Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin 9dc26459ea v0.203.0: the box collects what the hub staged for it (R-218 consume half) + R-220's message
gates / gates (push) Successful in 10s
R-218's declaration half shipped in v0.201.0 and works. Its consume half never
existed. Reconcile ran exactly twice per process — at start-up and when the
recovery screen drives it — and BOTH fire before the hub has anything staged,
because the hub stages in RESPONSE to the declaration those runs precede.

Measured on the R-201 re-walk: unlock reconcile 11:43:07, hub staged 11:44:57
saying 'next cycle', a full report cycle ran 11:55:46, still unconsumed at
12:06. A guest command line applied it in 18 seconds — everything correct except
the trigger.

Bridge.RetryIfDeclared re-runs the SAME reconcile on a 5-minute tick, driven from
the box's own published declaration (OffboxReportStatus().State) — the very
statement the hub acts on, so the two cannot disagree.

Poll, not an ACK flag, decided on the promise: the no-target message says 'amint
megvannak' (no deadline) and the card says 'within a day'. Five minutes is inside
both by a wide margin and needs no hub change.

It stops by construction — a healthy box does no work and logs nothing — and the
settle gate is deliberately kept via ReconcileWhenSettled.

The marker was investigated and left alone: applied_marker lives in the guest's
DataDir, which a rebuild destroys, so it cannot suppress a legitimate re-run.

R-220's customer half: the refusal no longer tells the customer to choose from a
list that may be empty. It names the rebuild, points at the Meghajtók page, and
promises no outcome.

Red-proofs: remove the retry -> credential uncollected (the dead end reproduced);
drop the stop condition -> a healthy box hammers the hub; call Reconcile instead
of ReconcileWhenSettled -> settle gate bypassed; restore the old sentence -> the
impossible action returns.

28 packages ok, vet clean, all controller gates OK.
2026-08-06 12:56:12 +02:00
admin cb8bf14599 v0.162.0 — R-71(a): the apply-bridge settle-gate (kills the F10 day-0 race)
The day-0 race (DIAG-f10): a fresh box boots below the operator floor, the
apply-bridge consumes the single-use offsite password, then ~35s later the
managed auto-floor update replaces the container mid-install -> the new process
finds no installed key -> consume -> 404 -> offsite dead until an operator
Re-issue. Recurs on every onboarding whose ISO floor lags the managed floor.

Ordering-only fix (consume/install/persist internals + the 404-no-oracle
contract + the Consumer UNTOUCHED; R-71(b) rejected-by-design):
- New seam offsiteapply.SettleProvider.SettleState() + SettleFunc adapter over
  the self-updater's own GetFloor()/IsUpdateRunning() (no second floor path).
- Bridge.AwaitSettle polls 10s BEFORE the 3-min Reconcile ctx: defers while an
  update runs or the box is below the known floor; GOes at/above floor on the
  first poll with zero added latency (B'). Bounds 90s floor sub-bound / 5min
  overall, both GO+WARN (hub that can't serve a floor can't serve a consume ->
  no burn risk; R-71c is the belt). ReconcileWhenSettled = gate then reconcile.
- main.go: bridge goroutine moved after the updater is built; wired only when an
  updater exists (nil Settle = reconcile immediately, old behavior).

Finding: the floor is in-memory (report-ACK ~5-10s), NOT persisted -> unknown on
any restart until the first ACK; the 90s sub-bound is sized to that.

Tests (injectable clock, fake SettleState, recorded Consumer): A-E + nil-provider
+ cancelled-gate. Four red-proofs all observed FAIL then restored: gate removed /
updateRunning branch / floor sub-bound / overall bound. Deferral paths ship
unit-proven + red-proofed, NOT live-fired -- their precondition is now
structurally prevented by the v1.25.0 build gate. Layering: gate prevents, (a)
defers, (c) heals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N7Drmtm2RzoqbkJZCNSFNQ
2026-07-24 07:48:45 +02:00
admin f830325ca3 offsiteapply: include QuotaGB in the descriptor hash — quota changes re-apply
A hub-side quota raise now reaches the target: the marker hash changes and
the bridge re-applies via key-auth-first (no password consumed). Test:
quota-only change remaps the new quota with a panicking consumer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:58:30 +02:00
admin 8917014991 v0.109.0: soft-quota gate + usage bar + offsite report status (SLICE 4)
QuotaGB rides the descriptor into OffboxTarget; RepoSizeBytes persisted
from restic stats. Pre-run gate: >=100% refuses NEW backups (Hungarian
notice + operator alert) but prune STILL runs (red-proofed) and restore is
never gated; >=80% warns. /backups usage bar (quota>0 only). The hub
report gains the non-secret offsite status object for the OffsiteChecker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 23:48:42 +02:00
admin a38c743926 v0.107.0: key-auth-first bridge + staged-secret wipe on escrow confirm
Key-auth-first: a KeyAuthProber seam lets the bridge skip consume+install
when the already-installed key still authenticates (pinned to the freshly
verified host key) — descriptor changes on provisioned guests no longer
loop on consume-404. Fingerprint verify still precedes everything.

Wipe-on-escrowed: confirm-escrow now calls the agent's new
DELETE /escrow/stage-secret (v0.78.0) best-effort, closing the hygiene gap
where a ceremony-less confirm left the staged password file behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 22:26:53 +02:00
admin 0c4a4ec02c v0.106.1: ssh-copy-id -s requires ~/.ssh locally — create it in the installer
Live finding: SFTP-mode ssh-copy-id mktemp's under ~/.ssh; the container
image has no /root/.ssh, so the install died locally AFTER the one-time
password was consumed (fail-safe held; password never transmitted).
Probe confirmed the pinned known_hosts + StrictHostKeyChecking=yes chain
is sound against the real box once ~/.ssh exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 21:29:38 +02:00
admin 9a34887acc harden offsite apply-bridge: pin verified host key on the install/verify sessions (no TOFU)
The SSHCopyIDInstaller used StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new on the ssh-copy-id
and sftp-verify connections, so even though the bridge verifies the box host-key
fingerprint against the hub descriptor BEFORE installing, the actual install
connection was not pinned to that verified key — a MITM could substitute a
different key in the gap between the scan and the install (TOCTOU).

Now the bridge threads the scanner-verified known_hosts line into KeyInstaller,
which writes it to a temp known_hosts and connects with StrictHostKeyChecking=yes
+ UserKnownHostsFile — the install/verify sessions refuse any key but the one the
bridge already matched. Empty known_hosts now refuses to install.

Test asserts the installer receives the pinned known_hosts; red-proofed by passing
an empty line (the pre-fix TOFU shape) → test fails. Addresses the security-review
"host-key TOFU after verify" finding on internal/offsiteapply/seams.go.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 19:24:17 +02:00
admin aa61fb3411 v0.106.0: offsite provisioning SLICE 2 — controller apply-bridge
On startup reconcile the hub-served offsite: descriptor into a key-only offbox
target. internal/offsiteapply.Bridge: verify-pin box host key vs host_fingerprint
(NO blind TOFU) → consume the one-time password (single-use, never logged) →
sshpass ssh-copy-id -s -f install + verify → configure offbox → EscrowState=pending
(fork-4 via Manager.ApplyOffsiteTarget) → persist a descriptor-hash marker LAST.
Idempotent + fail-safe. Seams faked in tests; both red-proofs run+reverted.
Dockerfile + sshpass. NOT yet live-applied (supervised end-to-end next runbook).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-09 19:14:14 +02:00