505 lines
44 KiB
Markdown
505 lines
44 KiB
Markdown
# CONTEXT — felhom-agent working state
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> Snapshot of the current state + open threads. Authoritative history lives in `CHANGELOG.md` (top
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> entry = current); the end-of-task detail lives in `REPORT.md`.
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## R-199 (v0.125.0) — links 6–8 of the recovery chain, assembled and walked
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`POST /escrow/recover-offsite-password` (pinned local API, `withGuest`): the controller supplies the
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customer's recovery code, the agent fetches THIS host's own sealed blob from the hub
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(`hub.Client.FetchIdentityEscrow` → `GET /hosts/{id}/escrow`, hub >= v0.94.0, self-scoped by the
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per-host key), unseals it via `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer`, and returns **only** the offsite restic
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repository password plus its sha256.
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**Rules that must not erode:**
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- **Only that field.** Not the tunnel token, not the PBS token, not the WG key — the controller is a
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trust tier down and needs none of them. Narrowing cost nothing and is not recoverable later.
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- **The unseal stays in the agent.** `age` is an agent runtime dependency (`/usr/bin/age` — hardcoded,
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no config override; 1.2.1 on demo-felhom) and is deliberately absent from the controller image.
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- **R:** in memory for one call, cleared on the success path AND every failure path, never on disk,
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never in argv, never logged at any level including inside an error, never echoed. Verified live: 0
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log lines, 0 files, 0 leftover `felhom-idesc-*` dirs, with a positive control proving the search worked.
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- **Three distinct outcomes**, not one generic failure: no blob (404), a bundle that opens but predates
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the field (409 — pre-fork-4, cannot be retro-fitted), a code that does not open it (400 — fail-closed
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at age's KDF, nothing written).
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- **The wiring is pinned by an AST walk** (`cmd/felhom-agent/escrow_recover_wiring_test.go`):
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`main` → `runDaemon` → `buildLocalAPIServer`, an `escrow.OffsiteKeyRecoverer` constructed there, the
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`Options.EscrowRecovery` field present, and the fetcher calling the DAEMON's own `hubClient` (the
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self-scoping that makes cross-host retrieval impossible is a property of WHICH key is used).
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Links 6 and 7 were two of this project's six built-but-never-wired instances.
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**Proven live on demo-felhom 2026-08-04:** recovered sha256 == on-disk sha256 == the hub's stored hash.
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A wrong code five minutes earlier failed closed. **The chain stops at link 8** — nothing installs a
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recovered password, reopens a repository, or restores a file.
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**§8.6, fixed while here:** `runSelftestIdentityConsume`'s success line used to recite
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"tunnel_token + pbs_token", which became a misstatement when v0.77.0 sealed the repository password
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into the same bundle — anyone reading it would conclude the password was not there. It now names what
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THIS bundle carried and what it did not.
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## Current
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- **2026-08-03 — v0.123.0 (R-185): a tier the box cannot READ now says so.** The agent's token had
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`FelhomAgentStore` on `local`, `local-lvm`, `felhom-pbs` and **not** on `felhom-backup` — the
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storage both demo boxes configure as `local_backup_target`. That storage answered `{"data":[]}`
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through the token while root listed three archives, and `pickForThisRun` skipped it as *"no settled
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archive yet"* — **which is what a brand-new tier reports**, so the host tier was never
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restore-testable and nothing said so.
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- **The permission question is asked directly**, because unlike the listing it has a definite
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answer: `Client.Permissions` reads `/access/permissions?path=/storage/<target>` **as the agent's
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own token**, and `storeGrantStatuses` emits one `capability.Status` per configured tier. It
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composes AROUND the sudo prober, the way `poolReadStatus` already does — an API read does not
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belong inside a sudo-policy probe. `Status`'s wire shape is untouched, so the hub's critical
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degraded alert applies with **no hub change**.
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- **MEASURED FIRST, and the obvious reading is wrong:** an ungranted path answers neither empty nor
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403 — it carries the privileges INHERITED from the box-wide `/` grant
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(`Sys.Audit, SDN.Use, Datastore.Audit`). Checking path-presence, or `Datastore.Audit`, reports a
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blinded storage HEALTHY. The probe tests **`Datastore.AllocateSpace`**; re-measure before ever
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changing that constant (`storeGrantRequiredPriv`, red-proved).
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- **The probed set comes from `BackupTiers()`, never a fixed list** — a hardcoded probe list is the
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defect reproduced inside the fix. Critical, EXCEPT the `local` fallback target (reported, but it
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does not page). It never consults content, so it cannot alarm on a newborn tier; it never reports
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ok when it could not ask.
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- **LIVE:** degraded observed on the still-blind box (hub emailed `agent_capability_degraded`) →
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grant applied on **both** demo boxes → token lists 3 and 4 archives → `ok=70 total=70 degraded=0`
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and `degraded → ok` at the hub → **the host tier became a due-check candidate for the first time**,
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correctly picking the 08-02 archive (08-03 had not settled 24 h).
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- **The installer's real defect was NOT `PVE_STORAGES`** — see `felhom.eu` CONTEXT S-22: Case A
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grants, the Scenario-F reuse arm did not. Fixed in installer **1.24.0** with a gate.
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- **2026-08-03 — v0.122.0 (R-189 · R-188 · R-186): three signals that lied about their own work.**
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None touches data; all three cost attention, which every other signal depends on.
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- **R-189 — a passing restore-test no longer vanishes on a restart.** `restore_tests[]` came only
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from the in-memory `backup.Store` (*"lost on restart; the cadence re-populates"* — true under a
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timer, FALSE since R-86, because the agent will not re-test a proven archive). **Observed live:**
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a 14.5 GB offsite PASS at 15:25:14, agent restarted 2 m 43 s later, hub logged `0 restore-tests`
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twice. `RestoreTestState` now stores `tier` + `verified` beside the archive (v3 shape; v1/v2
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still read, and a record missing archive-or-tier is NOT reported), exposes
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`ProvenRestoreTests`, and `Collector.SetProvenRestoreTests` merges it — **one entry per tier,
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newest by `TestedAt` wins**, so a fresh failure beats a stored success and a tier never appears
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twice. Wiring pinned by an AST test: the method this replaces (`Snapshot`) claimed a
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"host-report gauge" in its doc comment and had **no caller** for weeks.
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- **ONLY SUCCESSES ARE PERSISTED, and the reason is now in the code:** a success *suppresses*
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future work (a proven archive is never re-tested, so a lost proof leaves the box quietly less
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tested than it believes); a failure *causes* future work and heals itself at the next evaluation.
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- **R-188 — the release stopped emailing false failures.** Only the tag PUSH moved (build → tag
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locally → publish → push tag): the push is what wakes CI, and a tag visible before its package
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made the gate correctly fail a correct release ~half the time. The old order's invariant is now
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asserted directly — `check-published-versions.py` refuses a **published version with no tag**, as
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a bounded, printed probe (the package listing api is still 401 without a token, re-measured).
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- **R-186 — a released binary is verifiable.** `-trimpath -buildvcs=false`: same source → same
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bytes whether or not the tag exists. Measured. `publish-agent.sh`'s fallback also forced
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`CGO_ENABLED=0` and built a **74 KB different** binary for the same version — both paths now
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identical. The verification command is in `CLAUDE.md`.
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- **2026-08-03 — v0.121.0 (R-86): the restore-test follows the BACKUP, not the clock.** The ticker is
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now only the **evaluation interval**; a tier is **DUE** when its newest archive that has settled for
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`settle` (default 24 h) **has not been proven**. Daily tier → proved daily on yesterday's archive;
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weekly tier → weekly on its own; newborn → UNKNOWN. **The trap, so it is not reintroduced:** the
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literal reading of R-86 — *"due when the newest archive is ≥ 24 h old"* — is NEVER true on a daily
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tier (a new archive resets the age before it reaches the lag), so it switches restore-testing off
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where it matters most. Red-proved at 0 runs over 5 simulated days.
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- **The state now records WHICH archive was proven**, not just when a tier passed. A pre-R-86 file
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keeps its time (ordering survives) and yields no proven archive → each tier is due once after the
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upgrade, deliberately.
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- **The old cadence key:** `restore_test_cadence_seconds` is DEPRECATED. Negative still DISABLES
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(verbatim); a positive value now seeds the **settle lag** and the daemon WARNs once at start-up
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naming `restore_test_eval_interval_seconds` (default 6 h) and `restore_test_settle_seconds`
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(default 24 h). It is NOT carried into the evaluation interval.
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- **6 h is bounded from both ends:** measured evaluation cost (local 18 ms, PBS-over-WAN 392 ms,
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both 430 ms) says cost is irrelevant; the ceiling is that a FAILING tier stays due, so the
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evaluation interval is also its retry interval for a multi-GB restore.
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- The due-check now runs **before** the heavy-operation gate is taken (a frequent poll must not be
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able to make a starting backup record a failure — F-A1), and the candidate picker skips archives
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failing `archivePlausiblyComplete` (a phantom would be due forever and fail forever).
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- New read-only `--selftest=restore-test-due` prints the per-tier verdict + its cost.
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- **v0.121.1 — a quiet evaluation is AUDIBLE.** "Nothing is due" is now the NORMAL outcome, and at
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DEBUG it was silent: an empty journal would have been equally consistent with a healthy loop and
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a dead goroutine (standing rule 3 — the shape the R-88 watcher was retired for). A not-due
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evaluation logs ONE INFO line naming every tier's verdict; an unlistable tier reads `UNKNOWN`
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with its error in that same line.
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- **PROVEN LIVE 2026-08-03 on demo-felhom:** due-triggered offsite restore-test of a 14.5 GB
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encrypted PBS archive — restored, booted, verified, scratch destroyed, **635 s**; the state then
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named that archive, a second evaluation ran nothing, and an agent restart ran nothing.
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- **R-185 (filed, NOT fixed here):** on demo-felhom the agent token has no ACL on
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`/storage/felhom-backup`, so its content listing comes back EMPTY (root sees 3 archives) — the
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host tier has never been restore-testable there, and the due-check cannot distinguish that from
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a newborn tier.
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- **2026-07-28 — v0.107.0: F-REBOOT fixed — a guest rebooted mid-backup now comes back by itself.**
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New `internal/localapi/guestpower.go`: a 60 s watchdog that starts a guest which is `onboot:1`,
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stopped, unlocked, and has no vzdump in flight. It closes the two narrow gaps that let
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`RecoverStaleLockedGuests` miss campaign fault 11 — that recovery acts only on a **stale vzdump
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lock** (fault 11's guest was unlocked) and runs **once at agent startup** (fault 11's guest went
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down while the agent was already up). `onboot` is the deliberate-stop discriminator and is *not*
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invented here: it is already what `stalelock.go` uses for this decision, it is 0 on scratch/golden
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guests, and it is what `pve-guests` consults at host boot — so the agent agrees with the platform
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instead of keeping a second private definition of "should be running". Retry bounded at 3
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(1m/2m/4m) then escalates **once**; an unbounded silent retry loop is the over-correction here.
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Live on demo-hp: **120 s unattended** recovery vs the incident's **587 s** with a human; Scenario B
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proven (an `onboot:0` guest left stopped throughout). Detail: `REPORT.md`.
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- **2026-07-28 — F-LEAK took THREE attempts; v0.108.0 and v0.110.0 are the corrections.** The cause is
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structural: `FelhomAgentGuest` is granted at `/pool/felhom` and a guest joins that pool only when its
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restore **completes**, so a *failed* restore-test leaves a pool-less guest out of reach (403).
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**(1) v0.107.0 pool adoption — REFUTED LIVE:** `PUT /pools/{pool}` also requires `VM.Allocate` on the
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VM being added, so membership cannot bootstrap its own authority; removed in **v0.108.0**.
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**(2) host-install v1.21.0 per-path `/vms/990000..990009` ACLs — works, but exactly ONCE per slot:**
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PVE's destroy calls `AccessControl::remove_vm_access` (`API2/LXC.pm:906`) which deletes every ACL at
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`/vms/<vmid>` (`AccessControl.pm:1898`) — **the grant is consumed by the op it authorises**. Caught by
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counting ACL rows after the fix, not by reasoning. **(3) v0.110.0 SHIPPED —
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`Privileged.DestroyScratchLXC`, the FOURTH root-fenced exception** (was exactly three: keyctl
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`pct create`, USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors). Band enforced in **sudoers literally**
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(`pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge`) + re-checked in code + journal provenance at the caller; none is
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consumed by use. API destroy still tried FIRST; band ACLs stay provisioned so the common case needs no
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privileged call. **Ships with a sudoers change — deploy `configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` WITH the
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binary.** Live: token 403 on a stranded scratch → fenced path removed the guest and all 3 LVs; sudo
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PERMITS the band and REFUSES `9201`/`9100`/`9999`/`990010`/`1`, and refuses `pct start 990000` too.
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- **2026-07-28 — v0.109.0: the guest-power watchdog got the observable it shipped without.** A
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self-correction: v0.107.0's watchdog logged only at startup and when it *acted*, so on a healthy box
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its health could be read only from **absence** — F-OBS's exact shape, shipped in the same session
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F-OBS was fixed in the controller. Now an INFO summary every 10th sweep carrying
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`sweeps_since_boot`/`guests_evaluated`/`currently_stopped`. An **aborted** sweep (unproven
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ownership) does not count, or the heartbeat would claim liveness for a watchdog examining nothing.
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- **2026-07-28 — v0.106.0: F-CRIT-2 fixed — a failed backup no longer looks like a fresh one.**
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`NewestArchiveTime` counted an aborted PBS upload (1 byte, manifest-less, NEWEST) as a successful
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backup, so the tier reported fresh, went **not due**, and was never retried — 7 days of silence on
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the real 168h cadence, invisible to both the R-88 breaker (defers only DUE tiers) and the hub
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deadline monitor (reads the same freshness). Now only *plausibly complete* entries count, via a
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measured floor `minPlausibleArchiveBytes` = 1 MiB; undecidable ⇒ not counted.
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**Size is the only tier-agnostic discriminator** — `verification` and `encrypted` are absent on
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every local (dir) archive and on a good PBS snapshot until verify-new catches up, so gating on
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either would reject 100% of local backups and cause fleet-wide backup THRASH. Floor measured:
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smallest real backup on the fleet is 612,397,450 B, so 1 MiB leaves 584x headroom (asserted by a
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test). Rejections logged at WARN once per volid. Re-tested live by replaying campaign fault 2 on
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demo-hp — both directions, incl. a no-thrash window with 91 scheduler ticks as the positive
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observable. Deployed on both boxes. Detail: `REPORT.md`.
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**Also established:** server-side prune does NOT count phantoms toward `keep-last` (dry-run kept
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2 real + the phantom) ⇒ **no retention/data-loss bug** — but it never removes them either, so they
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accumulate. Filed as R-99 (LOW).
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- **2026-07-25 — v0.95.0 (additive): SMART coverage fixes (spike B+A) + device model.** Union-path
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drives (USB/registry) now get SMART via `storage.SmartReader.SMARTForBacking` wired into the localapi
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`/disks` union (localapi `Smart` seam); `smartDeviceFor` resolves dm/LVM to the whole disk via
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`/sys/block/<dm>/slaves` (recursive, skips >1-disk); the builtin `local` dir on the LVM root gets a
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**SMART-only** device from its containing filesystem (never touches backing/durable_id — the
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removable-safety guard in build() stays intact); `SmartSummary.ModelName` captured from smartctl. The
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watchdog `Known` path stays enrich-free. Consumed by controller v0.171.0. Source of WHERE:
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`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-smart-coverage-2026-07-25.md`.
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- **2026-07-24 — v0.94.0 (additive): SMART serialized into /disks.** `localapi.DiskInfo` gains
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`Smart *hub.SmartSummary` (omitempty), copied from the target's already-computed Observe-time
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enrichment when `Health != ""` — no new smartctl load, no endpoint, no sudoers/MinAgent change. The
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controller v0.169.0 renders a "Lemezek állapota" card + 6h degradation alert from it; old controllers
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ignore it. **NOTE: at the remote-site vacation window the agent is DOWN (localapi binds .162 → fails),
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so live /disks-from-real-agent validation is deferred — the field is unit-proven; publish only.**
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- **2026-07-22 — v0.93.0 is the FLEET AGENT.** Built, published (sha `a68b2ff73200622e…`),
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Day-0-manifest-vouched (MinAgent also 0.93.0, operator-ruled) and deployed to BOTH boxes
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(`demo-felhom-8363b5` + `demo-hp-bb76ea`, the latter over G1 break-glass — still no key baked);
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clean-restart 5/5 on both, `.bak-0.92.1` retained. Discharges the onboarding runbook §A5
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ceremony gate. Record: `felhom.eu/documentation/pilot/RUNBOOK-publish-agent-0.93-2026-07-22.md`.
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**The bullet below ("agent is DOWN … deployed 0.90.0") is SUPERSEDED history** — vmbr0 was made
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static .162 on 2026-07-20 (F1 mitigation) and the agent has been up since; kept for the record.
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- **2026-07-20 — REMOTE SITE until ~2026-08-02; the agent is DOWN there and cannot self-recover.**
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felhom-pve moved off the home LAN; `ssh felhom-pve` = tailnet `100.70.170.35` (direct, ~37 ms). The
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host is on DHCP and holds `192.168.0.147`, so `localapi`'s literal `192.168.0.162` bind fails with
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`bind: cannot assign requested address` — the daemon exits ~1.1 s after start, systemd gave up after
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4 retries, and a manual restart reproduces it exactly. Deployed binary is **0.90.0**. Fix needs
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`listen_addr` in `/etc/felhom-agent/agent.json` **and** the guest bootstrap endpoint (plus the
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pinned leaf's SAN) → **Viktor GO**; re-pinning to another literal just re-breaks on the next lease.
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Also re-observed each start: `pbs: cannot read token secret … /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw:
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permission denied` (R-39-adjacent). Evidence + ranked findings:
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`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md`
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- **v0.90.0** (2026-07-17) — **agent train: guest RAM resize (R-24) + fast-tick (R-28); LIVE on BOTH
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demo hosts (felhom-pve + nested demo-vm-felhom-4846bc).** MinAgent coupling: felhom-controller
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v0.143.0 gates its resize UI on this agent. (1) **R-24 guest RAM resize (controller-direct)** —
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self-scoped `GET`/`POST /guest/memory` (`internal/localapi/guestmemory.go`); the AGENT enforces
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every bound fresh per request (min 2048 / max host_total−2048 / shrink floor max(2048, usage+512)) and
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applies via PVE `SetConfig` — **live cgroup apply, no reboot** (Phase-0 PROVEN on the nested box; the
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break-glass access path + the proof are in `~/.claude/.../nested-vm-access-breakglass.md`). Verify-
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after-apply re-reads maxmem before claiming success. New narrow `MemoryOps` seam (GuestAPI untouched);
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memory only. (2) **R-28 fast-tick** (`internal/fasttick/`) — while any desired-state item is unapplied
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(esp. the pre-tunnel WG-registration window a hub poke can't reach) pulse the shared out-of-band
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trigger every 30 s, self-disarm on convergence; four cached sources (desired-gen==0, reconcile
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Planned−Pending>0, pbsdr waiting_secret ONLY, wgtunnel desired-not-operational). Seams:
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`reconcile.Engine.LastResult()` + `wgtunnel.Manager.TunnelConvergence()` (cached — no per-tick exec).
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(3) **Guests-0/0** REFUTED live: the 0/0 was the pre-provision window (guest not yet created), not a
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pool-membership bug; the fast-tick shortens that window. **OPEN (operator GO):** publish 0.90.0 +
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hub Day-0 manifest vouch + MinAgent-floor raise to 0.90.0 (password-gated UI; the safety gate — both
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agents on 0.90.0 — is satisfied and the coupling is proven live via the version header). See REPORT.md.
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- **v0.89.0** (2026-07-16) — **agent train: three bundled agent-plane items; built + published to
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Gitea (sha256 `3969fd91…`); paired with hub 0.59.0 (LIVE).** (1) **pbsdr self-grant (R-22)** —
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closes the F4 self-deadlock: a 403 on the token-auth `StorageEntry` pre-check now self-grants via
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the root wrapper + re-reads instead of aborting before the grant (the demo's `felhom-offsite`
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case). (2) **escrow config live-reload** — `/escrow/preflight`'s `pbs_storage_id` row now reads
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the live agent.json (late-bound `CurrentPBSStorageID`) so a pbsdr-seeded id flips green with no
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restart. (3) **agent-plane poke listener (Direction-2a)** — `internal/poke`: contentless UDP poke
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bound to the box WG /32 (port **51822**), leading-edge debounced, fires the hub-loop out-of-band
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trigger for an immediate desired-state cycle; enabled with `wg_tunnel.enabled`; first slice of
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R-13. Red-proofs for all three (run-fail-revert). **ALL THREE LIVE LEGS PROVEN on the demo
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(2026-07-17), demo now LIVE on 0.89.0:** Scenario 4 floor-driven A/B train 0.88→0.89 (operator
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signed+enqueued the `agent_update` op — the vouch+floor alone does NOT trigger it; committed, no
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rollback); Scenario 1 R-22 self-heal (marker aside + ACLs revoked → `pre-check 403 … self-granting
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(R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs restored, offsite active); Scenario 3 poke→tick
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~31 ms ep0→box + immediate report cycle (save→tick ≈ ~0.45 s). Details: REPORT.md.
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- **v0.88.0** (2026-07-13 eve) — **controller-driven escrow ceremony (agent half), LIVE on demo
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host + drill VM (63/63 capabilities both).** `--output=json` machine mode (text mode
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byte-identical; extraction into `escrowCeremony()`); the ONE fixed argv
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(`escrow.CeremonyArgs()` — shared by the localapi exec + the `escrow-ceremony` capability
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(Critical, pbs_dr-gated EXPLICIT) + the new `FELHOM_ESCROW` sudoers alias, three-way
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pin-tested); localapi job endpoints (`POST /escrow/ceremony` single-flight 60 s,
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status, ONE-SHOT claim → 410, 10-min TTL → `unclaimed_void`, `GET /escrow/preflight`).
|
||
R in-memory ONLY (never the job struct — snapshot-hygiene-tested; restart loses it safely).
|
||
Live-proven on drill endpoint-exact: stage → preflight all-green (live FELHOM_ESCROW
|
||
list-probe) → job ~4 s → hub blob `restic_pw_sha256` covering (repaired the spike's hash-less
|
||
blob) → claim 200 once → 410. Coupled: controller v0.127.0 (MinAgent 0.88.0 for the wizard).
|
||
**OPEN: publish 0.88.0 + Day-0 manifest vouch (operator) at the next train; deployed hosts got
|
||
direct deploys.** Details: REPORT.md + felhom.eu RUNBOOK-escrow-ceremony.md (F1 threat model).
|
||
|
||
- **v0.87.0** (2026-07-13) — **SystemDisks device-mapper walk (IA finding 2, MEDIUM):
|
||
legacy-boot hosts get a working drive wizard.** Operator ruling (approved 2026-07-13,
|
||
verbatim): *resolve device-mapper/raid parents — for the root filesystem's backing block
|
||
device, walk `/sys/block/<dev>/slaves` recursively down to physical disks; those, plus any
|
||
ESP holder when present, are system. Disks outside that set become wizard candidates (still
|
||
subject to the existing data-bearing guards). The all-system fail-safe remains ONLY for walk
|
||
failure — it returns to being the error case, not the legacy-boot common case.* Implemented as
|
||
`physicalDisksOf`/`walkSlaves` + `HostReader.BlockSlaves` (one seam method); per-branch
|
||
conservatism (any unresolvable slave → ok=false → unchanged all-system path); signature test
|
||
`TestSystemDisks_WalkTopologies` (root-backing disk ALWAYS system — never weaken). §3 spike
|
||
transcripts: drill (legacy) dm-1→sda3→sda; felhom-pve (EFI+LVM) ESP+walk agree on sda →
|
||
byte-identical regression. §13.2 wizard leg COMPLETE (offered → enrolled → formatted →
|
||
torn down, boxes as found) + Day-0 manifest vouched to 0.87.0 (operator). The leg also
|
||
surfaced two CONTROLLER bugs (fixed same-day: v0.126.3 claimed-box wizard CSRF, v0.126.4
|
||
502-through-CF + native-alert ban).
|
||
|
||
- **v0.83.0** (2026-07-11, LIVE on felhom-pve; NOT published — Peti stays 0.81.0) — **observability
|
||
pass** (pairs with controller v0.116.1 + hub v0.46.0). `applog.New` → `(logger, *Ring)`: slog
|
||
fan-out, journald at the configured level, ~1000-entry ring FIXED at DEBUG. `GET /debug/logs`
|
||
(local API, token-authed; the controller Debug page's Ügynök tab) + request-level DEBUG
|
||
middleware. Heartbeat log-pull: envelope `log_tail_requested` → next heartbeat ships `log_tail`
|
||
(128 KB, consume-once; failed push re-armed by the next envelope; `operator log pull served` INFO
|
||
on fulfillment). Gap-fill sweep: netverify phase/verdict lines (job start, trigger outcome,
|
||
/proc/mounts verdict, journal bytes, classification code, rollback outcome, durations), netmount
|
||
unit steps, signedjobs op-received (class/host/expiry — never signatures) + fetch duration,
|
||
selfupdate invariants + download sha/duration, disks outcome INFOs, controller-swap pre-pull +
|
||
health verdicts, desired/loop per-exchange DEBUG. Logging conventions:
|
||
`felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/logging-conventions.md`. OPEN: the hub-side live pull awaits
|
||
the operator's button click (hub UI password-gated); pre-existing lanresolver
|
||
permission-denied WARN on /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests noted in REPORT.
|
||
|
||
- **v0.77.0** (2026-07-09) — **fork-4: escrow the offsite restic repo password under R.** `IdentityBundle`
|
||
gains `ResticRepoPassword` (rides the existing age-under-R `WrapIdentityBundle` path — validated by the
|
||
custody spike `febdc56`). New `POST /escrow/stage-secret` (`withGuest`) transiently stages the
|
||
controller-pushed password (0600, never logged), which the `--selftest=escrow-create` ceremony
|
||
auto-injects into the bundle and then wipes. `AttachResticPassword`/`StagedResticPasswordPath`/
|
||
`WipeStagedResticPassword` added. Pairs with controller v0.105.0 (push + atomicity gate + DR inject +
|
||
`DRResticCoord`). **NOT yet live-validated** — the supervised escrow ceremony is operator-run.
|
||
|
||
- **v0.76.0** (2026-07-08, LIVE on felhom-pve + **PUBLISHED sha `9828c5f7…f50b`** — THE Day-0
|
||
manifest bump target; **0.75.0 superseded unpublished**) — **GL-5b / G12: restore-test
|
||
full-fidelity**. Params derive from the ARCHIVE's embedded config (`drRestoreOverrides`, same as
|
||
DR — the old live-source-config path verified the wrong object AND dropped storage mpN per PVE's
|
||
all-or-nothing rule; deleted with `bindMountOverrides`/`archiveVMID`). NEW mount-parity assert
|
||
(restored mpN vs archive; miss/mispath/undersize/extra = FAIL naming the delta) + `MountParity`/
|
||
`MountInventory` on the wire record (additive). Live-proven: scratch 990000 ← 6.5GB 9201 archive,
|
||
parity ok, inventory mp0 200G+mp1 50G+2 throwaways, **3m4s local tier** (cheaper than feared);
|
||
rotated-out archive volid → clean up-front refusal (nice failure mode). bringup.go untouched.
|
||
|
||
- **v0.75.0** (2026-07-08, LIVE on felhom-pve) — **GL-5 / go-live G8: guest-loss DR bring-up
|
||
actually restores** (closes the v0.74.0 OPEN item + SPIKE-dr-bindmount-source §8). DR passes the
|
||
COMPLETE explicit restore param set derived from the archive's embedded config (NEW
|
||
`Client.ExtractArchiveConfig`, 200 under the scoped token) — **two live-discovered PVE rules: mpN
|
||
params need an explicit rootfs, AND unlisted mountpoints are silently DROPPED** (first run booted
|
||
without mp0/mp1!) — storage mpN passed through, structural mp8/mp9 → throwaways, then step 4d
|
||
swaps the REAL binds in via the host runner (root pct; new `EngineOptions.HostRunner`+`StateDir`
|
||
seam) and deletes the unusedN residue. Scratch-DR live-proven end-to-end (9310 from a real 9201
|
||
archive: mp0 200G + mp1 50G + real binds + no residue + clean teardown). Provision = nil
|
||
overrides (regression-tested). NOTE: published/vouch-pending agent is 0.74.0 — publish 0.75.0
|
||
before/with the manifest bump. OBSERVATION: the DR selftest hardcodes KeepMAC=true — a scratch DR
|
||
while the SOURCE guest is live briefly duplicates its MAC on the bridge (pre-existing; fine for
|
||
supervised runs, worth a -keep-mac flag someday). Full customer-data DR drill = GL-6/S5 family.
|
||
|
||
- **2026-07-07 — v0.74.0 Gitea-PUBLISHED (RUNBOOK GL-1)** — the LIVE felhom-pve binary's exact
|
||
bytes, sha256 `1ec3f58842edce1e…76af05`, anon-fetch-verified. This supersedes/closes every
|
||
standing "publish 0.6x + Day-0 vouch" OPEN item below (0.64→0.73 were never published; 0.74.0
|
||
is the vouch target). Golden 0.103.0 published in the same run (felhom.eu execution record
|
||
`documentation/pilot/RUNBOOK-GL1-publish-2026-07-07.md`). **Day-0 manifest vouch = operator
|
||
step** (agent 0.74.0 / golden 0.103.0).
|
||
|
||
- **v0.74.0** (2026-07-07) — **campaign-2 R2 CLOSED; the mislabelled "R1" was a symptom** (LIVE on
|
||
felhom-pve). Pool membership is what lets the pool-scoped token reach a guest; `pct restore --pool`
|
||
sets it only at CREATE, so a restore-over-existing dropped 9201 from the `felhom` pool → no
|
||
`VM.Audit` → restore-test's *existing* `bindMountOverrides` never ran → "mp8 … only possible for
|
||
root". Fix: `Client.PoolAddVMID` + bring-up re-asserts membership post-restore (warn-not-fail).
|
||
Role/ACL + `bindMountOverrides` untouched (both correct). **Live restore-test PASSED for the first
|
||
time** once the pool was healed (Part A one-liner): read config → neutralize 2 binds → restore →
|
||
boot+running → clean teardown, 4m35s. B3 (scratch-teardown 403) confirmed a cascade — no code.
|
||
OPEN: DR `bring-up -mode dr` bind-override gap (spike `SPIKE-dr-bindmount-source-2026-07-07.md`:
|
||
small known-constant override reusing `bindMountOverrides`; mp8/mp9 are structural constants).
|
||
|
||
- **v0.73.0** (2026-07-06) — **F2 mount-role fallback CLOSED** (LIVE on felhom-pve). `roleForMountPath`
|
||
gained a mount-table fallback (Impl-2b style): a bind-mounted RAW enrolled user-data drive is not a PVE
|
||
storage, so it fail-safe'd to `system` and the eject/decommission gates 403'd EVERY user-data drive
|
||
(campaign F2, `where=/mnt/teszt_enroll role=system`). Device-keyed classification + whole-disk containment
|
||
(`storage.SameWholeDisk`); Observe-error keeps the fail-safe BEFORE the fallback. Only `roleForMountPath`
|
||
touched. Live-proven full lifecycle on teszt_enroll (eject/decommission 200, no-rebind across restart,
|
||
end==pre). OPEN follow-up: the `deviceRole`/`roleForMountPath` unification refactor (deferred).
|
||
|
||
- **v0.72.0** (2026-07-05) — **OOB operator access (merged E1+H1)** — TASK H1, provenance both
|
||
`SPIKE-{felhom-sshd,oob-wg-operator-peer}-2026-07-05`. Operator `/32` RENDERED into wg-felhom
|
||
AllowedIPs (survives self-heal, [OF-1]); dedicated `internal/felhomsshd` (port claim + config
|
||
render→sshd -t→reload + operator authorized_keys + heal + oob heartbeat stanza); static
|
||
`inet felhom_oob` belt (agent mutates SET ELEMENTS ONLY); `configs/felhom-sshd.service` (NO
|
||
RuntimeDirectory [SF-1]) + `felhom-oob.nft` + `felhom-op.sudoers`; `FELHOM_SSHD`+`FELHOM_OOB`
|
||
grants; `oob.enabled` DEFAULT FALSE. Live on felhom-pve (8822, belt filled, operator SSH as
|
||
felhom-op with scoped sudo); hub v0.35.0. Rollback `.bak-0.71.0`. 5 live-found bugs fixed (port
|
||
path, self-listen flip-flop, nil-block lockout, reachable-via-dial, operator-configured source).
|
||
- **v0.71.0** (2026-07-05) — **management-plane break-glass: privsep-dir watchdog + mgmt_plane
|
||
health** — TASK G1 (prereq for felhom-sshd/H1), provenance `SPIKE-felhom-sshd-2026-07-05` §8.
|
||
Host artifacts (`configs/felhom-privsep.tmpfiles` + `felhom-mgmt-watchdog.{sh,service,timer}`) make
|
||
`/run/sshd` boot-persistent AND auto-heal it every ~60s **agent-independently** (heals with the
|
||
agent stopped — proven live: `/run/sshd` removed → restored in 30.0s, `:22` back, no login).
|
||
`internal/mgmtplane` reports the additive `mgmt_plane` heartbeat stanza; hub v0.34.1 raises
|
||
`mgmt_plane_healed`. **NO unit declares `RuntimeDirectory=`** (the incident cause). H1 may now
|
||
assume `/run/sshd` is guaranteed present. Live on felhom-pve; rollback `.bak-0.70.0`.
|
||
- **v0.70.0** (2026-07-05) — **agent self-update (operator-signed A/B slots + crash-loop
|
||
auto-rollback)** — TASK D1, provenance `SPIKE-agent-selfupdate-2026-07-05`. An operator-signed
|
||
`agent_update` op (version+sha256, sha is the only integrity root) rides the signed-jobs gate;
|
||
`internal/selfupdate.Executor` downloads+verifies+hands to `felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply` (root
|
||
re-verify → A/B atomic flip → pending marker → detached restart); the new binary commits after a
|
||
60s dwell; a crash-looping binary is auto-reverted by `OnFailure=felhom-agent-rollback.service`
|
||
(first-crash trigger [SF-1]) with the tuned `[Unit]` start-limit (120s/4) as backstop. Host
|
||
artifacts + sudoers `FELHOM_SELFUPDATE` + `felhom-host-install.sh` day-0 install + report field
|
||
`selfupdate_pending`. Green tests + companions. **LIVE-VALIDATED on felhom-pve (2026-07-05): all 4
|
||
drills PASS** — happy path (0.70.0→0.70.1 signed op → download+verify+flip+commit), crash-rollback
|
||
(0.70.2-crash → OnFailure → **~2s crash-to-recovered**, byte-identical revert, no loop), no-pending
|
||
guard, gate refusal (non-pinned key). Full agent-side pipeline ran real (envelope injected into the
|
||
hub `signed_jobs` queue — CC lacks the hub global operator key; hub enqueue-auth is hub-unit-tested).
|
||
Box restored to canonical **v0.70.0** (host artifacts KEPT installed; scratch operator key REMOVED —
|
||
self-update dormant until an operator pins a real key, a Day-0-vouch-style follow-up). Rollback
|
||
`felhom-agent.bak-0.69.0`. OPEN (v1 scope-outs): no hub-floor auto-update, no failed-update
|
||
auto-retry, no pending-timeout auto-rollback; per-crash OnFailure can double-fire (idempotent —
|
||
future: serialize the rollback oneshot). Detail: REPORT.md.
|
||
|
||
- **v0.69.0** (2026-07-04, live on felhom-pve) — **S5: host-loss DR — safe halves shipped**.
|
||
**Part 1** `wgtunnel.InstallRecoveredKey` — writes an escrow-recovered WG privkey (create-only,
|
||
refuse-overwrite) so the tunnel re-establishes with the SAME identity/pubkey (same /32), no keygen;
|
||
wired into `--selftest=identity-consume -install-wg-key` (opt-in; pre-S3 blob → logged fresh-keygen
|
||
fallback). **Part 2** new `internal/dr` — consumes the host_loss `restore_directive` (was
|
||
logged-ignored) into an inspectable RestorePlan via AddConsumer: per-guest {vmid,archive,target,
|
||
sizing} + per-drive {durable_id→mount} + offsite PBS coord; DERIVE-AND-SURFACE only (Consumer has
|
||
no restore/destroy dep — execute-nothing is structural). Tests + red-proofs (WG create-only; plan
|
||
mode-gate). **Part 3** hub escrow-GET NOT needed (operator exports the blob via `sqlite3 writefile`
|
||
on a cp'd hub.db). **Part 4-A** re-attach wrong-disk safety already unit-proven
|
||
(`ResolveStorageDevice`: match resolves, absent/mismatch ERRORS, non-uuid scheme refused — never a
|
||
near disk). **Part 4-B (destructive in-place 9201 restore) PREPARED + OPERATOR-GATED, NOT executed**
|
||
— pre-flight green (offsite ct/9201 restorable per S4.1); the operator runs the R-consume steps +
|
||
confirms the destroy (§9-4a: CC never runs a consume/R command — see [[operator-present-one-time-secrets]]).
|
||
OPEN: the operator-run 4-B drill; guest_loss DR; hub-driven full-auto DR. Rollback
|
||
felhom-agent.bak-0.68.0. Detail: REPORT.md + doc-06 §3.5/S5.
|
||
- **v0.68.0** (2026-07-04, live on felhom-pve) — **S4.1: unattended offsite restore-test**.
|
||
**Tier-aware restore-task deadline:** `RestoreTestSpec.RestoreTaskTimeout` (0→10m default) from
|
||
`config.RestoreTestPBSRestoreTimeoutSeconds` (accessor default **120m**), set only when
|
||
`SourceTier=="pbs"` (`main.restoreTaskTimeout`); local tier UNCHANGED. Fixes the WAN restore being
|
||
killed at 10m → mid-restore teardown → leaked scratch. **Teardown "VM.Allocate" follow-up =
|
||
PHANTOM (diagnosed, not blind-fixed):** ran the restore-test on the AGENT-TOKEN path sourcing the
|
||
offsite (pbs) backup → `pass:true verified:boot+running`, teardown succeeded (`torn down
|
||
vmid=990000`, no 403), scratch band clean. The earlier 403 was the 10m-timeout consequence (guest
|
||
not yet pool-associated); the scratch is restored INTO `/pool/felhom` (ACL already grants
|
||
VM.Allocate) so teardown is authorized once the restore completes. **No ACL/host-install change.**
|
||
OPEN: publish 0.68.0 + Day-0 vouch; Tier-1/Tier-2 split for offsite-as-default; S5 DR consume.
|
||
Rollback `felhom-agent.bak-0.67.0`. Detail: REPORT.md.
|
||
- **v0.66.0 + v0.67.0** (2026-07-04, live on felhom-pve) — **S4: PBS over the tunnel**. **v0.66.0**:
|
||
wgtunnel **v4-pin** (renderConf writes the resolved A LITERAL, never DNS/AAAA; `Resolver` seam,
|
||
lowest addr; cached → steady-state zero-DNS/zero-exec) + **re-resolve watchdog** (`Manager.Watchdog`,
|
||
loop-only; handshake stale > `stale_after_seconds`=180 → re-resolve → IP-changed re-render+restart)
|
||
+ FELHOM_WG **Critical** flips (conf-install/enable/restart/handshake-read). **v0.67.0**:
|
||
**namespace-aware PBS client** (Config.Namespace → `Snapshots ?ns=`, `Verify ns=`; root-ns
|
||
unchanged) — the operator-approved fix after Phase-1 showed the ns-unaware datastore-root 403s a
|
||
per-tenant token. **Live Scenario-D (all green):** real vzdump of 9201 → **ciphertext** in ns
|
||
`demo-felhom-01` over the tunnel; ns-scoped verify=ok under the box's own `felhom@pbs!demo-felhom-01`
|
||
token; WARN gone; restore round-tripped (decrypt with box-born key → boot → teardown).
|
||
**Confirmed tenant ACL (felhom-hetzner):** `DatastoreBackup` on `/datastore/felhom-offsite/<ns>`
|
||
(NOT `/ns/<ns>`) to BOTH user `felhom@pbs` AND token (privsep=intersection; cross-ns 403);
|
||
DatastoreBackup can't prune (safety). **FINDINGS:** retarget field is `local_backup_target` (not
|
||
`backup_target`); retarget REVERTED to `local` (controller backs up ~every 30 min → single-target
|
||
offsite = near-continuous 20-min uploads; needs Tier-1/Tier-2 split); restore-test scheduler needs
|
||
a WAN restore deadline + scratch-band `VM.Allocate` before it runs offsite unattended. **OPEN:**
|
||
escrow-create (OPERATOR-PRESENT, new R); publish 0.66/0.67 + Day-0 vouch; S5 DR consume. Rollback:
|
||
`felhom-agent.bak-0.65.0`/`.bak-0.66.0`. Detail: REPORT.md + doc-06 §3.4/§4.2 + runbook §4a/§4b.
|
||
- **v0.65.0** (2026-07-04, live on felhom-pve) — **S3.1 offsite-tunnel client MTU 1420 → 1280**:
|
||
resolves `06 §4.3`'s OPEN DECISION left by the CGNAT smoke test. 1420 **silently black-holed bulk
|
||
TCP** on sub-~1480 paths (mobile ~1400, DS-Lite ~1452) — handshake+ping healthy, PBS TLS page
|
||
(and at S4 the backup itself) drops. New `const clientMTU = 1280` (RFC 8200 IPv6-minimum floor;
|
||
outer 1340 v4 / 1360 v6 fits every realistic path), **permanent + fleet-wide + family-agnostic**.
|
||
**Client-only by construction** — interface MTU caps box→PBS, advertised MSS caps PBS→box, so the
|
||
endpoint's `wg0` is untouched (zero live-endpoint risk). Golden pins exact `MTU = 1280`
|
||
(red-proofed vs a 1420 flip); no wire/JSON change. Live: agent re-rendered on restart (hash-gated
|
||
apply), conf + live iface both 1280, PBS page loads at 1280 (no regression on wired). OPEN:
|
||
true-CGNAT-SIM retest (low risk); publish 0.65.0 + Day-0 vouch (operator); S4 PBS-over-tunnel.
|
||
Rollback: `felhom-agent.bak-0.64.0` on the box. The v4-pin (§4.2 determinism) is a separate,
|
||
optional future note — NOT needed for MTU correctness.
|
||
- **v0.64.0** (2026-07-04, live on felhom-pve) — **S3 offsite WG tunnel**: new `internal/wgtunnel`
|
||
(keygen 0600/0700, marker-gated one-shot registration, agent-managed `wg-quick@wg-felhom` from
|
||
the hub's desired-state `wireguard` block via the new `desired.Syncer.AddConsumer` seam,
|
||
revoked-stays-revoked teardown, report stanza) + `FELHOM_WG` sudoers/capabilities +
|
||
`IdentityBundle.WGPrivateKey` escrow auto-inject. **`wg_tunnel.enabled` DEFAULTS FALSE** (safety
|
||
gate — rollout to Peti's box is a no-op until the production endpoint exists; enabled explicitly
|
||
on felhom-pve only). Live: tunnel to ep0.felhom.eu:443 up 3 s after enable (PBS page through
|
||
10.77.0.1:8007), reboot-persistent, revocation drill clean, 30-min keepalive soak. GOTCHAS:
|
||
hub envelope poll_interval_seconds (hub-side const 900 s) silently overrides agent poll_seconds
|
||
on cycle 1; `wg show <if> dump` leaks the PRIVATE key (forbidden everywhere — sudoers only
|
||
grants `latest-handshakes`). OPEN: CGNAT/mobile-hotspot smoke (operator-assisted appendix);
|
||
publish 0.64.0 to Gitea + Day-0 vouch (operator); S4 points PBS at the tunnel.
|
||
- **configs: build-golden.sh v2.0.0** (2026-07-03, @ `ceca355`; no agent version change) — **drill
|
||
findings B5 + B1 FIXED** (`DRILL-golden-098-2026-07-03.md`): the controller tag is a MANDATORY
|
||
argument (the default rotted twice — a fresh install booted a pre-floor controller, forcing the
|
||
guide's manual D.1b update) and the golden now bakes a `felhom-controller-bootstrap.path` unit
|
||
(controller deploys the moment the back-half hot-plugs the bootstrap mount — no reboot; installer
|
||
v1.9.1's reboot is a redundant belt, kept). **Golden 0.98.3** baked on the drill VM, clean-room
|
||
validated (bake integrity → isolated hot-plug proof → local-golden Day-0 → published-artifact
|
||
Day-0), published (sha256 b9a02ef1…fd01) + operator-vouched — Day-0 manifest now vouches
|
||
**agent 0.63.0 + golden 0.98.3** (the v0.63.0 vouch follow-up below is DONE). Fresh installs land
|
||
current and self-manage. NEW operator follow-up (SECURITY): the customer-config `git.token` has
|
||
Gitea package-WRITE rights — scope down + rotate (evidence-doc observation O1).
|
||
- **v0.63.0** (2026-07-03, live on felhom-pve + Gitea-published sha256 b4a89c81…) — **drill findings
|
||
B3 + B2 FIXED** (`DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03.md`): `TokenStore.Lookup` reloads the append-only
|
||
store once on a miss (cross-process coherence with the one-shot provisioner — no more fresh-install
|
||
`/controller/swap` 401 / manual restart; size short-circuit bounds the cost; behind the
|
||
`TokenAuthority` seam) + `guesthook.InstallSnippet` issues a fenced `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets`
|
||
first (fresh boxes lacked the dir → the self-heal hook silently never installed). Sudoers gained
|
||
exactly that one grant — **ship sudoers WITH the binary** (done on felhom-pve). Red-proofed both;
|
||
Scenario-E method: compiled test suite run ON felhom-pve + live channel-health hit-path.
|
||
**OPERATOR FOLLOW-UP: bump the hub Day-0 manifest to agent 0.63.0** — until then fresh installs get
|
||
0.62.0 and the guide's D.1b restart-first step still applies (narrowed to "< v0.63.0" in the guide).
|
||
- **v0.62.0** (2026-07-03) — **audit A1 RESOLVED**: the stale-lock reaper's scan is now
|
||
pool-intersected (`staleLockController.Guests()` = `ListLXC` ∩ `Client.Pool("felhom")` members),
|
||
fail-safe skip on pool-read failure; `pve:pool-read` capability (non-critical) + `--selftest`
|
||
"pool read" line. Companion host-install **v1.9.0** adds `Pool.Audit` to `FelhomAgentGuest` —
|
||
**deploy order on any box: rescope ACL first, then this agent.** Per
|
||
`SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03.md`; red-proofed tests in stalelock_pool_test.go.
|
||
- **2026-07-03 — CLAUDE.md refreshed**: version narrative removed (state lives HERE + CHANGELOG top), layout completed (all 17 internal packages + cmd/felhom-opsign); deploy runbook now in the `felhom-build-deploy` skill (`felhom.eu/skills/`).
|
||
- **2026-07-03 — `REUSE.md` exists at the repo root** (canonical helpers / format-safety guards / traps / seams, code-verified); maintenance rule active: update it in the same commit that changes a shared helper.
|
||
- **v0.61.0** (2026-07-03) — blast-radius audit fixes **B1 + D1 + D2 + D3** from
|
||
`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md`: random temp
|
||
staging for root-installed scripts (+ sudoers/manifest glob updates), mkfs-wrapper member/RO
|
||
re-checks (validated by `scripts/mkfs-guarded-harness.sh`), classifyClaim empty-lsblk fail-safe,
|
||
and the blank-format anti-retarget (durable-id-bound, AGENT-001's benign-branch twin).
|
||
- Deployed on demo host `felhom-pve` (node `demo-felhom`), non-root `felhom-agent` service user,
|
||
pool-scoped token (`felhom` pool).
|
||
|
||
## Open threads
|
||
|
||
- Deferred audit items (housekeeping/design, all INFO): C1 (controller-swap version floor), C2 (NAS
|
||
server allowlist), A2 (gate journal cross-check), B2–B5, E1/E2.
|
||
- Drive-enrollment leftovers: (a) `runStorageInit` slow-device detached-format polling; (b) Impl-3
|
||
shared-box operator format gate.
|
||
- BUNDLE leftover: non-root agent can't read the PBS key; migration must preserve cert/key/tokens.
|
||
- Not run (needs a supervised session): the destructive D1/D3 live proofs (real mkfs on a crafted
|
||
member; a live /dev re-enumeration race during a real format).
|