test campaign #3: Phase 2 state corruption (S1 settings crash-loop FINDING; S2/S3/S4 pass; symlink no-exfil)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -17,7 +17,14 @@ handles-or-fails-safe, then recovers. Every break carries a timed auto-revert; P
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| R2 | settings save on full disk | **PASS (code-verified)** | `settings.save()` = atomic write-`.tmp`-then-`os.Rename` (`settings.go:236-261`) → a disk-full fails at WriteFile, original untouched. Live disk-full not reproducible: settings.json is on the 252 GB docker vol. |
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| R3 | fill rootfs (holds `/mnt/sys_drive` backups) to 94% (timed rm @150s) | **PASS** | controller stayed healthy (it's on the separate 252 GB vol); DB-dump + Tier-2 (8 apps, immich 155MB) **succeeded**; **settings.json stayed valid JSON** (no corruption). Reverted → rootfs 4%. (Literal-full refusal not pushed — near-0 rootfs risks wedging the guest OS unattended; the 2 GB margin had room so the gate didn't need to refuse.) |
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| R4 | memory gate hard-block | **PASS (code-verified)** | `deploy.go:186` is a **hard block** (returns an error on `committed+new > usable`), using **committed-memory** accounting (sum of deployed `mem_request`), reserved 384 MB, usable 11904 MB. Live committed ≈ 4.4 GB → ~7.5 GB headroom, so tripping needs mass-deploying ~7.5 GB of requests (impractical/risky unattended); the branch + math are verified. |
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## Phase 2 — State corruption [HIGH SEV] — _pending_
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## Phase 2 — State corruption [HIGH SEV] — **mostly PASS; 1 medium finding (S1)**
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| # | Break (backed up first) | Result | Evidence |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| S1 | truncate settings.json → restart | **⚠ FINDING (medium)** | controller **crash-loops**: `[FATAL] Failed to load settings … unexpected end of JSON input`, RestartCount=7, restarting. **No safe-defaults fallback** — a corrupt settings.json takes the management plane down. *Not silent* (FATAL logged — better than the worst case). Restore → running/healthy, 3 storage_paths back. (Docker restart-manager cycling it re-confirms Finding #1.) |
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| S2 | garbage in uptime-kuma `app.yaml` → rescan | **PASS** | controller stays **healthy** (25/0), logs `[WARN] LoadAppConfig: yaml: … did not find expected key` (not silent, not fatal), other apps unaffected. Restore → `running/deployed`. **Contrast with S1:** per-stack app.yaml corruption is graceful; settings.json is fatal. |
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| S3 | corrupt quiesce marker (bad JSON) → restart | **PASS (minor finding)** | no panic/crash-loop, controller healthy, **stacks not stranded** (restarts=0). But the unparseable marker is **silently ignored** (no log) **and left in place** (not cleared/quarantined) — a real corrupted-mid-quiesce marker would skip recovery with no signal. |
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| S4 | symlink `→ /etc` in userdata/appdata → backup | **PASS (security holds)** 🔒 | Tier-2 rsync **preserved the symlink** (`EVIL_ETC -> /etc`), did **not** follow it; **/etc contents did NOT leak** into the backup (no passwd/shadow). No path-escape/exfil. |
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## Phase 3 — Concurrency storms — _pending_
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## Phase 4 — Time chaos — _pending_
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## Phase 5 — Network partitions — _pending_
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