Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal;
that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first.
Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd:
1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so
token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor
content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the
fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the
hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct.
2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw
through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no
read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and
skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a
narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one
secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal
refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion.
3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized
sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud
`auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace
or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as
unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing
anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network
blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears.
R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the
vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift.
Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm
test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied
AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset
guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch
it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed —
the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
Live PBS coord: new internal/pbs/live_reporter.go (LiveSnapshotReporter implements
hub.PBSReporter via the cheap Client.Snapshots() list with last-known-good fallback,
bounded by an 8s timeout, list-only — never triggers a verify). Closes the gap where
the recipe's pbs block was omitted whenever the verify-loop SnapshotStore was empty
(one-shot collect + the first ~6h after a daemon restart). SnapshotStore.Get added
(per-datastore LKG). Wired into the collector in both runDaemon and runSelftestHub;
the verify loop keeps Recording into the SAME shared store via one hoisted pbsTargets.
v1 host-half drive shape: dropped drives[].role (hub/operator-owned manifest concept,
not host-derivable) and drives[].restic_repo_coord (named a backup tier that doesn't
exist). Drive shape is now {durable_id, mount_path, intent, fs_type?, total_bytes}.
Hub reads drives as json.RawMessage → no hub struct change; goldens re-pinned
byte-identical (agent + hub copies).
Tests: live_reporter_test.go (T1 load-bearing coord-without-verify + T2..T6),
TestDRRecipeHostHalf_V1DriveShape; each companion demonstrated to fail pre-fix then
reverted. go build/vet/test green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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