admin
15206314ab
Mint a 160-bit capability URL (/s/<token>) serving a standalone read-only guest launcher: same tiles, opens apps in new tabs, no account, no admin session. Information only, zero control — every privilege stays behind each app's own auth. - /s/ pre-auth pass-through (after the claim gate) + session-CSRF exemption; guest password POST carries its own pre-auth HMAC CSRF. - Constant-time token match; empty stored token = disabled = byte-identical mux 404. - Optional per-share password: separate bcrypt hash + own attempt map; signed cookie = HMAC(token|passwordHash) keyed with web.session_secret, so rotate/change invalidates. - Guest labels ride the v0.164.0 ruling; never expose internal state vocabulary. - Token redacted in logs (/s/<redacted>); never in CHANGELOG/REPORT/CONTEXT. - Admin modal: copy-link, QR (go-qrcode), set/clear password, rotate, disable. - Tests: Groups A-G (14) + 3 red-proofs verified red.
97 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
97 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
# REPORT — felhom-controller v0.165.0 — Indítópult megosztása (guest launcher via capability URL)
|
||
|
||
## Baselines
|
||
|
||
| Repo | main @ start | version start → target |
|
||
|------|--------------|------------------------|
|
||
| felhom-controller | `8e5edb2` | v0.164.0 → **v0.165.0** |
|
||
|
||
Clean tree, `HEAD == origin/main`, verified before build.
|
||
|
||
## What shipped
|
||
|
||
The admin launcher gains an **"Indítópult megosztása"** button that mints a **capability URL**
|
||
(`https://<host>/s/<token>`, 160-bit token) serving a standalone, read-only guest launcher — same
|
||
tiles, opens apps in new tabs — with **no accounts and no admin session**. Optional per-share
|
||
password (separate credential); modal offers copy-link, QR, rotate, disable. The link grants
|
||
**information only, zero control**.
|
||
|
||
## Files created / modified
|
||
|
||
**Created**
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/share.go` — pure core: `newShareToken` (20 rand bytes → base64.RawURLEncoding, 27 chars), `shareTokenMatches` (constant-time; empty stored never matches), `shareCookieValue`/`shareCookieValid` (HMAC guest cookie), `shareCSRFToken`/`setShareCSRFCookie`/`validShareCSRF` (pre-auth HMAC CSRF), `shareRateLimited`/`shareRegisterFailure`/`shareClearFailures` (own attempt map).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/share_handlers.go` — HTTP surface: guest GET/POST handlers, `share404`, `setGuestHeaders`, `GuestLauncherApp` + `buildGuestApps` (pure mapping), render helpers, admin `/launcher/share/*` handlers (enable/rotate/disable/password) + QR handler.
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/share_test.go` — Groups A–G (14 tests) + companion red-proofs.
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/templates/launcher_shared.html` — standalone guest launcher (own minimal `<html>`).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/templates/launcher_share_password.html` — standalone one-field password gate.
|
||
|
||
**Modified**
|
||
- `controller/internal/settings/settings.go` — `LauncherShareToken` + `LauncherSharePasswordHash` fields + 4 accessors (copy of the `PasswordHash` pattern).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/server.go` — Server struct `shareAttempts` map (+ NewServer init); ServeHTTP `/s/` mux cases (GET/POST) + `/launcher/share/*` cases; ServeHTTP debug-line `/s/<redacted>` redaction.
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/auth.go` — `/s/` added to the RequireAuth pre-auth allowlist (after the claim-gate block).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/csrf.go` — `/s/` exempted from session CSRF (guest carries pre-auth HMAC CSRF).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/handlers.go` — `launcherApps()` extracted; `launcherHandler` wires share modal state (ShareEnabled/ShareURL/SharePasswordSet/ShareFlash).
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/funcmap.go` — `isOperationalState` promoted to a package predicate; funcmap `isOperational` points at it.
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/templates/launcher.html` — `launch_tile` partial extracted; both tile branches use it; share button + modal + JS added.
|
||
- `controller/internal/web/templates/style.css` — share-modal + guest-launcher CSS.
|
||
- `controller/go.mod` / `go.sum` — `github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e`.
|
||
- Docs: `CHANGELOG.md`, `controller/README.md`, `CONTEXT.md`.
|
||
|
||
## Part-2 secret decision — and why
|
||
|
||
**REUSED `web.session_secret`** (via `s.cfg.Web.SessionSecret`) as the HMAC key for both the guest
|
||
gate cookie and the guest CSRF, with per-purpose domain-separation labels
|
||
(`felhom-share-cookie-v1|…`, `felhom-share-csrf-v1`). It qualifies for the **reuse branch** of the
|
||
decision rule: it is **persisted** (a `controller.yaml` `web.session_secret` field) and
|
||
**box-scoped** (each box's own config), and it is **stable across restarts** — not per-boot and not
|
||
claim-generation-scoped. It is the SAME secret the claim pre-auth CSRF already trusts
|
||
(`claim.go:claimCSRFToken`), so reusing it introduces **no new security assumption** beyond what the
|
||
box already relies on. No `ShareCookieSecret` field was added. Binding the cookie to
|
||
`token|passwordHash` makes rotation and password-change invalidate cookies with zero bookkeeping.
|
||
|
||
## Tests + red-proofs
|
||
|
||
`go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` — all green. Gates: template_id, emoji,
|
||
native_confirm, mojibake, app_row_dedup — all OK.
|
||
|
||
New tests (`share_test.go`), 14 total, all PASS:
|
||
|
||
| Group | Scenario | Test |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| B(core) | constant-time token match | `TestShareTokenMatches`, `TestNewShareToken_EntropyAndCharset` |
|
||
| A | guest 200 + 3 headers + tiles + no admin chrome | `TestShareGuest_HeadersTilesNoAdminChrome` |
|
||
| B | wrong/disabled/empty = byte-identical mux 404 | `TestShareGuest_WrongTokenIs404LikeDefault` |
|
||
| C | password gate: 5 wrong → 6th rate-limited; correct → cookie; change pw invalidates | `TestShareGuest_PasswordGate` |
|
||
| D | rotate → old 404 + old cookie invalid; disable → all 404 | `TestShareGuest_RotateAndDisable` |
|
||
| E | guest labels + no internal state words + empty state | `TestBuildGuestApps_Labels`, `TestShareGuestTemplate_LabelsNoInternalWords` |
|
||
| F | claim gate intercepts guest page; admin surfaces need auth + CSRF | `TestShare_ClaimGateInterceptsGuestPage`, `TestShare_AdminSurfacesRequireAuthAndCSRF` |
|
||
| G | token never logged (valid + wrong), path redacted | `TestShareGuest_TokenNeverLogged` |
|
||
|
||
Companion **red-proofs** (mutate → FAIL → restore → green), all verified:
|
||
1. **Token match** (Group B): `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` → prefix-accept (`presented[:len(stored)] == stored`) → `TestShareTokenMatches` FAILS on the superstring case ("a superstring must not match"). Restored → green.
|
||
2. **Cookie binding** (Group C): dropped `passwordHash` from `shareCookieValue`'s HMAC input → `TestShareGuest_PasswordGate` FAILS ("changing the password must invalidate the old gate cookie"). Restored → green.
|
||
3. **Log redaction** (Group G): reverted the ServeHTTP `/s/<redacted>` redaction (log raw `path`) → `TestShareGuest_TokenNeverLogged` FAILS. Restored → green.
|
||
|
||
Existing launcher tests (`TestBuildLauncherApps_*`, `TestLauncherTemplate_*`, `TestTileColor`,
|
||
`TestInitial`, `TestLauncherRoute_EndToEnd`) still green after the `launch_tile` partial extraction.
|
||
|
||
Test count (internal/web): +14 (share_test.go). Full `go test ./...` green before/after.
|
||
|
||
## Deployed version + live validation (§13)
|
||
|
||
_Filled after build + deploy to guest 9201 — see the transcripts below (token redacted throughout)._
|
||
|
||
<!-- LIVE-VALIDATION -->
|
||
|
||
## Accepted residuals (no code action)
|
||
|
||
- **Link-preview crawlers** (Messenger/WhatsApp/Slack) fetch the URL once and see app names — accepted; `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow` prevents search indexing.
|
||
- **Reverse-proxy / Cloudflare access logs** may record the `/s/<token>` path — an ops-tier residual outside the controller (the controller's own logs redact it).
|
||
- **LAN-IP link host** — the modal builds the link from the request `Host`, so an admin on a LAN IP gets a LAN-IP link. Kept the UI clean; noted here only.
|
||
|
||
## Observations
|
||
|
||
- The guest gate cookie is scoped `Path=/s/` + `HttpOnly` + `SameSite=Lax` (Lax so a first click from an external app still sends it on top-level GET). The CSRF cookie is `SameSite=Strict`.
|
||
- Disable clears BOTH token and share password (clean slate — a later re-enable never inherits a stale gate).
|
||
- The token GET is deliberately NOT rate-limited or CAPTCHA'd — 160-bit entropy is the defence; the path stays fast and boring.
|