admin
605ce25f58
Append a reversible SetConfig write+revert to runSelftestTask: read GuestConfig, write a `description` marker, verify it landed, restore the original (or delete if absent), verify the restore. Handles PVE's dual-mode SetConfig return (empty UPID = synchronous; UPID = WaitTask+assert OK). Live self-gate PASSED on demo-felhom / guest 9999. Findings: - LXC `description` write is synchronous (empty UPID) — dual-mode modeling confirmed; empty string is success, not an error. - PVE appends a trailing newline to `description` on read; slice-4 reconcile must normalize description comparisons (hence normDesc helper). First live exercise of the VM.Config.* privilege cluster. Standing operator token rotated during the run; new secret stored out-of-band, not in the repo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
79 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
# CLAUDE.md — `felhom-agent`
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> Place at the repo root (`felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md`). Loads when Claude Code touches this repo. Keep under ~200 lines. The cross-repo orientation lives in the workspace-root `e:\git\CLAUDE.md`; this file is `felhom-agent`-specific.
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## What this repo is
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`felhom-agent` is the operator-tier **host agent** that runs on each Proxmox host and owns **all** Proxmox interaction: provision/restore guests, host storage, backup/restore orchestration, the hub control loop, and a narrow per-guest local API. It is the **most privilege-sensitive** component.
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- It is the renamed former `proxmox-controller` repo.
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- **Distinct from `felhom-controller`** — that is the *in-guest* controller (Docker-only, no Proxmox creds). Do not confuse them.
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- Control plane, not data plane: if the agent dies, apps keep serving; only management degrades.
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## Build / run
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- Module `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent`; binary `felhom-agent` (`cmd/felhom-agent/`).
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- **Pure Go stdlib + `golang.org/x/crypto` only** — no web frameworks.
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- `go.mod` directive **go 1.25.0**; dep `golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0` (declares go 1.25, will NOT build on Go 1.24). The **build server (192.168.0.180) runs go1.26.0** (upstream Go on PATH, backward-compatible). Build/run the agent there for live tests (same LAN as the demo host).
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- Version: `version` var in `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go`, overridable via `-ldflags "-X main.version=<v>"`; `--version` flag. **Current: v0.3.2.** Bump on meaningful changes + add a CHANGELOG entry.
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## Layout
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```
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cmd/felhom-agent/ main + flag handling + --selftest modes + the daemon entry
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internal/config/ JSON config + FELHOM_AGENT_* env overlay; secrets redacted (Redacted())
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internal/log/ slog setup
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internal/proxmox/ API-first Client + fenced root-CLI Privileged + UPID WaitTask
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internal/authz/ operator signed-op verifier (SSHSIG); durable FileNonceStore
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internal/hub/ daemon: HostReport collector + Bearer client + resilient Loop
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```
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## Proxmox model (the load-bearing rules)
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- **API-first** via a scoped `FelhomAgent` token (16 privileges). Raw root-CLI is **fenced to exactly 3 exceptions**: keyctl `pct create` (golden image), USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors. `Client` never shells out; `Privileged` never makes HTTP calls (asserted by tests). Keep that fence.
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- **Every mutating op is async** → returns a UPID → `WaitTask` asserts `exitstatus == "OK"`. A 200 on the POST is **not** success; authorization can fail at task execution, not the POST.
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- **TLS:** SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning (the host serves a self-signed cert). No insecure default.
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- **Privsep token gotcha:** a `--privsep 1` token's rights = intersection of the backing user's perms AND the token's ACLs — so the role must be granted on **both** user and token, or every call 403s. (Token provisioning is out-of-band / human-run; the agent only consumes the token.)
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## Design + platform facts (read before designing)
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- Design doc: `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` (locked).
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- Platform facts: `felhom.eu/documentation/proxmox-platform.md` + `tests/phase{0,1-2,3,4}-findings.md`.
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## Current state
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Built in slices, all on `main`:
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- **v0.1.0** slice 1 — scaffold + `internal/proxmox` + `internal/config`/`log` + `--selftest`.
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- **v0.2.0** slice 2 — `internal/authz` signed-op verifier.
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- **v0.3.0** slice 3 — `internal/hub`: the first **daemon loop** (no-`--selftest` mode) posting a read-only `HostReport` to the hub (= the heartbeat). Report's storage/backup/restore/pbs/audit fields are **defined-but-empty** (slices 5/6); the envelope's desired-state/signed-ops fields are **parsed-but-ignored** (slice 4).
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- **v0.3.1** — slice-3 validation follow-ups.
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- **v0.3.2** — slice-4 pre-check: reversible `SetConfig` step added to `--selftest=task`; passed live on guest 9999. Findings: LXC `description` write is **synchronous** (empty UPID — dual-mode modeling confirmed); PVE appends a trailing `\n` to `description` on read (reconcile must normalize). First live `VM.Config.*` exercise.
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- **Next: slice 4 (reconcile + benign/destructive gate)** — the first slice that issues real Proxmox mutations. The live `--selftest=task` gate (snapshot/rollback/delete + `SetConfig`) is now **passed**.
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## Demo host (for live tests)
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Node **`demo-felhom`**, API `https://192.168.0.162:8006`, PVE 9.2.2; leaf-cert SHA-256 fingerprint starts `BA:7C:99:7D:45:D0…` (verify it still matches before a live run — the agent pins it). `pveum`/`pct` ops need `root@pam` on the PVE (SSH alias `felhom-pve`) - available to Claude Code
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Selftest modes (run from the build server, pointed at the demo API):
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- `--selftest` / `--selftest=read` — read-only health checks.
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- `--selftest=task -vmid N` — reversible snapshot→rollback→delete on guest N (gated; never under bare `--selftest`).
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- `--selftest=hub` — one collect + report round-trip to the hub.
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- No flag → the **daemon** (poll loop); requires `hub` config.
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## Conventions
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- Push to `main` directly; no feature branches.
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> **In every repository where you make a change, update both files in that repo:**
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> - **`CHANGELOG.md`** — a cumulative log of **all** changes; newest entry on top.
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> - **`REPORT.md`** — **overwrite** with a summary of the **most recent** implementation (or significant validation/operational run) only; not cumulative.
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>
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> **Never write secrets** — tokens, passwords, private keys, API keys — into `CHANGELOG.md`, `REPORT.md`, or any committed file. Reference them as "stored out-of-band" instead.
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- Code quality: verify generated code for bugs/edge cases; add debug logging; **ask rather than guess** when you'd otherwise invent input/output.
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## Workflow & artifacts
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- Implement **`TASK.md` / `TASK-*.md`** specs (when placed as `TASK.md` or told to implement one), then push + CHANGELOG + REPORT.md.
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- **`RUNBOOK-*.md`** — an operational procedure. CC executes the steps it has access and capability for, including live validation on the demo nodes and the demo Proxmox host (CC has root@felhom-pve SSH + the felhom-agent token). A step is human-only only when it genuinely needs physical presence, a real-world decision, or credentials CC truly lacks — mark those steps HUMAN. Do not decline a whole procedure because it touches a live host or a privileged token. (Judgment still applies: confirm before irreversible ops on real customer data — but demo scratch guests are fair game.)
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