R-201 PASSED: a customer's file survived a machine rebuild and came back byte-identical
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# DRILL — R-201, the night run: **THE KEY CAME BACK. The verdict was not reached.**
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# DRILL — R-201, the night run: **PASS. The customer's file came back, byte-identical.**
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**Date:** 2026-08-04, 21:30–22:40 · **Box:** `demo-hp` (Tier 0) · **Unattended, by operator decision.**
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**The wipe happened.** The box is up, its apps are serving, and it is left mid-drill by deliberate
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choice — see §7 for the exact state and the one command that resumes it.
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**Date:** 2026-08-04, 21:30–23:15 · **Box:** `demo-hp` (Tier 0) · unattended, then **finished with the
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operator present**. The box is up, healthy, and fully re-armed.
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> **THE RESULT, first.** A real rebuild was performed: the controller's data volume was destroyed and
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> the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced
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> `8a9e33aa4da6769c5aea1831f87759e10930e2ec1dea0062576484e0598d080a` — **byte-identical to the key the
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> box used before the wipe, and to the hash the hub had independently recorded.**
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> **THE VERDICT: PASS.**
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>
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> **The off-site backup key is recoverable after a machine is rebuilt. That has never been shown
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> before.**
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> ```
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> pre-wipe sha256: 643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c
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> restored sha256: 643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c
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> ```
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>
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> **And the drill did not finish**, because three separate things stand between a recovered key and a
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> restored file. All three are measured below. That is the other half of the night's result, and it is
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> the half nobody knew.
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> A machine was destroyed on purpose — controller data volume gone, the customer's file deleted from
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> disk — and **the file came back byte-identical**, through the customer's own recovery code and the
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> customer's own restore flow. **This is the first time the Felhom backup story has been proved end to
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> end.**
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>
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> The key recovered byte-identical (`8a9e33aa4da6…`), the existing repository **opened rather than
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> being re-initialised** (`repo_state: null`, 3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size exactly), and
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> the pre-wipe snapshot `e6132ae5` was still there with the file inside it.
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>
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> **It took four undocumented steps to get there**, each measured, and they are the other half of the
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> result — see §3. A customer hitting this alone today would not get their data back.
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---
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## 1. The verdict
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**NOT REACHED.** Step 10 (restore the sentinel and compare) was not run.
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## 1. The verdict — **PASS**
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| | |
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|---|---|
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| sentinel sha256, pre-wipe | `643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c` |
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| sentinel sha256, post-restore | **not obtained** — the restore was never reachable |
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| snapshot count at step 9 | **not obtained** — the run was refused before it started |
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| sentinel sha256, pre-wipe (step 3) | `643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c` |
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| sentinel sha256, restored (step 10) | **`643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c`** |
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| **match** | **YES — byte-identical** |
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| snapshot count at step 9 | **3** — the pre-wipe count. **NOT 1.** No fresh history was started |
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| repo size at step 9 | **42 026 B** — the pre-wipe size exactly |
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| `repo_state` | **`null`** — the repository OPENED. Not orphaned |
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**This is not a FAIL.** A fail is "the file came back wrong" or "a fresh empty history was started".
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Neither happened, because the box never got as far as running a backup. What the night established is
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where the wall is.
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The restore ran through the customer flow (`POST /backup/offbox/restore`, `mode=full`, two-step
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confirm), out of snapshot `e6132ae5` — the one taken **before** the wipe.
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---
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**A detail worth keeping:** the first restore attempt used the default `mode=unit`, which recovers the
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recovery unit only and **not** the userdata leg. `mode=full` is what returns the customer's files. A
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customer told to "restore from off-site" would, on the default, get their app definition back and not
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their documents — and nothing in that outcome says so.
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## 2. What was proven, in order, on hardware
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@@ -153,23 +162,25 @@ that appears in no design document, and it comes *before* anything else can happ
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---
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## 4. Why the session stopped here
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## 4. How it was finished, and the fourth undocumented step
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By 22:35 the path forward was a chain of workarounds assembled live — Re-issue, then the deprecated
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manual confirm, then the root-gated `--print-reset-code` escape hatch to re-claim, then the confirm
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again, then the run. Each is individually defensible; the accumulation is precisely the pattern §8.10
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names:
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The unattended run stopped at the wall in §3 rather than improvising further at 22:35 (§8.10). With the
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operator present the remaining path was walked, and it took **four steps a customer would have to
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discover**:
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> *"If anything is ambiguous at 03:00, stop and leave it for the morning. An unattended session that
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> halts with a clear state beats one that improvises."*
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1. **Re-issue** the offsite credential (hub, operator-only) — otherwise the box can never configure its
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tier. §3(a).
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2. **Re-claim the box.** The local escape hatch (`--print-reset-code`) mints a code — **and does not
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work on its own**: it writes the new hash to `settings.json` while the RUNNING controller keeps its
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old copy in memory, so `effectiveClaimCode()` never sees it and every attempt returns
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*"Hibás vagy lejárt kód"*. **The controller must be restarted between minting and claiming.** Two
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claim attempts failed on this before it was diagnosed; the generation counter reached 6.
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3. **Confirm the escrow** manually (`/backup/offbox/confirm-escrow`) → `escrowed`, so `OffboxRunnable`
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permits a run. **Not a ceremony** — the identity blob was never superseded (still 2 retained rows).
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4. **Restore with `mode=full`.** The default `mode=unit` returns the recovery unit and **not** the
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customer's files.
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The remaining steps need about five minutes **with a person present**. They are not worth improvising
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alone at the end of a long night, on the one box whose off-site history the drill is trying to prove.
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**Nothing was left broken.** The box is up, all six app containers are serving, and the recovered key
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is on disk.
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---
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**None of these four is in any design document, and the drill needed all four.**
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## 5. §5's five conditions, as recorded before the wipe
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@@ -208,33 +219,18 @@ see §8.
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---
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## 7. The exact state the box is in, and how to resume
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## 7. The state the box is left in — healthy and re-armed
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```
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controller felhom-controller:0.197.0, healthy
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controller felhom-controller:0.197.0, healthy, CLAIMED
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apps privatebin opengist calibre-web filebrowser cloudflared traefik — all serving
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claimed None ← must be re-claimed before any controller endpoint responds
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escrow_state pending ← R-196: the Re-issue marked the escrow stale
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repo key 8a9e33aa4da6… ← THE RECOVERED KEY, on disk
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sentinel absent from disk (deliberately) — present in off-site snapshot e6132ae5
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escrow_state escrowed (no ceremony was run; identity_blob untouched)
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repo key 8a9e33aa4da6… THE RECOVERED KEY — and the repository opens with it
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off-site 3 snapshots, 42 026 B, repo_state null; all three apps re-toggled for off-site
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sentinel restored to its live location, sha256 643166269103a25c… — verified
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```
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**To resume (operator present, ~5 minutes):**
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1. Re-claim the box — `docker exec felhom-controller /usr/local/bin/felhom-controller
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--print-reset-code`, then the claim page.
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2. Confirm the escrow (`/backup/offbox/confirm-escrow`) so `OffboxRunnable` allows a run. **Do NOT run
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a new ceremony** — it would supersede the identity blob and destroy the key under test.
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3. Run an off-site backup. **The observable is whether the repository OPENS** — and whether the
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pre-wipe snapshot `e6132ae5` still exists with the sentinel in it. A same-day `forget` keeps one
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snapshot per tag, so the *count* is a poor discriminator; the surviving history is the real one.
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4. Restore the sentinel through the customer restore flow; compare to `643166269103a25c…`.
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**Rollback, if preferred:** `pct restore 9201` from
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`/mnt/nvme-1tb/dump/vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_08_04-21_44_24.tar.zst` — verified by a full read before the
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wipe. It returns the box to its pre-wipe state and voids the remaining drill.
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---
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The verification copy under `backups/offsite-restore/calibre-web/` is **left in place as evidence**.
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## 8. R persisted nowhere — searched, with a positive control
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@@ -256,9 +252,14 @@ staging directories. A planted copy was found by the same sweep (**1**) and not
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**Nothing was deleted on the storage endpoint**, including the ~1.2 GB of previously-orphaned
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ciphertext. Ruled, still owed, and deliberately not ridden along with a drill.
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## 10. Part 2 — not run, and why
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## 10. Part 2 — not run
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Its gate is *"the drill PASSED"*. It did not — the verdict was not reached. Running a second wipe on a
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box whose first result is incomplete would have destroyed the staged state that makes the first one
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finishable in five minutes. **R-198's retention therefore remains unit-proven only**, unchanged from
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this morning.
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Its gate is *"the drill PASSED; its evidence is written down; and there is time."* The first two are
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now met. **The third was not** — it was 23:15 after a full destructive cycle, and Part 2 is a second
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wipe. It is deliberately left for a session that starts fresh, with drill 1's result already recorded
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so a second wipe cannot overwrite it.
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**R-198's retention therefore remains unit-proven only.** Nothing has yet superseded a key in
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production, so the retention's live behaviour is still unobserved — and it is now the last unproven
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link in the chain this drill exercised. The check is cheap: wipe again, do NOT recover, let a ceremony
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seal a different password, then read the superseded row's `identity_blob`.
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File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
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| R-201 | **The wipe-and-recover drill** | L | **PREPARED, HALTED BEFORE THE WIPE (2026-08-04)** | Nothing irreversible done. Established live for the first time: a rebuilt box's off-site run REFUSES (the orphan card, not a silent fresh history — closes R-193 Q3), the orphan reset works move-aside-never-delete, and demo-hp's pre-rebuild key is permanently gone (superseded four hours before v0.93.0). Resume needs R-203 |
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| R-203 | **The app and its backup looked in different directories, and a run that skipped a mandatory folder still said `ok`** | M | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (controller v0.197.0, 2026-08-04)** | Adds the capability-map row *"off-site app-data capture covers MANDATORY paths on both drive layouts"* as PROVEN-LIVE, and corrects that row's predecessor, which was optimistic. Unblocks R-201 |
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| R-204 | **The recovered key cannot be used: the Re-issue that reconfigures a rebuilt box's off-site tier marks the escrow stale, which gates every run, and the only way to clear it destroys the key** | M | **OPEN — the wall the 2026-08-04 night drill hit** | Blocks R-201's verdict. Fix is most likely R-196's (mark stale on evidence, not on a Re-issue) or letting a verified recovered key confirm the escrow without a ceremony |
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| R-201 | **The wipe-and-recover drill** | L | **PASSED + PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night)** | Flips the off-site app-data row to *"a customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back"* — PROVEN-LIVE, scoped to demo-hp and to a controller-data rebuild. The journey took four undocumented manual steps (R-204); the capability is real, the customer experience is not yet |
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| R-19 | Internet-outage customer-experience drill: pull WAN on demo, verify lan_resolver path, document what the customer actually sees/does | S | idea | Flips map row E "LAN access" IMPLEMENTED→PROVEN-LIVE |
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| R-20 | ~~Verify operator-key pinning is fully in the day-0 install flow~~ | XS | **closed** (2026-07-16) | Confirmed against `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` source (not changelog): keys resolve at L1181–1219 (script constants `OPERATOR_KEY_*`, populated, `--operator-pubkey-file` override), pinned automatically by `step_agent_config()` "STEP 6/8" (L2044; python builds `authz.signers` L2146–2156, reinstall preserves existing), verified at L2332–2337 ("authz signers: N … operator-signed self-update armed"). No interactive prompt or post-install hand-edit — fully automatic. Doc-drift note: the L193–197 "EMPTY by default" comment is stale vs the now-populated constants (→ R-16 hygiene) |
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| R-23 | **Immediate-sync Direction-2 follow-ups** (hub v0.58 / controller v0.140, 2026-07-16): **(a) — BANKED 2026-07-21 (both legs).** The operator-UI save->apply round trip is PROVEN: the STOP-2 global-floor save (hub `18:56:27 CEST`) released the controller's held wait in the **same second** (`16:56:27Z wait woke: generation=1 - firing out-of-cycle report`), with the report built 2 s later; the ring also shows `wait baseline generation=0` at startup (baseline recorded WITHOUT firing, as designed) then `generation=1`, so the generation advanced past 0. **RESTART LEG BANKED 2026-07-21 — the floor was moved to a version the box did NOT run, and the swap fired EXACTLY ONCE.** Operator saved global floor 0.153.0 → **v0.154.0** (a real version boundary, unlike the 2026-07-20 attempt which targeted an already-running version and therefore proved nothing). Timeline (guest UTC): `06:57:13` UpdateState `pending` written `initiated_by=auto-floor` → `06:57:17` agent `controller swap requested 0.153.0 -> 0.154.0` → `06:57:19` `image file written, restarting bootstrap` → `06:57:21` container StartedAt + UpdateState `completed_at` → `06:57:29` agent `new controller healthy`. **16 s end to end.** Assertions over the whole window (06:50 → 07:29, 39 min): `controller swap requested` = **1**, agent-driven bootstrap restarts = **1**, `new controller healthy` = **1**, rollback/swap-failed/unhealthy = **0**, container `RestartCount` = **0**. `VerifyStartup` banked it on the next boot (`Post-update startup: update successful (0.153.0 → 0.154.0)`) and the `06:57:52` periodic check logged `Current version 0.154.0 is up to date` — the at/above-floor branch correctly doing nothing. **No storm, no rollback, no second attempt.** *Caveat, disclosed: a hand-deploy of v0.155.0 at `07:17:10` sits inside the observation window and is what StartedAt shows after that point; it never touches `SwapController`, so the swap-count assertions above are uncontaminated across the full window. A second, unplanned confirmation of the at/above-floor branch came with it — after the hand-deploy the box ran 0.155.0 against a 0.154.0 floor and the updater logged `Current version 0.155.0 is up to date` and did nothing.* Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` §6 (2026-07-21). *(Superseded note:)* **the self-restart single-fire leg was** - the floor was set to a version the box ALREADY ran, so there was no work and no restart. Finish by bumping the floor to a version the box does NOT run, debug ring open, asserting EXACTLY ONE restart. **Trap found while banking this: the wake is `logx.Debugf`, so it is INVISIBLE in `docker logs` at INFO** and lives only in the debug ring (`GET /api/debug/logs?level=DEBUG`) - a hunter looking at stdout wrongly concludes the box never woke; arguably (b) generalised. (b) cosmetic: the Waiter's "recovered" INFO logs on the next hold completion (`pollOnce` blocks ~240 s), not at reconnect | S | **(a) BANKED in full; only (b) cosmetic remains** | Map row "config/state change round-trips in seconds" flipped PARTIAL->PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-21 on this evidence. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` 4f |
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