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felhom-agent/CONTEXT.md
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admin 3f382bf762 v0.61.0: audit fixes B1 (random temp staging) + D1 (mkfs wrapper member/RO re-checks) + D2 (empty-lsblk fail-safe) + D3 (blank-format anti-retarget)
From AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md. Each fix ships with a
non-hollow test + a companion red-proof (shown failing on the pre-fix impl).
Sudoers install-source grants became globs — deploy the sudoers drop-in with
the binary. A1 (stale-lock pool-membership) deliberately excluded (spike).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-03 07:25:50 +02:00

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# CONTEXT — felhom-agent working state
> Snapshot of the current state + open threads. Authoritative history lives in `CHANGELOG.md` (top
> entry = current); the end-of-task detail lives in `REPORT.md`.
## Current
- **v0.61.0** (2026-07-03) — blast-radius audit fixes **B1 + D1 + D2 + D3** from
`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md`: random temp
staging for root-installed scripts (+ sudoers/manifest glob updates), mkfs-wrapper member/RO
re-checks (validated by `scripts/mkfs-guarded-harness.sh`), classifyClaim empty-lsblk fail-safe,
and the blank-format anti-retarget (durable-id-bound, AGENT-001's benign-branch twin).
- Deployed on demo host `felhom-pve` (node `demo-felhom`), non-root `felhom-agent` service user,
pool-scoped token (`felhom` pool).
## Open threads
- **A1 (LOW, pending SPIKE — not fixed in v0.61.0):** stale-lock recovery
(`internal/localapi/stalelock.go`) reaps guests by a pool-blind `ListLXC` scan, not ownership.
Contained by the pool-scoped token today; **must be fixed before any broad/root-token deployment.**
It is a spike, not a patch: the role lacks `Pool.Audit`, so there is no cheap authorized
pool-membership read — which read to use is the open design question.
- Deferred audit items (housekeeping/design, all INFO): C1 (controller-swap version floor), C2 (NAS
server allowlist), A2 (gate journal cross-check), B2B5, E1/E2.
- Drive-enrollment leftovers: (a) `runStorageInit` slow-device detached-format polling; (b) Impl-3
shared-box operator format gate.
- BUNDLE leftover: non-root agent can't read the PBS key; migration must preserve cert/key/tokens.
- Not run (needs a supervised session): the destructive D1/D3 live proofs (real mkfs on a crafted
member; a live /dev re-enumeration race during a real format).