09, AND THE RESULT NARROWS THE ROW — recorded because it partly refutes what was written above.** On the RESUME path step 7 **fetched the vouched 0.210.0 correctly** (`fetching golden v0.210.0 from Gitea`), because `--resume` skips preflight and preflight is where local auto-discovery sets `GOLDEN_VOLID` (the GL6-F4 comment says so). **So the fresh-install and resume paths disagree on golden selection, and the resume path is the safe one.** Discovery is `… | sort | tail -1`, i.e. the NEWEST local archive by filename — a sensible heuristic, **and still no comparison against the manifest's version or sha**. The defect therefore stands as: *a box whose newest local golden predates the vouched one installs stale, silently* — which is exactly the state demo-hp was in before this run (newest local 0.192.0 vs vouched 0.210.0). It is now masked on this box because the freshly fetched 0.210.0 is the newest — **correct by recency, not by verification**. There are now **three** goldens on `local` (07-21, 08-03, 08-09), because the teardown keeps them. **Still not observed: a FRESH (non-resume) install taking a stale local golden.** | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: Local golden is now checked against the hub manifest's version and sha before use (GOLDEN_CHECK_WHY, R-297) — felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh:2855-2905) — **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-09, NARROWED same day** | — | Compare the local golden's version/sha against the manifest and refuse or re-fetch on mismatch; say so in the BYO disclosure, which today lists only what the install CREATES, never what it REUSES | CC |
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| **R-349** | Box system & updates | P3 | **"Prove it by hand, then publish" leaves the fleet running a DIFFERENT binary under the SAME version name — and self-update cannot notice.** Hit on 2026-08-20 during the R-344 train, caught and corrected the same hour, filed because the next prove-then-publish train will hit it identically. **The mechanism:** a proof deploy is a hand build (`go build -ldflags "-X main.version=0.130.0"`), while `scripts/release-agent.sh` deliberately builds with **`-trimpath -buildvcs=false`** so the published artifact is reproducible (R-186). Same source, same version string, **different bytes**: `256e0829...` on the boxes vs **`a56a92a7...`** published and vouched. **Nothing corrects it automatically**, and that is the sharp edge: the boxes already report `0.130.0`, so the self-update path sees the vouched version as already installed and does nothing, **forever**. The divergence is invisible to every version check in the system — the hub, `--version`, and the artifact manifest all agree, because they all compare the version STRING. **Consequence if unnoticed:** the binary a customer box runs is not the binary the operator vouched, and not the one a reinstall would fetch — so a bug reproduced on the fleet may not exist in the published artifact, or vice versa. It is the same "one version name, two binaries" hazard `publish-agent.sh` already carries a comment about for `CGO_ENABLED`; that comment fixed the two ENTRY POINTS and does not cover a hand build during a proof. **Corrected here** by downloading the published artifact from the registry (not rebuilding it locally — the boxes get the bytes a fresh install would get) and installing it on both; both now report `sha256 a56a92a7...`, matching the vouch. | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-20** | — | Make the reconciliation a step, not a memory: the honest fix is for the agent to REPORT the sha256 of its own binary in the host report, so the hub can compare it against the vouched `agent_sha256` and flag drift — **exactly the mechanism `wrapper_sha256` already implements for the PBS wrapper** (R-50b), whose manifest help text says it *"makes host drift visible: agents report the installed file's hash and a mismatch is surfaced on the host page"*. The pattern exists and is proven; it simply was never extended to the agent's own binary. Cheaper interim: end every prove-then-publish train by installing the DOWNLOADED artifact. | CC |
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| **R-444** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Nothing runs `pct fstrim` on the fleet, and demo-hp's thin pool was carrying ~23.8 GB of blocks the guest had already freed.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 during this spike's teardown: the run itself added ~1.05 GiB that `local-lvm` did not reclaim on delete (68.97% -> 70.91%); `fstrim` INSIDE the unprivileged container is refused (`FITRIM ioctl failed: Operation not permitted`, all three mounts); `pct fstrim 9201` from the PVE host then trimmed **30.2 GiB + 57 GiB** and took `local-lvm` to **26.78%** — **23.8 GB BELOW this run's own starting point**, i.e. the surplus was long-standing, not ours. **Why it is not merely housekeeping:** a thin pool that only ever grows can reach 100% from DELETED data alone, and a full thin pool takes every guest on the host read-only. demo-hp had 16.4 GB free before the trim. **Not urgent, and the row says so** — but the appliance has no periodic trim and no operator surface reports the gap between guest-free and pool-used. Owner: **CC.** `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-468** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] THE GOLDEN WAIVER — goldens on a cadence, not per release (operator ruling 2026-09-13).** 25 goldens in 26 days in August, almost one per release, because `golden_currency_gate.py` trips on every release by design and the only honest ways past it were a bake or a declared `--no-verify` (thirteen by 2026-09-01, R-404/R-417). **The ruling: bake WEEKLY, and always before any drill or fresh install.** Every release still raises the FLOOR, so both demo boxes keep getting each release in ~20 s; only the golden — which protects a fresh install and nothing else — moves to a cadence. **The mechanism (built 2026-09-13):** `documentation/tests/golden-waiver. **⚠ CORRECTED THE SAME DAY (R-472): between bakes the floor does NOT carry a release — the hub holds any floor above the vouched golden (publish-train rule 1), so releases between bakes reach the demo boxes only by hand-deploy.**yml`, four lines (`issued`, `expires`, `reason`, `register_row: R-468`), read by the gate. While valid, a golden BEHIND the record makes the gate print a loud ADVISORY and exit 0; when it expires the gate is red again until someone bakes or renews. **The 14-day cap is enforced by the gate, not the runbook** — a longer, undated, unparseable, reason-less or row-less waiver is INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never 0 and never silently ignored. **It never covers a golden that is UNRECORDED (R-385)** — that is not a cadence choice. **A dated waiver cannot be forgotten; it just expires** — the difference from R-242's original rule, which recurred the day after it was written. Tests: `scripts/test_golden_currency_gate.py` cases 5–15 (E/F/G/H, a 15-day, absent, unparseable, bad-row and empty-reason waiver each 2; the R-421 decoy — a file saying only `expires` — 2). **This is a PRE-CUSTOMER arrangement: the first external install retires it** (delete the file in that commit). Cadence written into `RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.2 and the `felhom.eu` end-of-session checklist. **Does NOT touch R-242's open half (nothing gates the VOUCH).** | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (renew ≤ 14 days or bake); retire at the first external install** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-531** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Three supervisor facts measured live and not pinned: restart timing during a deploy was not measured; restarts before the hub first sees the stanza produce no `controller_restarted_by_agent`; deliberate operator kills spend the crash-loop budget.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 on 9201: after 3 test restarts in 13 minutes the 4th kill tripped the 30-minute pause and the dashboard stayed down (the guard as designed, `A4-kill-middeploy-9201.txt`). The hub checker seeds silently on first sight, so the three restarts before the first v0.131.0 report emitted nothing (only the crash-loop did). **What it needs:** a deploy-kill timing on a fresh budget; the operator's view whether a restart after minutes of uptime should count toward the budget **MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box, both halves.** (1) **Timing during a deploy (F9'):** the controller was killed 5 s into a deploy on an EMPTY budget; the agent saw it on the next sweep, confirmed on the one after, and the dashboard answered 200 again **37 s** after the kill; the interrupted app ended `not_deployed`, not stuck. (2) **The budget's shape (F9''):** three further kills at idle, 20 minutes apart, recovered in **61 s / 41 s / 61 s** - and NONE of them accumulated, because the window is 15 minutes. Four restarts this session, zero pauses, zero crash-loop events. **So the brake catches a FAST loop and is blind to a SLOW one:** a controller dying every 20 minutes is restarted forever and the only trace is an `info` event that mails nobody. That is a design question for the operator (leave it / add a longer second counter / raise the severity of the Nth restart in a day), and this session deliberately measured it without changing it. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f9prime.txt` and `phase2-f9dprime.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (measure) · operator (budget rule)** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-194** | Box system & updates | P4 | **PVE's permission cache delays every grant-state verdict by an unknown amount, so "the agent can read it" and "the ACL exists" are not the same measurement.** Observed twice while validating R-190's self-repair on demo-felhom 2026-08-04: both ACL rows for `/storage/felhom-backup` were deleted, and `GET /access/permissions` continued to report `Datastore.AllocateSpace` present — for **~40 s** in one run and **~16 minutes** in another. During that window the capability probe reads healthy and the self-repair does not fire | **OPEN** | — | **Why it matters beyond the delay:** it puts a floor under how fast a lost grant can be noticed, it makes any single permission read a lagging indicator, and — the interesting part — **it is a candidate contributor to R-190's own timeline**: a grant removed at an unknown moment could keep working until a cache expiry, which is exactly the shape of *worked at 04:44, refused at 09:24*. That does not explain what removed it, but it may explain when the refusal SURFACED, and the two have been treated as the same instant. **Not a defect in our code** — it is PVE behaviour, and the mitigation already tolerates it (the repair fires on the next probe after the cache clears). **What is worth deciding:** whether the store-grant probe should ALSO consult the storage content listing as a second signal, since that appeared to reflect the loss immediately (`{"data":[]}` while the permission read still said present) — two signals disagreeing is itself information, and today only one of them is read | CC |
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| **R-836** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A new host kernel that hangs before userspace stays the GRUB default: `--next-boot` is not a one-shot on these hosts.** MEASURED 2026-10-04 on demo-hp (operator's word, 2 reboots): both demo hosts boot UEFI + GRUB without proxmox-boot-tool ESPs; installing a kernel makes it the default at once; `kernel pin <new> --next-boot` writes an ordinary `GRUB_DEFAULT`, and `proxmox-boot-cleanup.service` clears it only after a boot reaches userspace. With the old kernel pinned FIRST, the fallback after a good boot worked (new 60 s, old 76 s). READ FROM THE CODE, not measured: a hang leaves the new kernel default on every power cycle. Only `softdog` runs (useless before userspace); demo-hp's `sp5100_tco` ships unloaded, untested. Fix direction for the slow lane: GRUB's own one-shot (`GRUB_DEFAULT=saved` + `grub-reboot`) with the old kernel saved — to be measured, including Secure Boot (ON on demo-hp). `audits/os-updates-spike-2026-10-04/partH/` | **NARROWED 2026-10-04 (os-host-lane Part E, operator's word before each of 2 reboots) — GRUB's own one-shot is NOT a one-shot here either.** `GRUB_DEFAULT=saved` (old kernel saved) + `grub-reboot <new>`: boot 1 → new kernel, **Secure Boot ON and fine**; but GRUB could not clear `next_entry` (`grub-reboot` itself warns: *environment block on lvm device … will remain the default until manually cleared*; `/boot` is ext4 on LVM `pve-root`), so boot 2 (no command) → **the new kernel again**. `kernel.panic = 0`: a panic leaves the host stopped (R-851). `sp5100_tco` LOADS and answers (`SP5100 TCO timer`, 60 s, inactive, nowayout 0; read from sysfs, never opened, unloaded) — a hardware watchdog exists on demo-hp, but nothing arms it before userspace. demo-hp left on 7.0.14-20 with that as the saved default. **LEFT (fix direction):** a GRUB env block GRUB can write (on the ESP, vfat) or a userspace "boot good" step that rewrites the default, plus arming `sp5100_tco`; to be measured before the kernel slow lane. `audits/os-host-lane-2026-10-04/partE/` **READY — owner: CC + operator (reboots).** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-853** | Box system & updates | P3 | **After a boot the box's versions and crash facts reach the hub up to ~15 minutes late.** MEASURED 2026-10-04 on demo-hp (crash-guard test): the agent's first report after a boot has no `system.facts` — the facts read needs a RUNNING customer guest (`firstGuest`), the guest starts ~1–2 min after the agent, and the failed read is cached for 10 minutes; so the HOST half (the crash guard, the kernel) is lost too. The crash events arrived 15 min after the boot (17:17 → 17:32 CEST); nothing was lost (the guard keeps 7 days). Fix direction: the facts mode reads the host without a guest (guest fields `unknown`), and a failed read is not cached. `audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partC/c4-hub-events.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-839** | Box system & updates | P3 | **After a Docker restart that stopped every container, the boot sweep HELD an app whose `app.yaml` `HDD_PATH` names its user folder instead of the drive.** MEASURED 2026-10-04 on scratch 9202 (paperless-ngx): `bootrecon` logged `drive /mnt/felhom-drives/scratch_hdd/userdata/paperless-ngx is not a live mountpoint — NOT starting it`, although the drive `/mnt/felhom-drives/scratch_hdd` IS a mountpoint; the app stayed down until started by hand. The customer boxes' 9201s showed no hold. **Not diagnosed:** which writer put a per-app path in `HDD_PATH` on 9202, and whether a household box can get it. `audits/os-updates-spike-2026-10-04/partG/SUMMARY.md` | **READY — diagnose; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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## Monitoring & notifications — 25 rows (P2 3, P3 15, P4 7)
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## Monitoring & notifications — 23 rows (P2 3, P3 14, P4 6)
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| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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@@ -338,19 +314,17 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-522** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] While the box has no internet, the dashboard's „Cloudflare Tunnel" tile keeps saying „Fut", and no page tells the household the box is offline.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 (BIGNIGHT F8, VM 333): VM 333's traffic off the LAN and to the hub was dropped at demo-hp's bridge 21:08:36 → 21:26:07Z. Throughout, the LAN dashboard (probed every 26 s from demo-hp) answered 200 and, polled every 2 min, showed no banner and the tile „Cloudflare Tunnel — Biztonságos internetkapcsolat — a szerver portnyitás nélkül érhető el kívülről. · **Fut** · Védett"; meanwhile cloudflared logged ≈ 20 errors every 2 minutes, the public name answered 530, and the controller logged `[report] Push failed … context deadline exceeded` and `Job hub-report failed: hub push failed after 3 attempts`. The tile reports the container, not the connection. A household whose remote access is gone sees „Fut". **Fix shape:** the tile reads the tunnel's connection state (cloudflared's registered connections or the report push result) and says „Nincs internetkapcsolat" when either fails. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-547** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A disk that fills and empties between sweeps is never mentioned to anyone: `disk_critical` is defined at ≥95 % used, but the fill-watch runs once a day.** MEASURED 2026-09-17 (chaos night) on a fresh box (`tester-1-022354`, controller 0.245.0): the customer guest’s root filesystem was held at **96 % for ten minutes** (29 G used, 1.5 G free) and **no alarm of any kind fired** — checked twice, once by the round’s own runner and once independently after the fill was released. Cause, established from the ladder BEFORE the round rather than after: `fillwatch` runs **daily at 03:30** plus once ~90 s after a controller start, so a ten-minute window contains no check unless a restart lands inside it. The timing here was almost comic — the controller restarted at 21:28 after the previous round’s power cut, so its one opportunistic check ran about **twenty seconds before** the disk filled. Meanwhile all twelve apps kept serving and the background household loop logged 12 operations with 0 failures, so nothing else would have hinted at it either. **This is the ladder working as designed, not a missed alarm** — the fill-watch is a daily sweep, not a monitor. It is filed because the honest answer to „would the household be told their disk is full?” is **no, unless the controller happens to restart while it is full**, and that answer is not written down anywhere. **Fix shape (one of):** sample the fill more often than daily (a cheap `statfs` on the 5-minute health pass would do it); or say plainly in `08-alarm-ladder.md` that a transient full disk is out of scope. Evidence: `audits/evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/round-3.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-585** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Six event producers still send Hungarian only, so an English household can see one Hungarian line in some mails.** FOUND 2026-09-18 by localisation slice 3 Part B (R-558, controller v0.256.0), which converted 19 of the customer-facing producers and left these: `backup_failed`, `db_dump_failed`, `backup_integrity_ok`, `backup_integrity_failed`, `offbox_enlarge_blocked` and `local_api_endpoint_drift`. **Why they were left:** each receives its sentence already FINISHED from another package, so the key and its arguments no longer exist by the time the notifier sees it — converting them means changing their callers, not the notifier. The 15 operator-tier types are deliberately excluded and are NOT part of this row: the operator reads Hungarian. **Why it matters more than it looks: `offbox_enlarge_blocked` has no `customerMessages` entry on the hub**, so its raw sentence IS the household's mail rather than an extra line under a translated headline — for that one type an English household gets a wholly Hungarian mail, not a mostly-English one. **Fix shape:** push the key and its arguments down from each caller (the shape slice 2 release B already used for errors, `util.MsgError`), then add each to the `convertedProducers` table in `internal/notify/message_customer_test.go`, which is the list both language tests walk. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-723** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A fresh box sends the operator two mails on day one that describe nothing wrong.** MEASURED 2026-09-29: `Operator email sent for tester-1/node_recovered` 2 s after the new box's first controller report (the customer's previous box had been silent 12 days — the new box is not a recovery); and `backup_tier_skipped (warning) — Whole-guest backup tier felhom-pbs skipped: its storage does not exist on the host (never provisioned or removed)` → operator mail at 19:27 UTC, 7 min after enrolment, because the first whole-guest run fired before the off-site tier's descriptor arrived (applied ~19:35 UTC, backed up fine at 19:37). Operator-only, so no household is alarmed, but an operator learns to ignore both. **Fix direction:** `node_recovered` not for a host enrolled < N min ago; the skipped tier inside the first hour after enrolment is `info`, not a mailed warning. **FIXED 2026-09-30 (hub v0.126.0):** no `node_recovered` when the customer's host was enrolled after the outage began; `backup_tier_skipped` in a box's first hour recorded, not mailed. Real recoveries and old boxes' skips still mail (controls). Unit + red-proof (RP40, RP41); the live proof is Tester-2's first hour. | **WATCHING** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — FIXED in hub v0.126.0; the live proof is Tester-2's first hour) — **FIXED — hub v0.126.0; live proof at the first real install; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-724** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The status pages disagree with each other in small ways a household notices.** MEASURED 2026-09-29 on a fresh box: Beállítások reads „Mentés ütemezés 02:30 / 03:00" while Biztonsági mentés says 02:30 / 03:30 / 04:15 / 04:30–08:30; Beállítások shows a raw `2026-09-29T19:22:30Z`; its „Helyi cím (LAN)" and „Átjáró" read „nem állapítható meg" on the page the household is asked to read out for remote help; the backups overview still says „Következő mentés — 0 órája" (the age of the LAST run, under the word "next" — noted 2026-09-14, never filed); the dashboard shows the backup at 19:33 where the backup pages say 21:33 (R-500, still reproducing). **FIXED 2026-09-30 (controller v0.283.0):** Beállítások shows the real schedule and a local time; the dashboard's last backup is local time (R-500); „az előző N órája készült" replaces „0 órája". **NARROWED — remaining:** „Helyi cím (LAN)" / „Átjáró" read through the file-sharing container, so a box without it says „nem állapítható meg" — not a text fix (the read needs another path). | **NARROWED — the LAN/gateway read only; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-177** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **There is no operator-triggerable "run the fill check now" path.** `fill-watch` is reachable only on its daily 03:30 schedule plus the once-at-startup run added in controller v0.191.1 — so the only way to exercise it on demand is to restart the controller | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-02** | — | **Noticed while live-validating R-167 on 9201, not by a failure.** It cost a controller restart per observation during validation, and it costs the same on a support call: after a customer frees space, nobody can confirm the warning has cleared without restarting their controller or waiting until 03:30. **Partially mitigated already** — v0.191.2 makes every run log a positive observable (`checked N filesystem(s), M unreadable/skipped, K notification(s)`), so at least a run that DID happen is visible; the gap is triggering one. The scheduler has `GetJobs` but no run-now, so this is a general affordance, not a fill-watch one — **scope it as "run a named scheduler job now", operator-gated.** **ID established free:** `grep -ro "R-177\b" documentation/ *.md` → 0 hits | CC |
|
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| **R-266** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **A failed root `statfs` still reaches the hub as a 0-of-0 disk, and the hub cannot tell that from an empty one.** Split out of R-259 on 2026-08-08 so that fixing the CUSTOMER-facing half could not be mistaken for fixing the wire. `report/builder.go:93-95` copies `sysInfo.DiskTotalGB` / `DiskUsedGB` / `DiskPercent` into `r.Storage[0]` (`Mount: "/"`), and those are exactly the zeros a failed `statfs` leaves behind — the controller now KNOWS the measurement failed (`SystemInfo.DiskKnown`, controller v0.210.0) and the report still does not carry it. **Deliberately not fixed here, for a reason that is now structural rather than a preference:** adding a field to that report is a change to a declared wire, which since G-1 means the receiving side must model it in the same session (`scripts/wire_contract_gate.py` refuses otherwise) — a two-repo change with a hub bump, and this session deliberately touched no hub code. **RANKED LOW, and the reason is that the consequence is bounded:** the hub bands host storage on `disk_percent`, so a failed read presents as 0% used — the *quiet* direction. It cannot raise a false "nearly full" alarm; it can only fail to raise a true one, and only while the root filesystem is unreadable, which is a state with louder symptoms of its own. **Fix shape when it is taken:** carry `disk_known` on the storage entry and have the hub's fill checker skip an unknown reading rather than band it — never treat absent as 0 | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
|
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| **R-285** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **A planned, supervised reinstall pages the operator as if the machine had died — there is no notion of expected downtime anywhere.** During the 2026-08-09 rehearsal the hub sent, all `status: sent` to the operator channel: `host_stale` 08:58 UTC, `node_stale` 09:00, **`host_down` 09:28 (error)**, **`node_down` 09:30 (error)**, `host_leaf_changed` 09:31, `host_recovered` 09:31, `node_recovered` 09:34, `offsite_delivery_stuck` 09:34 — eight operator mails for work that was deliberate, attended and announced. **This is the OPPOSITE gap from the one R-281 filed:** the alarms are not missing, they are indiscriminate. `host_stale` at 30 min and `host_down` at 60 min (`monitor/host_staleness.go:22-23`, `downAfter = 2 * threshold`) cannot distinguish a wiped-on-purpose box from a dead one, and `host_leaf_changed` firing on a reinstall is correct-but-expected. **Note the interaction with the mute used on 2026-08-09 evening:** blocking a customer silences everything, so today the only two settings are *page me for planned work* and *tell me nothing at all*. **What is owed is a middle:** a maintenance window, or an operator-set expected-downtime flag, that suppresses staleness and leaf-change while leaving genuine faults audible | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | The evidence is the operator's mailbox plus `events`/`notification_log` for 2026-08-09 | CC |
|
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| **R-337** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **`/backup/status` lagged a completed backup by minutes on one box and not the other — and it RESOLVED ITSELF, which is why this is WATCHING and not a defect.** During the R-336 recovery on 2026-08-18, `demo-hp`'s snapshot landed on ep0 at **03:58:43Z** (complete manifest; the host's own task index says `OK`) — yet `GET /backup/status` was **still serving the superseded 03:27:00Z failure at ~04:03Z**, four-plus minutes later. `demo-felhom` showed its new result within ~40 s of completion. **The lag cleared on its own:** demo-hp's 04:07:35Z host report carries `felhom-pbs success=true, 4.29 GB`, and the hub is green for both boxes. **The first draft of this row claimed the success was "still reported as failed" — that was written before the next report arrived and it was wrong; the corrected claim is a several-minute skew between the two boxes, not a stuck value.** It is recorded because a status field that can trail its own artifact by minutes will, during an incident, be read as a second failure — this session nearly did — and because the asymmetry between the two boxes is unexplained | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-18** | another observation, ideally during an incident rather than constructed | **Do not open a fix on this as written.** First establish the intended refresh path for `/backup/status` after an out-of-schedule run; only if the skew is not simply collection cadence is there anything to pin. If it is cadence, close this row and say so | CC |
|
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| **R-371** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **The off-site tier is the only backup tier that announces nothing on success.** Written down 2026-08-05 in `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md:508-513` and explicitly *"recorded, not filed"*: the off-site run emits **no hub event at all**, while both lesser tiers do (`db_dump_completed`, `crossdrive_completed`). Failures are covered by `backup_run_failures` and staleness by the hub's 8-day tier deadline, which is why it was judged a wrinkle. **Still true 2026-08-22** — the 2026-08-21 drill's own event dump shows `db_dump_completed` and six `crossdrive_completed` rows and no off-site success event. **Age when filed: 17 days.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Either emit one, or record deliberately that the highest-value tier is silent on success and say why. | CC |
|
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| **R-856** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **A crash restart reaches the household twice: the hub's "restarted after an unexpected stop" line AND the controller's app mails.** 2026-10-04 crash-guard test on demo-hp: after the third crash and the power-on, the controller sent `app_start_failed` (operator) and `app_stopped_unhealthy` (operator AND the household's address) for apps that were still coming up. Each is true on its own; the app ladder has no "the host just crashed" suppression like its boot grace for an ordinary restart (`08` §5). A design question for the operator, not a defect yet. `audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partC/c4-hub-events.txt` | **READY — operator decision** | — | — | operator |
|
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| **R-872** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **A box that is off every night never raises a missed-backup alarm: the 05:00 deadline check skips every customer whose node is `down`, so missing database dumps, second copies and off-site copies stay silent indefinitely; the only nightly signal is `node_down`.** MEASURED 2026-10-05 05:00 Budapest, hub log: `Deadline check: … 0 backup missed … 1 skipped (down)` — the skipped one is Tester 2, off since 18:06 UTC (`hub/internal/monitor/deadline.go` ~360: `if st == "down" \|\| st == StateDisabled { skipped++; continue }`). R-195 / R-321's shape again — a skip keyed off the wrong fact: "down now" was meant to avoid a double alarm, but a box down at every deadline is never checked at all. Fix direction (after R-871): count the days since the last success regardless of the node state, and alarm on N missed nights. `audits/night-fixes-2026-10-05/partF/FINDINGS.md` | **NARROWED 2026-10-05 — FIXED hub v0.134.0, proven by tests (3 red-proofs, `audits/catchup-2026-10-05/partC/`): a down box is judged on 48 h (dump) / 72 h (whole-guest) lines (`08` §6.4, decision 115). LEFT: the first live 05:00 run — DATED CHECK 2026-10-06 (DUE-CHECKS): the hub log line `Deadline check: Tester-2 is DOWN — judged on the longer lines … dump missed=1 backup missed=1` (if Tester 2 is still off at 05:00), and the two events in `events`. Holds → close; does not → a new row.** | R-871 | — | CC |
|
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| **R-886** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **DooPlex's Alertmanager cannot write its own state since the Longhorn restart of 2026-10-05 13:20Z** — every 15 min `Running maintenance failed … open /alertmanager/nflog.…: permission denied` (and the same for `silences`), 8 times by 14:21Z; the pod was recreated 13:20:48Z by that restart. Mail still goes out (`alertmanager_notifications_total{integration="email"}` 5 → 6, `failed_total` 0, 14:23Z), but a silence set now and the record of what was already sent do not survive the next pod restart — so a restart can re-send every active alarm or drop a silence. Likely collateral of the restart (volume ownership on re-attach), not measured. | **OPEN** | — | Compare the volume's file owner with the pod's `securityContext` (`fsGroup`/`runAsUser`); fix in homelab-manifests; prove with a silence that survives a pod restart | operator |
|
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| **R-884** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **ArgoCD app `monitoring` shows `Deployment/prometheus` OutOfSync** (seen 2026-10-05 while syncing the R-173 alarm rules; only the rules ConfigMap was synced, so the Deployment drift is untouched and its cause unknown). A full sync would change the running Prometheus in an unknown way. | **OPEN** | — | `argocd app diff monitoring` (or the CR's resource diff) to see what differs, then decide git or live | operator |
|
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|
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## Hub & operator — 24 rows (P2 1, P3 9, P4 14)
|
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## Hub & operator — 21 rows (P2 1, P3 9, P4 11)
|
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|
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| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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@@ -367,19 +341,16 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-92** | Hub & operator | P4 | Hub PBS-DR gauge is 0.1 GB-granular — small deltas unverifiable | READY (XS) | — | Widen precision when retention becomes customer-visible | CC |
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| **R-264** | Hub & operator | P4 | **Twenty-one facts the boxes report that the hub can now decode nowhere, each allowlisted with a reason rather than silently skipped — and for these the reason is "no consumer today, and one is arguably owed".** Split out of R-260 on 2026-08-08 so that closing the CLASS (gated) and fixing its sharpest instance (`operator_key_configured`) could not be mistaken for having decided what the hub should do with the rest. **The list, grouped by what a consumer would be for.** **(a) Guest-network health — `guest_net` and its seven children** (`checked_at`, `has_route`, `dhclient_alive`, `heal_succeeded`, `heals_last_hour`, `last_heal_at`, `damped`). The R-54 watchdog reports per-guest network state and self-heal counts every cycle and the hub — the component that emails the operator — models none of it. There is a live incident in this project's own record where a killed `dhclient` took a tunnel down for 1 h 15 m (`audits/INCIDENT-guest-dhclient-killed-2026-07-20.md`); a recurring-heal signal is exactly what would have surfaced it. **This is the strongest candidate of the twenty-one.** **(b) `selfupdate_pending` + `selfupdate_pending_version`** — an agent that has flipped its binary and never committed reports pending on every heartbeat so that "the operator sees WHY the version isn't advancing", and no operator can see it. **(c) `mgmt_plane.healed_recently`** — bounded: the hub DOES alarm on the `privsep_healed_at` timestamp beside it, so the recurring-clobber signal is not lost, only this flag. **(d) `restore_tests.mount_parity` + `mount_inventory`** — R-262's subject; the verdict is not lost (a mismatch fails before `Pass` is set) but the hub cannot tell a full-fidelity pass from a boot-only one. **(e) `pbs_dr.applied_at`.** **(f) Controller-side: `config_hash`, `reporting_disabled`, `stacks`, `storage.migrated_to`, `backup.last_db_dump`, `backup.last_integrity_check`** — the last two are backup-integrity timestamps, which is the "presence is not success" neighbourhood. **For each the question is the same and is NOT answered here: is it wanted? If the hub should act on it, model it and name what consults it. If it should not, the honest end is that the emitter stops sending it** — a fact emitted forever and consumed nowhere is a future false green waiting for someone to write a check against it. **Deliberately not decided in the G-1 session**, whose scope was the gate plus the operator-access instance; unilaterally removing emitters would also break the byte-identical cross-repo host-report golden and is a coordinated two-repo change. **⚠ DISPOSITIONS RECORDED 2026-08-13 — and the first thing to say is that they were NOT in this register before today.** The rulings were made on 2026-08-12; this row still read **READY — owner Viktor** and the gate's twenty entries still all said *"arguably owed"*, so a session told to *"re-read the dispositions from the register"* would have found none. They are written down now, which is the point of writing them down. **THE COUNT WAS ALSO WRONG:** this row says *twenty-one*; the gate's allowlist held **twenty**, measured. Twenty is the number the dispositions below account for, exactly. **(1) BUILD A READER — four groups, fourteen facts.** (a) guest-network health, (b) the staged-update-pending pair, (d) the restore-test depth pair, (f-part) the two backup-integrity timestamps. **(2) NO READER WANTED — five facts, now recorded as `not consumed, DELIBERATELY` with the ruling and its date** in `scripts/wire_contract_gate.py`, each with its own reason rather than a bare refusal: `mgmt_plane.healed_recently` (the hub already alarms on the timestamp beside it), `pbs_dr.applied_at` (`pbs_dr.state` is the verdict; the timestamp alone is the attempt-read-as-result trap), `config_hash` (the hub authors the config and knows its own generation), `stacks` (the app view is built from the purpose-built `app_telemetry` wire), `storage.migrated_to` (box-local bookkeeping with no hub-side intent to reconcile against). **The emitters are deliberately left alone** — removing one is a coordinated two-repo change and breaks the host-report golden; the honest end here is a recorded decision, not a deletion. The gate grew a THIRD entry kind to carry them, because an undecided fact and a decided one must not read alike. **(3) `reporting_disabled`, decided on its own merits: RECLASSIFIED `redundant`** — `health.status = "disabled"` travels in the same minimal report, is decoded into `reports.health_status`, and IS rendered. **The decision surfaced a real defect the flag would not have fixed: the staleness checker is age-only, so a deliberately-silent box still alarms → R-321.** **PROGRESS, 2026-08-13: the first reader is BUILT — guest-network health, R-319.** Its eight allowlist entries are **removed** (an allowlisted tag is skipped, so leaving them would have meant the new reader's fields were never checked); the gate's checked-tLine truncated
|
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| **R-292** | Hub & operator | P4 | **The artifact-save flash conflates three different facts, and a failing test found it rather than a reading.** `artifact_sha_invalid` reads *"the Gitea sha lookup failed (version missing / Gitea unreachable) or the manually-entered sha is invalid"* — three causes, one message, and the operator acts differently on each. It surfaced because scenario E of the new installability gate kept reporting `artifact_sha_invalid` where it expected `artifact_unverifiable`: `resolveArtifactSHA` ran first and swallowed the distinction. **Worked around in v0.102.0 by ORDERING** — the installability probes now run before the sha resolution, so an unreachable registry is reported as unreachable — **but the underlying message is untouched and still conflates on its own paths** | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Split it into "version not found", "registry unreachable" and "invalid sha" | CC |
|
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| **R-372** | Hub & operator | P4 | **A Tier-2 copy that has NEVER been produced because its source path is missing is not surfaced prominently to the operator.** Written down **2026-07-15**, in `audits/CAMPAIGN-6E-2026-07-15.md:128` (F-6E-1), whose disposition ends *"Optional product idea: surface 'tier-2 has never produced a copy (source missing)' more prominently in the operator UI — not filed."* The finding it sits on was correctly judged demo-data churn rather than a product defect (the code warns loudly and does not silently succeed), but the surfacing idea was never carried anywhere. **Age when filed: 38 days — the oldest gap this sweep recovered.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Decide whether "never produced a copy" deserves its own operator surface, distinct from "last copy failed". | CC |
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| **R-402** | Hub & operator | P4 | **The off-site integrity verdict and its depth are published to the hub and NO hub surface reads either.** `offsite.last_integrity_ok` has been on the wire since controller v0.227.0 and `offsite.last_integrity_depth` since v0.228.0; both are allowlisted in `scripts/wire_contract_gate.py` **with their reason**, which is why the gate is green rather than silent. **The order is deliberate and is the opposite of the one that produced R-331:** publish the value first, build the display when someone decides what the screen should say. R-331 removed a hub Backup card that rendered `Integrity Unknown` for every customer forever from fields nothing wrote. **The depth is not decoration:** "checked, OK" means two different things at structure depth and at 100%, so a card showing the verdict without the depth shows the same words for a check that re-read every byte and one that only read the index. **WHAT HAPPENS IF NOBODY ACTS:** the operator can only answer "was this customer's off-site store verified, and how deeply?" by reading that box's own log. | **OPEN — SMALL, needs a HUB decision first** | — | Decide what the hub screen should say, then model both fields hub-side and delete the two allowlist entries together. `offsite.last_integrity_check` is already decodable and is not allowlisted. | Viktor decides, CC builds |
|
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| **R-445** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Hub app telemetry survives the app's removal, so a 15-minute throwaway now sets a FLEET-WIDE memory recommendation.** MEASURED 2026-09-01: this spike's Phase 6 Nextcloud existed for ~15 minutes on demo-hp, spent part of it crash-looping, and was then removed with all volumes. The hub's `/apps/nextcloud` page still reports `Deployments`, `Avg Memory 208 MB`, `P95 Memory 280 MB` and **`Suggested Limit (P95x1.2) = 352 MB`**, plus three MariaDB `io_uring` rows under Known Issues attributed to demo-hp. **The suggested limit is an operator-facing recommendation derived from a sample that no longer exists anywhere** — and Nextcloud is a real catalog app whose limit someone may act on. **RETAINED DELIBERATELY BY THIS RUN, NOT CLEARED, and the reason is part of the row:** the hub offers `POST /apps/nextcloud/reset-telemetry` whose own confirm reads *"Delete all telemetry data for nextcloud? This cannot be undone."* — an irreversible write on the operator's surface, and the operator authorised Phase 6, not this. **The one-line command is recorded in the audit doc so it is a decision, not a task.** The general question is the row: should telemetry for an app with zero live deployments age out, or be excluded from the suggestion? Owner: **VIKTOR rules, CC implements.** `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: VIKTOR rules, CC implements** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: operator-only recommendation surface; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC + operator |
|
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| **R-451** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P3-LOW] UPDATE ARC SLICE 7 — a fleet sweep: the operator can SEE, and MOVE, how far behind every box is.** Slices 1 and 2 make one box's state visible on that box's own pages. The operator has no fleet view, and **it is not derivable from what is already reported: the hub's report payload carries container name, state, CPU and memory, and NO image field at all** (spike §5, which is why Peti's box could only be recorded UNKNOWN). So this is a hub-side change as well as a controller one. Rank LOW today because the fleet is two enrolled boxes; it rises with the fleet. `architecture/09-update-architecture.md` §6, §8.4 **BOTH SIDES VERIFIED 2026-09-21, and it is cheaper than this row implies.** The controller's payload carries no image (`internal/report/types.go` L98–103) and the hub's `Store.SaveReport` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:965`) denormalises only container **counts** — but **the hub stores the raw report JSON whole**, so a new controller field lands there the day it is sent. What is missing is the denormalisation and the page, not the transport. Shape in `09` §6.2–6.3; the payload question is `09` §3b **Q7**. **-- RULED 2026-09-23 (`09` §3 decision 18):** the report carries, per compose service (database included), the installed reference, the catalog reference and the badge state. **Built later, when the fleet grows** — Q7's recommendation, confirmed. | **DEFERRED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the fleet sweep (report field, hub denormalisation, fleet page) is ruled and not built — deferred until the fleet grows (`09` §6.3)) — **RULED — build deferred until the fleet grows; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-544** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The host-delete log line says „escrow deleted: true" while the documented (and actual) effect is DEMOTION to retained custody.** MEASURED 2026-09-16 during the teardown of the fresh box: an unacknowledged delete was correctly refused 409 („has key escrow (acknowledgement missing)") and the refusal text promises the acknowledgement „moves it to retained custody"; the acknowledged delete then logged `host deleted: tester-1-33b6a9 (escrow deleted: true)`. The hub's own customer page states the truth — „host deletion only demotes custody, never destroys it… recovery-key custody is demoted to retained custody, not destroyed", with the customer delete named as „the one true purge point". **Nothing is broken; the log is.** An operator reading that line during an incident would believe a household's last key had just been destroyed, and the R-304 retention exists precisely so it is not. **Fix shape:** log what happened — `escrow custody demoted to retained (host delete)` — and keep the boolean's name out of operator-facing text. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: operator log wording only; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
|
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| **R-599** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P3-LOW] A drill's teardown is blocked for 30 minutes by design, and nothing says so.** FOUND 2026-09-20 tearing the slice-6 drill down. VM destroyed at 17:12Z; the hub then refused **both** `POST /configs/<id>/delete` (409, *host … is ONLINE*) and the host delete (`deletable:false`) — correctly, because an online host would receive permanent 401s. But "online" is not a liveness probe: it is a **report-staleness window**, and the window is **45 minutes** — `manifests/hub.yaml` sets `alerting.stale_threshold: "45m"`, which `hostStatus()` reads (`ok` under it, `stale` over, `down` at 2x). A machine that no longer exists therefore reads ONLINE for three quarters of an hour. **Measured the boring way, and worth recording:** this row first said 30 minutes, because `monitor/host_staleness.go`'s literal default says 30m — the DEPLOYED value is in the manifest, and the 409s kept coming after the half hour was up. Reading a default and calling it the live value is the same mistake in a smaller coat. **The consequence is not theoretical:** a session that destroys its VM and then tears down the hub side walks away believing the delete failed, or leaves the customer behind — and the 2026-09-14 drill's teardown had the same shape without recording this. **Fix shape (smallest first):** the 409 body says *how long* it will refuse ("the last report was N minutes ago; deletion opens at HH:MM"), and `runbooks/target-selection.md`'s drill section names the wait. A force flag is NOT proposed — the refusal is right, only silent about its own clock. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: operator teardown comfort; refusal is correct.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-688** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The customer delete says it removes the tunnel and zone, but no leg of it calls Cloudflare.** The dialog's acknowledgement reads "the customer will be RESET — offsite repo DESTROYED, PBS revoked, tunnel/zone removed" (`hub/internal/web/customer_delete.go` `deleteCascadeAcks`), while `commitCustomerReset` has legs for Hetzner, PBS, claim, descriptor and DB only. Seen 2026-09-25 retiring `peti-felhom`, whose config carried a Cloudflare tunnel token and API token (`sajatfelhom.hu`): the tokens went with the record; any tunnel or DNS record on Cloudflare's side was neither listed nor removed. **Fix direction:** either a Cloudflare leg (tunnel + DNS by the customer's ids), or the dialog stops promising it and lists what to remove by hand. `audits/RETIRE-peti-2026-09-25.md` **-- HALF DONE 2026-09-25 (hub v0.125.0):** the dialog no longer promises a Cloudflare removal; the preview lists what the operator removes by hand, by domain (the tunnel, the DNS records), never the token — proven live on the hub (`audits/night-2026-09-26/F/`). The Cloudflare leg itself is NOT built. | **NARROWED — the Cloudflare leg only; owner: operator (decide if it is wanted) / CC (build)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the dialog no longer promises it; what is left is operator comfort.** | — | — | CC + operator |
|
||||
| **R-719** | Hub & operator | P4 | **[P2-MEDIUM] A customer who already exists never gets a fresh self-bind link when their new box registers: the last link expires in 7 days and nothing re-sends it.** MEASURED 2026-09-29 (new-household drill, `tester-1`): the previous link went out 2026-09-17 07:25 UTC at a host delete and expired 2026-09-24; the box registered at 19:11:30 UTC and its console told the volunteer to open the link from their e-mail — there was none that worked. Hub source: the link is sent at customer creation, RESET, e-mail set on a box-less customer and host delete (`selfbind_mint.go` callers `hosts.go:908`, `configs.go:850`, `customer_reset.go:162`) — never on appliance registration. The volunteer guide says the operator needs to press nothing. The operator pressed „Send self-bind link" (the mail arrived in 1 s) — an operator step the volunteer depends on, recorded, not an intervention. **Fix direction:** send the link when an unclaimed appliance registers while a box-less customer waits with no live link (R-509's first fix shape), or the guide's operator part says: press it the day the volunteer installs. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-new-household-2026-09-30/` `phase0/operator-steps.txt`. **CHANGED AND BUILT 2026-09-30 (hub v0.126.0) — the brief's shape was not buildable:** a box registers UNCLAIMED (uuid, MACs, host keys, hardware — nothing of a customer), so "send the link when their box registers" would mail every waiting customer. Built instead: the expired AND used link pages offer „Új linket kérek" → a fresh link to the address registered for that link's customer, only when it has no box, ≤1/h per customer, identical answer for any token (no oracle). Live: the button on the real hub, the same page for a made-up token, no mail; the mint+send path unit-proven (RP42). Evidence: `audits/evidence-fixes-first-tester-2026-09-30/``partD/`. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — the operator has not reviewed the changed page shape ("operator may prefer another"), and mint+send is unit-proven only) — **CLOSED 2026-09-30 — hub v0.126.0 (changed shape; operator may prefer another)** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-814** | Hub & operator | P4 | `PBS-storage-1` (u629193, box 611421) still `status=active`, 19.9 MB | **VERIFY** (2026-10-03 triage: a July watch row with no id; given R-814. WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — no record found that the box was deleted.) — WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | operator console | Delete the box | operator |
|
||||
| **R-844** | Hub & operator | P4 | **The household's OS-update line exists only on the hub's customer timeline.** 2026-10-04: the box itself has no event surface for agent results (the controller UI shows no timeline), so `os_update_applied` is a hub customer event (info: recorded, never mailed). Its stored text is the hub's English sentence; the hu/en bundle text (`mail.event.os_update_applied`) is used only if it is ever mailed. Fix direction: a controller-side line (the controller already polls the agent's local API) when the box gets a household timeline. `audits/os-guest-lane-2026-10-04/partG/hub-customer-timeline-demo-hp.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-855** | Hub & operator | P4 | **The hub's start log prints "after -1 healthy ring-0 night(s)" for the TEST override `OS_DOCKER_APPROVE_NIGHTS=0`** (the internal "none" value; the WARN line before it is right). Cosmetic, TEST configuration only. Fix: print 0. `audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partB/` (hub log 16:27:42) | **READY — owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Business & legal — 7 rows (P2 4, P4 3)
|
||||
## Business & legal — 6 rows (P2 4, P4 2)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -388,44 +359,32 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-802** | Business & legal | P2 | **[P2-MEDIUM] A lawyer reviews the non-OSI licence list before the first paying customer.** Operator ruling 2026-10-02 (`09` §3 decision 66): Tandoor (R-789), SparkyFitness (R-784), Emby, n8n, Plex (kept — R-790..R-792), the EE/BUSL parts (R-793), redis 7.4 (R-794); the table is `audits/licences-2026-10-02/TABLE.md`. STATUS "Before the first paying customer". | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: operator (trigger: first paying customer)** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-813** | Business & legal | P2 | **[P2] The website collects personal data but publishes no privacy notice, no terms and no imprint.** CHECKED 2026-10-03 (read-only): `website/` holds nine Hungarian pages and one English page; none is an ÁSZF, an adatkezelési tájékoztató or an impresszum, and no page links to one (ASCII-fragment search `aszf`, `adatkezel`, `impresszum`, `impressum`, `privacy` over `website/`; positive control: the same search finds `adatkezel` in the contact form). The contact form makes the visitor tick a data-processing consent (`website/kapcsolat.html:123-128`) whose text names no controller, no retention and no rights, and links nowhere. The papers around it — contract, data-processing agreement, billing — are the intention **R-809** in `ROADMAP.md`. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — the operator writes or commissions the texts; CC drafts on request; owner: operator** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-89** | Business & legal | P4 | Retention as a per-customer **commercial** policy on the hub | READY (increment 2) | — | Policy object + reconciler → ep0 prune job; keep box tokens write-only | CC |
|
||||
| **R-793** | Business & legal | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Enterprise / BUSL code ships inside four open images — Cal.com and Docmost (EE folders, off without a key), Outline (BUSL-1.1: no commercial "Document Service"), meilisearch v1.36 in Wanderer (EE modules).** READ 2026-10-02 (`audits/licences-2026-10-02/TABLE.md`). Each is fine as the catalog runs them: no EE key, the household's own Outline is not a Document Service, Wanderer uses plain search. **Watch:** never turn on an EE feature, never switch Karakeep's/Wanderer's meilisearch to the `-enterprise` image, and re-read on each major. | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a watch item; nothing is wrong as the catalog runs them.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-794** | Business & legal | P4 | **[P3-LOW] redis 7.4 (RSALv2 / SSPL, not OSI) runs as a private cache in seven apps: dawarich, docmost, immich, nextcloud, outline, paperless-ngx, romm.** READ 2026-10-02 (`audits/licences-2026-10-02/TABLE.md`). Read as permitted (a private cache only its app uses is not Redis offered as a service — inferred). Valkey (BSD-3) or redis 8 (AGPL option) removes the question. **Needs:** a ladder step per app to valkey or redis 8, through the harness — no hurry. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: the row itself says no hurry; usage read as permitted.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Process & tooling — 65 rows (P3 5, P4 60)
|
||||
## Process & tooling — 52 rows (P3 4, P4 48)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **R-565** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The English page test sees only ACCENTED Hungarian: an ASCII-only Hungarian word left in a template passes it on the English page.** FOUND 2026-09-17 by slice 1 release C (R-556, controller v0.250.0): after the extractor and the tests were green, a by-eye review of the English renders found six Hungarian fragments still in JavaScript strings — „, majd a(z)” and „FIGYELEM:” in the storage decommission dialog, „jelenlegi:” on the drive-init list, the uptime units „mp” and „p” and the count word „ db” on the debug page. All six were converted by hand; **no test failed on any of them**, because `TestI18nEnglishPages` looks for Hungarian letters and the extractor's ASCII word list (`i18n_extract.py` `ASCII_HU`) is used by neither test nor gate. Release B's review had found more of the same kind (Konfig, Megtartva, helyi, pl., Befejezve, automatikus, jelenleg:, kedd/szerda/szombat, szint). **Fix shape:** run the ASCII word list over the English renders in `TestI18nEnglishPages` (after the data mask), with a negative control on an English sentence and a decoy planting „mp” in an English value; extend the list with the words releases B and C found. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-578** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A helper that takes the settings lock must never be called from inside a settings callback — there is no gate, only one test in one package.** FOUND 2026-09-18 the hard way, by localisation slice 2 release C introducing exactly that: `UpdateOffboxStatus` holds the settings WRITE lock while it runs its callback, `boxLang()` reads the language through the READ lock, and `sync.RWMutex` is not reentrant — so the off-site run's final status write DEADLOCKED, **holding the settings lock**, which would wedge everything else on that box that touches `settings.json`. The only symptom was `go test ./internal/backup/` going from 8 minutes to a 25-minute timeout. Fixed by hoisting the language resolution; `TestNoteHelpersAreNotCalledUnderTheSettingsLock` (internal/backup) now names the file and line in a second. **What is still open:** that test covers `internal/backup` only, and it knows only the `note`/`noteErr`/`boxLang` helpers. Any other settings-reading helper, in any other package, can make the same mistake with nothing to catch it but a hang. **Fix shape:** promote it to a gate over every package, keyed on "a call to a method that reads settings, inside a literal passed to a `settings.Update*` function"; or give `Settings` a re-entrant read path and remove the class. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-586** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P2-MED] The ISO bootstrap harness captured the console to a FILE, so each banner erased the one before it — two checks were RED for two days and nobody saw.** FOUND 2026-09-18 starting slice 4 (R-559): running `scripts/iso/test/bootstrap-modes.sh` unchanged at `183727db9c44` reported `FAIL: R-496: banner painted to the console seam` and `FAIL: R-496: banner names the Tulajdonosi jelmondat`. **Cause:** the script paints each banner with `> "$CONSOLE_DEV"`. On a real console that is a character device and truncation is a no-op, so every paint appears; pointed at a plain file, as the harness did, each paint TRUNCATES. Commit `c033b3b` (ISO 1.28.0, R-535, 2026-09-16) added `print_bound_banner`, which paints immediately after the pairing banner in the same invocation — from that commit the pairing banner was wiped before the check read it. `c033b3b` did not touch the harness. **Why it survived: the harness is in NO gate and NO CI run** — not in `repo_gates.py`, not in `.gitea/`; it runs only when a person runs it, and between 09-16 and 09-18 nobody did. FIXED in the same session: the harness points `FELHOM_CONSOLE_DEV` at a FIFO with a background reader, which restores device semantics (opening a FIFO with `>` truncates nothing) and lets a test see EVERY paint — which slice 4's golden checks then needed anyway. Production code untouched. **What is still open: the harness remains outside every gate.** It needs a container, so it cannot join `repo_gates.py --fast`, which is what both the pre-push hook and CI run — meaning a non-fast entry would still never execute. **Fix shape:** either give CI a container-capable job that runs it, or make the ISO release gate's G16 the place it is required (done for G16 this session — so it now runs at least once per ISO release, which is better than never but later than a push). | **READY - rank P2-MED; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P2->P3: test harness gap; now required at each ISO release gate.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-733** | Process & tooling | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The test bench has NO swap and the boxes have 512 MiB — so a box proof can pass on swap where the bench fails, and nobody records whether a customer guest has swap.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 (R-732): immich's first start was OOM-killed 61–104 times on the bench (swap 0) and passed on 9202 by swapping ~108 MB; the bench given 512 MiB swap passed too. demo-hp 9201, 9202 and demo-felhom 9201 all read `swap: 512`; the golden's guest config is not recorded in its bake evidence, so a customer guest's swap is NOT measured. The harness's memory watch judges `anon` against the limit and never reads `memory.swap.current`. **Needs:** the golden's `swap` read and recorded; the box walk and the harness report `memory.swap.peak` beside `anon`; a decision whether proofs run with swap off (the stricter venue, as R-732's fix was proven). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (harness + golden evidence)** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-887** | Process & tooling | P3 | **Some CI jobs are never run, and Gitea fails them ~10–13 minutes later with no log.** Seen 2026-10-05: felhom.eu job 1361 (commit `1122b5c`) and felhom-controller job 1357 (`114ff27`): every step reads `failure`, including the first fetch, the log API answers `file does not exist`, and the runner pod's log has no `task` line for them (its task ids are job id + 1). A re-run through the API ran the controller job normally (success in 32 s) but the felhom.eu job was again never picked up and failed after ~12 min. The runner pod (`gitea-system/act-runner`, image `felhom-act-runner:0.1.0`) had restarted 5 times ~142 min earlier, around the Longhorn instance-manager restart (R-882). Suspected, NOT measured: a stale runner registration claims jobs it never runs — the session's Gitea token cannot list runners (`read:admin` scope). Consequence: a red CI verdict that is not about the code, and **no failure mail** (the alarm step never runs either), so only the pull check sees it. | **OPEN** | — | Operator: list the runners (Site Administration → Runners) and remove any offline duplicate of `felhom-gates-runner`; then push and confirm the new job runs | operator |
|
||||
| **R-93** | Process & tooling | P4 | `drill-r50` is both a blocked customer and the only drift fixture **FACT 2026-09-13 (R-461): the fixture is GONE — `qm list` is empty on both demo boxes, so neither option is available and the row's premise no longer holds; the operator decides whether that closes it or reopens it as "build a drift fixture".** | READY (XS) | — | Retire it for a synthetic fixture, or unblock + silence per-customer | CC |
|
||||
| **R-887** | Process & tooling | P3 | **Some CI jobs are never run, and Gitea fails them ~10–13 minutes later with no log.** Seen 2026-10-05: felhom.eu job 1361 (commit `1122b5c`) and felhom-controller job 1357 (`114ff27`): every step reads `failure`, including the first fetch, the log API answers `file does not exist`, and the runner pod's log has no `task` line for them (its task ids are job id + 1). A re-run through the API ran the controller job normally (success in 32 s) but the felhom.eu job was again never picked up and failed after ~12 min. The runner pod (`gitea-system/act-runner`, image `felhom-act-runner:0.1.0`) had restarted 5 times ~142 min earlier, around the Longhorn instance-manager restart (R-882). Suspected, NOT measured: a stale runner registration claims jobs it never runs — the session's Gitea token cannot list runners (`read:admin` scope). Consequence: a red CI verdict that is not about the code, and **no failure mail** (the alarm step never runs either), so only the pull check sees it. **CORRECTED 2026-10-05 18:21 (operator's screenshot of Gitea → Site Administration → Runners): ONE runner only — ID 2, `felhom-gates-runner`, v0.6.1, label `felhom-gates`, Idle, last online „now". There is no old registration; the stale-registration guess (this row's first text and the reviewer's) was WRONG.** | **OPEN** | — | Operator: list the runners (Site Administration → Runners) and remove any offline duplicate of `felhom-gates-runner`; then push and confirm the new job runs | operator |
|
||||
| **R-129** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Every doc says demo-hp has "no baked SSH key"** and needs the G1 break-glass password — but `ssh -o BatchMode=yes demo-hp` authenticated **by key**, first try, 2026-07-31 | READY (XS) | — | Stale in the expensive direction: a session that believes it sends itself to the hub vault for a credential it does not need. Verify who owns the key and when it landed, then correct `CLAUDE.md`, `runbooks/target-selection.md:41-42`, `runbooks/workspace-CLAUDE.md` and `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md` together — or remove the key if it was not deliberate | CC |
|
||||
| **R-161** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The volume-persistence gate is enforced by CONVENTION, not automatically.** The catalog repo has no CI of any kind (`.gitea/workflows`, `.github`, drone/woodpecker — searched, none exists). | **OPEN** — **REDUCED SCOPE — open** (operator ruling 2026-08-02) | a second person touching templates | **RULED. Both obvious enforcement points were rejected for measured reasons.** *Controller-side at template load:* rejected because such a check can only read the file, and a static audit of all 53 templates reports the catalog clean **including papra** — **it would pass on the exact defect it exists to catch**; the property is decidable only at runtime. *CI:* rejected for now — neither repo has any, and there are no users yet. **SHIPPED instead** (`app-catalog-felhom.eu` `fd7747d`): `scripts/catalog_gates.py`, ONE entry point running all three gates, non-zero exit on any failure, **mandated in the catalog's `CLAUDE.md`** the way `site_gates.py` is. Rationale for the record: of this project's gates, the only ones that ever get run are those with a single entry point named in a CLAUDE.md — `site_gates.py` is run, R-29's three orphans are named nowhere and have stopped nothing. **What remains open is only the automatic half:** this is convention, run by a person, and that is sufficient while one person touches templates. Revisit when a second does **UPDATE 2026-08-02:** `catalog_gates.py` gained `--fast` (gate 1 only — the network and runtime gates are deliberately NOT in a hook: a push that pulls images and starts containers gets bypassed within a week and the bypass becomes the habit) and `.githooks/pre-push` now runs it. **The automatic half now has a designated successor row: R-168** (Gitea Actions runner). This row stays open at its reduced scope — the runtime gate remains a deliberate periodic run **UPDATE 2026-08-02 (second):** the automatic half now EXISTS — R-168's runner executes `catalog_gates.py --fast` on every push to this repo (measured: run #1, `image-pin gate OK — 53 templates`, with the two runtime gates announced as skipped and their own output absent from the log). This row's *original* scope — the RUNTIME volume-persistence gate — is deliberately still NOT automatic and should stay that way: CI that pulls 53 images on every push gets disabled. It remains a periodic run | operator |
|
||||
| **R-162** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`docker diff` is the gate's only witness, and its failure mode is quiet.** The gate's power comes from `docker diff` excluding mounted paths, which makes "in the writable layer" mechanically decidable — an implementation detail of the overlay driver. On a driver where `docker diff` is unsupported or lies, the gate degrades to the mount-occupancy and writability legs **and would not say so**. | **WATCHING** — a limitation, not a defect | — | It **fails closed**: the canary self-test would stop reporting BROKEN and the gate would then refuse to report at all. What is wrong is the message — it would blame the prober rather than the driver. Revisit only if a non-overlay storage driver ever ships | CC |
|
||||
| **R-169** | Process & tooling | P4 | **CI can only report, because there is no gate in the road.** Every felhom repo pushes straight to `main` with no pull request, so there is no merge for a status check to stand at. R-168's runner therefore notices a broken push *after* it has landed | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** (a working-style decision, not a defect) | an operator ruling | Making CI *blocking* requires two things this task deliberately did NOT do, because both change how the operator works and that is not a task's call: **(a)** branch protection on `main`, and **(b)** a pull-request workflow instead of direct-to-`main` pushes. The cost is real — every change would need a PR, which for a single-operator project may be worse than the disease. **The current arrangement is two nets, and it is not nothing**: `.githooks/pre-push` REFUSES locally, and R-168's runner NOTICES when that hook was skipped or was never armed in a clone, and emails. The honest gap is the window between a `--no-verify` push landing and the operator reading the alarm. Decide only if that window ever actually costs something | operator |
|
||||
| **R-206** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The build-cache cap and the weekly prune exist only as a hand-edited `/etc/docker/daemon.json` on DooPlex — not in Ansible, so a rebuild loses them.** The `node_housekeeping` role must also carry the prune, which today it is forbidden to run | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | **The spike validated the recipe; this row builds it.** Three parts. **(a) Template `/etc/docker/daemon.json`** with the **`policy` array** form — **the flat form (`{"gc":{"reservedSpace":…}}`) is SILENTLY IGNORED**, measured: the daemon starts, logs nothing, and `docker buildx inspect` still reports the built-in defaults. **The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`, never `dockerd --validate`** — the validator returned `configuration OK` for a bogus key AND for the config that then **crashed the daemon** (`filter` takes one value per policy entry, not an array; `error initializing buildkit: filters expect only one value`). **(b) Narrow the role's Docker ban** (`node-housekeeping.sh.j2:10-14`) to permit exactly `docker builder prune -af` and nothing else — the ban's stated premise ("Docker here runs only unrelated jarr-* dev containers") is obsolete: the growth is Felhom Go build cache. **The measured prune is SYNCHRONOUS** (150.35 GB back at t+0, two consecutive polls <1 MB apart within 60 s) — **unlike containerd's image GC, so it needs no `settle_imagefs` equivalent**, but it MUST measure the filesystem rather than trust the command: `prune` claimed **156.9 GB** and the filesystem returned **150.35 GB**, the 6.5 GB gap being layers still shared with images. **(c) A restart-safety note in the role:** a bad `daemon.json` takes the daemon down AND leaves the `unless-stopped` dev containers stopped — they needed a manual `docker start` — so the role must restart-and-verify, not validate-and-assume. Recipe + every measurement: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` | CC |
|
||||
| **R-208** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Every Felhom Go build re-downloads its modules because `ARG VERSION` sits ABOVE the module-download layer — ~440 MB of dead cache per build, 90.5 GB of the 157 GB** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-05, ROOT CAUSE PROVEN** | — | **Measured, not inferred.** All **208** retained `go mod download` records carried **`Usage count: 1`** — not one was ever reused in ~a month of builds. The mechanism was isolated by four controlled builds: an unchanged tree rebuilt with the **same** `--build-arg VERSION` → `RUN go mod download` **CACHED**; the **same** tree with a **new** `VERSION` → **executed**. `COPY go.mod ./` stays CACHED either way, which is the tell: a `COPY`'s key is content-based, while a `RUN`'s key includes the stage **environment**, and `ARG VERSION`/`ARG GIT_COMMIT` are declared *before* the download in `felhom-controller/controller/Dockerfile`. Since every real build passes a fresh version, the layer is invalidated **every single time**. **`felhom.eu/hub/Dockerfile` has the identical defect** (`ARG VERSION`/`ARG BUILD_TIME` above `COPY go.mod go.sum*` → `RUN go mod download`) — and because both Dockerfiles produce byte-identical `buildx du` description strings, the 208 records are a COMBINED count and must not be attributed to one project. **Fix shape (one line each, not applied here):** move the `ARG VERSION`/`ARG GIT_COMMIT`/`ARG BUILD_TIME` declarations down to just above the final `go build`. **Worth more than the cap and the move combined** — the cap bounds the symptom, this removes the source. `build.sh`'s `rm -rf` + `cp -a` and its host-side `go mod tidy` were **ruled out by fingerprinting**: the tree is byte-identical across runs and `tidy` is a no-op | CC |
|
||||
| **R-209a** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The SSD2 move has NOT survived a reboot, so by this project's own standard it is not fully validated** | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-05** | the next DooPlex reboot | **Operator ruled explicitly: do NOT reboot DooPlex.** Uptime verified unbroken (7 weeks 6 days, since 2026-06-10). **The distinction is stated rather than glossed: the MECHANISM is proven** — the guard is wired into both units and containerd refuses to start when a required mount's device is absent — **but the CONSEQUENCE is not**: that a real boot mounts `/mnt/ssd_2` before containerd starts, in this host's actual ordering. Mount-ordering reasoning is precisely the class this project has been burned by (`RequiresMountsFor` RE-MOUNTS rather than refusing — the ep0 lesson), and `CLAUDE.md` prefers a consequence assertion over a mechanism one. **Two deliberate consequences: (1)** the rollback copy `/var/lib/containerd.pre-move-2026-08-05` (**34.3 GB on `/`**) **STAYS** until a reboot validates — which is why `/` sits at 54% and not lower; deleting it now would trade a cheap 34 GB for the only cheap way back. **(2)** validation is **automatic and needs no one to remember it**: `felhom-store-postboot-check.service` (oneshot, enabled, dry-run PASS at install) runs at **every** boot and writes `RESULT: PASS`/`FAIL` to `/var/log/felhom-store-postboot-check.log`, asserting positively that `/mnt/ssd_2` is mounted, that containerd's root is on it, that **`/var/lib/containerd` does NOT exist** (the empty-store trap), that ≥100 images are visible and that both dev containers run. **Next action: after the next reboot — planned or not — read that file; on PASS, `rm -rf /var/lib/containerd.pre-move-2026-08-05` returns ~34 GB to `/`** **P3's prune already removed the urgency: `/` went 86% → 53% used and SSD1's Longhorn disk went `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)` → `Schedulable=True` (18.85% → 50.32% available).** The move was ruled "cap then move"; the cap is in and the pressure is gone, so this is now a deliberate choice rather than a rescue. **The numbers, measured (`Crucial-SSD-240G`, `/mnt/ssd_2/data/longhorn`, `storageMaximum` 235,148,750,848):** available today **214,958,080,000 (91.41%)**; 25% floor **58,787,187,712**. Moving the whole containerd tree at steady state (~31.5 GB images + ≤30 GB cache ≈ 65 GB) leaves **63.77%, i.e. +38.8 pp above the floor — comfortably safe as measured.** **But `storageScheduled` on SSD2 is 139,586,437,120 while `df` says only 20,094,939,136 is actually used** — Longhorn has overcommitted 6.9× — and if those volumes ever inflate to their scheduled size, the same disk lands at **13.00%, i.e. 12 pp BELOW the floor → `Schedulable=False`**, which is exactly the failure that just took SSD1 out. **Recommendation: do the move only together with setting `storageReserved` on SSD2 to cover the containerd tree (~80 GB); SSD2 reserving zero while HDD2 and HDD4 each reserve 500 GB is an anomaly in its own right.** Mechanism, if it goes ahead: **containerd's `root` in `/etc/containerd/config.toml`** (the key is present but commented out) — **not** Docker's `data-root`, which would move only 0.62 GB. Guard: `RequiresMountsFor=/mnt/ssd_2` on `containerd.service` **and** `docker.service`, remembering that **`RequiresMountsFor` RE-MOUNTS rather than refusing** ([[ep0-datastore-volume-move-2026-07-27]]) — so it must be tested with a genuinely absent device, and the move is not validated until it has survived a **reboot**. Full pre-analysis: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` §P6 | operator + CC |
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| **R-210** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Which of the 345 local images may be deleted — 131 controller tags and 62 hub tags exist ONLY on this box and are not recoverable by `docker pull`** | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — NEW 2026-08-05 | an operator ruling | **Nothing was deleted; this is a list, not an action.** The registry was queried directly: `felhom-controller` has **76** tags in Gitea vs **207** locally, `felhom-hub` **45** vs **107**. The **131 + 62 local-only tags are all OLD** — controller `0.39.0`–`0.135.0` plus `v0.35.0`–`v0.39.0`, hub `0.9.0`–`0.57.0` plus `v0.7.2`–`v0.13.0` — while everything from controller `0.136.0` and hub `0.58.0` upward IS in the registry and therefore re-pullable. **Size the prize honestly before spending a decision on it:** per-tag sizes sum to 139.29 GB, but that double-counts shared layers — `docker system df` puts the **real** dedup'd image footprint at **31.02 GB with 27.02 GB reclaimable**, i.e. an order of magnitude less than the build cache P3 already returned. `docker image prune -a` would remove 343 of 345 (only `redis:7-alpine` and `postgres:16-alpine` are held by running containers). **CC's view: not worth doing for the space** — it buys ~27 GB against 199 GB now free, and its only real benefit is dropping unrecoverable clutter | operator |
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| **R-230** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Three instruction/memory follow-ups deliberately left by the part-2 session (2026-08-06), each needing a decision rather than an implementation.** (a) **A ruling is owed on auto-written staleness.** The hand-written `CLAUDE.md` files are now clean of version literals and expired blocks — the gate enforces it — but `MEMORY.md`, which Claude writes and which is the LARGER half of what loads (8.4k tokens vs the root file's 6.6k), carries **21 lines with component version literals**, **5 with bare host addresses**, and an entry still reading *"demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02"* — the same expired-TEMPORARY class the gate was built to kill, now surviving in the one file the gate's content rules do not cover. **Partly actioned 2026-08-06 (close-out), and the ruling is STILL OWED:** the **three statements that were actively false** were corrected — `R-193 decision open` (closed 2026-08-05), `demo boxes REMOTE till ~08-02` (the box answers on the home LAN), `OPEN R-25b` (shipped 2026-07-21) — and gate check 6 now **WARNs** on version literals, host addresses, expired statements and stale-open citations in the index. WARN, never FAIL: Claude writes that file between sessions, so a hard failure would refuse a human's push over a line no human typed, and the warning is read by the model that will next edit it. **The remaining 32 version literals and 4 host addresses were deliberately left** for that loop. What is still owed is the bulk-correction ruling. **Correcting the premise:** the earlier report's "three expired statements" were all FALSE POSITIVES — each matched an ISO date inside a markdown link target, i.e. a filename — while the one real expired claim carried no ISO date at all. (b) **CLOSED 2026-08-06 (close-out)** — the workspace-root `CLAUDE.md` **is now a relative symlink** to the versioned copy, so the divergence class is gone rather than policed. Check 5 learned two shapes: for a link it asserts the target resolves to a real file (**a dangling link is worse than a diverged copy — the instructions load NOTHING and there is no content left to notice is wrong**), for two files byte-identity as before, so a clone elsewhere is unaffected. **Proven, not assumed:** three fresh sessions logged `session_start` for the link path, and a fourth **with no tools at all** quoted standing rule 1 verbatim — the content reaches the model, not just the path. (c) **The spec-as-failing-test pilot**, approved in principle and not started (was R-229(d)). | **READY** — owner Viktor | — | — | operator |
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| **R-288** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The capability map is too long to be read, and that is why it stops being true.** `architecture/00-capability-map.md` is **134 642 bytes / 19 456 words across 99 table rows in only 159 lines** — because the rows ARE the length. Measured, longest first: the unaided-recovery-journey row is **3 024 words**, the offsite-password-recovery row **1 087**, the unattended-restore-proof row **971**, the app/guest-network-failure row **904**. That single longest row is a novella of nested corrections, each appended rather than resolved. Its own verification stamp reads **2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip `4b18cc5`** (line 23) — three weeks stale, which is the measurable consequence: nobody re-reads a row they cannot finish. **This is the project's memory, so restructuring it is surgery and wants daylight** — filed, deliberately not attempted in the 2026-08-09 session. **What the shape should probably be:** one line of status per capability plus a dated evidence pointer, with the argument moved to the audit it came from | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Do not fold this into another session; it needs its own. **SECOND CONCRETE COST, 2026-08-10 — and it is a different failure mode from the first.** An *execution record* — 33 package deletions on the operator's rule — was undiscoverable for two days because it lives **inside the row about the Configuration page being slow**. Two sessions searched for it: one reported "no register row records a package prune", the other exhausted the Gitea logs, the activity feed and the schema before concluding it might be unestablishable. It was in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` the whole time. **The first cost (2026-08-09) was two records that looked contradictory and were not; this one is a record that could not be found at all.** Illegibility now has two measured costs and they are different in kind: prose rows make claims ambiguous, and rows-about-other-things make facts unfindable. **The rule this earns is in CONTEXT.md: a record that lives inside a row about something else has not been recorded** | Viktor |
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| **R-290** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Most capability-map rows that back a green dot cite no evidence document at all — measured, 20 of 28 probed.** The page's *Walked* means *"done end to end on real hardware, evidence on file"*. Extracting the evidence column for the 28 rows behind the page's claims found a `tests/` or `audits/` path in **8**; the other 20 carry prose only. **Consequence, applied this session:** of 32 claims the page drew as Walked, **12 were downgraded to Built** because no walk document exists for them — `install.installer-by-tag`, `use.lifecycle`, `drives.enrol`, `drives.migrate`, `backup.tier1`, `backup.whole-machine`, `backup.restore-proof`, `fault.selfheal`, `fault.operator-email`, `fail.drive-filling`, `fail.lost-recovery-code`, `fail.hub-down`. **This is not a claim that those twelve are false** — several are near-certainly fine — it is a claim that nothing on file distinguishes them from an opinion, which is exactly what the status word promises. **The gate now enforces it going forward:** `scripts/check_stands.py` fails on `status: walked` with no `evidence:` source. **What is owed:** either a walk document per row, or an honest demotion in the map itself (the map is the source; the dataset only follows it) | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | R-288 | The dataset was corrected; **the capability map itself still says PROVEN-LIVE for these rows** and is the thing to fix | Viktor |
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| **R-315** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The wire-contract gate's positive control FAILS on the new wire: it checks name-presence, not decodability.** R-311 declared `hub -> agent (GET /escrow/retained)` as a fourth ROOT, and the gate's tag count rose 174 → 182, so the fields ARE inspected. But renaming the agent-side `superseded_at` json tag to `superseded_at_RENAMED` **still passed** — because the string `superseded_at` also occurs as a map key in the agent's local-API response, and the check is a repo-wide name search. The gate documents this ("name-reachability is not use"), so it is a known limit rather than a regression — but it means **declaring this wire bought documentation, not enforcement**, and a report that claimed coverage would have been wrong. The mutation was asserted to have applied before the run | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-12, RANK 3** | R-311 | Make the check resolve the RECEIVER'S mirror type and compare field-by-field, or state per-root which kind of check it got. **A gate whose positive control fails is an instrument nobody has calibrated** | CC |
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| **R-325** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The shared copy vocabulary is imported by ONE of its two consumers, and drift-checked into the other.** `customer_copy_vocab.py` is the single list; `hub_copy_gate.py` imports it. **`felhom-controller/controller/scripts/retrieval_promise_gate.py` still carries its own `STEMS` literal**, because the session that created the shared module was under a hard end-state requirement to leave `felhom-controller` untouched — its target box was being re-deployed the same evening. **Two copies of a word list is not a theoretical risk in this project: it is the R-299 defect exactly**, where a guard asserted one inflection of a Hungarian verb and the plural walked past it. **So the gap is instrumented rather than left open: `hub_copy_gate.py` READS the controller gate's `STEMS` and FAILS if the two disagree** — single-source semantics tonight without a cross-repo edit. **Watched failing:** removing one stem from the shared list produced *"the shared vocabulary is no longer shared"* with both lists printed, and restoring it returned the gate to green. An ABSENT sibling clone is **INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never a pass** — the G-1 lesson. **This is a scaffold, not the destination** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-13, RANK 3** | R-299, R-324 | Make `retrieval_promise_gate.py` import `felhom.eu/scripts/customer_copy_vocab.py` and delete its own literal — a felhom-controller change of a few lines, needing no bake (a gate is not shipped code). Then the drift check becomes redundant and should be removed with it, rather than left as a second mechanism nobody re-reads | CC |
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| **R-327** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The standing picture still describes a defect that has been fixed twice over.** Found by the first run of `unproven.py` (R-326), which is the argument for having built it. `where-felhom-stands.yaml`'s `claim.code-naming` is `status: partial` and its title reads *"The same word is used for two different secrets across three surfaces; the email points at a page a rebuilt machine does not show"* — **both halves of which are now false.** The box side shipped 2026-08-10 (R-295), the hub half and the page-naming fix on 2026-08-13 (R-295 hub, new `reenroll` mail kind), and the third near-homograph on 2026-08-13 (R-323). **NOT MOVED BY THIS SESSION, deliberately and by the dataset's own rule:** *"A status may not be RAISED here — if the evidence supports a stronger status than the capability map records, the MAP changes first and this file follows it."* Raising it here would be the exact inversion the file's header forbids, and the map edit is a separate judgement about what "walked" means for a naming change that no customer has yet met | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-13, RANK 4** | R-295, R-323, R-326 | Decide the capability-map status for the naming arc, then let the dataset follow it. **Note the honest difficulty: no customer has typed „Tulajdonosi jelmondat” yet**, so `walked` would be an over-claim; `built` is probably right, and the title needs rewriting either way because it describes a defect rather than a capability | operator + CC |
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| **R-346** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`ActiveEnterTimestamp` answers a different question than the one a slope measurement asks, and on ep0 right now it is wrong by 5 h 56 m.** Found while taking R-341's first dated check. ep0's `proxmox-backup-proxy` has `MainPID=551655` started **2026-08-18 09:51:04Z** (`ps -o lstart=`), but `systemctl show -p ActiveEnterTimestamp` reads **03:54:54Z** and `NRestarts` reads **0** — because the 4.2.5-1 upgrade **re-exec'd** the daemon rather than restarting the unit, so systemd never observed a stop. Anyone anchoring "when did this proxy generation start" on `ActiveEnterTimestamp` would divide 388 descriptors by 52.1 h instead of 46.2 h and report **178/day instead of 201.6/day — ~12% low** — while every field consulted looks healthy and consistent. **This is the workspace rule's own case, in a new place:** ask of a timestamp *what exactly must have happened for this to be set?* Here the answer is "the unit entered active", which is not "this process started". `NRestarts=0` is the tell, and it reads like reassurance. | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-20** | — | R-341's command already uses `ps -o lstart= -p $MainPID` and is correct; the risk is a future reader "improving" it to a systemd property. Add the reason as a comment beside that command in the R-341 row (done), and check whether any other slope or uptime check in the repo or in `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` anchors on a systemd timestamp where it means a process start. | CC |
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| **R-364** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Accented-text search is an instrument that silently transforms its input, and discipline alone has failed at least three times.** (1) 2026-07-20, `ssh → pct exec → bash -c`, nearly a wrong "banner cleared" claim (`felhom-controller/.claude/rules/ui-hungarian.md:19-22`). (2) 2026-08-13, `kubectl exec … sh -c grep` returned **0 for three strings that were present**, one step from a wrongly-reported failed hub deploy. (3) 2026-08-21, `tar -tf` rendered `őszibarack.md` as `\305\221szibarack.md`; recording the fixture's name bytes from that listing would have been wrong. **NOTE: that is two inside two weeks plus the founding case a month earlier — a third inside the two-week window is not on record.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | **PROPOSED, NOT BUILT:** a helper that refuses to report a zero for any pattern containing a byte ≥ 0x80 unless a negative control also returns zero AND an ASCII anchor known to be present returns non-zero. Three probes, one helper, no judgement at the call site — because judgement is what failed. | CC |
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| **R-374** | Process & tooling | P4 | **Three C1 refusal cases were judged borderline, left unfiled, and never named — so nobody can re-open the judgement.** `audits/CAMPAIGN-12-class-sweep-2026-08-08.md:123`: *"'Names a route' is a judgement, not a predicate — two readers could disagree on the borderline cases, and three of the 19 were called borderline and left unfiled."* The disclosure is honest and is exactly the right thing to write; **what is missing is WHICH three.** An unnamed borderline case cannot be re-judged by a second reader, which is the only remedy a judgement call has. **Age when filed: 14 days.** | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Name the three in that document, or file them as one row listing them. No code. | CC |
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| **R-377** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`CONTEXT.md`'s standing rulings are 188 KB in one section with no sub-headings, and that is why nobody reads them.** Measured 2026-08-22: `CONTEXT.md` is 217 KB, of which **187,913 bytes — 86% — is a single `## Standing rulings` section** carrying 39 `S-` ids and 153 bullets under **one** heading. **This session deliberately did NOT compress or split it**, and the reason is the ruling itself: `PROMPT-TEMPLATE.md` §3.4 and this file's own contract say the decision log is *dated, never edited afterwards*, and it is the only place that answers *"has this been proposed before, and why did we say no?"* — compressing it destroys exactly that. With no per-ruling delimiter, any mechanical split risks cutting a live ruling from its reason, which is the failure this whole arc is correcting. **So the problem is navigational, not volumetric, and the fix is structural: give each ruling a sub-heading with its `S-` id and date.** Then it can be linked, cited and found without a single word being edited. **13 mentions of SUPERSEDED already sit inside that blob** and cannot be separated from live text safely today. | **OPEN — LOW** | R-369 | Add per-ruling sub-headings only. Do not compress, do not reorder, do not edit any ruling's text. | CC |
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| **R-392** | Process & tooling | P4 | **No architecture document covers the two-AI workflow.** `documentation/architecture/` holds eight documents and **all eight cover the product** — topology, host agent, control-plane authorization, hub, off-site connectivity, backup, controller modules, capability map. Nothing records how the Claude.ai / Claude Code split works, what each side owns, how skills and `.claude/rules/` are scoped, or why. **The absence was found by trying to fill the template field, not by a survey:** the task that added the five process skills (2026-08-25) had to name an owning architecture document and could not, and the template requires that be recorded rather than passed over. The exposure today is low — the split is stable and both sides work — but it lives entirely in the operator's head and in chat, which is precisely the shape of a commitment nothing enforces. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Write one architecture document for the agent-tooling layer: which AI owns which artifact class (`TASK-*.md`, `RUNBOOK-*.md`, validation), how skills are scoped and installed, what belongs in a `CLAUDE.md` versus a skill versus a rules file, and the reasoning for each boundary. **The rules themselves already exist** in `skills/felhom-doc-authoring/SKILL.md`; what is missing is the map of who owns what. Do not restate the doc-authoring rules there — point at that skill. | CC |
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| **R-393** | Process & tooling | P4 | **A decision-log skill for unattended runs was considered and deliberately deferred.** Filed 2026-08-25 by the session that added the five process skills, so the deferral is a decision on the record rather than a thing that was dropped. **The gap it would close:** an overnight or unattended run makes dozens of decisions and the operator can only reconstruct them by reading the whole transcript, which is exactly what nobody does. The proposal is an appended row per decision — what was chosen, why, the evidence pointer, and the result — so a long run is reconstructable in a page. **Why it was NOT built with the other five:** the other five are text files that need nothing but the existing installer glob. This one needs a helper script to append rows and a storage convention for where the log lives and when it is rotated, which makes it an implementation task with its own acceptance criteria, not a skill file. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Decide the storage convention FIRST — most likely a per-session file beside the session's evidence directory, never `REPORT.md`, which is overwritten every session (the R-341 shape). Then the skill, then the helper. **Check it does not duplicate `felhom-handoff`**, which already owns the end-of-session note; a decision log is the during-the-run half and the two must point at each other rather than overlap. | CC |
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| **R-394** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`felhom-build-deploy/SKILL.md` is 179 lines, over the 150-line limit its own repo now enforces.** Found 2026-08-25 by `scripts/check_skills.py` on its first run — the over-length was discovered BY the new checker, on the day the limit was written down, which is the checker working as intended. **It is not edited and not trimmed here:** the task that introduced the limit explicitly scoped the four pre-existing skills out, and trimming a build-and-deploy skill without exercising its commands is how a wrong command ships to a live host. **It is a named single-entry exception in `GRANDFATHERED` in `scripts/check_skills.py`, printed as a WARN on every run**, so it cannot fade; a NEW skill over the limit is convicted normally, and growing the set requires editing that file in a commit with a row to name. **The rationale for the limit** — attention thins across the excess, so the lines that matter are not the ones that survive — is in `skills/felhom-doc-authoring/SKILL.md` §5. | **OPEN — LOW** | — | Trim `felhom-build-deploy/SKILL.md` under 150 lines in a session that can VERIFY the commands it keeps, then delete its `GRANDFATHERED` entry in the same commit. The likely trim is the per-artifact command blocks moving behind a pointer to the runbooks, keeping the gotchas inline — but that is a judgement for a session with a build to run, not a line-count exercise. | CC |
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| **R-420** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`controller_gates.py` could not express a NON-BLOCKING gate before 2026-09-01** — every registered gate's non-zero exit failed the run, so the only way to add a check was to give it the power to refuse a push. That is the wrong trade for a notice that must fire at the moment a release is committed, when the golden legitimately cannot exist yet. **The capability was added rather than the notice compromised** (a fifth `blocking` field, False for exactly one gate; the felhom.eu runner already had the shape from its `--scope` work). Recorded because the ABSENCE was invisible: nobody had wanted a non-blocking gate before, so nothing said it was impossible. `felhom.eu/scripts/repo_gates.py` still has no `blocking` field — it has `exemptible`, which is a different idea (scope-dependent, not permanent). If a permanently-advisory gate is ever wanted there, it needs the same addition. | **OPEN — noted, not needed yet** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-421** | Process & tooling | P4 | **THE CLASS: an instrument that matches a LABEL rather than the fact it names — five instances, every one found by accident.** R-410 (a `mkdir` turned the release gate green), R-400 (seven debug controls answering nothing), R-378 (a status word inside a sentence), R-419 (a phrase inside prose, including prose saying the marker was ABSENT), R-94 (a test comparing a constant to itself). **The gates are the machinery that enforces everything else in this project, and they were the one part nothing had ever checked.** The 2026-09-01 decoy sweep read all 29 scripts and fooled **16**. Ten were fixed the same day; four remain with rows (R-422..R-425); six could not be given a plausible decoy and are named. **The shapes, so the next one is cheap to recognise:** (1) name-for-fact — it matches a path or directory NAME while the fact lives inside the file; (2) substring-for-field — it matches a token anywhere in a body instead of in the field that carries it; (3) declaration-for-reachability — it checks a thing is declared, not that it RESOLVES; (4) constant-for-measurement — it compares a value against itself. **The single largest cause was mundane:** eight gates set their SCOPE with `os.listdir` (one level), so every one was green and correct today and would have gone blind the moment anyone added a subdirectory. `decoy_coverage_gate.py` now refuses a new gate that ships without a decoy. | **OPEN — the class row; it stays open as the place the next instance is recorded** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-422** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`reuse_refs_check.py` only checks citations whose extension is one of `go py html css yml yaml sh`.** A cited `.md` path that does not exist is invisible — MEASURED 2026-09-01: `documentation/architecture/99-does-not-exist.md` added to `REUSE.md` passed, while the `.go` control was correctly convicted. REUSE.md and the CLAUDE.md files cite `.md` paths routinely, so this is the common case, not an exotic one. Fix: widen `PATH_RE`, then walk the false positives it produces across all four repos — that pass is the work, not the regex. The decoy is kept in `scripts/test_gate_decoys.py` asserting TODAY's behaviour, so the day this is fixed the test fails and is updated deliberately. | **OPEN** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-424** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`one_register_gate.py`: a real defect parked under the roadmap state `idea` is invisible to it.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 with a correctly-shaped 5-column row. This is **declared** in the gate's own docstring as residual hole 1 — *"the state column is a human judgement, and a defect written under `idea` looks exactly like a proposal to this gate"* — so it is honest, not hidden. Recorded here because a hole declared only in a docstring is not in the register, which is this project's own standing rule. No cheap fix: distinguishing a defect from a proposal mechanically is the thing the gate cannot do. | **OPEN — declared, not hidden; recorded so it is not re-derived** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-425** | Process & tooling | P4 | **`offbox_rename_gate.py` scans a fixed three-entry `FILES` list.** MEASURED 2026-09-01: `NAS-mentés` in a new `backups_offbox_extra.html` passed. The scope was correct when written and silently narrows every time the feature grows a file. Fix: scan the offbox feature's files by pattern, or assert the FILES list against a discovered set so a new file fails until it is classified. | **OPEN** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-426** | Process & tooling | P4 | **The decoy-coverage exemption list — 20 registered gates that ship WITHOUT a decoy test, each named.** `scripts/decoy_coverage_gate.py`'s `EXEMPT` map is debt, and this row owns it so it lives in the register and not only in a Python literal. **Four kinds:** (a) genuinely covered in the 2026-09-01 sweep but not yet moved into a suite — `hub-copy`, `instructions`, `docker-v`, `image-pins`; (b) blocked by an open hole and therefore un-assertable as rejecting — `site` (R-423), `one-register` (R-424), `offbox-rename` (R-425); (c) shared scripts whose decoy lives in `felhom.eu` and is counted there — `reuse-refs`, `instructions`, `observations` in the controller and agent runners; (d) **no plausible decoy constructed yet** — `hostinstall`, `wire-contract`, `due-checks`, `published`, `image-resolvable`, `volume-persistence`. Group (d) is the honest unknown: six gates whose soundness is UNTESTED, not established. **The list is green today and shrinks; a NEW gate with no decoy fails immediately.** | **OPEN — 20 names; group (d) is six untested gates** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-454** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Five `internal/web` test files have been `gofmt`-unclean for an unknown length of time, and nothing notices.** MEASURED 2026-09-02: `gofmt -l controller/internal/web/` reports `backups_split_test.go`, `claim_code_naming_test.go`, `disk_health_test.go`, `r400_debug_routes_test.go`, `recovery_test.go` — at the **baseline** commit `960d29b0612c`, i.e. not introduced by v0.233.0 (both files added that day are clean). **`go vet` does not check formatting and `controller_gates.py` has no formatting gate**, so the only thing that would ever surface this is someone running `gofmt -l` by hand, which is how it was found. **Not reformatted in the same session, deliberately** — the minimal-changes rule, and a five-file whitespace commit inside a feature release makes that release's diff unreadable. **Small, and the cost of NOT having the instrument is the row:** the count can only grow, and every future `gofmt -l` run produces noise that hides a real one. Fix is two lines: a `gofmt -l` gate in `controller_gates.py` plus one formatting commit, in that order (the gate first, so the commit is provably complete). Owner: **CC.** | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: code-formatting tooling only; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
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@@ -434,7 +393,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-492** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `cfg.Paths.HDDPath` is empty on every box and still has readers; delete it.** R-465 audited its six readers and found every one falling back; R-490 (v0.242.0) gave the last one, `systemInfo`, the same fallback. The global now carries no information on any box and its deletion was deferred twice. **Fix shape:** remove the field, its env binding and the readers' fallback branches; a build proves nothing reads it. Next controller release. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: dead-code cleanup; every reader already falls back correctly.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-502** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The bootstrap regression harness is run by NO gate and NO CI — and it had never exercised the pairing banner.** MEASURED 2026-09-14: `grep -rn bootstrap-modes scripts/*.py .gitea/workflows` → nothing; the harness is run by hand in `felhom-iso-assistant:trixie`. While adding the R-496 checks, its fake hub's `register` reply turned out to carry no `pairing_code`, so `print_pairing_banner` returned early in every run: the banner that a household reads first had no test at all until ISO v1.27.0. **Fix shape:** register the harness in `repo_gates.py` behind a container-available check that reports INCONCLUSIVE (never skip-as-pass) when docker is absent, with a decoy. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: test harness coverage; no household meets it directly.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-507** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The proof-install harness cannot drive the graphical installer, so a release's graphical entry is proven only up to its password screen.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 on VM 332 (ISO 1.27.0): `qm sendkey 332 tab` did not move focus (both password copies landed in one field), `mouse_move 1237 772` + `mouse_button 1` did not move the cursor or press Next, while `alt-n` did advance a page. The TUI entry is fully drivable. The gate's "proof install on BOTH menu entries" was met for 1.26.1 (by a person) and not for 1.27.x. **Fix shape:** measure QEMU `input-send-event` with absolute coordinates, or a VNC client on DooPlex; until then a release's graphical proof is an operator click-through. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: release-test tooling; an operator click-through covers it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-551** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] No Tier-0 box can put the escrow ceremony in the state R-546 fixes — paused AND connected to its agent — so the readiness branches are proven only by tests.** FOUND 2026-09-17 while live-validating controller v0.246.0 (R-546). The branches (reminder bar held back while the agent's preflight is not `ok`; the waiting card on `/backup/escrow`; `POST /api/escrow/start` refused 409 before staging) need a box whose off-site tier is configured, whose escrow is NOT done, and whose controller reaches the agent. Measured on demo-hp: **9201** reaches the agent but is escrowed (the bar is off by design there; making it paused would be hand-set state on the standing demo box, and a real ceremony would supersede its live escrow — the hub keeps ONE `host_escrow` row per host, `host_id PRIMARY KEY`); **9202** is paused-capable but has **no local-API token at all** (its `bootstrap.json` holds only `schema`, `customer.id`, `disposition`), so its readiness is always UNKNOWN and the bar always shows. The fresh-bind window where this state occurs naturally (~17 min, chaos night Phase 0) needs a fresh install. **What IS proven:** five tests driving the real pages and handler through `ServeHTTP` with a fake agent, each red-proofed; and chaos night measured live that the agent's preflight is red for ~17 minutes after a bind and turns green by itself (`evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/phase0-escrow-*`). **Fix shape:** give the scratch guest a local-API token through the agent's own provisioning path, or walk R-546 on the next fresh install. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: test-coverage comfort; behaviour is unit-tested and no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-555** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The wire-contract gate counts a field as received when its name appears in a Go COMMENT on the receiving side.** FOUND 2026-09-17 by CC adding the report's `language` field (controller v0.247.0): `scripts/wire_contract_gate.py` passed WITHOUT an allowlist entry, because `receiver_tokens()` tokenises whole files and the word „language" occurs hub-side only in a comment (`hub/internal/web/configs.go:558`, „this page's existing language"). The shape is the gate's own named failure class (name-for-fact, R-421): any English tag name that also appears in hub prose passes unread. The field was allowlisted by hand with this row named. **Fix shape:** strip `//` and `/* */` comments (and template `{{/* */}}`) before tokenising; add the decoy „a tag whose name appears only in a receiver comment must convict"; expect a handful of currently-passing tags to surface — each is a finding, not noise. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: gate precision; tooling only.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-564** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The retrieval-promise gate's Hungarian stems cannot see a SPLIT verb — „csak akkor állíthatók vissza", „hozod vissza" — so those Hungarian sentences were never scanned; the English translation exposed them.** FOUND 2026-09-17 by slice 1 release B (R-556): after the gate learnt English (`EN_PATTERNS`), seven English retrieval phrases on `backups_remote`, `backups_escrow`, `backups_restore` and `backups_restore_wizard` had NO Hungarian registration, because their Hungarian carries the verb particle after the verb („A távoli mentések csak akkor állíthatók vissza …", „a távoli mentések CSAK ezzel a kóddal állíthatók vissza", „csak a hiányzó fájlokat hozod vissza"). The stems (`visszaállíthat`, `visszaszerezhet`, `visszahozhat`, `visszanyit`) match only the joined form. The seven were registered in English with reasons (none is a false promise: two are preconditions, five describe the action on the same page). **Fix shape:** add split-form patterns to the Hungarian scan (`állíthatók? vissza`, `(hoz|szerez|nyit)\w* vissza`), register the Hungarian occurrences found, decoy with a planted split-verb promise. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: copy gate precision; the seven found sentences were reviewed and are true.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-569** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Four more API handlers pick their status code by matching ENGLISH words in an error — the same shape as R-553, one language over.** FOUND 2026-09-17 while fixing R-553: `controller/internal/api/router.go` matches `"protected"`, `"not found"`, `"not deployed"`, `"still running"`, `"not orphaned"` in `err.Error()` at the stop/start, remove and orphan-cleanup handlers (three separate blocks). These strings are internal English, so localisation does not move them — the risk is a reworded internal error, not a translation, which is why this is P3 and was NOT folded into R-553's release. **Fix shape:** the same `util.KindErrorf` sentinels in `internal/stacks` (`ErrProtectedStack`, `ErrStackNotFound`, `ErrStillRunning`, …), a `statusFor` helper per handler family, and one table test per family passing a reworded message. | **READY - rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3->P4: internal robustness; only a future rewording would break it.** | — | — | CC |
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@@ -454,7 +412,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-759** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] wger's onboarding record (the checklist pilot) keeps rows open that no other row owns.** 2026-10-01, `app-catalog-felhom.eu/onboarding/wger.md`: **2.5** no backup → remove → restore → read back of wger exists — the box has no per-app backup press outside an Update (R-648) and wger has no newer step to carry one; **3.7** changing the password and adding a family member not measured, and the template has no `add_people` text; **6.3** no forced-fail undo for wger; **8.2** the app page not read on 9202 this session; **9.1** the runtime volume-persistence gate not re-run (last CLEAN 2026-08-02). The other open rows have their own: 1.5 (R-755), 1.7/2.8 (R-762), 3.4 (R-763), 7.1 (R-764). wger is exempt from the onboarding gate (published before the checklist), so nothing blocks; this row is what keeps the record honest. **Needs:** the five measured on 9202 — 2.5 and 6.3 ride wger's next ladder step (the update's backing-up phase is the per-app backup). `audits/new-app-checklist-2026-10-01/` | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: record-keeping for a hidden app; nothing blocks.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-781** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The catalog's `scripts/test_gate_decoys.py` fails 4 of its own "genuine" onboarding cases — on the untouched tree.** Measured 2026-10-01 (same 4 FAIL lines before and after this session's checklist edit): the harness copies the catalog into a temp tree with a fake sibling `felhom.eu`, and the REAL published records (radicale, karakeep, dawarich) name evidence that the fake sibling lacks, so a complete record reads incomplete. The gate itself (`onboarding`) is green on the real tree. **Needs:** the genuine cases build their own records, or the fake sibling mirrors the cited evidence. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a test-harness self-check; the real gate is green.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-786** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] SparkyFitness's onboarding record has six open rows** (`app-catalog-felhom.eu/onboarding/sparkyfitness.md`): 0.5 runtime internet (food search providers), 0.7 the phone app's sign-in route through traefik, 1.6 the env names the server reads, 1.7 the entrypoint read, 5.4 a second memory watch at another limit, 8.3 no logo/screenshots on felhom.eu (404). Everything else measured this session (bench + 9202). **Needs:** each row measured, or n/a with a reason. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (catalog)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: onboarding record completeness; no household meets it directly.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-797** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `check-family-gate.py` rule 3 (a family_gate template needs a baked golden ≥ 0.287.0) is checked only where the felhom.eu sibling exists — CI's single clone cannot.** MEASURED 2026-10-02 (`audits/family-gate-2026-10-02/C-metube-bench/C3b-family-gate-with-sibling.txt`): without the sibling the gate printed NOT CHECKED and its summary read OK. The summary line now says "rule 3 … NOT CHECKED here". The pre-push hook (with the sibling) is where it bites. **Needs:** nothing more unless CI gets the sibling. | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a CI coverage gap; the pre-push hook still checks it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-805** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The volume-persistence gate judges an empty NAMED volume (R-788) but not an empty BIND mount.** MEASURED 2026-10-02 (`audits/persistence-sweep-2026-10-02/A/sweep/TABLE.md`): Grimmory's `/app/data` bind held 0 files and read CLEAN (its state is in MariaDB); komga, paperless-ngx, radarr and sonarr also carry empty binds that are not judged. **Needs:** decide whether an empty bind after the exercise is UNDETERMINED like a named volume, with a decoy. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a test-gate rule; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-806** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] The gate's GET exercise speaks plain http to an HTTPS backend (crafty-controller :8443), and gramps-web did not answer on :5000.** MEASURED 2026-10-02 (`audits/persistence-sweep-2026-10-02/A/sweep/TABLE.md`): both reached data only through their fixture seed. **Needs:** read the `loadbalancer.server.scheme` label (upgrade_boxport already does); find why gramps-web's first GET got no answer. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a test-gate defect; no household meets it.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-807** | Process & tooling | P4 | **[P3-LOW] 13 apps stay UNDETERMINED because their seeds write only to the database, so their upload / media / cache / redis volumes stay empty.** MEASURED 2026-10-02 (`audits/persistence-sweep-2026-10-02/A/sweep/TABLE.md`): claper, crafty-controller, dawarich (redis), docmost, gramps-web, immich (ML cache), outline (+redis), sparkyfitness, tandoor, vikunja, wger, wishlist, zipline — plus plex (no seed route: a plex.tv claim token) and wanderer (no fixture; unhealthy under the gate). None is BROKEN: nothing was written outside a preserved folder. **Needs:** per app, a seed that uploads one file (or the volume named n/a with a reason: a redis cache, an ML model cache). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: test coverage; nothing was found broken.** | — | — | CC |
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Reference in new issue
Block a user