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Author SHA1 Message Date
admin 98f3cdd76a Security review of 912f7c1: the mkfs wrapper trusts no sibling claim; the internal-place helper fails closed
gates / gates (push) Successful in 25s
- felhom-mkfs-guarded: the 0.158.0 exemption for a sibling part mounted at /mnt/<name> + under /mnt/felhom-drives is
  removed — the agent can make that corroborating mount itself. Every mount of every node outside /mnt/felhom-drives
  refuses (kernel mount table); an unlistable disk refuses. CandidatePartition.Formattable is false for every part of a
  disk with a mounted node, so it is never offered for formatting (attach still is).
- felhom-internal-place: a failed lvs listing, a listing without the pool, or a blkid exit other than 0/2 refuses
  (they read as "nothing promised" / "no signature" before).
Every new test was seen failing against the 0.158.0 versions.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012qRErfCoiTkvDK9N5XHbzb
2026-10-16 04:02:00 +02:00
admin 888a98571b CHANGELOG: v0.158.0 — the internal data place, partitions, add_internal_place
gates / gates (push) Successful in 28s
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012qRErfCoiTkvDK9N5XHbzb
2026-10-16 03:56:29 +02:00
8 changed files with 146 additions and 33 deletions
+26
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@@ -1,3 +1,29 @@
## v0.158.0 — the internal data place; partitions as places; add_internal_place (2026-10-16)
Design: felhom.eu `architecture/16-storage-physical-identity.md` §5, §6, §7, §9 (operator rulings D3–D5; the D3 sizes
ruled 2026-10-16 after the space check, felhom.eu `audits/storage-identity-buildB-2026-10-15/SPACE-CHECK.md`).
- **The internal data place („Belső tárhely")** (`internal/localapi/internalplace.go`): when the record
`/var/lib/felhom-agent/internal-place.json` names a filesystem, the agent mounts it at `/mnt/belso` by fs-UUID like an
enrolled drive (startup + every 20 s tick) and records it `enrolled`; `GET /disks` reports it with kind `internal`.
It never takes `/mnt/belso` from a household drive, and eject/decommission/format of it are refused (device-mapper on
the system disk). Its identity is the system disk's, so build A never counts a copy to `sys_drive` as a second copy.
- **Root helper `configs/felhom-internal-place`** (new in the bundle): `plan|create <planned GiB>` — the ruled size rule
(reserve max(16 GiB, 10 %) ≤ 48 GiB, made only when ≥ 20 GiB, nothing promised beyond pool − reserve), the only
lvcreate/mkfs of a system-disk volume; formats only a `felhom-belso` with no signature. Run by the installer (1.33.0)
and by the new signed op.
- **Signed op `add_internal_place`** (old one-disk boxes, `16` §9): no parameters (the size is the rule's), destructive
class (operator key). Runs the helper with `create 0`, writes the record, mounts.
- **Partitions as places** (`internal/storage/partitions.go`): `GET /disks/candidates` lists each partition of a free
disk as empty / filesystem / in_use. A data-bearing part's wipe id binds disk id + part number + fs-UUID
(`byid:<…-partN>+fsuuid:<uuid>`); both must name the same device at format time.
- **`felhom-mkfs-guarded`**: a SIBLING part that is Felhom's own drive (mounted raw at /mnt/<name> AND under
/mnt/felhom-drives) no longer blocks formatting the free part next to it; every other mount still refuses; an
unlistable disk now refuses (it passed before). First tests of the wrapper: `configs/test_felhom_mkfs_guarded.py`.
- `configs/` changed (sudoers `FELHOM_INTERNALPLACE`, the helper, the wrapper, the bundle list) — **a config-bundle job
is needed** with the agent update. **Not vouched** (the operator's act).
- Released: tag `v0.158.0` (code `912f7c1`), sha256 `a3589d1d…2caba`, bundle `17066273…fb5c76`.
## v0.157.0 — every storage place knows its physical disk(s); POST /disks/same-disk (2026-10-15)
Design: felhom.eu `architecture/16-storage-physical-identity.md` §3, §4, §10 (operator rulings D1–D6, 2026-10-15). Spike:
+1 -1
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@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
| `storage.IdentityResolver` / `Relation` / `MountFor` | internal/storage/identity.go | `HostPath(path) PlaceIdentity`, `Device(dev) PlaceIdentity`, `Relation(a, b) (different, proven, reason)` | physical-disk identity of a storage place (felhom.eu `16-storage-physical-identity.md` §3, v0.157.0) | Reads /sys + /run/udev/data + /proc/mounts only (no block I/O). Judge a drive ONLY on its own mount (`localapi.ownMountIdentity`) — never the containing fs, or an absent drive reads as the root disk. A shared disk key is "same, proven" even when unknown. Pinned by identity_test.go (fixture trees) + samedisk_test.go |
| `localapi.Server.EnsureInternalPlace` / `InternalPlaceRecord` | internal/localapi/internalplace.go | `EnsureInternalPlace(ctx)` (startup + 20 s tick); `ReadInternalPlace` / `WriteInternalPlace` | the one-disk box's internal data place (felhom.eu `16` §5, v0.158.0): mounts it at /mnt/belso by fs-UUID like an enrolled drive, records it `enrolled`; the controller binds + registers it | Never takes /mnt/belso from a household drive (a foreign mount, or a unit naming another UUID, waits). Never formats/ejects (dm on the system disk → role system). The ONLY maker is the root helper `configs/felhom-internal-place` (installer + signed `add_internal_place`). Pinned by internalplace_test.go |
| `configs/felhom-internal-place` | configs/ (bundle → /usr/local/sbin) | `plan\|create <planned GiB>` | the ruled size rule (reserve max(16, 10 %) ≤ 48 GiB; ≥ 20 GiB or nothing) + the only lvcreate/mkfs of a system-disk volume | Formats only a felhom-belso with NO signature; refuses a foreign one; never resizes/removes. Sudoers: `^(plan\|create) 0$` only. Pinned by configs/test_felhom_internal_place.py |
| `storage.candidatePartitions` / `CandidatePartition` | internal/storage/partitions.go | `CandidateDisk.Partitions` | partitions as places (`16` §6): empty / filesystem / in_use per part of a free disk | A part with children or a member type is never listed; a raw /mnt mount counts as Felhom's only when corroborated (felhomOwnedMounts). Pinned by partitions_test.go |
| `storage.candidatePartitions` / `CandidatePartition` | internal/storage/partitions.go | `CandidateDisk.Partitions` | partitions as places (`16` §6): empty / filesystem / in_use per part of a free disk; `Formattable` only while no node of the disk is mounted | A part with children or a member type is never listed; a raw /mnt mount counts as Felhom's only when corroborated (felhomOwnedMounts) — for LISTING only: the root mkfs wrapper trusts no such claim (v0.158.1). Pinned by partitions_test.go |
| partition wipe id `byid:<…-partN>+fsuuid:<uuid>` | internal/storage/durable_device.go | `DeviceDurableID` / `ResolveDurableDevice` | a data-bearing PART binds disk id + part number + filesystem (`16` §6) | Both halves must resolve to the SAME device or the wipe refuses. Whole disks keep the plain id. Pinned by partition_durable_test.go |
| `ValidateUUID/MountPath/BlockDevice/FSType/SMARTDevice/LVMName`, `UnitNameForMount` | internal/storage/validate.go | `Validate*(v) error` | EVERY arg that reaches a root shell-out | The security boundary; strict whitelists (no by-* symlinks, no dm, no traversal); `systemdEscapePath` computed in-process |
| `ValidateNetworkMountSpec` | internal/storage/netmount.go | `ValidateNetworkMountSpec(spec) error` | NAS mount input boundary | Same discipline as validate.go; SMB requires a creds ref; mountpoint confined under `NetworkMountRoot` |
+19 -4
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@@ -55,15 +55,19 @@ pool_gib=$(gib_floor "$pool_b")
# Every thin volume promised in the pool (its virtual size) — except the place itself and vzdump's short-lived
# snapshots (snap_*_vzdump), which exist only during a whole-box copy and are what the reserve is for.
promised_b=0; have_lv=false
# FAIL CLOSED: a failed or empty listing must never read as „nothing promised" (that would size the place too big).
listing=$(lvs --noheadings --nosuffix --units b -o lv_name,pool_lv,lv_size "$VG" 2>/dev/null) || die "cannot list the volumes of $VG"
pool_seen=false; promised_b=0; have_lv=false
while read -r name pl size; do
[[ -n "${name:-}" ]] || continue
[[ "$name" == "$POOL" ]] && pool_seen=true
[[ "$pl" == "$POOL" ]] || continue
if [[ "$name" == "$LV_NAME" ]]; then have_lv=true; continue; fi
[[ "$name" =~ ^snap_.*_vzdump$ ]] && continue
[[ "$size" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || die "cannot read the size of $VG/$name"
promised_b=$(( promised_b + size ))
done < <(lvs --noheadings --nosuffix --units b -o lv_name,pool_lv,lv_size "$VG" 2>/dev/null)
done <<< "$listing"
$pool_seen || die "the listing of $VG does not contain the pool $POOL — refusing to guess what is promised"
promised_gib=$(( (promised_b + 1073741823) / 1073741824 )) # rounded UP: never promise a partial GiB twice
reserve=$(( pool_gib / 10 )); (( reserve < 16 )) && reserve=16; (( reserve > 48 )) && reserve=48
@@ -79,6 +83,17 @@ is_block() { [[ "$(stat -L -c %F "$1" 2>/dev/null)" == "block special file" ]];
fs_uuid() { blkid -p -s UUID -o value "$DEV" 2>/dev/null; }
fs_type() { blkid -p -s TYPE -o value "$DEV" 2>/dev/null; }
fs_label() { blkid -p -s LABEL -o value "$DEV" 2>/dev/null; }
# has_signature: FAIL CLOSED. blkid -p exits 0 when it found something and 2 when it found NOTHING; any other result (an
# error, an ambivalent probe, blkid missing) must never read as „empty" — that is the only gate in front of mkfs.
has_signature() {
local rc=0
blkid -p -o value "$DEV" >/dev/null 2>&1 || rc=$?
case $rc in
0) return 0 ;;
2) return 1 ;;
*) die "cannot probe $DEV for a signature (blkid exit $rc) — refusing" ;;
esac
}
lv_gib() { gib_floor "$(lvs --noheadings --nosuffix --units b -o lv_size "$VG/$LV_NAME" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')"; }
if $have_lv; then
@@ -89,12 +104,12 @@ if $have_lv; then
echo "existing uuid=$(fs_uuid) gib=$(lv_gib)"; exit 0
fi
# A felhom-belso with NO signature: a crash between lvcreate and mkfs. Nothing can be on it — format it.
[[ -z "$(blkid -p -o value "$DEV" 2>/dev/null)" ]] || die "$DEV carries a signature blkid cannot name — left alone"
has_signature && die "$DEV carries a signature blkid cannot name — left alone"
else
(( internal >= MIN_GIB )) || { echo "skipped only $internal GiB free for it (pool $pool_gib, reserve $reserve, promised $promised_gib, planned $PLANNED; needs $MIN_GIB)"; exit 0; }
lvcreate -q -y -V "${internal}G" -T "$VG/$POOL" -n "$LV_NAME" >/dev/null || die "lvcreate failed"
is_block "$DEV" || die "$DEV did not appear after lvcreate"
[[ -z "$(blkid -p -o value "$DEV" 2>/dev/null)" ]] || die "the new $DEV already carries a signature — left alone"
has_signature && die "the new $DEV already carries a signature — left alone"
made=created
fi
mkfs.ext4 -q -L "$LABEL" "$DEV" >/dev/null || die "mkfs.ext4 failed on $DEV"
+7 -15
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@@ -58,31 +58,23 @@ fi
# 3) mounted OUTSIDE Felhom's own drive area = a live foreign filesystem → catastrophic. Mounts under
# /mnt/felhom-drives are our own drives (the agent detaches before a re-init) → allowed.
# Agent v0.158.0 (felhom.eu architecture/16 §6, partitions as places): a SIBLING partition that is Felhom's own
# enrolled drive is mounted TWICE — raw at /mnt/<name> and under /mnt/felhom-drives (R-220). That raw mount is
# allowed only when the same device is ALSO mounted under /mnt/felhom-drives, a state only Felhom's enrolment
# produces. The TARGET itself mounted anywhere outside /mnt/felhom-drives, or any mount elsewhere (/srv, /media,
# /mnt/a/b), still REFUSES. Read from the kernel's mount table, every node of the disk (partitions and children).
# Agent v0.158.0: read from the kernel's mount table for EVERY node of the disk (lsblk's MOUNTPOINT shows one mount
# per node; a bind elsewhere hid behind it), and a disk whose nodes cannot be listed REFUSES (it passed before).
# Deliberately NO exemption for a sibling that is Felhom's own enrolled drive (raw /mnt/<name> + /mnt/felhom-drives):
# the only corroboration available here is a mount the agent itself can make, so trusting it would let a compromised
# agent unlock a host owner's disk. Consequence (felhom.eu `16` §13): the free part next to an in-use Felhom drive
# cannot be formatted; the dashboard does not offer it.
PROC_MOUNTS=/proc/mounts
node_mounts() { awk -v d="$1" '$1 == d { print $2 }' "$PROC_MOUNTS"; }
disk_nodes="$(lsblk -nrpo NAME "$whole" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[[ -n "$disk_nodes" ]] || die "cannot list the nodes of $whole — refusing"
while read -r node; do
[[ -z "$node" ]] && continue
own=false
while read -r mp; do
case "$mp" in /mnt/felhom-drives/*) own=true ;; esac
done < <(node_mounts "$node")
while read -r mp; do
[[ -z "$mp" ]] && continue
case "$mp" in
/mnt/felhom-drives|/mnt/felhom-drives/*) : ;;
*)
if [[ "$node" != "$dev" && "$own" == true && "$mp" =~ ^/mnt/[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$ ]]; then
: # a sibling that is Felhom's own enrolled drive (raw mount + managed mount)
else
die "device (or a partition) is mounted at $mp ($node)"
fi ;;
*) die "device (or a partition) is mounted at $mp ($node)" ;;
esac
done < <(node_mounts "$node")
done <<< "$disk_nodes"
+42 -4
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@@ -14,12 +14,16 @@ GIB = 1 << 30
STUB_LVS = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json, os, sys
st = json.load(open(os.environ["IP_STATE"]))
if st.get("lvs_fail_listing") and "lv_name,pool_lv,lv_size" in sys.argv: sys.exit(5)
args = [a for a in sys.argv[1:] if not a.startswith("-") and a not in ("b",)]
fields = sys.argv[sys.argv.index("-o") + 1].split(",")
target = args[-1]
listing = target == st["vg"]
for lv in st["lvs"]:
full = st["vg"] + "/" + lv["name"]
if target == st["vg"] or target == full:
if listing and st.get("hide_pool_in_listing") and lv.get("pool", "") == "":
continue # a listing that silently lost the pool row (the pool's own size stays readable)
if listing or target == full:
row = {"lv_name": lv["name"], "pool_lv": lv.get("pool", ""), "lv_size": str(lv["size"])}
print(" " + " ".join(row[f] for f in fields))
'''
@@ -35,15 +39,18 @@ if st.get("dirty_new"): st["fs"]["felhom-belso"] = {"TYPE": "", "RAW": "junk"}
json.dump(st, open(p, "w"))
'''
STUB_BLKID = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
# like blkid -p: exit 0 when something is found, 2 when nothing is; st["blkid_rc"] forces an error exit
import json, os, sys
st = json.load(open(os.environ["IP_STATE"]))
if st.get("blkid_rc"): sys.exit(st["blkid_rc"])
fs = st["fs"].get(os.path.basename(sys.argv[-1]), {})
if "-s" in sys.argv:
v = fs.get(sys.argv[sys.argv.index("-s") + 1], "")
if v: print(v)
else:
vals = [fs.get(k, "") for k in ("TYPE", "LABEL", "UUID", "RAW") if fs.get(k)]
if vals: print("\n".join(vals))
sys.exit(0 if v else 2)
vals = [fs.get(k, "") for k in ("TYPE", "LABEL", "UUID", "RAW") if fs.get(k)]
if vals: print("\n".join(vals))
sys.exit(0 if vals else 2)
'''
STUB_MKFS = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json, os, sys
@@ -213,5 +220,36 @@ class Create(unittest.TestCase):
b.close()
class FailsClosed(unittest.TestCase):
"""A read that fails must never read as „empty" or „nothing promised". Positive control: Create (same setups)."""
def test_a_failed_volume_listing_creates_nothing(self):
b = Box(349, lvs_fail_listing=True)
try:
rc, out, err = b.run("create", "132")
self.assertEqual(rc, 1, out)
self.assertEqual(b.calls(), [])
finally:
b.close()
def test_a_listing_without_the_pool_creates_nothing(self):
b = Box(349, [thin("vm-9201-disk-1", 250)], hide_pool_in_listing=True)
try:
self.assertEqual(b.run("create", "132")[0], 1)
self.assertEqual(b.calls(), [])
finally:
b.close()
def test_a_blkid_error_never_reads_as_empty(self):
for setup in ({"lvs": [thin("felhom-belso", 183)], "fs": {}}, {}):
b = Box(349, **({"lvs": setup["lvs"], "fs": setup["fs"]} if setup else {}), blkid_rc=4)
try:
rc, out, err = b.run("create", "0" if setup else "132")
self.assertEqual(rc, 1, (setup, out))
self.assertNotIn("mkfs", " ".join(b.calls()), setup)
finally:
b.close()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+13 -8
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@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Tests for configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh — the ONLY mkfs path the agent's sudoers permits.
First tests of this wrapper (agent v0.158.0), written with its change for partitions as places (felhom.eu
architecture/16 §6): a SIBLING partition that is Felhom's own enrolled drive (mounted raw at /mnt/<name> AND under
/mnt/felhom-drives) no longer blocks formatting the empty partition next to it; every other mount still refuses.
First tests of this wrapper (agent v0.158.0), written for partitions as places (felhom.eu architecture/16 §6). Every
mount of every node of the disk outside /mnt/felhom-drives refuses — INCLUDING a sibling that is Felhom's own drive
(its raw /mnt/<name> mount): the agent can make that corroborating mount itself, so the root wrapper must not trust
it (security review of 912f7c1). An unlistable disk refuses.
HOW IT RUNS ANYWHERE: the wrapper is copied with five literal host paths replaced (each replacement is asserted, so a
drifted wrapper fails here instead of silently testing nothing): /proc/mounts → a fake mount table, the block-device
@@ -110,8 +111,12 @@ class Partitions(unittest.TestCase):
finally:
d.close()
def test_the_empty_part_next_to_felhoms_own_drive_is_formatted(self):
self.check(OWN_SDB1)
def test_a_free_part_on_an_unmounted_disk_is_formatted(self):
self.check([]) # positive control for every refusal below
def test_the_free_part_next_to_felhoms_own_drive_is_refused(self):
# The agent could make the „corroborating" managed mount itself: the root wrapper does not trust it.
self.check(OWN_SDB1, want_ok=False)
def test_a_sibling_mounted_raw_only_is_refused(self):
self.check([("/dev/sdb1", "/mnt/hdd_1")], want_ok=False)
@@ -131,9 +136,9 @@ class Partitions(unittest.TestCase):
def test_the_catastrophic_cases_still_refuse(self):
self.check([("/dev/sdb1", "/")], want_ok=False) # system disk
self.check(OWN_SDB1, nodes=disk_sdb(sdb1_fstype="LVM2_member"), want_ok=False) # a member signature
self.check(OWN_SDB1, pvs="/dev/sdb1", want_ok=False) # an LVM PV (pvs)
self.check(OWN_SDB1, ro="1", want_ok=False) # read-only
self.check([], nodes=disk_sdb(sdb1_fstype="LVM2_member"), want_ok=False) # a member signature
self.check([], pvs="/dev/sdb1", want_ok=False) # an LVM PV (pvs)
self.check([], ro="1", want_ok=False) # read-only
if __name__ == "__main__":
+20 -1
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@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import (
// A disk that passed the WHOLE-disk unclaimed filter (classifyClaim: not the system disk, no LVM/ZFS/RAID/LUKS/swap
// member on any node, no foreign mount on any node) also lists its partitions, each with its own state:
//
// empty no filesystem, no children → „format this part" (self-serve: the agent's probe says blank)
// empty no filesystem, no children → „format this part" (self-serve: the agent's probe says blank) —
// only while NO part of the disk is mounted (Formattable)
// filesystem ext4/xfs (mountable) or another fs → „use this part" when mountable; „format this part" only through
// the customer-confirmed data-bearing path (the agent's own probe)
// in_use already Felhom's own drive → shown, never offered (it is a registered drive already)
@@ -32,6 +33,10 @@ type CandidatePartition struct {
Mountable bool `json:"mountable"`
DurableID string `json:"durable_id,omitempty"` // uuid:<fs-uuid> — the attach key ("" when empty)
MountedAt string `json:"mounted_at,omitempty"` // in_use: Felhom's own mount
// Formattable is false when ANY node of the disk is mounted (another part in use): the root mkfs wrapper refuses
// every mount outside /mnt/felhom-drives on the disk and deliberately does not trust a sibling that claims to be
// Felhom's own (a compromised agent could fake that). Such a part can still be USED (attach erases nothing).
Formattable bool `json:"formattable"`
}
const (
@@ -55,6 +60,19 @@ func candidatePartitions(lsblkJSON []byte, wholeName string, sizeOf func(string)
if d.Name != wholeName {
continue
}
diskMounted := d.MountPoint != ""
var walk func(n lsblkDev)
walk = func(n lsblkDev) {
if n.MountPoint != "" {
diskMounted = true
}
for _, c := range n.Children {
walk(c)
}
}
for _, c := range d.Children {
walk(c)
}
for _, p := range d.Children {
if len(p.Children) > 0 || memberFSTypes[p.FSType] {
continue // LVM/mapper on it, or a member: not a place (the disk filter refuses these anyway)
@@ -74,6 +92,7 @@ func candidatePartitions(lsblkJSON []byte, wholeName string, sizeOf func(string)
c.DurableID = "uuid:" + u
}
}
c.Formattable = c.State != PartInUse && !diskMounted
out = append(out, c)
}
}
+18
View File
@@ -71,3 +71,21 @@ func TestPartitions_UncorroboratedMountIsNotOffered(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// The root wrapper refuses any format on a disk with a mounted node (and trusts no „it is Felhom's own" claim), so a
// part next to a mounted one is never offered for formatting — only for use. Positive control: an unmounted disk.
func TestPartitions_FormattableOnlyWhenNothingOnTheDiskIsMounted(t *testing.T) {
m := listParts(map[string]bool{"/mnt/films": true})
for dev, p := range m {
if p.Formattable {
t.Fatalf("%s: a part of a disk with a mounted part must not be formattable: %+v", dev, p)
}
}
free := `{"blockdevices":[{"name":"sdc","fstype":null,"mountpoint":null,"children":[
{"name":"sdc1","fstype":null,"mountpoint":null},{"name":"sdc2","fstype":"ext4","mountpoint":null}]}]}`
got := candidatePartitions([]byte(free), "sdc", func(string) int64 { return 1 << 30 }, func(string) int { return 1 },
func(string) (string, bool) { return "u", true }, nil)
if len(got) != 2 || !got[0].Formattable || !got[1].Formattable {
t.Fatalf("parts of an unmounted disk are formattable, got %+v", got)
}
}