Files
felhom-agent/internal/pbs/live_reporter.go
T
admin b2ca63ee9f v0.91.0 — the DR tier can no longer be applied and dead at the same time (R-39 + R-50b(a))
Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal;
that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first.

Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd:

1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so
   token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor
   content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the
   fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the
   hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct.

2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw
   through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no
   read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and
   skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a
   narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one
   secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal
   refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion.

3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized
   sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud
   `auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace
   or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as
   unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing
   anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network
   blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears.

R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the
vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift.

Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm
test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied
AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset
guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch
it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed —
the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
2026-07-21 10:12:31 +02:00

153 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package pbs
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
)
// DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout bounds the per-collect live PBS reads so a slow/hung PBS can never
// stall the host-report (and thus the heartbeat). A few seconds is ample for the cheap list GET on
// the LAN; on overrun the reporter falls back to last-known-good rather than blocking.
const DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout = 8 * time.Second
// LiveSnapshotReporter resolves the PBS snapshot inventory LIVE on each collect (the cheap
// Snapshots() list), so the host-report — and the DR recipe's pbs coord derived from it — is present
// whenever PBS is reachable, INDEPENDENT of the 6 h verify cadence. This closes the gap where a
// one-shot collect (selftest=hub) and the first window of every daemon after a restart saw the
// verify-loop's SnapshotStore still empty (→ no pbs coord, the restore SOURCE missing).
//
// On a per-datastore live error/timeout it falls back to the store's last-known-good; a successful
// (even empty) response is authoritative and updates the store. If targets cannot be resolved at all
// it returns the store's full aggregate. It shares the same *SnapshotStore the verify loop Records
// into, so the two keep each other's last-known-good warm. It NEVER triggers a verify — list only.
type LiveSnapshotReporter struct {
targets Targets // pbsTargetsFromPVE(...) closure — re-resolved each collect
store *SnapshotStore // shared last-known-good cache (verify loop writes it too)
timeout time.Duration // per-collect bound on the live reads
log *slog.Logger
// listSnapshots is the production→PBS seam, overridable in tests so no live PBS is needed.
// Default = liveListSnapshots (one Snapshots() GET, converted via Snapshot.ToHub()).
listSnapshots func(ctx context.Context, t Target) ([]hub.PBSSnapshot, error)
// probeAuth is the R-39 credential probe seam (default = (*Client).ProbeAuth). Overridable so the
// auth-honesty path is testable with no PBS.
probeAuth func(ctx context.Context, t Target) error
// authSink receives every probe result. nil = nobody is listening (the probe is then skipped
// entirely — no point paying for a request nothing consumes).
authSink AuthSink
}
// AuthSink receives the result of each per-storage credential probe (R-39 leg c).
//
// It exists so the DR bridge can turn a 401 into a LOUD `auth_failed` state instead of the Warn-and-
// skip that made an applied-but-dead tier invisible. Deliberately a plain interface taking a bool
// rather than the error: the consumer (internal/pbsdr) must not have to import this package just to
// test a sentinel.
type AuthSink interface {
// NoteAuthResult reports one storage's credential health. unauthorized=true means PBS REJECTED
// the credential (401) — terminal until it is replaced. A transport error is unauthorized=false
// with a non-empty detail: unknown, not dead, and never a reason to re-key.
NoteAuthResult(storageID string, unauthorized bool, detail string)
}
// SetAuthSink wires the credential-probe consumer. Without it the reporter does not probe at all.
func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) SetAuthSink(s AuthSink) { r.authSink = s }
// NewLiveSnapshotReporter builds a live reporter sharing store with the verify loop. A zero timeout
// falls back to DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout; a nil logger to slog.Default.
func NewLiveSnapshotReporter(targets Targets, store *SnapshotStore, timeout time.Duration, log *slog.Logger) *LiveSnapshotReporter {
if timeout <= 0 {
timeout = DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout
}
if log == nil {
log = slog.Default()
}
return &LiveSnapshotReporter{
targets: targets,
store: store,
timeout: timeout,
log: log,
listSnapshots: liveListSnapshots,
probeAuth: func(ctx context.Context, t Target) error { return t.Client.ProbeAuth(ctx) },
}
}
// liveListSnapshots does ONE cheap snapshot list for a target and converts each record to the hub
// wire shape (reusing Snapshot.ToHub — RFC3339 backup_time, verify_state). List only; no verify.
func liveListSnapshots(ctx context.Context, t Target) ([]hub.PBSSnapshot, error) {
snaps, err := t.Client.Snapshots(ctx, t.Datastore)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := make([]hub.PBSSnapshot, 0, len(snaps))
for _, s := range snaps {
out = append(out, s.ToHub())
}
return out, nil
}
// probeAuthAndReport runs the credential probe for one target and forwards the verdict to the sink.
// No sink → no probe (nothing would consume it). Never fails the collect: a report must still go out.
func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) probeAuthAndReport(ctx context.Context, t Target) {
if r.authSink == nil || r.probeAuth == nil {
return
}
err := r.probeAuth(ctx, t)
switch {
case err == nil:
r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, false, "")
case errors.Is(err, ErrUnauthorized):
// The one case that is TERMINAL and actionable: the credential is rejected, not the network.
r.log.Error("pbs: the DR endpoint REJECTED this box's credential (401) — the storage entry is "+
"pinned to a superseded secret and every backup/restore against it will fail",
"storage", t.StorageID, "datastore", t.Datastore)
r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, true, "PBS rejected the stored credential (401)")
default:
// Unreachable/timeout/TLS — UNKNOWN, not dead. Reporting this as unauthorized would re-key a
// perfectly good credential on every network blip.
r.log.Debug("pbs: credential probe inconclusive (not a rejection)", "storage", t.StorageID, "err", err)
r.authSink.NoteAuthResult(t.StorageID, false, err.Error())
}
}
// PBSSnapshots implements hub.PBSReporter with a single bounded, live pass (last-known-good
// fallback). Non-nil result so it marshals as [].
func (r *LiveSnapshotReporter) PBSSnapshots(ctx context.Context) []hub.PBSSnapshot {
childCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
defer cancel()
targets, err := r.targets(childCtx)
if err != nil {
// Cannot even enumerate datastores → fall back to the full last-known-good aggregate.
r.log.Debug("pbs: live targets resolution failed; using last-known-good aggregate", "err", err)
return r.store.PBSSnapshots(ctx)
}
out := []hub.PBSSnapshot{}
for _, t := range targets {
// R-39 leg (c): prove the credential BEFORE interpreting anything else about this datastore.
// A snapshot list that fails with 401 used to look identical to "PBS is busy" — which is how
// an applied-and-dead tier stayed green. The probe runs on this 15-minute collect path (not
// the 6 h verify cadence) because that is how fast the hub can react.
r.probeAuthAndReport(childCtx, t)
snaps, err := r.listSnapshots(childCtx, t)
if err != nil {
// Per-datastore live failure → that datastore's last-known-good (does NOT clobber it).
r.log.Debug("pbs: live list failed; using last-known-good", "datastore", t.Datastore, "err", err)
out = append(out, r.store.Get(t.Datastore)...)
continue
}
// A successful response (INCLUDING empty) is authoritative — record it as the new
// last-known-good so a later error reuses fresh truth, not a stale set.
r.store.Record(t.Datastore, snaps)
out = append(out, snaps...)
}
return out
}