b2ca63ee9f
Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal; that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first. Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd: 1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct. 2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion. 3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud `auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears. R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift. Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed — the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
153 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
153 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
package pbs
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
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)
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// DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout bounds the per-collect live PBS reads so a slow/hung PBS can never
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// stall the host-report (and thus the heartbeat). A few seconds is ample for the cheap list GET on
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// the LAN; on overrun the reporter falls back to last-known-good rather than blocking.
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const DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout = 8 * time.Second
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// LiveSnapshotReporter resolves the PBS snapshot inventory LIVE on each collect (the cheap
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// Snapshots() list), so the host-report — and the DR recipe's pbs coord derived from it — is present
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// whenever PBS is reachable, INDEPENDENT of the 6 h verify cadence. This closes the gap where a
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// one-shot collect (selftest=hub) and the first window of every daemon after a restart saw the
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// verify-loop's SnapshotStore still empty (→ no pbs coord, the restore SOURCE missing).
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//
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// On a per-datastore live error/timeout it falls back to the store's last-known-good; a successful
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// (even empty) response is authoritative and updates the store. If targets cannot be resolved at all
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// it returns the store's full aggregate. It shares the same *SnapshotStore the verify loop Records
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// into, so the two keep each other's last-known-good warm. It NEVER triggers a verify — list only.
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type LiveSnapshotReporter struct {
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targets Targets // pbsTargetsFromPVE(...) closure — re-resolved each collect
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store *SnapshotStore // shared last-known-good cache (verify loop writes it too)
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timeout time.Duration // per-collect bound on the live reads
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log *slog.Logger
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// listSnapshots is the production→PBS seam, overridable in tests so no live PBS is needed.
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// Default = liveListSnapshots (one Snapshots() GET, converted via Snapshot.ToHub()).
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listSnapshots func(ctx context.Context, t Target) ([]hub.PBSSnapshot, error)
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// probeAuth is the R-39 credential probe seam (default = (*Client).ProbeAuth). Overridable so the
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// auth-honesty path is testable with no PBS.
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probeAuth func(ctx context.Context, t Target) error
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// authSink receives every probe result. nil = nobody is listening (the probe is then skipped
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// entirely — no point paying for a request nothing consumes).
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authSink AuthSink
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}
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// AuthSink receives the result of each per-storage credential probe (R-39 leg c).
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//
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// It exists so the DR bridge can turn a 401 into a LOUD `auth_failed` state instead of the Warn-and-
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// skip that made an applied-but-dead tier invisible. Deliberately a plain interface taking a bool
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// rather than the error: the consumer (internal/pbsdr) must not have to import this package just to
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// test a sentinel.
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type AuthSink interface {
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// NoteAuthResult reports one storage's credential health. unauthorized=true means PBS REJECTED
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// the credential (401) — terminal until it is replaced. A transport error is unauthorized=false
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// with a non-empty detail: unknown, not dead, and never a reason to re-key.
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NoteAuthResult(storageID string, unauthorized bool, detail string)
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}
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// SetAuthSink wires the credential-probe consumer. Without it the reporter does not probe at all.
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func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) SetAuthSink(s AuthSink) { r.authSink = s }
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// NewLiveSnapshotReporter builds a live reporter sharing store with the verify loop. A zero timeout
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// falls back to DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout; a nil logger to slog.Default.
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func NewLiveSnapshotReporter(targets Targets, store *SnapshotStore, timeout time.Duration, log *slog.Logger) *LiveSnapshotReporter {
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if timeout <= 0 {
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timeout = DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout
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}
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if log == nil {
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log = slog.Default()
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}
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return &LiveSnapshotReporter{
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targets: targets,
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store: store,
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timeout: timeout,
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log: log,
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listSnapshots: liveListSnapshots,
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probeAuth: func(ctx context.Context, t Target) error { return t.Client.ProbeAuth(ctx) },
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}
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}
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// liveListSnapshots does ONE cheap snapshot list for a target and converts each record to the hub
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// wire shape (reusing Snapshot.ToHub — RFC3339 backup_time, verify_state). List only; no verify.
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func liveListSnapshots(ctx context.Context, t Target) ([]hub.PBSSnapshot, error) {
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snaps, err := t.Client.Snapshots(ctx, t.Datastore)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out := make([]hub.PBSSnapshot, 0, len(snaps))
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for _, s := range snaps {
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out = append(out, s.ToHub())
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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// probeAuthAndReport runs the credential probe for one target and forwards the verdict to the sink.
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// No sink → no probe (nothing would consume it). Never fails the collect: a report must still go out.
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func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) probeAuthAndReport(ctx context.Context, t Target) {
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if r.authSink == nil || r.probeAuth == nil {
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return
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}
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err := r.probeAuth(ctx, t)
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, false, "")
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case errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthorized):
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// The one case that is TERMINAL and actionable: the credential is rejected, not the network.
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r.log.Error("pbs: the DR endpoint REJECTED this box's credential (401) — the storage entry is "+
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"pinned to a superseded secret and every backup/restore against it will fail",
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"storage", t.StorageID, "datastore", t.Datastore)
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r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, true, "PBS rejected the stored credential (401)")
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default:
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// Unreachable/timeout/TLS — UNKNOWN, not dead. Reporting this as unauthorized would re-key a
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// perfectly good credential on every network blip.
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r.log.Debug("pbs: credential probe inconclusive (not a rejection)", "storage", t.StorageID, "err", err)
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r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, false, err.Error())
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}
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}
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// PBSSnapshots implements hub.PBSReporter with a single bounded, live pass (last-known-good
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// fallback). Non-nil result so it marshals as [].
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func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) PBSSnapshots(ctx context.Context) []hub.PBSSnapshot {
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childCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
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defer cancel()
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targets, err := r.targets(childCtx)
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if err != nil {
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// Cannot even enumerate datastores → fall back to the full last-known-good aggregate.
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r.log.Debug("pbs: live targets resolution failed; using last-known-good aggregate", "err", err)
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return r.store.PBSSnapshots(ctx)
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}
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out := []hub.PBSSnapshot{}
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for _, t := range targets {
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// R-39 leg (c): prove the credential BEFORE interpreting anything else about this datastore.
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// A snapshot list that fails with 401 used to look identical to "PBS is busy" — which is how
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// an applied-and-dead tier stayed green. The probe runs on this 15-minute collect path (not
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// the 6 h verify cadence) because that is how fast the hub can react.
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r.probeAuthAndReport(childCtx, t)
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snaps, err := r.listSnapshots(childCtx, t)
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if err != nil {
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// Per-datastore live failure → that datastore's last-known-good (does NOT clobber it).
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r.log.Debug("pbs: live list failed; using last-known-good", "datastore", t.Datastore, "err", err)
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out = append(out, r.store.Get(t.Datastore)...)
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continue
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}
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// A successful response (INCLUDING empty) is authoritative — record it as the new
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// last-known-good so a later error reuses fresh truth, not a stale set.
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r.store.Record(t.Datastore, snaps)
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out = append(out, snaps...)
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}
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return out
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}
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