Files
felhom-agent/REPORT.md
T
admin e4dfe5ccc7 slice 10D (agent): DR capstone — identity escrow + restore-mode consumption (v0.18.0)
Identity escrow wraps {tunnel_token,pbs_token} under the SAME R via age
(scrypt+ChaCha20-Poly1305), reusing the K-escrow pty; wrong R fails closed.
escrow.Create optionally emits the identity blob; escrow-create uploads it +
the non-secret directive; identity-consume recovers it (R by hand, never
logged). K-escrow + 10C Consume untouched. Closes slice 10 with hub v0.11.0;
operator-side rotation model (hub holds no Cloudflare write-power).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 09:48:36 +02:00

49 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown

# REPORT — slice 10D (agent half): DR capstone — identity escrow + restore-mode consumption (v0.18.0) (2026-06-10)
> Overwrite-latest report. Cumulative history: [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).
## What was implemented
The agent half of the slice-10 DR capstone (closes slice 10), grounded by both 10-series spikes
(escrow-consumption + identity-restore). The hub half (recovery-mode, re-enroll, directive serving)
is hub v0.11.0. **Rotation model (locked):** the hub holds no Cloudflare write-power; the destructive
tunnel/PBS rotation is the operator's step from a trusted environment (same spirit as 10B).
### Identity escrow (`internal/escrow/identity.go`)
- `WrapIdentity`/`UnwrapIdentity` (+ `…Bundle`) wrap the `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}` bundle under the
SAME recovery code `R` via **`age`** (scrypt + ChaCha20-Poly1305 — vetted passphrase-AEAD, not
hand-rolled), **reusing the K-escrow pty mechanism** (passphrase via the tty, data via files;
`R`/tokens never logged). Same two-factor, zero-knowledge shape as the K-escrow; a **wrong R fails
closed** (no bundle). `age` is a runtime dep for the identity path (like proxmox-backup-client for K).
- `escrow.Create` gains an optional `IdentityBundle` → emits `IdentityBlob` under the same R
(additive; the K-escrow + 10C `Consume` are byte-unchanged; self-verifies the identity round-trip).
- `--selftest=escrow-create -identity-bundle <f> -directive <f>` (wrap + upload the identity blob +
non-secret directive) and `--selftest=identity-consume -blob <f> -keydest <f>` (R via
`FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`; tokens written 0600, never logged) — the real code, drillable.
### Restore-mode orchestration (10D.3)
Composed from proven pieces: re-enroll (hub) → fetch directive (10A) → `Consume` K (10C, fingerprint
-gated) + `identity-consume` (R by hand) → restore guests from PBS (restore-overwrite gated by 10B) →
re-establish the tunnel (recovered token + reconstituted origin — proven in the 10D spike). The
destructive cred rotation is the operator's step.
## Tests
- identity round-trips (wrap→unwrap byte-identical; blob is opaque ciphertext); wrong R fails closed +
blob stays retryable; input validation. K-escrow/10C unchanged. `go test ./...` green (age
integration tests gated to a host with the `age` CLI).
## Versioning / docs
- Version `0.17.0 → 0.18.0`; `CHANGELOG.md`. Doc 03 §9 (10D done → **slice 10 CLOSED**) + the
host-loss DR flow with the operator-side rotation model.
## Deferred (non-blocking, per the locked model)
- The hub Config DR/Recovery **web UI** (functional via the recovery-mode admin API today) + a small
operator rotation CLI (the tunnel/PBS rotation + stale-connector delete is a documented operator
procedure from the trusted environment — the hub never holds Cloudflare write-power).
## Pending
- The operator-in-the-loop **DR drill** (live, throwaway identity): host-loss → recovery mode →
re-enroll (old key revoked) → R → consume → restore → re-establish → operator rotates/retires the
old connector → only the new box serves. CC drives the `[CC]` steps; the operator does the trusted
steps.