R-67: the NAS share appears in FileBrowser (v0.160.0)

Network shares bind their share ROOT :rslave into FileBrowser — no
skeleton, no userdata scoping, nothing written toward the NAS. Gate is
the stub classifier (stub ⇒ excluded from mounts AND sources — an
exposed stub swallows uploads the real mount later shadows); idle autofs
is healthy and included. Drives byte-identical. Add/remove trigger the
debounced sync. Phase-0 probe on demo-hp: GO (in-container rslave access
wakes the idle trigger). Red-proofs A + B run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UuFPHmHNrCJj1VhY6QdDMU

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,39 @@
 ## Changelog
 
+### v0.160.0 — R-67: the NAS share appears in FileBrowser (2026-07-22)
+
+No agent coupling; MinAgent unchanged. Origin: the R-64 pairing drill — the share said „Elérhető"
+and the customer had no way to BROWSE it; FileBrowser synced drives only.
+
+**Phase-0 probe (GO, demo-hp, 2026-07-22):** with the Felhom-Share automount confirmed IDLE (autofs
+trigger in /proc/mounts, no cifs mount), `docker run --rm -v …/Felhom-Share:/probe:rslave alpine ls
+/probe` listed the real share content and left cifs mounted — an in-container access through an
+rslave bind DOES wake the idle trigger, one namespace further than the spike's in-guest proof. The
+design shipped as specified, no fallback fork needed.
+
+**The change:** `syncFileBrowserMounts`' path loop is extracted into the pure
+`buildFileBrowserPaths` (deps injected: mount probe / FS classifier / skeleton fn / logger), which
+now returns BOTH the mount lines and the config source set so the two can never disagree. Network
+shares get their own branch:
+
+- bind = the share ROOT, `…/<name>:/srv/<name>:rslave` — `:rslave` is load-bearing (host-side
+  automount wake / idle-unmount events propagate into the running container);
+- NO `EnsureUserdataSkeleton`, no userdata scoping — nothing is ever written toward the NAS;
+- the drive-absent gate does NOT apply (an idle automount is healthy and would be skipped
+  forever); the gate is the `stub` classifier verdict instead — **the data-safety wrong case**:
+  exposing a local stub dir lets a customer upload files the real mount will later shadow, so a
+  stub share is excluded from mounts AND sources this pass with a WARN. autofs / network /
+  unknown / nil-classifier all include (fail open).
+- Drive behavior is byte-identical (tested: the drive line with a share present equals the
+  drives-only render; drives always stay in the source list as before).
+- NAS add-success (`runNetAdd` done) and remove (`handleNetStorageRemove`) now trigger
+  `SyncFileBrowserMounts()`; removal drops the source + mount on the next sync (F2 change
+  detection forces the recreate).
+
+Tests: `filebrowser_network_test.go` scenarios A–D. Red-proofs recorded in REPORT.md: A (network
+routed through the drive branch → the skeleton-call assertion fails with the NAS path recorded)
+and B (stub gate dropped → the stub share leaks into mounts + sources).
+
 ### v0.159.0 — R-66: the box's own address becomes visible (2026-07-22)
 
 No agent coupling; MinAgent unchanged. Controller-only, three XS legs with one theme: **the box

REUSE.md

@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
 | `Manager.SambaLANAddress()` | controller/internal/stacks/samba.go | `() string` — the guest's LAN IPv4 for the Megosztás connect card (v0.151.0, S-2) | Read from the SAMBA container's netns (`network_mode: host`), never `net.InterfaceAddrs()` — the controller is on a docker BRIDGE and would answer 172.x (the same trap `setup.DetectLocalIPs` needs `HOST_IP` for). **NEVER cache/persist it** — the guest holds it by DHCP (S-5); callers re-derive per render. `""` = omit the line |
 | `Server.sambaAddrFn` (func seam) | controller/internal/web/server.go (field) + sharing_handlers.go `sambaLANAddress()` | nil → `stackMgr.SambaLANAddress()` | The web-side half of the connect card. Tests inject a COUNTED fn — the fresh-per-render assertion is what stops anyone memoizing a DHCP lease |
 | `Manager.guestNetExecFn` (func seam) + `GuestGateway()` / `GuestNetSnapshot()` | controller/internal/stacks/manager.go (field) + guestnet.go | nil → `docker exec felhom-samba <args>` — ONE seam for all R-66 guest-netns reads (route/link/addr/resolv.conf); tests script canned outputs per argv | guestnet_test.go. **The netns door rule:** the controller's OWN netns is the docker bridge, so any in-process read (`net.Interfaces`, `/proc/net/route`, its own `/etc/resolv.conf` = 127.0.0.11) is the S-2 wrong answer — guest-net reads MUST go through the samba (`network_mode: host`) exec door. Megosztás off ⇒ door closed ⇒ "" / per-item error strings; NEVER substitute an in-process value. Same S-5 law as SambaLANAddress: live per render, never cached/persisted. Parsers (`parseDefaultRoute`, `parseGuestInterfaces`, `parseResolvConf`) are pure + separately pinned |
+| `buildFileBrowserPaths` + `fbPathDeps` (R-67, v0.160.0) | controller/internal/web/handlers.go | pure assembly of one FileBrowser sync pass: (mount lines, config source paths) from the registry, with per-kind gates | filebrowser_network_test.go. **Two storage classes, two DIFFERENT gates:** drives keep the drive-absent gate + userdata scoping + skeleton (byte-identical to pre-R-67 — tested); network shares bind the share ROOT `:rslave` with the STUB gate instead (`classifyFSPath`; stub ⇒ excluded from mounts AND sources — an exposed stub swallows uploads the real mount later shadows; idle autofs / unknown ⇒ include, fail open). NEVER call `EnsureUserdataSkeleton` toward a network path (red-proven); never force-wake an idle trigger in the sync (doctrine) |
 | `Server.guestGatewayFn` / `guestNetFn` (func seams) | controller/internal/web/server.go (fields) + sharing_handlers.go accessors | nil → `stackMgr.GuestGateway` / `stackMgr.GuestNetSnapshot` | network_card_test.go — the counted-fn freshness test (2 renders ⇒ 2 resolves) is what stops anyone memoizing a DHCP lease; the Hálózati név row is gated on `smb.Enabled` (red-proven: gate dropped ⇒ \\FELHOM rendered while samba is down) |
 | `sambaEnsureState.consumeIfRunning()` | controller/internal/web/samba_ensure_job.go | serve-once `snapshot()` for terminal `running` only | `/sharing/status` carries a job EDGE (`phase`) and a service LEVEL (`running`) in one envelope — never let a level reach the phase channel, and never re-serve a consumed edge: the client answers `phase=="running"` with `location.reload()`, so both mistakes produce an infinite page reload (S-1/S-4, DIAG-sharing-2026-07-20.md). `failed`/`needs_password`/in-flight are NOT consumed |
 | `infra.SambaHostInterface` | controller/internal/infra/samba.go | the guest LAN nic name (`eth0`) | Single source for smb.conf's `interfaces =`, the container's `FELHOM_IFACE`, and the LAN-address read — if they name different nics, the service and the address the page prints drift apart |

controller/README.md

@@ -1309,6 +1309,16 @@ not just those with HDD data. Non-HDD apps can configure destination, method, an
 >     `syncFileBrowserMounts` (system + additional drives); a **deploy belt** in `composeExecCustomEnv`
 >     (on `up`) pre-creates every `${USERDATA_PATH}/...` bind source the app declares, so Docker never
 >     auto-creates a userdata dir as guest-root (covers apps not in the skeleton).
+>   - **NAS shares browse too (v0.160.0, R-67):** a registered network storage binds its share ROOT
+>     into FileBrowser (`/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>:/srv/<name>:rslave`) — no userdata scoping and NO
+>     skeleton (Felhom convention dirs are never written onto a customer's own NAS; the sync is
+>     read-only toward the share). The gate differs from drives: an idle autofs trigger is HEALTHY
+>     and included (first access wakes it — Phase-0-probed through an rslave bind on demo-hp), while
+>     a `stub` classifier verdict (this namespace sees a local dir, not the NAS) EXCLUDES the share
+>     from both the mounts and the source list that pass — uploading into a stub would be silently
+>     shadowed by the real mount later. `unknown` fails open. NAS add-success and remove trigger the
+>     same debounced `SyncFileBrowserMounts`; pure assembly lives in `buildFileBrowserPaths`
+>     (handlers.go) with every edge seamed.
 >   - **FileBrowser** mounts `<drive>/userdata` (was `appdata`) and runs as uid 1000 → it can create
 >     folders + upload into the 2775 setgid tree (fixes the old permission-denied); app internals
 >     (`appdata/`) are no longer browsable. **(v0.66.2)** its entrypoint is wrapped

controller/internal/web/filebrowser_network_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"log"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/appbackup"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/infra"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/settings"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller/internal/system"
+)
+
+// R-67 — the NAS share appears in FileBrowser. Scenarios A–D drive buildFileBrowserPaths with
+// every edge seamed (no drive, no NAS, no docker anywhere near these tests).
+
+func fbTestDrive() settings.StoragePath {
+	return settings.StoragePath{Path: "/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1", Label: "Külső HDD", Schedulable: true}
+}
+
+func fbTestShare() settings.StoragePath {
+	return settings.StoragePath{
+		Path: "/mnt/felhom-drives/Felhom-Share", Label: "Felhom Share", Schedulable: true,
+		Kind: settings.StorageKindNetwork, Protocol: "smb", Server: "192.168.0.104", Export: "Felhom-Share",
+	}
+}
+
+// fbDeps returns deps where the drive is a live mountpoint, the classifier is scripted, and the
+// skeleton fake RECORDS every invocation — the A red-proof hangs off that recording.
+func fbDeps(classifyResult string, skeletonCalls *[]string, logBuf *bytes.Buffer) fbPathDeps {
+	var lg *log.Logger
+	if logBuf != nil {
+		lg = log.New(logBuf, "", 0)
+	}
+	return fbPathDeps{
+		isMount:  func(string) bool { return true },
+		classify: func(string) string { return classifyResult },
+		ensureSkeleton: func(path string) error {
+			*skeletonCalls = append(*skeletonCalls, path)
+			return nil
+		},
+		logger: lg,
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario A: one drive + one network share (healthy verdict) → the drive's userdata line is
+// BYTE-IDENTICAL to a drives-only pass (the B′ invariant), the share binds its ROOT with :rslave,
+// the config carries both sources, and the skeleton ran for the drive ONLY — never toward the NAS.
+func TestFileBrowserNetworkShareIncluded(t *testing.T) {
+	drive, share := fbTestDrive(), fbTestShare()
+	var calls []string
+	mounts, cfgPaths := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{drive, share}, fbDeps(system.FSClassNetwork, &calls, nil))
+
+	var onlyCalls []string
+	onlyMounts, _ := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{drive}, fbDeps(system.FSClassNetwork, &onlyCalls, nil))
+
+	// B′: the drive line with the share present is byte-identical to the drives-only render.
+	if len(onlyMounts) != 1 || len(mounts) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("mounts: got %v / drives-only %v", mounts, onlyMounts)
+	}
+	if mounts[0] != onlyMounts[0] {
+		t.Errorf("drive line changed by the network branch:\n with: %q\n only: %q", mounts[0], onlyMounts[0])
+	}
+	wantDrive := "      - " + appbackup.UserdataDir(drive.Path) + ":/srv/hdd_1"
+	if mounts[0] != wantDrive {
+		t.Errorf("drive line = %q, want %q", mounts[0], wantDrive)
+	}
+	// The share binds its ROOT (not a userdata subtree) with :rslave — the propagation flag is
+	// load-bearing (idle-wake events must reach the running container).
+	wantShare := "      - /mnt/felhom-drives/Felhom-Share:/srv/Felhom-Share:rslave"
+	if mounts[1] != wantShare {
+		t.Errorf("share line = %q, want %q", mounts[1], wantShare)
+	}
+	// Skeleton: exactly the drive, NEVER the NAS. (Red-proof: routing network paths through the
+	// drive branch makes this fail with the share path recorded.)
+	if len(calls) != 1 || calls[0] != drive.Path {
+		t.Errorf("skeleton calls = %v, want exactly [%s] — a skeleton toward the NAS writes Felhom convention dirs onto the customer's own NAS", calls, drive.Path)
+	}
+	// Config has both sources, share named by its display label.
+	cfg := infra.RenderFileBrowserConfig(cfgPaths)
+	for _, m := range []string{`- path: "/srv/hdd_1"`, `- path: "/srv/Felhom-Share"`, `name: "Felhom Share"`} {
+		if !strings.Contains(cfg, m) {
+			t.Errorf("config missing %q:\n%s", m, cfg)
+		}
+	}
+	// And the full compose render carries both lines (the renderer passes propagation through).
+	compose := infra.RenderFileBrowserCompose("example.hu", mounts)
+	if !strings.Contains(compose, wantShare) || !strings.Contains(compose, wantDrive) {
+		t.Errorf("compose lost a mount line:\n%s", compose)
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario B: stub verdict → the share is excluded from BOTH mounts and sources this pass, the
+// drive is untouched, and the warn is logged. The wrong case this gate kills: a customer uploads
+// into a local stub dir that the real mount later shadows — their files silently vanish from view.
+// Red-proof: dropping the stub gate fails the absent-line assertions.
+func TestFileBrowserNetworkStubExcluded(t *testing.T) {
+	drive, share := fbTestDrive(), fbTestShare()
+	var calls []string
+	var logBuf bytes.Buffer
+	mounts, cfgPaths := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{drive, share}, fbDeps(system.FSClassStub, &calls, &logBuf))
+
+	if len(mounts) != 1 || strings.Contains(mounts[0], "Felhom-Share") {
+		t.Errorf("stub share leaked into mounts: %v", mounts)
+	}
+	cfg := infra.RenderFileBrowserConfig(cfgPaths)
+	if strings.Contains(cfg, "Felhom-Share") {
+		t.Errorf("stub share leaked into the source list:\n%s", cfg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(cfg, `- path: "/srv/hdd_1"`) {
+		t.Errorf("drive source lost while excluding the stub share:\n%s", cfg)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), "local stub") {
+		t.Errorf("stub exclusion not logged: %q", logBuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario C: the autofs-trigger verdict (idle automount) INCLUDES the share — idle is healthy;
+// the wrong case here is treating idle like a detached drive (the pre-R-67 gate skipped an idle
+// share forever). unknown also includes (fail open), as does a nil classifier.
+func TestFileBrowserNetworkIdleIncluded(t *testing.T) {
+	share := fbTestShare()
+	for _, verdict := range []string{system.FSClassAutofs, system.FSClassNetwork, system.FSClassUnknown} {
+		var calls []string
+		mounts, cfgPaths := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{share}, fbDeps(verdict, &calls, nil))
+		if len(mounts) != 1 || !strings.Contains(mounts[0], ":rslave") {
+			t.Errorf("verdict %q: share not mounted: %v", verdict, mounts)
+		}
+		if len(cfgPaths) != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("verdict %q: share not in sources", verdict)
+		}
+	}
+	// nil classifier (no seam wired) must fail OPEN — never hide the share.
+	var calls []string
+	d := fbDeps("", &calls, nil)
+	d.classify = nil
+	if mounts, _ := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{share}, d); len(mounts) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("nil classifier hid the share: %v", mounts)
+	}
+}
+
+// Scenario D: removal — a registry without the share renders with no trace of it, and the F2
+// change detection sees the difference (forces the recreate that drops the live mount).
+func TestFileBrowserNetworkRemoval(t *testing.T) {
+	drive, share := fbTestDrive(), fbTestShare()
+	var calls []string
+	withMounts, withCfg := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{drive, share}, fbDeps(system.FSClassNetwork, &calls, nil))
+	withoutMounts, withoutCfg := buildFileBrowserPaths([]settings.StoragePath{drive}, fbDeps(system.FSClassNetwork, &calls, nil))
+
+	oldCompose := infra.RenderFileBrowserCompose("example.hu", withMounts)
+	newCompose := infra.RenderFileBrowserCompose("example.hu", withoutMounts)
+	oldCfg := infra.RenderFileBrowserConfig(withCfg)
+	newCfg := infra.RenderFileBrowserConfig(withoutCfg)
+
+	if strings.Contains(newCompose, "Felhom-Share") || strings.Contains(newCfg, "Felhom-Share") {
+		t.Error("removed share left a trace in the renders")
+	}
+	if !fbNeedsRecreate([]byte(oldCfg), []byte(newCfg), []byte(oldCompose), []byte(newCompose)) {
+		t.Error("F2 change detection missed the share removal — the live mount would linger")
+	}
+}

controller/internal/web/handlers.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
@@ -2119,33 +2120,18 @@ func (s *Server) syncFileBrowserMounts(resetDBOnChange bool) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Build volume mount lines. SCOPE to the drive's `userdata/` subtree (v0.66.0): the customer
-	// browses ONLY userdata — app internals (appdata/) and the recovery units + Tier 2 copies
-	// (backups/) are NOT mounted into FileBrowser. userdata is owned group 1000 mode 2775 (setgid),
-	// and FileBrowser runs as uid 1000 → it can create folders + upload files (the old appdata mount
-	// was guest-root 0755 → permission-denied). Pre-create the full skeleton with the convention.
-	var storageMounts []string
-	for _, sp := range paths {
-		mountName := filepath.Base(sp.Path) // "/mnt/hdd_1" → "hdd_1"
-		// Drive-absent gate: an external drive path that isn't currently a live mountpoint is detached —
-		// don't create its userdata skeleton (would write onto the rootfs) and don't mount it into
-		// FileBrowser this pass. It returns on the next sync after reconnect. Matches planDriveGates'
-		// external-only rule (system paths, not under StableParentDir, are never skipped).
-		if skipFileBrowserPath(sp.Path, system.IsMountPoint) {
-			s.logger.Printf("[INFO] [web] FileBrowser: drive %s not mounted — skipping userdata skeleton", sp.Path)
-			continue
-		}
-		if err := appbackup.EnsureUserdataSkeleton(sp.Path); err != nil {
-			s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [web] FileBrowser: could not ensure userdata skeleton on %s: %v", sp.Path, err)
-		}
-		userdataSrc := appbackup.UserdataDir(sp.Path)
-		line := fmt.Sprintf("      - %s:/srv/%s", userdataSrc, mountName)
-		storageMounts = append(storageMounts, line)
-	}
+	// Build volume mount lines + the config source set (R-67: the two must agree — a source with
+	// no mount behind it renders a broken sidebar entry).
+	storageMounts, configPaths := buildFileBrowserPaths(paths, fbPathDeps{
+		isMount:        system.IsMountPoint,
+		classify:       s.classifyFSPath,
+		ensureSkeleton: appbackup.EnsureUserdataSkeleton,
+		logger:         s.logger,
+	})
 
-	// Generate and write config.yaml (sources + sidebar entries per drive)
+	// Generate and write config.yaml (sources + sidebar entries per drive/share)
 	configPath := stackDir + "/config.yaml"
-	fbConfig := generateFileBrowserConfig(paths)
+	fbConfig := generateFileBrowserConfig(configPaths)
 
 	// Capture the current on-disk content BEFORE any writes, so we can detect whether this sync
 	// actually changes anything (F2). The integrations' ReapplyConfigForTarget edits config.yaml
@@ -2215,6 +2201,78 @@ func (s *Server) syncFileBrowserMounts(resetDBOnChange bool) {
 	}
 }
 
+// fbPathDeps are the injectable edges of buildFileBrowserPaths — everything that would otherwise
+// touch the real mount table, the real filesystem or a real statfs, so the A/B/C/D scenarios run
+// without a drive, a NAS or docker.
+type fbPathDeps struct {
+	isMount        func(string) bool   // drive-absent gate probe (production: system.IsMountPoint)
+	classify       func(string) string // network stub gate (production: Server.classifyFSPath; nil → include, fail open)
+	ensureSkeleton func(string) error  // userdata skeleton (production: appbackup.EnsureUserdataSkeleton) — DRIVES ONLY
+	logger         *log.Logger
+}
+
+// buildFileBrowserPaths computes one FileBrowser sync pass's volume mount lines + the source-list
+// paths, with the per-kind gates applied. Two storage classes, two DIFFERENT gates:
+//
+// DRIVES (v0.66.0 semantics, unchanged byte-for-byte): scope to the `userdata/` subtree, pre-create
+// the skeleton, and apply the drive-absent gate — a detached external drive must not get a skeleton
+// written onto the rootfs. Drives always stay in the config source list (pre-R-67 behavior kept).
+//
+// NETWORK SHARES (R-67): the drive-absent gate does NOT apply — an idle automount trigger is
+// HEALTHY (first access mounts it; the old gate skipped an idle share forever). The gate here is
+// the STUB classifier instead, and it is a data-safety gate, not cosmetics: exposing a local stub
+// dir lets a customer upload into a directory the real mount will later SHADOW — their files
+// silently vanish from view. A stub share is excluded from BOTH the mounts and the source list
+// this pass (a source without a mount is a broken sidebar entry). autofs-trigger / real network fs
+// / unknown all include (unknown fails open — a wedged NAS must not hide the share forever).
+// The bind is the share ROOT with :rslave — load-bearing: host-side automount wake and
+// idle-unmount events must propagate into the RUNNING container (Phase-0 probe 2026-07-22 proved
+// an in-container access through an rslave bind wakes the idle trigger). Never a skeleton, never
+// any write toward the NAS — Felhom conventions must not be written onto a customer's own NAS.
+func buildFileBrowserPaths(paths []settings.StoragePath, d fbPathDeps) (storageMounts []string, configPaths []settings.StoragePath) {
+	configPaths = make([]settings.StoragePath, 0, len(paths))
+	for _, sp := range paths {
+		mountName := filepath.Base(sp.Path) // "/mnt/hdd_1" → "hdd_1"; ".../Felhom-Share" → "Felhom-Share"
+		if sp.IsNetwork() {
+			if d.classify != nil && d.classify(sp.Path) == system.FSClassStub {
+				if d.logger != nil {
+					d.logger.Printf("[WARN] [web] FileBrowser: %s namespace sees a local stub, not the NAS — excluded until propagation recovers", mountName)
+				}
+				continue
+			}
+			storageMounts = append(storageMounts, fmt.Sprintf("      - %s:/srv/%s:rslave", sp.Path, mountName))
+			configPaths = append(configPaths, sp)
+			continue
+		}
+		// Drives are ALWAYS in the source list (pre-R-67 behavior: the config listed every
+		// registered path; only the mount obeys the drive-absent gate).
+		configPaths = append(configPaths, sp)
+		// Drive-absent gate: an external drive path that isn't currently a live mountpoint is detached —
+		// don't create its userdata skeleton (would write onto the rootfs) and don't mount it into
+		// FileBrowser this pass. It returns on the next sync after reconnect. Matches planDriveGates'
+		// external-only rule (system paths, not under StableParentDir, are never skipped).
+		if skipFileBrowserPath(sp.Path, d.isMount) {
+			if d.logger != nil {
+				d.logger.Printf("[INFO] [web] FileBrowser: drive %s not mounted — skipping userdata skeleton", sp.Path)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		// SCOPE to the drive's `userdata/` subtree (v0.66.0): the customer browses ONLY userdata —
+		// app internals (appdata/) and the recovery units + Tier 2 copies (backups/) are NOT mounted
+		// into FileBrowser. userdata is owned group 1000 mode 2775 (setgid), and FileBrowser runs as
+		// uid 1000 → it can create folders + upload files (the old appdata mount was guest-root 0755
+		// → permission-denied). Pre-create the full skeleton with the convention.
+		if err := d.ensureSkeleton(sp.Path); err != nil {
+			if d.logger != nil {
+				d.logger.Printf("[WARN] [web] FileBrowser: could not ensure userdata skeleton on %s: %v", sp.Path, err)
+			}
+		}
+		userdataSrc := appbackup.UserdataDir(sp.Path)
+		storageMounts = append(storageMounts, fmt.Sprintf("      - %s:/srv/%s", userdataSrc, mountName))
+	}
+	return storageMounts, configPaths
+}
+
 // fbNeedsRecreate reports whether the FileBrowser container must be force-recreated: true when either
 // the config.yaml or the compose file content changed between the pre-sync and post-sync state. On the
 // first-ever run the old files are empty → differs from the freshly generated content → true (creates

controller/internal/web/netstorage_handlers.go

@@ -325,6 +325,9 @@ func (s *Server) handleNetStorageRemove(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] [web] netstorage deregister %q: %v", where, err)
 	}
 	s.logger.Printf("[INFO] [web] network storage removed: %s", name)
+	// R-67: drop the share's FileBrowser source + mount line on the next sync (F2 change-detection
+	// forces the recreate).
+	go s.SyncFileBrowserMounts()
 	writeDiskJSON(w, http.StatusOK, true, "", map[string]any{"removed": true, "name": name})
 }
 

controller/internal/web/netstorage_job.go

@@ -283,6 +283,8 @@ func (s *Server) runNetAdd(agent netAgent, req agentapi.AddNetStorageRequest, la
 	s.netAdd.set(job)
 	logx.Infof(s.logger, "[web] network storage added + verified: %s (%s %s:%s) → %s (warn=%q) in %dms",
 		req.Name, req.Protocol, req.Server, req.Export, res.GuestPath, outcome.Warn, time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
+	// R-67: the fresh share becomes browsable — same debounced/mutexed path the drive flows use.
+	go s.SyncFileBrowserMounts()
 }
 
 // pollAgentVerify polls the agent's verify slot until it leaves `running` (or ctx expires).