R-124 recipe root namespace as PBS spells it; R-118 no root size for an absent drive; R-269 rotated-out token rejected at once; R-317 dnsmasq install probed by its unit (burn-down round 2)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS

.gitignore

@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@
 
 # go
 /vendor/
+
+# Python bytecode written by configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py
+configs/__pycache__/

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,378 @@
+## unreleased (to be released as v0.147.0) — the recovery recipe spells the root namespace the way PBS does; a removed drive no longer shows the root disk's size; a rotated-out token stops at once; the dnsmasq check looks at the right package (burn-down round 2: R-124, R-118, R-269, R-317) (2026-10-05)
+
+MinAgent impact: none (the controller needs nothing new from this agent). Config bundle content unchanged from v0.146.1.
+
+- **R-124 (operator ruling 2026-10-05: fix it):** the DR recipe's `pbs.namespace` for a box in PBS's ROOT namespace is
+  now `""` — PBS's own spelling — beside `namespace_state: resolved`; it used to be the word `root`, which no namespace
+  is named, so `--ns root` failed in a recovery. `hub.PBSRootNamespace`; `TestR124_RootNamespaceOnTheWireIsPBSSpelling`
+  (red-proof: back to "root" → FAIL). Runbook: `felhom.eu runbooks/ep0-datastore-copy.md` step 2 says how to read it
+  (and to treat a recorded `root` from older agents as empty). The hub stores the recipe raw; its fixture follows.
+- **R-118:** the local API's drive list reads a drive's capacity only while its DEVICE is present — with the device gone
+  the bare mountpoint is a directory on the root filesystem, whose size was reported as the drive's.
+  `TestDisks_UnionPath_AbsentDeviceReportsNoRootCapacity` (red-proof convicts).
+- **R-269:** the token store re-reads its shared file whenever it has grown, BEFORE answering — so a token rotated out by
+  another process stops authorizing on its next use (it used to keep working until an unrelated miss). One `stat` per
+  call. `TestTokenStore_RotatedOutTokenRejectedFirst` (red-proof convicts).
+- **R-317:** the LAN resolver decides whether to install `dnsmasq` by its service UNIT, not by `/usr/sbin/dnsmasq` (which
+  the `dnsmasq-base` package also ships). Same `apt-get install` command; no sudoers change. `TestEnsureDnsmasq_*`
+  (red-proof convicts). Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/burndown2-2026-10-05/agent-red-proofs.txt`,
+  `r124-red-proof.txt`.
+
+Also in this release (no binary effect; from burn-down round 1):
+
+- **R-291:** `scripts/retention-policy.json` names where its 10 comes from — the R-267 newest-10 prune of generic
+  packages, established 2026-08-10 (R-287) — instead of „observed, no located ruling"; the non-existent
+  `registry-retention.md` reader is dropped. `check-published-versions.py` still reads 10 (checked).
+- **R-348:** `internal/backup/store.go` no longer says backups are „unaffected" by a restart: the reported backup list
+  reads 0 until the next backup runs; only the hub's verdict (7-day look-back) is unaffected.
+
+## v0.146.1 — R-861 review fixes: the signed update flips a root-owned copy; no Wants=/continuations in mount units; the escrow read follows no symlink anywhere (2026-10-05)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `badd6c9a2e40c8bfe856d2d1a203443b21b7eb92ecc35d6090ab44518d4d082a`,
+config bundle sha256 `42333e969028867ad8142335e6c1bc4040eec231de0d8d330c2d4b2cf7bc3442`. **Supersedes v0.146.0, which
+was released but never vouched or delivered to any box.** The same order applies: signed `agent_update` first, then the
+signed `agent_config_update`.
+
+**Delivery needs a STEP bundle (R-880, found while delivering).** An installed `felhom-os-apply` checks an incoming
+bundle's paths against its OWN table (R16), so every box on the v0.145.0 bundle REFUSES the v0.146.1 bundle (it adds 4
+paths). `scripts/build-step-bundle.py` builds the transition: the box's current bundle with ONLY `felhom-os-apply`
+replaced (same paths — the old wrapper accepts it), published as bundle version `0.146.1-step1`; then the release's own
+bundle. Order on a box: `agent_update` 0.146.1 → `agent_config_update` 0.146.1-step1 → `agent_config_update` 0.146.1.
+Tests `StepBundle` (the R16 refusal reproduced; the step accepted; exactly one file changed). Tooling only — not in the
+binary or the bundle.
+
+A background security review of the v0.146.0 commit found three holes in the new code; each is fixed and red-proved
+(`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt`, S1–S3):
+
+- **S1 — a race in the signed update.** `felhom-os-apply` hashed the agent's staged file and then let the A/B wrapper copy
+  it BY PATH; the agent owns that directory and could swap the file in between. Now the root step reads the file ONCE
+  (`read_staged_once`: O_NOFOLLOW, fstat, owner, size), hashes those bytes, writes them to a root-owned directory
+  (`/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/agent-update/`) and hands ONLY that copy to `felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply`, which now
+  refuses any other directory, a symlink, or a file not owned by root. Tests: `AgentUpdate` (+1),
+  `SelfupdateWrapperConfinement`.
+- **S2 — an allowlist escape in `felhom-priv-apply`.** `[Unit]` accepted `Wants=`/`Requires=`/`Before=` naming any unit, so
+  a mount unit could start e.g. `reboot.target`. `[Unit]` now holds only `Description` and `After=local-fs-pre.target`
+  (what the renderers write), and any line ending in a backslash (a systemd continuation this parser would read
+  differently) is refused. Tests `test_U2_wants_starts_another_unit`, `test_U2_continuation_line`.
+- **S3 — a path traversal in the escrow read.** `O_NOFOLLOW` guards only the last component; a symlinked DIRECTORY in the
+  agent's own state dir still redirected the root read. `readStagedNoFollow` now walks the path from `/` with
+  `openat(O_NOFOLLOW)` per component. Test `TestAttach_RefusesASymlinkedDirectory`.
+
+## v0.146.0 — the agent's root grants narrowed: exact sudo patterns, a root content checker, fixed files from the bundle, the signed update checked as root (R-861) (2026-10-05)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `b860af465076041e07f35fed1b12d64ae2b2985d8995f0ce167418d39c2b00d5`,
+config bundle sha256 `161c737e523aa7910cf32ce41b83f989569bee55b8c5938e7211c92aef68548e`. **Order on a box: the signed
+`agent_update` FIRST (the old bundle still grants the old flip), then the signed `agent_config_update`.** Between the
+two (minutes) the new agent's checker calls are refused and retried; nothing is lost. After the bundle, an agent BELOW
+0.146.0 cannot update itself on that box any more (the unsigned flip grant is gone) — deliver both together.
+
+Design: `felhom.eu/documentation/architecture/03-host-agent.md` §3.1 (new). Measured before the change (real sudo
+1.9.16, a throwaway container): the v0.145.0 sudoers let **23 of 29** attack command lines through; v0.146.0 lets
+**0** through and still allows all **64** commands the agent's capability check uses.
+
+- **Exact patterns.** A sudoers `*` in the arguments also matches spaces: `pct set [0-9]* -onboot 1` matched
+  `pct set 100 --dev0 /dev/sda -onboot 1` (a raw host disk for a guest), `mount --bind /mnt/*/felhom-data
+  /mnt/felhom-drives/*` matched a `..` path onto `/etc/sudoers.d`, `nft add element … *` took a chained `; flush
+  ruleset`. Every varying argument list is now a sudo regex (`^…$`): one value per slot, a fixed character set, no
+  `..`, no extra argument. `TestSudoersRefusesTheR861Injections` (29 attacks) + `TestManifestCoveredBySudoers`
+  (regex-aware now).
+- **`felhom-priv-apply`** (new root wrapper, in the bundle). A systemd mount/automount unit, a dnsmasq drop-in, the
+  WireGuard config and the OOB sshd config + felhom-op key reach their root-read places only through it: fixed source,
+  fixed destination, CONTENT checked against what the agent's renderers write (no `[Service]`, `Where=` only
+  `/mnt/<name>` or `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` and equal to the unit name, no `bind`/`suid`; a network share must carry
+  `nosuid,nodev`; no `dhcp-script=`; no `PostUp=`; the sshd config only the one template with its Port). Its 30 tests
+  (`configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py`) + Go contract tests feeding each renderer's real output
+  (`internal/privapplytest`). Pre-flight: every live file on both demo boxes reads OK.
+- **NFS/SMB options gain `nosuid,nodev`** (a set-uid file on a server outside the box never acts on the host).
+- **Fixed files from the bundle.** The guest pre-start hook (`/var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh`, run as root at
+  every guest start) and the shared drive parent script + unit are bundle files now (byte-identical to the agent's
+  constants, pinned). The agent no longer installs them from `/tmp`; it checks them (`guesthook.SnippetReady`,
+  `ensureSharedParentBoot`) and only registers / enables.
+- **The signed update is checked as root.** `felhom-os-apply` mode `agent_update` verifies the operator signature
+  (root-owned signers, this host, the window, the nonce), re-hashes the staged binary against the SIGNED sha, then runs
+  the A/B flip; `felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply` is no longer in the agent's sudoers. 7 tests (`AgentUpdate`).
+- **The root escrow run reads no path from the agent's config.** As root it pins the PVE secret dir and the WireGuard
+  state dir to their defaults, refuses a storage id that is a path, and reads its two staged files without following a
+  symlink (`readStagedNoFollow`) — before, a symlink in the agent's own directory sealed any root file into the blob.
+- **Not narrowed here (named in `03` §3.1):** `FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP` stays guest-scoped (a compromised agent can run a
+  chosen controller image in the guest — the household's data, not host root); `FELHOM_ESCROW` still hands the agent R
+  by design (the agent relays the ceremony); the mkfs / pbs-apply / backup-target wrappers keep a coarse argument and
+  their own checks.
+- Red-proofs F1–F9: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt` (F1's first run did NOT
+  convict — the name rule masked it — and the test now uses the pair only the Where rule stops).
+
+## v0.145.0 — the OS update repairs itself after a power cut; a short-session box gets restore-tested; "sent late" (R-876, R-874, R-875) (2026-10-05)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `894da35c7b9e1ac78885690b78352b634e6831e7d99b321573c75d878db8886e`,
+config bundle sha256 `78c00adce662d2d966b2ac50ebde46cde1ae225f0107c6a7c02b70ec8ce80c4f`. The wrapper changed: a box
+needs the signed `agent_update` AND the signed `agent_config_update`.
+
+- **R-876.** After a crash during an install, `dpkg --audit` can read clean while dpkg's update journal
+  (`/var/lib/dpkg/updates/`) is not — and apt refuses every install until `dpkg --configure -a` (measured on demo-hp
+  2026-10-05: every later pass failed until a person typed it). The wrapper now reads `--audit` and the journal in ONE
+  `sh -c` call (`DPKG_STATE_SCRIPT`) — a clean pass still costs one call (R-845's speed, pinned) — and repairs when
+  either shows something; as a belt, when apt itself says "dpkg was interrupted", it repairs and retries the install
+  ONCE. `REPAIR` now logs `journal=N`; a journal still not empty after the repair refuses (R13). Tests
+  `CrashLeftTheJournal` (the measured shape, the speed, the belt); 3 red-proofs.
+- **R-874.** The restore-test's first due-check runs 30 minutes after the agent starts (`DefaultFirstEval`), then every
+  interval; a box whose power-on sessions are shorter than the 6 h interval never evaluated. A crash-looping agent
+  restarting faster than 30 minutes still never evaluates (the earned restraint, pinned).
+- **R-875.** A kept report's reason is neutral — "sent late — kept on the box until the hub could take it" — the copy
+  cannot tell a killed agent from an absent hub.
+- Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/catchup-2026-10-05/part{C,D}/`.
+
+## v0.144.1 — a killed pass really keeps its report: the wrapper survives a dead reader; the agent looks again every 5 minutes (R-868, measured live) (2026-10-05)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `6ccd521d47e64999017e8eb5bc613d724543cfdc5ef9b13bcae9e3ea8c53b8f3`,
+config bundle sha256 `e89a9ddfb767e177f8874d56f3dcd3bfd47409d157ff830d362653333bf815e8`. The wrapper changed again:
+a box needs the signed `agent_update` AND the signed `agent_config_update`.
+
+- **Found live on demo-hp 2026-10-05 05:45 UTC with v0.144.0** (the night's A5 shape: kill -9 of the pass and the
+  daemon while apt-get ran): apt finished all 13 packages, but the wrapper's next log line went to a stderr pipe no
+  process read any more → `BrokenPipeError` → the wrapper died before it saved its report copy (journal: `PLAN
+  upgrade=13`, then nothing; no copy; the hub got nothing). v0.144.0's mechanism was right and never reached.
+  `Runner.log` and the final `OSAPPLY-REPORT` line now survive a dead reader (the journal still gets every line).
+  Test `AgentDiesMidPass` drives the REAL `log()` into a pipe that breaks while apt-get runs.
+- **Also found live:** the restarted daemon looked for kept copies ~7 s before the orphaned wrapper wrote one. The
+  daemon now looks at start and every 5 minutes (`Leg.SendUnsentLoop`); `TestR868_ACopyWrittenAfterTheStartIsSentByTheLoop`.
+- Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/night-fixes-2026-10-05/partD/r868-brokenpipe-red-proof.txt`.
+- A second agent release in one session, against "one release per repo": recorded as `09` decision 108 (operator may
+  reverse) — the alternative was to ship a fix proven not to work.
+
+## v0.144.0 — R8 measures the real download; an OS pass reports even when its agent was killed; the debug pass runs with the hub away (R-865, R-868, R-866) (2026-10-05)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `f18093c3466749ec4cd47f83f97a401160a24bad1e704f1183051adad14db928`,
+config bundle `felhom-config-bundle.json` sha256 `6acf42fe46df5223384d767801cb2bf73238ba4dab82debb7811ca2f790591d8`.
+The wrapper `felhom-os-apply` changed, so a box needs BOTH the signed `agent_update` and the signed `agent_config_update`.
+
+- **R-865.** `download_bytes` runs `apt-get --print-uris` WITHOUT `-s`: with `-s` apt prints the simulation and no URI
+  list, so R8 summed 0 B and only its 500 MB floor ever applied. `--print-uris` alone downloads nothing (measured on
+  9202: the archive cache and the versions unchanged). The test fake now answers like real apt (with `-s`: no URIs),
+  and `test_R8_counts_the_real_download` / `test_download_bytes_never_simulates` pin it.
+- **R-868.** The wrapper writes every apply pass's report to `<plan dir>/report-<run>-<layer>-apply.json` before it
+  prints it (root writes into the agent's dir: the dir opened O_NOFOLLOW and checked to be the agent's own, the file
+  created O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600, handed to the agent). The plan now carries `run_id`, `trigger`, `ring`, echoed in
+  the report. The agent deletes the copy once the hub has the report; a copy left on disk (the agent was killed, or
+  the hub was away) is sent at the agent's start and before every pass (`Leg.SendUnsent`), then deleted. A pass lock
+  (flock on `pass.lock`, across the daemon and a selftest) keeps the sender off a pass that is still running.
+- **R-866.** The daemon saves the hub's newest os_update block (`os-update-block.json`); `--selftest=os-update` uses it
+  when the hub cannot be reached and says so in its header (`block=SAVED(<time>; hub unreachable: …)`); with no hub
+  and nothing saved it does not run.
+- Tests: `configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py` (UnsentReport, SaveReportOnDisk — real files, symlink cases), Go
+  `TestR868_*`, `TestR866_*`. Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/night-fixes-2026-10-05/part{C,D}/`.
+
+## v0.143.0 — the config bundle: a signed route for a box's root-owned files (R-840, decision 96) (2026-10-04)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `41c0d3060013dfda795262147454248149bee0888c0935170fdb85de6e7a35da`,
+config bundle `felhom-config-bundle.json` sha256 `8d7273cf5313ef62b867cb6f831c631923a436452d6f90b8ff7f0771170396ba`.
+
+- **The bundle.** Every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes (sudoers ×2, the five wrappers, the crash guard
+  and its units, the agent and rollback units, the start-limit drop-in, the mgmt watchdog, the OOB belt's files) as ONE
+  reproducible JSON file, built by `scripts/build-config-bundle.py` from `BUNDLE_FILES` in `configs/felhom-os-apply`
+  (one table) and published beside the binary. The installer (1.31.0) installs the same file.
+- **The route.** A signed `agent_config_update` {agent_version, bundle_sha256} (`felhom-opsign -op agent_config_update
+  -bundle-sha256 …`). The agent is the courier (downloads, checks the sha, hands over); `felhom-os-apply` mode `bundle`
+  verifies it ITSELF: the operator signature against the root-owned `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` (or, when that file
+  is missing, ONLY the installer's pinned key, after which it creates the file with exactly that key), the host binding,
+  the window, its own nonce; the bundle sha; every path in `BUNDLE_FILES` (R16) and never a trust file (R17); every
+  content check before the first write (visudo, sh/bash -n, python, unit sections, the RuntimeDirectory guard, User=,
+  nft -c, and that the route itself survives). Atomic per file, previous copies kept under
+  `/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/bundle-prev/`; a self-check after (visudo -c, `sudo -l` lists the route, the new wrapper's
+  `--self-check`, the self-update wrapper's usage, the crash guard's status = kernel.panic); any failure puts every
+  previous copy back. A newly installed crash guard is started (`enable --now`: kernel.panic for this boot, no reboot).
+  Record `/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json`; the agent reports it as `system.config_bundle`, the facts mode adds drift.
+- **Bootstrap.** A box whose `felhom-os-apply` predates 0.143.0 cannot take the first bundle by the route (nothing on it
+  can write a root file from a signed job): `felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-bundle-bootstrap.sh` is the one by-hand step.
+- **`build-golden.sh` 3.2.0** (not part of the binary): `GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS` brings the template to exactly the
+  approved guest release (only installed packages, never newer, never a removal or a new package) and prints the
+  first-night count.
+- Tests: `configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py` (43; 22 of 22 mutants red), `internal/osupdate/bundle_test.go`,
+  `internal/hub/bundle_record_test.go`. Live: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04/partB/`.
+
+## v0.142.1 — a Docker step no longer leaves the controller and traefik blind (R-858, `09` decision 95)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.142.1` (`4950030`), sha256
+> `003f882a59abfc10021a1f97a4744ab78ab1e916b1392dcef132e7067f3c62bd`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none. A same-day patch release, by the operator's ruling 95 after a live incident.
+
+- **The incident.** v0.142.0's Docker step on demo-felhom (14:13 UTC) restarted dockerd, which recreates
+  `/run/docker.sock`. live-restore kept every container running — including `felhom-controller` and `traefik`, which
+  bind-mount the socket FILE and so kept the deleted inode. The controller could not reach Docker for 1 h 44 min (hub:
+  DOWN, "docker not reachable"); its own health check stayed "healthy", so the step's health rule PASSED.
+- **The fix.** After a Docker step that installed something, the wrapper restarts ONLY the containers that mount
+  `/var/run/docker.sock` or `/run/docker.sock` (`os-apply: SOCKET-USERS restarted=…`; the apps and the engine untouched).
+  The guest health reading gains `controller_docker_ok` (`docker exec felhom-controller docker version`), and the health
+  rule fails when it is false — the consequence, not the mechanism.
+- Proven live on demo-hp BEFORE the release (signed undo to 29.7.2): the two restarted, guest / controller / traefik on
+  the same socket inode, healthy. Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partE-incident/`.
+
+## v0.142.0 — the Docker engine slow lane, the version report, the crash guard (`11` §5.8, §5.9; `09` decisions 87–89)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.142.0` (`b1746c2`), sha256
+> `7beb32224d6495e9561acfd3ad8a48393a799520f196080011cb27fceb6d1de6`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none. **Needs hub v0.132.0** for the System page, the Docker approval and the crash events; an older
+hub stores the new `system` stanza unread. **Needs the new root files** on an installed box (R-840): the wrapper,
+`/etc/felhom/os-trust.json`, `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` and the crash guard — the installer 1.30.0 writes them; the
+demo boxes got them by hand.
+
+- **Docker `live-restore` ON** (decision 87). Wrapper mode `live-restore-on`: merge `"live-restore": true` into the
+  guest's `/etc/docker/daemon.json` and `systemctl reload docker` — never a restart (R-835). An invalid daemon.json is
+  left alone (R16); a reload that does not enable it puts the old file back. The leg runs it once before a Docker step;
+  `--selftest=live-restore -vmid N` runs it by hand. Measured: demo-hp 24 containers, demo-felhom 5 — the same ids after.
+- **The Docker engine slow lane** (`11` §5.8). Wrapper layer `docker`, lane `slow` only, the six Docker packages only,
+  origin `Docker CE` only (R2; a Docker package in a fast-lane plan is refused). **R3 — the wrapper checks the authority
+  itself**, never the agent's config: a ring-1 step or ANY undo needs a signed `os_docker_step` it verifies with
+  `ssh-keygen -Y verify` against the ROOT-owned `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` (namespace `felhom-op-v1`, the blob's
+  `key_id`), bound to `/etc/felhom/os-trust.json` `host_id`, inside its time window, never replayed (a root-owned nonce
+  file), with exactly the signed packages and undo flag; an unsigned ring-0 step needs that file's
+  `"ring0_slow_lane": true` (the demo boxes only, set by hand). **R15:** live-restore must be on. An undo may downgrade
+  (`--allow-downgrades`) only inside a signed job. The leg: ring 0 runs the Docker step at night after a healthy guest
+  and host step (`select pending-docker`); ring 1 never does — only `DockerStepExecutor` (signed job, heavy-op gate).
+  **Health:** the guest rule + every container running at the start has the SAME id after + the engine reports the
+  installed version; a changed id is `health_failed`. Measured ring 0: 29.7.x → 29.8.2 on both demo boxes, every id kept.
+- **The version report** (R-852, decision 89). Wrapper mode `facts` (read-only): host Debian, running and next-boot
+  kernel (`next_entry` > saved default > newest installed, by dpkg order), held packages (R-848), kernel taint (oops,
+  warn), `kernel.panic`, the crash guard state; guest Debian, Docker engine, containerd, live-restore. The host report
+  gains `system {pve_version, kernel_version, vmid, facts, facts_error}`, read at most every 10 min (~2 s);
+  `--selftest=os-facts -vmid N`. A value nobody could read is `unknown`.
+- **R-849:** the guest is scanned for "restart needed" on every pass too, so a guest restart clears it.
+- **The crash guard** (decision 88, R-851): `configs/felhom-crash-guard` + `felhom-crash-guard.service` (early boot;
+  its ExecStop writes a clean-stop marker) + an hourly re-arm timer + `/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf`. A boot without
+  the marker followed an unclean stop (a crash, a power cut or a hard reset — pstore saved nothing for a real panic on
+  demo-hp, so they cannot be told apart). Armed: `kernel.panic = 10`. After the 2nd unclean boot within 60 min it
+  TRIPS (`kernel.panic = 0`), so the 3rd crash within the hour leaves the box off; it re-arms after 24 h of normal
+  running or `felhom-crash-guard rearm`. State in `/var/lib/felhom-crash-guard/state.json` (0644; read by facts).
+- **After the tag (main only, not shipped to boxes): `configs/build-golden.sh` 3.1.0** — the golden's `daemon.json`
+  carries `"live-restore": true` with a fail-closed assertion, and `GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS` pins the approved Docker engine
+  set (all six `name=version`); without it the bake log warns that the set is the newest, not an approved one.
+- Tests: wrapper 76 (DockerLane, LiveRestore, Facts, RealSignatureCheck with a throwaway key), crash guard 9, Go leg +
+  executor; red-proofs `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partB/agent-redproofs.txt` (17 caught).
+
+## v0.141.1 — "reboot needed" is true on the host (found live on demo-felhom, 2026-10-04)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.141.1` (`a6bc3f1`), sha256
+> `b712f577099fd2d374f648df1e825874821302fe1b46e93c7b4b70044fbe84b5`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none. **Pairs with hub v0.131.1** (reads `reboot_scanned`); an older hub ignores the field.
+
+A patch release in the same session as v0.141.0 — a deliberate exception to "one release per repo": v0.141.0's host
+"reboot needed" was wrong in two ways, and it feeds an operator alarm.
+- **The scan hid `lxc-start`.** The host scan skipped every process whose cgroup line contains `lxc`, to leave out the
+  guests' own processes. `lxc-start` lives in `0::/lxc.monitor/<vmid>`, so it was skipped too. Measured: after a
+  108-package host pass (libc6 included) `lxc-start` mapped 20 deleted files and the report said `reboot_needed:
+  false`. The pattern is now `:/lxc/` (`RESTART_SKIP_CGROUP`), pinned by a test that runs `grep` against the measured
+  cgroup lines.
+- **A reboot never cleared it.** v0.141.0 scanned only after an install (R-845). The host now scans on EVERY pass (it
+  is local, no `pct exec`); the guest still scans only after an install. The report carries `reboot_scanned`.
+- Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-host-lane-2026-10-04/partB/live-defects-redproofs.txt`.
+
+## v0.141.0 — OS updates: the host fast lane (`11` §8 step 3); the tunnel status is true (R-841); the leg is fast (R-845)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.141.0` (`cfba0d0`), sha256
+> `6eaad9809613c4fca64aefc30cc16415528499bf48efe3a1daaa08af8a611aff`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none required by any controller. **Needs hub v0.131.0** (`host_release`, the tunnel's three
+states, layer-tagged OS reports). With an older hub the host step finds no host release (ring 1 → nothing) and the
+tunnel's `detail` is ignored. Reads the cloudflared health check controller v0.292.0 adds; with an older controller
+the tunnel is judged on the container state alone and `detail` says so.
+
+- **R-841 — the tunnel.** The agent used to run `systemctl is-active cloudflared` on the HOST — a unit that does not
+  exist (cloudflared is a container in the customer guest), so every box reported `inactive`. `GuestTunnelProber`
+  now reads the guest's `cloudflared` container through the EXISTING sudoers line (`pct exec N -- docker inspect -f
+  *`): state, exit code, and the Docker health status. Three states: `running` (healthy), `not_running` (stopped,
+  absent, or running but NOT connected), `unknown` (could not ask, or the check is still starting). `detail` says why.
+- **The host step** (`11` §8 step 3). After a healthy guest step, under the same heavy-op gate, the leg runs the same
+  wrapper with `layer: host`. Debian origin only; never kernel, boot or firmware packages (new refusal **R14**);
+  **only on an appliance** (**R12** lifted for the host fast lane: proof is the ROOT-owned install record
+  `/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json` `mode: appliance` — the agent-writable `agent.json` is not trusted for this).
+  A failed or unhealthy guest step skips it. **Host health rule:** the agent, pveproxy, pvedaemon, pvestatd and
+  pve-cluster are active; the customer guest runs; the guest health rule passes; the tunnel is `running` (an
+  `unknown` tunnel does not fail the rule; `not_running` does). Never reboots: "reboot needed" is reported when PID 1
+  or `lxc-start` runs a replaced library. No automatic undo — the by-hand runbook is `os-updates-host-undo.md`.
+- **R-845 — the leg is fast.** The wrapper asked about each package in its own `pct exec` (about 0.9 s each). It now
+  makes one call per layer for the version checks (`apt-cache madison` for all names at once, `dpkg --compare-versions`
+  on the host), scans for restart-needed only after an install, repairs only when `dpkg --audit` reports something,
+  and reports its own `pass_seconds`.
+- **Wrapper tests:** `configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py` 46 tests (host layer, R12, R14, lxc-start, the speed rules).
+  Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-host-lane-2026-10-04/partA/`, `partB/`, `partC/agent-golden-redproof.txt`.
+- **Contract:** the desired-state golden gains `host_release` (byte-identical with the hub's); `TestOSUpdateGolden_Decodes`
+  checks it.
+
+## v0.140.0 — OS updates, guest fast lane (`11-os-updates.md` §8 step 2; `09` §3 decisions 76, 79, 80)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.140.0` (`9cac346`), sha256
+> `ae2d60b794869c51d6b063c8e31e2da98ecdbd36c6b75febd64e2fb4266c1250`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none required by any controller. **Needs hub v0.130.0** (`os-report`, the `os_update` block); an
+older hub serves no block and the leg then reports and installs nothing (ring 1, no release).
+
+- **`configs/felhom-os-apply`** — the root wrapper (Python 3, stdlib). One sudoers entry, `FELHOM_OSAPPLY`:
+  `felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-*.json`. Modes `inventory` / `apply` / `health`. Refuses (exit
+  2, nothing changed) on R1–R13: plan path/owner/JSON, a non-Debian origin, the slow lane, any removal, any downgrade,
+  a new or unlisted package, a version not downloadable even from the snapshot, low space, a lock (apt or a guest lock
+  such as a backup), a vmid that is not the box's own customer guest (it must bind `/mnt/felhom-drives`), malformed
+  names/versions, the host layer, dpkg still broken after the repair. Repairs first (`dpkg --configure -a`,
+  `apt-get -f install`). A version Debian already replaced comes from `snapshot.debian.org` at the approval time
+  (decision 79). Reports the full installed set with origins, pending, restart-needed (outside containers), health.
+  `configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py`: 35 tests; every refusal red-proved.
+- **`internal/osupdate`** — the leg: after a SUCCESSFUL primary whole-guest backup, still holding the heavy-op gate
+  (never beside another backup or a restore-test), once per night, 90 s after the backup. Ring 0 installs every pending
+  Debian / Debian-Security fix; ring 1 exactly the hub's newest approved release; switched OFF → reports only. The
+  health rule: docker answers, the network resolves, the controller is healthy, every container running at the START
+  of the leg runs (and is healthy if it was) — a 5-minute wait. **No automatic undo:** a customer guest cannot be
+  snapshotted (R-837). A failure is `health_failed` → the hub mails the operator.
+- **`--selftest=os-update -vmid N`** — the debug action (trigger `debug`, never throttled, not a night run).
+- **The `--selftest` flag also accepts `wgtunnel`** — it was dispatched but refused since S3 (found by the new
+  `TestSelftestFlag_AcceptsEveryDispatchedMode`, which also caught `os-update` live).
+- Proven live 2026-10-04 on both demo boxes (ring 0: 53 packages each; ring 1: exactly 3 approved versions; a failed
+  health check → `health_failed`, operator mailed): `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-guest-lane-2026-10-04/`.
+
+## v0.139.0 — a DR restore never lands beside a live original (2026-10-04, R-834)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.139.0` (`475bdce`), sha256
+> `8534a9be368a6d24d8065db77436e86900443c5c6554c71f6fe91c2bdb9d0b9c`, verified by download. **Not vouched.**
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none required by any controller.
+
+- The DR bring-up (`--selftest=bring-up -mode dr`) keeps the archive's `onboot: 1`, binds the host's REAL drives
+  (`mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives`) and STARTS the guest — right on a replaced host, wrong beside a live original (a second
+  controller for the same household on the same drives). It now REFUSES, before any restore, when the archive's
+  source guest still exists on the host, when any guest binds the drives parent, or when a guest's config cannot be
+  read (fail closed). On a replaced host it proceeds and keeps its binds, unchanged.
+- The restore-test was MEASURED safe live on demo-hp (onboot 0 and throwaway stand-ins for mp8/mp9 from the first
+  config read to teardown); a test now pins its "no host path" half beside the existing onboot test.
+- No sudoers change: the restore-test sets onboot 0 through the API create call, and DR refuses rather than degrade,
+  so no `-onboot 0` line is needed.
+- Tests: `TestRunBringUp_DRRefusesBesideALiveOriginal` (source guest present / drives bind on another guest / an
+  unreadable config refuse; a replaced host proceeds and keeps the drives bind), `TestRunBringUp_ProvisionNotBlockedByADrivesBind`,
+  `TestArchiveSourceVMID`, `TestRestoreTest_NoHostPathBindBesideTheOriginal`. Red-proofs: the DR check returning ""
+  → three refusal cases restore and START; the restore-test's mp8 override set to the host path → fails.
+
+## v0.138.0 — the restore test takes only THIS box's archives (2026-09-30, R-727, `09` §3 decision 51)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-09-30** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.138.0` (`e1b8269`), sha256
+> `55916026001790a79ebf97d32c032610cfde8e09d02979b9b9d8c2cbc5d88195`, verified by download. **Not vouched** (the golden
+> keeps 0.137.0 until the next bake); delivered to the demo boxes by signed `agent_update` jobs.
+>
+> **VOUCHED 2026-09-30** with golden 0.283.1 (`min_agent` 0.131.0), on the operator's word: the hub logged
+> `Artifact manifest set: agent=0.138.0 golden=0.283.1 min_agent="0.131.0"`. Evidence:
+> `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/evidence-golden-0283-2026-09-30/`.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none required by any controller.
+
+- A returning customer's PBS namespace can hold archives of EARLIER boxes: same guest id (9201), same token, written
+  with a different key. Measured 2026-09-30: the newest SETTLED archive was an earlier box's, and the test failed
+  `wrong key … manifest's key 6b:ca:5f:3f… does not match provided key de:51:7a:18…` every evaluation. The archive
+  carries no host id; it carries its key fingerprint (PVE content `encrypted`), and the storage carries its own
+  (`GET /storage` → `encryption-key`). `PickSettledRestoreCandidateOn` now skips — and logs by name, once — an archive
+  whose fingerprint is not the storage's own; an unencrypted storage is not filtered; a failed storage read is an
+  error (tier UNKNOWN), never "nothing to prove".
+- Tests: `TestR727_TheRestoreTestTakesOnlyThisBoxsArchives` (the 2026-09-30 shape: nothing picked while this box's
+  archive settles, then exactly it), `TestR727_UnencryptedStorageIsNotFiltered`, `TestR727_KeyLookupFailureIsUnknown`.
+  Red-proof RP39: the skip removed → the earlier box's `2026-09-16T21:59:54Z` is picked.
+
 ## v0.137.0 — a guest outside the agent's ACL is not a known guest (2026-09-27, R-689, v0.136.0 regression)
 
 > **RELEASED 2026-09-27** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.137.0` (`3ef095f`), sha256 `766c9166916a1bd3674b0dc69081f8a7619e770f1402d8ad7705b395937e7627`, verified by download. **NOT vouched** (the operator's act).

CONTEXT.md

@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # CONTEXT — felhom-agent working state
 
+> **2026-10-04 night — v0.143.0 RELEASED + vouched (R-840, decision 96): the config bundle.** `felhom-os-apply` mode
+> `bundle` (signed `agent_config_update`, verified by the wrapper itself; trust files never bundle paths) +
+> `--install-bundle` (installer 1.31.0); `BUNDLE_FILES` is the one table; `scripts/build-config-bundle.py`;
+> `release-agent.sh` publishes it. A box whose `felhom-os-apply` predates 0.143.0 needs ONE by-hand bootstrap
+> (`felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-bundle-bootstrap.sh`) — done on both demo boxes; Tester 2 waits for the operator (R-862).
+> Both demo boxes: agent 0.143.0, bundle 0.143.0 (record `/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json`). R-861 found: the sudoers is
+> root-equivalent. `build-golden.sh` 3.2.0 (`GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS`). Runbook `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/config-bundle.md`.
+
 
 > **2026-09-25 night — v0.133.0 AND v0.134.0 DELIVERED to both demo boxes (CC-signed `agent_update`, ruling 1);
 > restore test back ON (the `-1` config kept as `agent.json.night-0925-off`). v0.134.0 = R-685:** `backup/runner.go`

REPORT.md

@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
-# REPORT — 2026-09-28: agent v0.137.0 vouched with golden 0.276.0
+# REPORT — 2026-10-05 burn-down: two record corrections (no release)
 
-No agent code changed. `configs/build-golden.sh` (v3.0.0) was USED, not changed, to bake golden 0.276.0 in the
-drill VM on DooPlex (RUNBOOK-manual-build §4.0–§4.1).
+Full session report: `felhom.eu/REPORT-burndown-2026-10-05.md`. Baseline `e06ed97` (v0.146.1). No binary, bundle or
+version change; `go build`, `go vet ./internal/backup/`, `agent_gates.py --fast` green.
 
-- **Vouched** in the hub's own form: `golden_version` 0.276.0, `agent_version` 0.137.0, `min_agent` 0.131.0 (the
-  MinAgent in controller v0.276.0's CHANGELOG header). The R-120 gate refused golden 0.258.0 first (negative
-  control). Rollback = the values before: agent 0.132.0, golden 0.258.0, min_agent 0.131.0.
-- **One sha, three places:** `766c9166…7627` in Gitea, on felhom-pve and on demo-hp.
-- **A new box comes up on it:** a Day-0 install (installer 1.28.0, `--force-gitea-golden`) in the drill VM fetched
-  agent 0.137.0 and golden 0.276.0 through the manifest, both sha-verified, and the controller answered healthy at
-  0.276.0 behind an armed claim gate. Not claimed.
-- CHANGELOG: the v0.137.0 entry carries the vouch.
-
-Evidence: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/evidence-golden-0276-2026-09-28/`.
+- R-291 — `scripts/retention-policy.json`: the source of the number (R-267 newest-10 prune, R-287) and readers corrected.
+- R-348 — `internal/backup/store.go`: the restart comment says what a restart really blanks.

REUSE.md

@@ -14,8 +14,15 @@
 | `Privileged` (CreateGoldenLXC/MountUSBByUUID/SMART/Sensors) | internal/proxmox/privileged.go | methods on `*Privileged` | the 3 fenced root-CLI exceptions ONLY | Do NOT add methods — fence is structural (`routing_test.go` asserts it) |
 | `SudoHostOps.run` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `run(ctx, name, args...) error` | allowlisted exec with stderr-wrapped error | Every arg pre-validated via validate.go before this is called |
 | `Prober.Probe` | internal/capability/probe.go | `Probe(ctx) []Status` | live sudo-policy capability check (`sudo -n -l --`) | Needs a DIRECT runner (never the sudo-prefixing one — double-sudo); never executes probed cmds. v0.86.0: config-gated caps (`Capability.GatedBy` + `Prober.GateActive`) report `inactive`/"disabled by configuration" ONLY when healthy — broken plumbing stays degraded; the pbsdr-* gate answers from `pbsdr.Manager.DRConfigured` (marker-backed across restarts) |
-| `stageTemp` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `stageTemp(pattern, content) (path, err)` | random-named temp before a root `install` (audit B1) | Fixed /tmp names are a TOCTOU — sudoers globs expect `/tmp/felhom-*-*.ext` |
-| `guesthook.InstallSnippet` / `Register` | internal/guesthook/install.go | `InstallSnippet(ctx, runner) error` | pre-start self-heal hook install (C1 net) | Same random-temp+install pattern; snippet delegates to the agent binary (no shell logic). Issues `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` FIRST (v0.63.0, B2 — fresh boxes lack the dir; sudoers grants exactly that argv) |
+| ~~`stageTemp`~~ (REMOVED v0.146.0, R-861) | — | — | — | Nothing the agent writes is `install`ed where root reads it any more: use `felhom-priv-apply` (below) or ship a fixed file in the bundle |
+| `felhom-priv-apply` (v0.146.0, R-861) | configs/felhom-priv-apply | `felhom-priv-apply unit <name> \| dnsmasq <tmp> <name> \| wg \| sshd-config \| sshd-key` | ANY agent-rendered file a root program reads (systemd unit, dnsmasq drop-in, wg-quick conf, OOB sshd) — fixed source + destination, CONTENT checked against the agent's own renderers | A new renderer needs a verb + a contract test (`internal/privapplytest.Check`) feeding its REAL output; never a new `install` sudoers line |
+| `privapplytest.Check` | internal/privapplytest/check.go | `Check(t, verb, name, content) string` | the Go↔root-checker contract: a renderer's real output must read `OK` | Skips without python3; one call per rendered shape + one refused control |
+| `BUNDLE_FILES` + `Bundle` (mode `bundle`, `--install-bundle`; mode `agent_update` v0.146.0, R-861) | configs/felhom-os-apply | the ONE table of root-owned paths + the installer of them | ANY new root-owned file the installer writes (sudoers line, wrapper, unit) — add it to the table, never a new installer fetch (R-840) | The builder (`scripts/build-config-bundle.py`) and the installer read the same table; `test_every_root_file_the_installer_writes_is_in_the_bundle` fails on a path the bundle lacks. Trust files (`/etc/felhom/os-trust.json`, `operator-signers`) are NEVER bundle paths (R17) |
+| `osupdate.ConfigUpdateExecutor` | internal/osupdate/bundle.go | signed op `agent_config_update` {agent_version, bundle_sha256} | delivering the bundle to an installed box | a courier only: the root wrapper re-verifies signature, host, nonce and sha itself |
+| `osupdate.Leg.SendUnsent` / `lockPass` (v0.144.0, R-868) | internal/osupdate/unsent.go | `(ctx) int` | an OS-pass report the agent never sent (killed mid-pass): the wrapper keeps `report-<run>-<layer>-apply.json` beside the plan; the agent deletes it once the hub has it | any new caller that runs an apply pass must hold `lockPass` (flock, across processes) — the sender must never take a running pass's copy |
+| `osupdate.LoadSavedBlock` (v0.144.0, R-866) | internal/osupdate/leg.go | `(planDir) (block, savedAt, ok)` | the hub's newest os_update block as the daemon last received it (`os-update-block.json`) | the debug pass uses it ONLY when the hub cannot be reached, and says so in its header; no saved block → no pass |
+| `dpkg_state()` / `DPKG_STATE_SCRIPT` (v0.145.0, R-876) | configs/felhom-os-apply | `audit, journal = self.dpkg_state()` | dpkg's state in ONE call: `--audit` AND the update journal | never gate a repair on `--audit` alone — a crash leaves only the journal (measured); keep it one call (R-845) |
+| `guesthook.SnippetReady` / `Register` (v0.146.0, R-861) | internal/guesthook/install.go | `SnippetReady(path) error` | is the pre-start hook (a FIXED file from the bundle) in place — register only then | The agent never installs the hook (Proxmox runs it as root); a missing hookscript stops a guest start, so never `Register` without `SnippetReady` |
 
 ### Disk / format safety (role gates, durable IDs, format guards)
 
@@ -60,7 +67,7 @@
 | `IntentStore` (`Get/SetEnrolled/SetEjected/SetDecommissioned/OnAbsent`) | internal/storage/intent.go | `OpenIntentStore(path)` | drive intent (4-state self-heal) | Keyed by durable-id only; `OnAbsent` is the ONLY ejected→enrolled path; refuses empty ids |
 | `GuestBindStore` (`Record/Remove/Guests`) | internal/localapi/guestbindstore.go | `OpenGuestBindStore(path)` | per-guest enrolled binds (F9 re-assert) | Same tmp+rename 0600 pattern as IntentStore |
 | `FormatJobStore` + `startFormatDetached` + `RecoverFormatJob` | internal/localapi/formatjob.go | `startFormatDetached(device, durableID, fstype, blank) <-chan error` | detached, restart-surviving mkfs (F20-BUG3) | Runs off `s.baseCtx` (60-min bound) so a request deadline can't SIGKILL mkfs; recovery re-resolves by durable id; blank jobs re-check STILL-blank |
-| `TokenStore.Mint` / `Lookup` | internal/localapi/tokenstore.go | `Mint(vmid) (plaintext, error)` | per-guest local-API tokens | Only the SHA-256 hash persists (fsync'd append log); constant-time compare on lookup; plaintext returned exactly once. Lookup RELOADS the file once on a miss (v0.63.0, B3): the one-shot provisioner mints into the same file the daemon indexes — cross-process coherence without a restart; append-only size check bounds the re-read |
+| `TokenStore.Mint` / `Lookup` | internal/localapi/tokenstore.go | `Mint(vmid) (plaintext, error)` | per-guest local-API tokens | Only the SHA-256 hash persists (fsync'd append log); constant-time compare on lookup; plaintext returned exactly once. Lookup stats the file on EVERY call and reloads BEFORE answering when the append-only log grew (R-269; was reload-on-miss only, v0.63.0 B3, which let a token rotated out by another process keep authorizing as a map hit): the one-shot provisioner mints into the same file the daemon indexes — cross-process coherence both ways without a restart; unchanged size = no re-read. Pinned by `TestTokenStore_RotatedOutTokenRejectedFirst` |
 | `FileNonceStore.SeenOrRecord` | internal/authz/noncestore.go | `SeenOrRecord(nonce, exp) bool` | durable anti-replay | fsync'd before returning false; prune only after exp |
 | `Journal` (`Append/Latest/InFlight/AlreadyApplied`) | internal/reconcile/journal.go | `OpenJournal(path)` | op journal + idempotency + crash recovery | `Recover` consumes `InFlight()`; scratch entries special-cased |
 
@@ -150,6 +157,7 @@
 | `storage.HostOps` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `*SudoHostOps` (prod), `NoopHostOps` (degraded) | fakes in internal/storage/observe_test.go, watchdog_test.go |
 | `storage.HostReader` | internal/storage/hostread.go | `*ProcHostReader` | `fakeHostReader` internal/localapi/disks_test.go; internal/storage/role_test.go. v0.87.0: `BlockSlaves(name)` lists `/sys/block/<name>/slaves` (root-free) — backs the `SystemDisks` dm/md walk (`physicalDisksOf`/`walkSlaves`, role.go); per-branch conservatism: an unresolvable slave fails the WHOLE walk → all-system fail-safe. NEVER weaken the signature test `TestSystemDisks_WalkTopologies` (root-backing disk always in the system set). |
 | `localapi.DiskOps` / `StorageGate` / `GuestAttacher` / `GuestLister` | internal/localapi/disks.go | `*storage.SudoHostOps`; `storageGateAdapter` (cmd/felhom-agent/main.go); `*GuestBinder`; `*proxmox.Client` | `fakeDiskOps`/`fakeGate`/`fakeGuestAttacher`/`fakeGuestList` internal/localapi/disks_test.go |
+| `lanresolver.hostRoot` + `dnsmasqUnitPaths` (data seam, R-317) | internal/lanresolver/lanresolver.go | prod `hostRoot = "/"`; probe = the `dnsmasq` package's systemd UNIT, never `/usr/sbin/dnsmasq` (owned by `dnsmasq-base`) | internal/lanresolver/ensure_dnsmasq_test.go — fixture root tree + recording `proxmox.Runner`; the REAL `os.Stat` probe and `EnsureDnsmasq` run. `TestEnsureDnsmasq_ProductionProbeIsTheUnit` pins the production wiring |
 | `localapi.GuestAPI` / `BackupService` / `BackupStore` / `TokenAuthority` | internal/localapi/server.go | `*proxmox.Client`, `*backup.BackupRunner`, `*backup.Store`, `*TokenStore` | `fakeGuests`/`fakeBackups`/`fakeStore` internal/localapi/server_test.go |
 | `backup.InFlight` | internal/backup/inflight.go | `TryAcquire(what) (release, busy, ok)` / `Busy()` | THE host-wide "one heavy guest operation at a time" gate — shared by the local-API backup path and the restore-test scheduler (R-85) | A **LINK** guard, not a lock one: the scratch VMID never touches the live guest's vzdump lock, but an offsite restore PULLS multi-GB over the tunnel a backup PUSHES one. Callers **DEFER, never cancel** — a deferred restore-test costs coverage, a cancelled backup costs the backup. A nil gate is ungated (pre-R-85 callers). |
 | `capability` store-grant probe (`storeGrantStatuses` / `storeGrantVerdict` / `Client.Permissions`) | cmd/felhom-agent/main.go, internal/proxmox/query.go | *"may the agent READ this backup tier?"*, one `capability.Status` per configured tier | R-185. **Never infer permission from an empty content listing** — `{"data":[]}` is what a FORBIDDEN tier and a NEWBORN tier both return, and that ambiguity hid an unreadable host tier on both demo boxes. Ask `/access/permissions` **as the agent's own token** (root always says yes). **The ungranted answer is not empty and not a 403** — it carries the privileges inherited from the box-wide `/` grant, so test for **`Datastore.AllocateSpace`** specifically; path-presence or `Datastore.Audit` reports a blinded storage healthy. Probed set comes from `BackupTiers()`, never a fixed list. Critical except the `local` fallback. Composes AROUND the sudo prober (the `poolReadStatus` precedent); `Status`'s wire shape is untouched so the hub alert is free. Unreachable PVE ⇒ degraded, never ok. |

cmd/felhom-agent/main.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
 	"os/exec"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ import (
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/localapi"
 	applog "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/log"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/mgmtplane"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/osupdate"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/pbs"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/pbsdr"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/poke"
@@ -242,6 +244,12 @@ func main() {
 		os.Exit(runSelftestRestoreTest(context.Background(), cfg, logger, archive))
 	case "restore-test-due":
 		os.Exit(runSelftestRestoreTestDue(context.Background(), cfg, logger))
+	case "os-update":
+		os.Exit(runSelftestOSUpdate(context.Background(), cfg, logger, vmid))
+	case "os-facts":
+		os.Exit(runSelftestFacts(context.Background(), cfg, logger, vmid))
+	case "live-restore":
+		os.Exit(runSelftestLiveRestore(context.Background(), cfg, logger, vmid))
 	case "pbs-verify":
 		os.Exit(runSelftestPBSVerify(context.Background(), cfg, logger))
 	case "lanresolver":
@@ -782,7 +790,7 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	pbsStore := pbs.NewSnapshotStore()
 	pbsTargets := pbsTargetsFromPVE(cfg, px, logger)
 	pbsReporter := pbs.NewLiveSnapshotReporter(pbsTargets, pbsStore, pbs.DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout, logger)
-	collector := hub.NewCollector(px, hub.SystemctlProber{}, observer, backupStore, backupStore, pbsReporter, cfg.Hub.HostID, version, logger)
+	collector := hub.NewCollector(px, newTunnelProber(cfg, px), observer, backupStore, backupStore, pbsReporter, cfg.Hub.HostID, version, logger)
 	collector.SetBackupTargetResolver(primaryBackupTargetOf(cfg)) // R-109: the recipe names the live target
 	// Privileged-capability self-check (v0.44.0): probe the sudoers grants the non-root agent
 	// depends on. The probe runs `sudo -n -l` LITERALLY (a policy LIST, never executing the
@@ -839,6 +847,11 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	// The "Down" channel sync hook: on each heartbeat, fetch desired-state when the generation
 	// advances. The loop calls it via the EnvelopeObserver seam (hub does not import desired).
 	desiredSyncer := desired.NewSyncer(client, desiredProvider, logger)
+	// OS updates, guest fast lane (agent v0.140.0, `11-os-updates.md` §8 step 2): the leg consumes the hub's
+	// os_update block and runs after each successful primary whole-guest backup (wired on the local API below).
+	osLeg := newOSLeg(cfg, client, px, logger)
+	collector.SetSystemReporter(&factsReporter{leg: osLeg, guest: firstGuest(px)}) // R-852: the versions
+	desiredSyncer.AddConsumer(osLeg)
 	// S5: consume a host_loss restore_directive into an inspectable restore PLAN (derive + surface,
 	// execute nothing). The recipe is fetched on-demand (rare directive) via a fresh Collect.
 	desiredSyncer.AddConsumer(dr.NewConsumer(func(ctx context.Context) *hub.DRRecipeHostHalf {
@@ -856,6 +869,12 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	logger.Info("felhom-agent daemon starting",
 		"version", version, "host_id", cfg.Hub.HostID, "hub_url", cfg.Hub.URL,
 		"interval_s", hcfg.PollSeconds) // hub key intentionally not logged
+	// R-868 (v0.144.0): an OS pass whose agent was killed kept its report on disk — send it now (a pass that starts
+	// first sends it itself; the pass lock keeps the two apart).
+	// v0.144.1: and again every 5 minutes — the wrapper of a killed pass can finish AFTER the restart (measured).
+	go osLeg.SendUnsentLoop(ctx, 5*time.Minute, func(n int) {
+		logger.Info("osupdate: sent kept report(s)", "count", n)
+	})
 
 	// Reconcile (slice 4) runs alongside the hub loop, sharing the per-guest queue
 	// (doc 03 §10). At slice 4 the desired-state provider is empty (no hub serving
@@ -1080,7 +1099,27 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	// recurring clobber before it locks the box out. Port 22 for G1 (H1 passes the felhom-sshd port).
 	collector.SetMgmtPlaneReporter(mgmtplane.NewReporter(mgmtplane.DefaultPrivsepDir, mgmtplane.DefaultHealMarker, mgmtplane.DefaultSshdPort))
 
-	jobsRunner := signedjobs.NewRunner(client, gate, signedjobs.ExecutorChain{wipeExec, decommExec, updateExec}, cfg.Hub.HostID, logger)
+	// Agent v0.142.0: a signed Docker engine step (`11` §5.8) — ring 1 and every undo; under the heavy-op gate.
+	dockerExec := osupdate.DockerStepExecutor{Leg: osLeg, Guest: firstGuest(px),
+		Gate: func(ctx context.Context) (func(), error) {
+			release, busy, ok := heavyOps.TryAcquire("os-docker-step")
+			if !ok {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("busy: %s", busy)
+			}
+			return release, nil
+		}}
+	// Agent v0.143.0 (R-840): the config bundle — the box's root-owned files by a signed job; the wrapper verifies it.
+	bundleExec := osupdate.ConfigUpdateExecutor{Leg: osLeg, URLTemplate: suCfg.URLTemplate, Username: suCfg.Username, Token: suCfg.Token,
+		// The capability probe confirms from the agent's side: `sudo -l` lists every command the new sudoers grants.
+		AfterInstall: func(ctx context.Context) {
+			ok, total, degraded := capability.Summarize(probeAll(ctx))
+			names := make([]string, 0, len(degraded))
+			for _, d := range degraded {
+				names = append(names, d.Name)
+			}
+			logger.Warn("osupdate: capability probe after the config bundle", "ok", ok, "total", total, "degraded", strings.Join(names, ","))
+		}}
+	jobsRunner := signedjobs.NewRunner(client, gate, signedjobs.ExecutorChain{wipeExec, decommExec, updateExec, dockerExec, bundleExec}, cfg.Hub.HostID, logger)
 	loop.SetEnvelopeObserver(hub.MultiObserver(desiredSyncer, jobsRunner))
 
 	// Controller-driven escrow ceremony (v0.88.0): static config facts + the LATE-BOUND DR gate —
@@ -1112,6 +1151,17 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 		},
 	}
 	localSrv := buildLocalAPIServer(cfg, px, backupStore, heavyOps, observer, driveKnown, hostOps, gate, collector, client, intentRec, guestBindStore, formatJobStore, logRing, escrowCeremonyCfg, logger, &localTokens)
+	if localSrv != nil {
+		localSrv.SetAfterPrimaryBackup(func(ctx context.Context, vmid int) {
+			// Let the controller finish bringing its apps back after the backup, then run (still under the gate).
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				return
+			case <-time.After(90 * time.Second):
+			}
+			_ = osLeg.Run(ctx, vmid, "night")
+		})
+	}
 	if localTokens != nil {
 		defer localTokens.Close()
 	}
@@ -1851,7 +1901,7 @@ func buildLocalAPIServer(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, store *backup.St
 		ConfigPath:     cfg.SourcePath,
 		StateDir:       cfg.WGTunnel.WithDefaults().StateDir,
 		SmbCredsDir:    cfg.Privileged.SmbCredsDir,
-		ControllerSwap: guestBinder, // Phase 1: agentic controller update — in-guest image swap
+		ControllerSwap: guestBinder,                    // Phase 1: agentic controller update — in-guest image swap
 		GuestsStateDir: "/var/lib/felhom-agent/guests", // R-523: <vmid>/bootstrap + controller-parked marker
 		// F2-b: recover a guest left with a stale vzdump lock by a reboot-during-backup. Reads + start
 		// go through the API client; the `pct unlock` is the one fenced root-CLI op (no API equivalent).
@@ -2008,7 +2058,7 @@ func runSelftestHub(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger)
 	// pbs coord. The live reporter lists snapshots directly (fresh store, last-known-good fallback) so
 	// the selftest reflects exactly what a freshly-restarted daemon's first collect emits.
 	pbsReporter := pbs.NewLiveSnapshotReporter(pbsTargetsFromPVE(cfg, px, logger), pbs.NewSnapshotStore(), pbs.DefaultLiveSnapshotTimeout, logger)
-	collector := hub.NewCollector(px, hub.SystemctlProber{}, observer, nil, nil, pbsReporter, cfg.Hub.HostID, version, logger)
+	collector := hub.NewCollector(px, newTunnelProber(cfg, px), observer, nil, nil, pbsReporter, cfg.Hub.HostID, version, logger)
 	// R-109: wire the backup-target resolver here TOO. Without it selftest=hub would print a recipe whose
 	// backup_target reads unknown/agent_backup_config_unavailable while the daemon's is resolved — and
 	// this one-shot exists precisely so "the report it would send" can be trusted to match.
@@ -2648,6 +2698,9 @@ func (e *escrowCeremonyErr) Error() string { return e.err.Error() }
 // restic password auto-attach), Create (R + self-verified blob), wipe the staged secret, upload
 // when asked. It PRINTS NOTHING — the output-mode shells own every byte of stdout/stderr. R is
 // returned for the caller to surface exactly once; escrow.Create never logs it and neither do we.
+// pbsStorageIDRe is a PVE storage id (letters, digits, '-', '_', '.'; starts with a letter) — never a path (R-861).
+var pbsStorageIDRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,63}$`)
+
 func escrowCeremony(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, opts escrowCeremonyOpts) (escrowCeremonyOutcome, *escrowCeremonyErr) {
 	var out escrowCeremonyOutcome
 	storage := opts.storage
@@ -2657,6 +2710,16 @@ func escrowCeremony(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger,
 	if storage == "" {
 		return out, &escrowCeremonyErr{kind: "usage", err: fmt.Errorf("selftest=escrow-create requires -storage <pbs-storage-id> (or escrow.pbs_storage_id)")}
 	}
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): this runs as ROOT through FELHOM_ESCROW, but agent.json is owned by the agent user. So the
+	// paths a root run reads never come from it: the PVE secret dir and the WireGuard state dir are the fixed defaults,
+	// and the storage id is a plain PVE id (no slash, no dot-dot) — a crafted id or dir would read another root file.
+	if os.Geteuid() == 0 {
+		cfg.Backup.PBSSecretDir = ""
+		cfg.WGTunnel.StateDir = ""
+	}
+	if !pbsStorageIDRe.MatchString(storage) {
+		return out, &escrowCeremonyErr{kind: "usage", err: fmt.Errorf("selftest=escrow-create: storage id %q is not a plain PVE storage id", storage)}
+	}
 	out.Storage = storage
 	keyPath := cfg.Backup.PBSEncKeyPath(storage)
 	if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); err != nil {
@@ -3478,8 +3541,237 @@ func (f *selftestFlag) Set(v string) error {
 		f.mode = "identity-consume"
 	case "controller-swap":
 		f.mode = "controller-swap"
+	case "os-update":
+		f.mode = "os-update"
+	case "os-facts", "live-restore": // agent v0.142.0
+		f.mode = v
+	case "wgtunnel": // dispatched since S3 but refused here until 2026-10-04 (TestSelftestFlag_AcceptsEveryDispatchedMode)
+		f.mode = "wgtunnel"
 	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid --selftest value %q (want read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|restore-test-due|pbs-verify|bring-up|provision|escrow-create|escrow-consume|identity-consume|controller-swap)", v)
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid --selftest value %q (want read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|restore-test-due|pbs-verify|lanresolver|wgtunnel|bring-up|provision|escrow-create|escrow-consume|identity-consume|controller-swap|os-update|os-facts|live-restore)", v)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// newOSLeg builds the OS-update leg (agent v0.140.0). The wrapper runs through sudo (FELHOM_OSAPPLY); the plan and
+// the once-per-night marker live in the agent's own os/ dir.
+func newOSLeg(cfg config.Config, client *hub.Client, px *proxmox.Client, logger *slog.Logger) *osupdate.Leg {
+	mode := proxmox.RunnerMode(cfg.Privileged.Mode)
+	if mode == "" {
+		mode = proxmox.RunnerSudo
+	}
+	l := &osupdate.Leg{
+		Runner:    &proxmox.ExecRunner{Mode: mode, SudoPath: cfg.Privileged.SudoPath},
+		Logger:    logger,
+		PlanDir:   osupdate.DefaultPlanDir,
+		StatePath: filepath.Join(osupdate.DefaultPlanDir, "last-night-run"),
+		// The host step (agent v0.141.0) runs only on an appliance install; the wrapper re-checks the ROOT-owned record.
+		Appliance: cfg.IsAppliance(),
+		Tunnel:    newTunnelProber(cfg, px),
+	}
+	if client != nil {
+		l.Hub = client
+	}
+	return l
+}
+
+// runSelftestOSUpdate is the OS leg's DEBUG ACTION (agent v0.140.0): one pass for -vmid, now, exactly as the night
+// runs it after a backup — the hub's os_update block (fetched fresh), the wrapper via sudo, the health wait, the
+// report to the hub — with trigger "debug" (never throttled, and it does NOT count as a night run for approval).
+// Run it as the agent user:  sudo -u felhom-agent felhom-agent --config … --selftest=os-update -vmid 9201
+func runSelftestOSUpdate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, vmid int) int {
+	if vmid <= 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update: -vmid is required")
+		return 2
+	}
+	client, err := hub.NewClient(cfg.Hub, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update: hub client:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	px, perr := newProxmoxClient(cfg)
+	if perr != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update: proxmox client:", perr)
+		return 1
+	}
+	leg := newOSLeg(cfg, client, px, logger)
+	blk, source, ok := selftestOSBlock(ctx, client, leg.PlanDir)
+	if !ok {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update:", source)
+		return 1
+	}
+	leg.SetBlock(blk)
+	b := leg.Block()
+	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=os-update vmid=%d ring=%d enabled=%v guest-release=%v host-release=%v appliance=%v block=%s ===\n",
+		version, vmid, b.Ring, b.Enabled, b.Release != nil, b.HostRelease != nil, leg.Appliance, source)
+	start := time.Now()
+	pass := leg.Run(ctx, vmid, "debug")
+	worst := pass.Guest
+	for i, rep := range []osupdate.Report{pass.Guest, pass.Host, pass.Docker} {
+		if rep.Layer == "" {
+			fmt.Printf("  %s step: skipped (see the log line above)\n", []string{"guest", "host", "docker"}[i])
+			continue
+		}
+		printJSON("os-update report ("+rep.Layer+")", map[string]any{"run_id": rep.RunID, "ring": rep.Ring, "release_id": rep.ReleaseID,
+			"mode": rep.Mode, "outcome": rep.Outcome, "healthy": rep.Healthy, "health_reason": rep.HealthReason,
+			"upgraded": rep.Upgraded, "pending": len(rep.Pending), "not_covered": rep.NotCovered,
+			"restart_needed": rep.RestartNeeded, "reboot_needed": rep.RebootNeeded, "wrapper_seconds": rep.PassSeconds,
+			"refused": rep.Refused, "docker_engine": rep.DockerEngine, "authority": rep.Authority})
+		if !(rep.Outcome == "applied" || rep.Outcome == "nothing" || rep.Outcome == "inventory" || rep.Outcome == "skipped") {
+			worst = rep
+		}
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("  pass took %s\n", time.Since(start).Round(100*time.Millisecond))
+	switch worst.Outcome {
+	case "applied", "nothing", "inventory", "skipped":
+		return 0
+	}
+	return 1
+}
+
+// selftestOSBlock is the debug pass's os_update block (R-866, v0.144.0): the hub's, fetched fresh; when the hub cannot
+// be reached, the block the daemon last saved — named in the selftest's first line, so a pass with the hub away can
+// be exercised by hand (the daemon's own leg already ran from its last block; the selftest stopped). No saved block
+// and no hub → not run (ok=false), never a guessed block.
+func selftestOSBlock(ctx context.Context, f interface {
+	FetchDesiredState(context.Context) (*hub.DesiredStateResponse, error)
+}, planDir string) (*hub.WireOSUpdate, string, bool) {
+	resp, err := f.FetchDesiredState(ctx)
+	if err == nil {
+		return resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate, "hub", true
+	}
+	saved, at, ok := osupdate.LoadSavedBlock(planDir)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Sprintf("desired state: %v — and no saved block (the daemon saves one when the hub sends it)", err), false
+	}
+	return saved, fmt.Sprintf("SAVED(%s; hub unreachable: %v)", at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), err), true
+}
+
+// runSelftestFacts prints the versions the host report carries (R-852, agent v0.142.0) — read-only.
+//
+//	sudo -u felhom-agent felhom-agent --config … --selftest=os-facts -vmid 9201
+func runSelftestFacts(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, vmid int) int {
+	if vmid <= 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-facts: -vmid is required")
+		return 2
+	}
+	px, _ := newProxmoxClient(cfg)
+	leg := newOSLeg(cfg, nil, px, logger)
+	start := time.Now()
+	f, err := leg.Facts(ctx, vmid)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-facts:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	var v any
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(f, &v)
+	printJSON(fmt.Sprintf("facts (vmid %d, %s)", vmid, time.Since(start).Round(100*time.Millisecond)), v)
+	return 0
+}
+
+// runSelftestLiveRestore is the ONE-TIME live-restore step (`09` decision 87) as a debug action — the night leg does
+// the same before a ring-0 Docker step. It prints the container ids before and after (they must not change).
+//
+//	sudo -u felhom-agent felhom-agent --config … --selftest=live-restore -vmid 9202
+func runSelftestLiveRestore(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, vmid int) int {
+	if vmid <= 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=live-restore: -vmid is required")
+		return 2
+	}
+	px, _ := newProxmoxClient(cfg)
+	leg := newOSLeg(cfg, nil, px, logger)
+	if err := leg.EnsureLiveRestore(ctx, time.Now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z"), vmid); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=live-restore:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Println("live-restore: on (see the wrapper's LIVE-RESTORE line above for the container ids)")
+	return 0
+}
+
+// newTunnelProber reads the box's REAL tunnel (R-841, agent v0.141.0): the cloudflared container in each running
+// customer guest — a guest that binds /mnt/felhom-drives, the same rule the OS wrapper's R10 uses — through the
+// existing `pct exec [0-9]* -- docker inspect -f *` sudoers line.
+func newTunnelProber(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client) hub.CloudflaredProber {
+	mode := proxmox.RunnerMode(cfg.Privileged.Mode)
+	if mode == "" {
+		mode = proxmox.RunnerSudo
+	}
+	return hub.GuestTunnelProber{
+		Runner: &proxmox.ExecRunner{Mode: mode, SudoPath: cfg.Privileged.SudoPath},
+		Guests: customerGuests(px),
+	}
+}
+
+// customerGuests lists the running guests that bind /mnt/felhom-drives — the box's customer guest(s), the same rule the
+// OS wrapper's R10 uses. Shared by the tunnel probe, the facts read and the signed Docker step.
+func customerGuests(px *proxmox.Client) func(ctx context.Context) ([]int, error) {
+	return func(ctx context.Context) ([]int, error) {
+		if px == nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("no proxmox client")
+		}
+		gs, err := px.ListLXC(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		var out []int
+		for _, g := range gs {
+			if g.Status != "running" {
+				continue
+			}
+			gc, err := px.GuestConfig(ctx, g.VMID)
+			if err != nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, v := range gc.MountPoints() {
+				if src, _, _ := strings.Cut(v, ","); src == "/mnt/felhom-drives" {
+					out = append(out, g.VMID)
+					break
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return out, nil
+	}
+}
+
+// firstGuest is the single customer guest (an error when there is none).
+func firstGuest(px *proxmox.Client) func(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
+	f := customerGuests(px)
+	return func(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
+		v, err := f(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+		if len(v) == 0 {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("no running customer guest")
+		}
+		return v[0], nil
+	}
+}
+
+// factsReporter feeds the host report's `system` stanza (R-852, agent v0.142.0) from the wrapper's read-only facts
+// mode, at most every 10 minutes (each read is ~2 s of pct exec; the host reports every 15 min).
+type factsReporter struct {
+	leg   *osupdate.Leg
+	guest func(ctx context.Context) (int, error)
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	at    time.Time
+	vmid  int
+	facts json.RawMessage
+	err   error
+}
+
+func (f *factsReporter) SystemFacts(ctx context.Context) (int, json.RawMessage, error) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	if !f.at.IsZero() && time.Since(f.at) < 10*time.Minute {
+		return f.vmid, f.facts, f.err
+	}
+	f.at = time.Now()
+	f.vmid, f.err = f.guest(ctx)
+	if f.err != nil {
+		f.facts = nil
+		return 0, nil, f.err
+	}
+	f.facts, f.err = f.leg.Facts(ctx, f.vmid)
+	return f.vmid, f.facts, f.err
+}

cmd/felhom-agent/r861_escrow_storage_id_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/config"
+)
+
+// R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the root escrow ceremony builds a file path from the storage id; an id that is a path is
+// refused before anything is read. RED-PROOF: drop the pbsStorageIDRe check → the "../" ids reach the key stat and
+// come back as a "setup" error instead of "usage".
+func TestEscrowCeremony_StorageIDIsNeverAPath(t *testing.T) {
+	lg := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
+	for _, id := range []string{"../../../etc/shadow", "a/b", "/etc/pve/priv/x", ".hidden", ""} {
+		cfg := config.Default()
+		cfg.Escrow.PBSStorageID = "" // the flag decides here
+		_, e := escrowCeremony(context.Background(), cfg, lg, escrowCeremonyOpts{storage: id})
+		if e == nil || e.kind != "usage" {
+			t.Errorf("storage id %q was not refused as usage (got %+v)", id, e)
+		}
+	}
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.Backup.PBSSecretDir = t.TempDir()
+	_, e := escrowCeremony(context.Background(), cfg, lg, escrowCeremonyOpts{storage: "felhom-pbs"})
+	if e == nil || e.kind != "setup" {
+		t.Fatalf("control: a plain id must pass the check and fail later on the missing key (setup), got %+v", e)
+	}
+}

cmd/felhom-agent/r866_selftest_block_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/osupdate"
+)
+
+type r866Fetcher struct{ err error }
+
+func (f r866Fetcher) FetchDesiredState(context.Context) (*hub.DesiredStateResponse, error) {
+	if f.err != nil {
+		return nil, f.err
+	}
+	r := &hub.DesiredStateResponse{}
+	r.DesiredState.OSUpdate = &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+// R-866 (v0.144.0). THE NIGHT'S SHAPE (A3, Tester 1 box, hub blocked): `selftest=os-update: desired state: hub:
+// transport error … connect: invalid argument` — the debug pass could not run at all. Now it runs from the block the
+// daemon saved, and its header says so.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: return at once on a fetch error in selftestOSBlock → "the pass did not run from the saved block".
+func TestR866_DebugPassUsesTheSavedBlockWhenTheHubIsAway(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	leg := &osupdate.Leg{PlanDir: dir}
+	r := &hub.DesiredStateResponse{}
+	r.DesiredState.OSUpdate = &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true}
+	leg.OnDesiredState(context.Background(), r) // the daemon received a block and saved it
+	away := r866Fetcher{err: errors.New("hub: transport error: connect: invalid argument")}
+	b, src, ok := selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), away, dir)
+	if !ok || b == nil || b.Ring != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("the pass did not run from the saved block: ok=%v block=%+v src=%q", ok, b, src)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(src, "SAVED(") || !strings.Contains(src, "hub unreachable") {
+		t.Fatalf("the header must say the block is the saved one: %q", src)
+	}
+	// the hub reachable: its block wins, and the header says "hub"
+	b, src, ok = selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), r866Fetcher{}, dir)
+	if !ok || b.Ring != 1 || src != "hub" {
+		t.Fatalf("hub block not used: %+v %q", b, src)
+	}
+}
+
+// No hub and nothing saved: the pass does not run on a guessed block.
+func TestR866_NoHubNoSavedBlockDoesNotRun(t *testing.T) {
+	_, why, ok := selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), r866Fetcher{err: errors.New("down")}, t.TempDir())
+	if ok || !strings.Contains(why, "no saved block") {
+		t.Fatalf("ok=%v why=%q", ok, why)
+	}
+}

cmd/felhom-agent/selftest_flag_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Every mode the dispatcher (`switch selftest.mode`) runs must be ACCEPTED by the --selftest flag. Found live
+// 2026-10-04: --selftest=os-update had a dispatch case and a function but the flag's allow-list refused it, so the
+// debug action could not run. Red-proof: drop the "os-update" case from selftestFlag.Set and this fails.
+func TestSelftestFlag_AcceptsEveryDispatchedMode(t *testing.T) {
+	src, err := os.ReadFile("main.go")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s := string(src)
+	i := strings.Index(s, "switch selftest.mode {")
+	if i < 0 {
+		t.Fatal("dispatch switch not found")
+	}
+	block := s[i:]
+	block = block[:strings.Index(block, "\n\t}\n")]
+	modes := regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^\tcase "([a-z-]+)":`).FindAllStringSubmatch(block, -1)
+	if len(modes) < 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("parsed only %d dispatch cases — the parser is wrong", len(modes))
+	}
+	var bad []string
+	for _, m := range modes {
+		var f selftestFlag
+		if err := f.Set(m[1]); err != nil {
+			bad = append(bad, m[1])
+		}
+	}
+	if len(bad) > 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("dispatched but refused by --selftest: %v", bad)
+	}
+}

cmd/felhom-opsign/main.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func main() {
 
 func run() error {
 	var (
-		op        = flag.String("op", "", "op class to sign, e.g. storage_wipe | guest_destroy | decommission | agent_update")
+		op        = flag.String("op", "", "op class to sign, e.g. storage_wipe | guest_destroy | decommission | agent_update | os_docker_step | agent_config_update")
 		host      = flag.String("host", "", "target host_id (anti-retarget — the op runs ONLY on this host)")
 		guest     = flag.String("guest", "", "target guest_id (\"\" = host-scoped op)")
 		keyID     = flag.String("key-id", "", "key id of the signing key (must match a pinned agent signer)")
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ func run() error {
 		fstype    = flag.String("fstype", "ext4", "for storage_wipe: the filesystem to mkfs after wipe")
 		agentVer  = flag.String("agent-version", "", "for agent_update: the target agent version (e.g. 0.70.1)")
 		sha256Hex = flag.String("sha256", "", "for agent_update: the pinned lowercase-hex sha256 of the target binary")
+		bundleSHA = flag.String("bundle-sha256", "", "for agent_config_update: the pinned sha256 of felhom-config-bundle.json (R-840)")
 		keyFile   = flag.String("key", "", "operator signing key (ssh private key / sk- key handle) for ssh-keygen -Y sign")
 		ttl       = flag.Duration("ttl", 30*time.Minute, "validity window from now (issued_at..expires_at)")
 		nonce     = flag.String("nonce", "", "explicit nonce (default: a fresh 128-bit random nonce)")
@@ -95,6 +96,17 @@ func run() error {
 			}
 			pj, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"version": *agentVer, "sha256": *sha256Hex})
 			params = string(pj)
+		case "agent_config_update":
+			// R-840: the box's root-owned files. The ROOT wrapper verifies this signature itself and refuses a bundle
+			// whose sha256 is not exactly this one.
+			if *agentVer == "" || *bundleSHA == "" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update needs -agent-version and -bundle-sha256 (the pinned bundle hash)")
+			}
+			if !isHex64(*bundleSHA) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update -bundle-sha256 must be 64 lowercase hex chars (got %d)", len(*bundleSHA))
+			}
+			pj, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"agent_version": *agentVer, "bundle_sha256": *bundleSHA})
+			params = string(pj)
 		default:
 			params = "{}"
 		}

configs/build-golden.sh

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
 
 # Script provenance — logged into every bake transcript next to the baked controller tag, so an
 # archive can always be traced to the script that produced it. Bump on any behavior change.
-GOLDEN_SCRIPT_VERSION="3.0.0"
+GOLDEN_SCRIPT_VERSION="3.2.0"
 
 VMID="${1:-9100}"
 TEMPLATE="${2:-local:vztmpl/debian-13-standard_13.1-2_amd64.tar.zst}"
@@ -112,7 +112,15 @@ for i in $(seq 1 30); do
   if pct exec "$VMID" -- getent hosts download.docker.com >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
   sleep 1
 done
-pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c '
+# v3.1.0 (`11` §5.8): GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS pins the APPROVED Docker engine set (the hub's newest Docker release, all six
+# "name=version"); without it the newest stable set is installed and the bake log says so.
+GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS="${GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS:-}"
+if [[ -n "$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" ]]; then
+  echo "[golden] Docker engine set PINNED to the approved release: $GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS"
+else
+  echo "[golden] WARNING: GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS not set — installing the newest stable Docker set, not an approved one"
+fi
+pct exec "$VMID" -- env GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS="$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" bash -c '
   set -e
   export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
   apt-get update -qq
@@ -122,7 +130,54 @@ pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c '
   echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian trixie stable" \
     > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
   apt-get update -qq
-  apt-get install -y -qq docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io >/dev/null
+  if [ -n "$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" ]; then
+    apt-get install -y -qq $GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS >/dev/null
+  else
+    apt-get install -y -qq docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io >/dev/null
+  fi
+  dpkg-query -W containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-ce docker-ce-cli docker-ce-rootless-extras docker-compose-plugin 2>/dev/null | sed "s/^/  installed: /"
+'
+# v3.2.0 (Part F of the R-840 brief, `11` §5.3): GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS = the newest APPROVED guest release, as
+# "name=version …" (the hub's os_releases row for layer guest, IN FORCE — never a cancelled test approval). The bake
+# brings every package the template HAS to exactly that version, under felhom-os-apply's rules: never a package the
+# template lacks (--only-upgrade), never newer than approved, never a removal or a new package (a simulation is checked
+# first and the bake FAILS on either). Empty = no approved guest release in force: the template's versions stay, and
+# the box's first night installs whatever release is approved then. Either way the bake PRINTS the first-night count:
+# how many installed packages are older than the approved version (target 0).
+GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS="${GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS:-}"
+pct exec "$VMID" -- env GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS="$GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS" bash -c '
+  set -e
+  export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+  if [ -z "$GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS" ]; then
+    echo "[golden] no approved guest release given - the template versions stay; first-night count vs an approved release: n/a"
+    echo "[golden] pending Debian upgrades in the baked guest (what a FUTURE approval may bring): $(apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | grep -c /)"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  want=""
+  for nv in $GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS; do
+    n=${nv%%=*}; v=${nv#*=}
+    cur=$(dpkg-query -W -f="\${Version}" "$n" 2>/dev/null) || continue           # not in the template: never added
+    dpkg --compare-versions "$cur" lt "$v" && want="$want $n=$v"
+  done
+  if [ -n "$want" ]; then
+    sim=$(apt-get -s install --only-upgrade -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold $want)
+    if echo "$sim" | grep -q "^Remv "; then echo "[golden] FATAL: the approved guest set would REMOVE a package"; echo "$sim" | grep "^Remv "; exit 1; fi
+    for p in $(echo "$sim" | awk "/^Inst /{print \$2}"); do
+      dpkg-query -W "$p" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[golden] FATAL: the approved guest set would ADD $p - not in the template"; exit 1; }
+    done
+    apt-get install -y -qq --only-upgrade -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef $want >/dev/null
+    echo "[golden] approved guest release installed: $(echo $want | wc -w) package(s) brought to the approved version"
+  else
+    echo "[golden] approved guest release: the template already runs every approved version"
+  fi
+  left=0
+  for nv in $GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS; do
+    n=${nv%%=*}; v=${nv#*=}
+    cur=$(dpkg-query -W -f="\${Version}" "$n" 2>/dev/null) || continue
+    dpkg --compare-versions "$cur" lt "$v" && { left=$((left+1)); echo "  still older: $n $cur < $v"; }
+  done
+  echo "[golden] first-night count vs the approved guest release: $left (target 0)"
+  [ "$left" -eq 0 ] || { echo "[golden] FATAL: $left package(s) stayed older than the approved release"; exit 1; }
 '
 echo "[golden] baking daemon.json: classic overlay2 driver (containerd-snapshotter OFF) + log rotation …"
 # containerd-snapshotter (Docker 28+/29 default) keeps the IMAGE content store under
@@ -135,9 +190,12 @@ echo "[golden] baking daemon.json: classic overlay2 driver (containerd-snapshott
 # layout (a container's `df /` reports the single volume, phase-0 spike). Since v3.0.0 /var/lib/docker
 # is a BIND of <volume>/docker rather than the mp0 mount itself, wired immediately below; data-root
 # still needs no override because the path is unchanged. Log caps kill the most common runaway.
+# v3.1.0: "live-restore": true (`09` decision 87) — a Docker engine update then restarts no app (`11` C5). A box made
+# from this golden never needs the agent's one-time live-restore-on step. NEVER removed by a plain restart (R-835).
 pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'mkdir -p /etc/docker; cat > /etc/docker/daemon.json <<JSON
 {
   "features": { "containerd-snapshotter": false },
+  "live-restore": true,
   "log-driver": "json-file",
   "log-opts": { "max-size": "10m", "max-file": "3" }
 }
@@ -175,6 +233,8 @@ pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'systemctl restart docker; sleep 3; docker run --rm
 # Guard: the image store MUST be on the data volume now. /var/lib/containerd holding the images would
 # mean containerd-snapshotter is still on (the split would leave images on the rootfs).
 pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'drv=$(docker info 2>/dev/null | sed -n "s/.*Storage Driver: //p"); [ "$drv" = "overlay2" ] || { echo "[golden] FATAL: storage driver is $drv, expected overlay2 — images would not land on the data volume"; exit 1; }'
+# v3.1.0 ASSERTION: live-restore is ON in the running daemon (decision 87), or the bake fails closed.
+pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'lr=$(docker info --format "{{.LiveRestoreEnabled}}" 2>/dev/null); [ "$lr" = "true" ] && echo "  live-restore: on" || { echo "[golden] FATAL: live-restore is $lr, expected true (decision 87)"; exit 1; }'
 # ASSERTION 1 (RETARGETED v3.0.0, not removed). /var/lib/docker must be a real mount — now the V-c
 # bind of <volume>/docker rather than the mp0 mount itself. Still fails closed on the same failure:
 # if the bind did not take, Docker's data-root silently sits on the OS rootfs and the golden ships

configs/crash-guard.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# /etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf — read by /usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard (`11` §5.9).
+# The LIMIT-th unclean stop within WINDOW_MINUTES leaves the box off. Decided by CC unattended — operator may reverse.
+LIMIT=3
+WINDOW_MINUTES=60
+# kernel.panic while armed: seconds after a crash before the kernel restarts the box.
+PANIC_SECONDS=10
+# A tripped guard re-arms after this many hours of normal running (or `felhom-crash-guard rearm`).
+REARM_HOURS=24

configs/felhom-agent.sudoers

@@ -1,30 +1,38 @@
-# felhom-agent sudoers allowlist — the NARROW host-root surface (slice 5 Phase B, doc 03 §3/§7).
+# felhom-agent sudoers allowlist — the NARROW host-root surface (slice 5 Phase B, doc 03 §3/§7; narrowed R-861).
 #
-# Install as a drop-in: /etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent (mode 0440, root:root), validated with
-# `visudo -cf`. The agent runs as the non-root `felhom-agent` service user and shells out via
-# `sudo -n` with FIXED argument vectors (no shell). The fine-grained validation is done IN
-# the agent BEFORE exec (internal/storage/validate.go): UUIDs against a strict hex regex,
-# mount paths confined+traversal-checked, SMART devices whitelisted to raw disks, LVM names
-# charset-checked. These sudoers wildcards are the COARSE allowlist; the agent is the fine
-# gate, so a wildcard can never be abused by a value the agent didn't already validate.
+# Install as a drop-in: /etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent (mode 0440, root:root), validated with `visudo -cf`. It rides the
+# signed config bundle (R-840). The agent runs as the non-root `felhom-agent` user and shells out via `sudo -n` with
+# FIXED argument vectors (no shell).
 #
-# Binary paths MUST match the agent config (privileged.systemctl/install/smartctl/lvs). Adjust
-# for your distro (Debian/PVE shown). A missing/declined entry degrades the agent with a
-# warning (SMART→UNKNOWN, mount→logged error), it does not crash.
+# R-861 (agent v0.146.0) — EXACT PATTERNS, NOT GLOBS. A sudoers `*` in the ARGUMENTS also matches spaces, so
+# `pct set [0-9]* -onboot 1` matched `pct set 100 --dev0 /dev/sda -onboot 1` (a raw host disk for the guest), and
+# `mount --bind /mnt/*/felhom-data /mnt/felhom-drives/*` matched a `..` path onto /etc. Every argument list that varies
+# is now a sudo regular expression (`^...$`, sudo >= 1.9.10; Debian 13 / PVE 9 ship 1.9.16): one value per slot, a
+# fixed character set, no `..`, no extra argument. Lines with no variable part stay literal. The patterns are pinned
+# by the capability manifest (every real call must match: TestManifestCoveredBySudoers) and by injection cases that
+# must NOT match (configs/test_sudoers_patterns.py, and live with `sudo -l -U felhom-agent` on the demo boxes).
+#
+# R-861 — NO FILE THE AGENT WROTE IS INSTALLED WHERE ROOT READS IT. The `install` lines are gone: a mount unit, a
+# dnsmasq drop-in, the WireGuard config and the OOB sshd config + key go through `felhom-priv-apply`, a root wrapper
+# from the bundle that checks the CONTENT against the agent's own renderers; the guest pre-start hook and the shared
+# drive parent are FIXED files that come with the bundle itself; the agent binary is replaced only by an
+# operator-signed agent_update that `felhom-os-apply` verifies as root (`felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply` is no longer
+# here). The two remaining root runs of agent code (FELHOM_ESCROW, the guest hook) therefore run only a signed binary.
+#
+# Binary paths MUST match the agent config (privileged.systemctl/install/smartctl/lvs). A missing/declined entry
+# degrades the agent with a warning (SMART→UNKNOWN, mount→logged error), it does not crash; the capability probe
+# reports it to the hub.
 
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_MOUNT = \
-  /usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/units/* /etc/systemd/system/*.mount, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply ^unit mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.(mount|automount)$, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl daemon-reload, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl enable --now -- *.mount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl disable -- *.mount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl stop -- *.mount
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^enable --now -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.mount$, \
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^disable -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.mount$, \
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^stop -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.mount$
 
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_DISK = \
-  /usr/sbin/smartctl -a -j /dev/sd[a-z]*, \
-  /usr/sbin/smartctl -a -j /dev/nvme[0-9]*n[0-9]*, \
-  /usr/sbin/smartctl -a -j /dev/vd[a-z]*, \
-  /usr/sbin/smartctl -a -j /dev/hd[a-z]*, \
-  /usr/sbin/lvs --reportformat json --units b -o lv_name\,data_percent\,metadata_percent -- *, \
+  /usr/sbin/smartctl ^-a -j /dev/(sd[a-z]+|nvme[0-9]+n[0-9]+|vd[a-z]+|hd[a-z]+)$, \
+  /usr/sbin/lvs ^--reportformat json --units b -o lv_name\,data_percent\,metadata_percent -- [A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+(/[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+)?$, \
   /usr/sbin/pvs --reportformat json --noheadings -o pv_name, \
   /usr/sbin/zpool status -P
 
@@ -35,9 +43,9 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_DISK = \
 # (the wildcard only ever names a path the agent itself created), and the bootstrap file the agent
 # writes there is the only thing these touch. ':' is escaped per sudoers grammar.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_PROVISION = \
-  /usr/bin/chown -R 100000\:100000 /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/*, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct set [0-9]* -mp[0-9]* /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/*, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct set [0-9]* -onboot 1
+  /usr/bin/chown ^-R 100000\:100000 /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/[0-9]+(/bootstrap)?$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^set [0-9]+ -mp[0-9]+ /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/[0-9]+/bootstrap\,mp\=/[A-Za-z0-9/_.-]+(\,ro\=1)?$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^set [0-9]+ -onboot 1$
 
 # Disk inspection + format (slice 8C + Impl-1). blkid/lsblk read the device's data-bearing evidence
 # (the agent decides data-bearing-ness from THIS, never the caller's claim). Format goes ONLY through
@@ -45,66 +53,54 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_PROVISION = \
 # mkfs the OS disk — the wrapper re-checks the catastrophic cases (system disk / LVM PV / foreign mount)
 # as root and refuses, and the agent's unclaimed-disk filter (claim.go) is the primary guard above it.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_FORMAT = \
-  /usr/sbin/blkid -p -o export /dev/*, \
-  /usr/bin/lsblk -J -o NAME\,FSTYPE\,PTTYPE\,MOUNTPOINT /dev/*, \
-  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded /dev/* *
+  /usr/sbin/blkid ^-p -o export /dev/[^ ]+$, \
+  /usr/bin/lsblk ^-J -o NAME\,FSTYPE\,PTTYPE\,MOUNTPOINT /dev/[^ ]+$, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded ^/dev/[^ ]+ (ext4|xfs)$
 
 # LAN split-horizon resolver (internal/lanresolver): the agent manages a host-side dnsmasq that
-# answers *.<customer-domain> with each guest's live LAN IP. install only ever writes felhom-*.conf
-# drop-ins (from agent-written /tmp temp files); the two `pct exec` reads are FIXED command vectors
+# answers *.<customer-domain> with each guest's live LAN IP. A felhom-*.conf drop-in reaches /etc/dnsmasq.d
+# only through felhom-priv-apply, which allows exactly the lines the resolver renders (R-861: a `dhcp-script=` would
+# run as root); the two `pct exec` reads are FIXED command vectors
 # (the guest's eth0 IPv4 + the controller's pulled controller.yaml for the domain) — NOT a general
 # `pct exec`. systemctl is scoped to the dnsmasq unit only. The agent never edits /etc/resolv.conf.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_DNSMASQ = \
   /usr/bin/apt-get install -y -q dnsmasq, \
-  /usr/bin/install -m 0644 /tmp/felhom-resolver-*.conf /etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-*.conf, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply ^dnsmasq /tmp/felhom-resolver-[0-9]+\.conf felhom-[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.conf$, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl enable --now dnsmasq, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl reload dnsmasq, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl restart dnsmasq, \
-  /usr/bin/rm -f /etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-*.conf, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- ip -4 -o addr show dev eth0, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- docker exec felhom-controller cat /opt/docker/felhom-controller/controller.yaml
+  /usr/bin/rm ^-f /etc/dnsmasq\.d/felhom-[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.conf$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- ip -4 -o addr show dev eth0$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- docker exec felhom-controller cat /opt/docker/felhom-controller/controller\.yaml$
 
-# Guest mountpoint lifecycle (intermediary-mount re-architecture + C1 net). The pre-start self-heal hook
-# wrapper is installed once into the PVE snippets dir (from an agent-written /tmp file) and registered
-# per-guest; decommission/eject DELETE the dead mountpoint slot so a missing bind source can't brick the
-# guest at next boot (the B3 C1 fix). The agent fine-validates the vmid (numeric) + slot (mp[0-9]+) and
-# the snippet path is fixed — the wildcards are the coarse allowlist. The install SOURCE is a
-# random-named agent temp (os.CreateTemp, audit B1 — a fixed /tmp name was a local TOCTOU), hence the
-# glob; the DESTINATION stays pinned. The `mkdir -p` creates the snippets dir on a FRESH box —
-# `install` won't create parents, so without it the hook install failed silently on Day-0 boxes
-# (B2, DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03; fixed agent v0.63.0).
+# Guest mountpoint lifecycle (intermediary-mount re-architecture + C1 net). The pre-start self-heal hook is a FIXED file
+# from the config bundle (/var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh — R-861: the agent no longer installs it from /tmp;
+# Proxmox runs it as root at every guest start). The agent only registers it per guest, deletes a dead mountpoint slot
+# (the B3 C1 fix) and reboots a guest to activate binds — each with an exact vmid / slot.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_GUESTHOOK = \
-  /usr/bin/mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets, \
-  /usr/bin/install -m 0755 -- /tmp/felhom-guest-hook-*.sh /var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct set [0-9]* --hookscript local\:snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct set [0-9]* --delete mp[0-9]*, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct reboot [0-9]*
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^set [0-9]+ --hookscript local\:snippets/felhom-guest-hook\.sh$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^set [0-9]+ --delete mp[0-9]+$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^reboot [0-9]+$
 
 # Intermediary mount model (the drive hot-swap re-architecture). The agent keeps a SHARED host parent
-# /mnt/felhom-drives (self-bind + make-shared + a boot-persistence systemd unit) and binds/unbinds each
-# drive's felhom-data namespace UNDERNEATH it so the change propagates into the running guest live (no
-# pct, no reboot). The agent fine-validates the drive name + confines paths before any exec; the trailing
-# `*` (matching the comma-laden mp spec) mirrors the existing FELHOM_PROVISION pattern.
-# `lxc-info -n <vmid> -p -H` resolves the guest init PID for the GuestSeesMount / bound_under_parent check
-# (a READ — the drive-gate's "is the drive live in the guest?" signal); WITHOUT it the non-root agent gets
-# an empty PID and reports every drive absent (multi-drive flapping, audit 2026-06-29). `make-private`
-# isolates the parent's peer group on FIRST setup only (EnsureSharedParent guards on mountpoint, so it
-# never re-churns a live parent); without it the parent stays in root's group and submounts double.
+# /mnt/felhom-drives (self-bind + make-shared) and binds/unbinds each drive's felhom-data namespace UNDERNEATH it so the
+# change propagates into the running guest live. The boot-persistence script + unit are FIXED files from the config
+# bundle (R-861: the agent no longer installs them from /tmp); the agent only enables the unit. A drive name is one
+# path segment that cannot start with a dot (no `..`); `lxc-info -n <vmid> -p -H` resolves the guest init PID for the
+# GuestSeesMount check; `make-private` isolates the parent's peer group on FIRST setup only.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY = \
   /usr/bin/mkdir -p /mnt/felhom-drives, \
-  /usr/bin/mkdir -p /mnt/felhom-drives/*, \
-  /usr/bin/mkdir -p /mnt/*/felhom-data, \
-  /usr/bin/chown 100000\:100000 /mnt/*/felhom-data, \
+  /usr/bin/mkdir ^-p /mnt/felhom-drives/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$, \
+  /usr/bin/mkdir ^-p /mnt/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*/felhom-data$, \
+  /usr/bin/chown ^100000\:100000 /mnt/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*/felhom-data$, \
   /usr/bin/mount --bind /mnt/felhom-drives /mnt/felhom-drives, \
   /usr/bin/mount --make-shared /mnt/felhom-drives, \
   /usr/bin/mount --make-private /mnt/felhom-drives, \
-  /usr/bin/mount --bind /mnt/*/felhom-data /mnt/felhom-drives/*, \
-  /usr/bin/umount /mnt/felhom-drives/*, \
-  /usr/bin/install -m 0755 -- /tmp/felhom-shared-parent-*.sh /usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh, \
-  /usr/bin/install -m 0644 -- /tmp/felhom-shared-parent-*.service /etc/systemd/system/felhom-shared-parent.service, \
+  /usr/bin/mount ^--bind /mnt/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*/felhom-data /mnt/felhom-drives/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$, \
+  /usr/bin/umount ^/mnt/felhom-drives/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl enable felhom-shared-parent.service, \
-  /usr/bin/lxc-info -n [0-9]* -p -H, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct set [0-9]* -mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives*
+  /usr/bin/lxc-info ^-n [0-9]+ -p -H$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^set [0-9]+ -mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives\,mp\=/mnt/felhom-drives$
 
 # Controller-swap / managed auto-update (Option A, non-root). The agent owns the in-guest controller
 # image SWAP (it survives the controller being killed mid-swap): read the baked image ref, check the
@@ -119,11 +115,11 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY = \
 #                                 the agent strict-validates the ref (controllerImageRe) before the write.
 # Validated GO: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-controllerswap-narrow-grants-2026-06-29.md.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP = \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- cat /etc/felhom-controller-image, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- docker image inspect *, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- docker inspect -f *, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- tee /etc/felhom-controller-image
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- cat /etc/felhom-controller-image$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- docker image inspect gitea\.dooplex\.hu/admin/felhom-controller\:[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- docker inspect -f .+ (felhom-controller|cloudflared)$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap\.service$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- tee /etc/felhom-controller-image$
 
 # Stale-lock recovery (F2-b, v0.49.0). A host reboot DURING a vzdump backup leaves the guest with a
 # `snapshot-delete`/`backup` lock + `onboot:1` then can't start it → the customer box stays DOWN. The
@@ -131,7 +127,7 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP = \
 # with no API equivalent (snapshot-delete + start go through the API token); the agent fine-validates the
 # vmid (numeric) before exec — the `[0-9]*` is the coarse allowlist.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_STALELOCK = \
-  /usr/sbin/pct unlock [0-9]*
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^unlock [0-9]+$
 
 # Restore-test scratch teardown (F-LEAK, Campaign 8, v0.110.0). A restore-test whose restore FAILS
 # leaves a scratch guest the API token CANNOT destroy: `FelhomAgentGuest` is granted at /pool/felhom and
@@ -160,8 +156,9 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN = \
 # into the guest through the existing shared bind (an unprivileged LXC cannot mount NFS/CIFS itself).
 # A NAS is NOT a drive — no durable-id, no SMART, no wipe; these grants only install/enable/remove the
 # unit pair. The agent fine-validates every value (share name, server, export, uid/gid, creds path) before
-# any unit is rendered (internal/storage/netmount.go ValidateNetworkMountSpec); the trailing globs are the
-# COARSE allowlist. The `.mount` install/enable/disable/stop reuse FELHOM_MOUNT; this alias adds the
+# any unit is rendered (internal/storage/netmount.go ValidateNetworkMountSpec); the unit FILE reaches
+# /etc/systemd/system only through `felhom-priv-apply unit` (FELHOM_MOUNT), which requires nosuid,nodev on a network
+# share (R-861). The `.mount` enable/disable/stop reuse FELHOM_MOUNT; this alias adds the
 # `.automount` variants + the unit-file removal. The unit FILE name is the systemd-escaped mountpoint,
 # which always begins `mnt-felhom` (the mountpoint is /mnt/felhom-drives/<name>), so the rm glob is scoped
 # to felhom mount units only. mkdir of the mountpoint reuses FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY's /mnt/felhom-drives/*.
@@ -176,51 +173,46 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN = \
 #    behind (the campaign accumulated 10 stub-shaped leftovers). rmdir ONLY (never rm -rf): it refuses
 #    a non-empty dir, so unexpected data is preserved, not destroyed — a fail-safe grant.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_NETMOUNT = \
-  /usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/units/* /etc/systemd/system/*.automount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl enable --now -- *.automount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl disable -- *.automount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl stop -- *.automount, \
-  /usr/bin/systemctl reset-failed -- mnt-felhom*, \
-  /usr/bin/rmdir /mnt/felhom-drives/*, \
-  /usr/bin/rm -f /etc/systemd/system/mnt-felhom*
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^enable --now -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.automount$, \
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^disable -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.automount$, \
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^stop -- mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.automount$, \
+  /usr/bin/systemctl ^reset-failed -- mnt-felhom[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]*\.(mount|automount)$, \
+  /usr/bin/rmdir ^/mnt/felhom-drives/[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$, \
+  /usr/bin/rm ^-f /etc/systemd/system/mnt-felhom[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]*\.(mount|automount)$
 
 # Offsite WG tunnel (S3, doc 06 §3.3). The agent manages wg-quick@wg-felhom as an agent-managed
 # host service (the dnsmasq/lanresolver shape): conf staged in the agent-owned StateDir (never
-# /tmp), installed 0600 to the FIXED destination, unit enable/restart/disable. The ONLY wg read
+# /tmp), installed 0600 to the FIXED destination by `felhom-priv-apply wg`, which refuses any key renderConf never
+# writes (R-861: PostUp/PreUp run as root under wg-quick), unit enable/restart/disable. The ONLY wg read
 # is `latest-handshakes` — `wg show <if> dump` is FORBIDDEN everywhere (its interface line
-# carries the PRIVATE KEY; the S1 session-log incident). Both install paths are FIXED (no glob):
-# the agent has exactly one tunnel conf to manage.
+# carries the PRIVATE KEY; the S1 session-log incident). Source and destination are fixed in the wrapper.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_WG = \
   /usr/bin/apt-get install -y -q wireguard-tools, \
-  /usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0600 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/wg/wg-felhom.conf /etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply wg, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl enable --now wg-quick@wg-felhom, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl restart wg-quick@wg-felhom, \
   /usr/bin/systemctl disable --now wg-quick@wg-felhom, \
   /usr/bin/wg show wg-felhom latest-handshakes
 
-# Agent self-update (TASK D1, SPIKE-agent-selfupdate-2026-07-05). The agent downloads the
-# operator-SIGNED binary (sha256 pinned in the signed op — neither hub nor Gitea compromise can
-# substitute it), verifies the sha in-process, then hands off to the guarded wrapper, which
-# RE-verifies the sha as root, confines the staged path to /var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/,
-# performs the A/B flip (atomic same-fs rename, .prev retained) and schedules a detached restart.
-# The apply args are a COARSE glob (spike S4b: sudoers fnmatch makes a [a-f0-9]* sha pattern
-# first-char-only anyway) — the wrapper's own sha re-verify + path confinement is the real gate.
-# `rollback` is normally run by felhom-agent-rollback.service (root, OnFailure=), not via sudo;
-# granting it here keeps the verb probe-able (capability self-check) and operator-invokable.
+# Agent self-update (TASK D1; R-861). The A/B flip (`felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply`) is NO LONGER the agent's: the
+# agent hands the operator-SIGNED agent_update to felhom-os-apply (FELHOM_OSAPPLY, mode agent_update), which verifies
+# the signature as root and only then runs the flip. Until v0.146.0 the agent passed the sha itself, so a compromised
+# agent could install any binary — the binary FELHOM_ESCROW and the guest hook run as root. `commit` (clear the pending
+# marker) and `rollback` (pending-guarded revert, normally run by felhom-agent-rollback.service) stay.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SELFUPDATE = \
-  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply /var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/* *, \
   /usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded commit, \
   /usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded rollback
 
 # Dedicated OOB sshd (TASK H1). The agent manages felhom-sshd like wg-felhom/dnsmasq: it RENDERS the
 # config (Port from its claim) + the operator's authorized_keys, validates with `sshd -t`, and reloads
-# (never restart-on-change [SF-2]). Both install SOURCES are the agent-owned staged files under
-# StateDir; both DESTINATIONS are FIXED. `sshd -t/-T` are the validate/discover reads. The
+# (never restart-on-change [SF-2]). Both files reach /etc/felhom-sshd only through felhom-priv-apply (R-861): the config
+# must be the ONE template with only the Port varying (an AuthorizedKeysFile the agent owns + `StrictModes no` would be
+# a root login), the key file one plain public key without options. `sshd -t/-T` are the validate/discover reads. The
 # systemctl verbs are SCOPED to felhom-sshd only. reset-failed precedes a deliberate restart [SF-5].
 # NOTHING here can touch the stock sshd, :22, or /etc/ssh.
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SSHD = \
-  /usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/sshd_config /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config, \
-  /usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys.felhom-op /etc/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys/felhom-op, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply sshd-config, \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply sshd-key, \
   /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/sshd_config, \
   /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config, \
   /usr/sbin/sshd -T -f /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config, \
@@ -270,8 +262,8 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_OOB = \
   /usr/sbin/nft list set inet felhom_oob ssh_port, \
   /usr/sbin/nft flush set inet felhom_oob operator_ips, \
   /usr/sbin/nft flush set inet felhom_oob ssh_port, \
-  /usr/sbin/nft add element inet felhom_oob operator_ips *, \
-  /usr/sbin/nft add element inet felhom_oob ssh_port *
+  /usr/sbin/nft ^add element inet felhom_oob operator_ips \{ [0-9.]+(/[0-9]+)? \}$, \
+  /usr/sbin/nft ^add element inet felhom_oob ssh_port \{ [0-9]+ \}$
 
 # Escrow ceremony (controller-driven, TASK 2026-07-13; mechanics validated by
 # SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13). ONE fixed argv — sudoers matches the argument vector
@@ -299,10 +291,17 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SELFHEAL = \
 # argument after the numeric vmid is a literal, so the grant cannot be widened by anything the guest or
 # the hub says. The address read is deliberately NOT duplicated here — it is already FELHOM_DNSMASQ's,
 # and the same command must not be granted twice under two names.
-Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_GUESTNET = \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- ip route show default, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- cat /etc/network/interfaces, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- pgrep -x dhclient, \
-  /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- dhclient -pf /run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0
+# OS updates, guest fast lane (`11-os-updates.md` §5.4.1, agent v0.140.0). The ONLY entry: the root wrapper with
+# one plan file in the agent's own os/ dir. Every safety rule (no removal, no downgrade, no new or unlisted package,
+# Debian origin only, the box's own customer guest only) lives in the wrapper, red-proved per rule
+# (configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py). The agent gets NO apt grant of its own.
+Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_OSAPPLY = \
+  /usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-*.json
 
-felhom-agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: FELHOM_MOUNT, FELHOM_DISK, FELHOM_PROVISION, FELHOM_FORMAT, FELHOM_DNSMASQ, FELHOM_GUESTHOOK, FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY, FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP, FELHOM_STALELOCK, FELHOM_NETMOUNT, FELHOM_WG, FELHOM_SELFUPDATE, FELHOM_SSHD, FELHOM_OOB, FELHOM_PBSDR, FELHOM_BACKUPTARGET, FELHOM_SELFHEAL, FELHOM_ESCROW, FELHOM_GUESTNET, FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN
+Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_GUESTNET = \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- ip route show default$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- cat /etc/network/interfaces$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- pgrep -x dhclient$, \
+  /usr/sbin/pct ^exec [0-9]+ -- dhclient -pf /run/dhclient\.eth0\.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient\.eth0\.leases eth0$
+
+felhom-agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: FELHOM_MOUNT, FELHOM_DISK, FELHOM_PROVISION, FELHOM_FORMAT, FELHOM_DNSMASQ, FELHOM_GUESTHOOK, FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY, FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP, FELHOM_STALELOCK, FELHOM_NETMOUNT, FELHOM_WG, FELHOM_SELFUPDATE, FELHOM_SSHD, FELHOM_OOB, FELHOM_PBSDR, FELHOM_BACKUPTARGET, FELHOM_SELFHEAL, FELHOM_ESCROW, FELHOM_GUESTNET, FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN, FELHOM_OSAPPLY

configs/felhom-crash-guard

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+# felhom-crash-guard — a crashed host restarts by itself, but not forever (`09` decision 88, R-851, `11` §5.9).
+#
+# Install as /usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard (0755 root:root), with felhom-crash-guard.service (boot / clean-stop)
+# and felhom-crash-guard-check.timer (hourly re-arm check). Python 3, standard library only.
+# Tests: configs/test_felhom_crash_guard.py (temp dirs; nothing real is touched).
+#
+# WHAT IT DOES
+#   boot        early at every boot. Was the previous boot ended CLEANLY? (the clean-stop marker exists). If not, this
+#               boot follows an UNCLEAN stop — a kernel crash, a power cut or a hard reset (they cannot be told apart
+#               on these boxes: measured 2026-10-04 on demo-hp, efi_pstore is on yet saved NOTHING for a real panic;
+#               the journal and `last` show only "no shutdown"). It records the unclean boot, counts those in the last
+#               WINDOW_MINUTES, and sets kernel.panic:
+#                 - fewer than LIMIT-1 recent unclean boots → kernel.panic = PANIC_SECONDS (a crash restarts the box);
+#                 - LIMIT-1 or more → the guard TRIPS: kernel.panic = 0, so the LIMIT-th crash within the window
+#                   leaves the box OFF (operator's own words: "if it crashes 3 times within one hour, it stays off").
+#               A tripped guard stays tripped across further boots until it re-arms.
+#   clean-stop  ExecStop of the service: writes the clean-stop marker during an orderly shutdown or reboot.
+#   check       hourly: a tripped guard re-arms after REARM_HOURS of normal running (since the trip AND since boot).
+#   rearm       the operator re-arms by hand (`felhom-crash-guard rearm`).
+#   status      prints the state.
+# The state is /var/lib/felhom-crash-guard/state.json (0644: the non-root agent reads it into its host report).
+# Before the service runs (very early boot) the kernel default kernel.panic = 0 applies, so a crash THAT early leaves
+# the box off — the safe side: a box that cannot reach userspace must not loop.
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import time
+
+CONF = "/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf"
+STATE_DIR = "/var/lib/felhom-crash-guard"
+DEFAULTS = {"LIMIT": 3, "WINDOW_MINUTES": 60, "PANIC_SECONDS": 10, "REARM_HOURS": 24}
+
+
+class Env:
+    """Paths and clock; tests replace them."""
+
+    def __init__(self, conf=CONF, state_dir=STATE_DIR, panic_path="/proc/sys/kernel/panic",
+                 uptime_path="/proc/uptime", boot_id_path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id"):
+        self.conf, self.state_dir = conf, state_dir
+        self.panic_path, self.uptime_path, self.boot_id_path = panic_path, uptime_path, boot_id_path
+
+    def now(self):
+        return time.time()
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        print(line, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
+        try:
+            import subprocess
+            subprocess.run(["logger", "-t", "felhom-crash-guard", line], timeout=10)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+
+def iso(t):
+    return time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime(t))
+
+
+def parse_iso(s):
+    import calendar
+    return calendar.timegm(time.strptime(s, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"))
+
+
+def load_conf(env):
+    c = dict(DEFAULTS)
+    try:
+        for line in open(env.conf):
+            line = line.strip()
+            if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+                continue
+            k, v = (x.strip() for x in line.split("=", 1))
+            if k in c and v.isdigit() and int(v) >= (1 if k != "PANIC_SECONDS" else 1):
+                c[k] = int(v)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return c
+
+
+def state_path(env):
+    return os.path.join(env.state_dir, "state.json")
+
+
+def marker_path(env):
+    return os.path.join(env.state_dir, "clean-stop")
+
+
+def load_state(env):
+    try:
+        with open(state_path(env)) as f:
+            s = json.load(f)
+        return s if isinstance(s, dict) else None
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def save_state(env, s):
+    os.makedirs(env.state_dir, mode=0o755, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = state_path(env) + ".tmp"
+    with open(tmp, "w") as f:
+        json.dump(s, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
+        f.write("\n")
+    os.chmod(tmp, 0o644)
+    os.replace(tmp, state_path(env))
+
+
+def set_panic(env, seconds):
+    with open(env.panic_path, "w") as f:
+        f.write(f"{seconds}\n")
+
+
+def read(path, default=""):
+    try:
+        with open(path) as f:
+            return f.read().strip()
+    except OSError:
+        return default
+
+
+def summarize(s, c, now):
+    window = c["WINDOW_MINUTES"] * 60
+    times = [parse_iso(t) for t in s.get("unclean_boots", [])]
+    after = parse_iso(s["rearmed_at"]) if s.get("rearmed_at") else 0
+    # a re-arm starts a fresh window (or the next unclean boot would trip again at once); the history stays
+    s["unclean_boots_in_window"] = sum(1 for t in times if now - t <= window and t > after)
+    s["unclean_boots_24h"] = sum(1 for t in times if now - t <= 86400)
+    s["config"] = c
+    s["updated_at"] = iso(now)
+
+
+def boot(env):
+    c = load_conf(env)
+    now = env.now()
+    try:
+        up = float(read(env.uptime_path, "0").split()[0])
+    except (ValueError, IndexError):
+        up = 0.0
+    boot_at = now - up
+    prev = load_state(env)
+    first = prev is None
+    s = prev or {"version": 1, "unclean_boots": [], "tripped": False}
+    clean = os.path.exists(marker_path(env))
+    unclean = (not first) and (not clean)
+    try:
+        os.remove(marker_path(env))
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    # keep 7 days of history (the 24 h figure and the operator's view), drop older
+    s["unclean_boots"] = [t for t in s.get("unclean_boots", []) if now - parse_iso(t) <= 7 * 86400]
+    if unclean:
+        s["unclean_boots"].append(iso(boot_at))
+    s["last_boot_at"] = iso(boot_at)
+    s["last_boot_unclean"] = unclean
+    s["boot_id"] = read(env.boot_id_path, "unknown")
+    summarize(s, c, now)
+    if not s.get("tripped") and s["unclean_boots_in_window"] >= c["LIMIT"] - 1:
+        s["tripped"], s["tripped_at"] = True, iso(now)
+        s["tripped_reason"] = (f"{s['unclean_boots_in_window']} unclean boots within {c['WINDOW_MINUTES']} minutes — "
+                               f"the next crash leaves the box off (limit {c['LIMIT']})")
+        env.log(f"crash-guard: TRIPPED: {s['tripped_reason']}")
+    panic = 0 if s.get("tripped") else c["PANIC_SECONDS"]
+    set_panic(env, panic)
+    s["kernel_panic"] = panic
+    s["armed"] = not s.get("tripped")
+    save_state(env, s)
+    env.log(f"crash-guard: boot first={first} unclean={unclean} in-window={s['unclean_boots_in_window']} "
+            f"tripped={s.get('tripped')} kernel.panic={panic}")
+    return 0
+
+
+def clean_stop(env):
+    os.makedirs(env.state_dir, mode=0o755, exist_ok=True)
+    with open(marker_path(env), "w") as f:
+        f.write(iso(env.now()) + "\n")
+    env.log("crash-guard: clean stop recorded")
+    return 0
+
+
+def rearm(env, by):
+    c = load_conf(env)
+    now = env.now()
+    s = load_state(env) or {"version": 1, "unclean_boots": []}
+    was = bool(s.get("tripped"))
+    s["tripped"] = False
+    s["armed"] = True
+    s["rearmed_at"], s["rearmed_by"] = iso(now), by
+    if was:
+        s["last_trip"] = {"at": s.get("tripped_at"), "reason": s.get("tripped_reason")}
+    s.pop("tripped_at", None)
+    s.pop("tripped_reason", None)
+    summarize(s, c, now)
+    set_panic(env, c["PANIC_SECONDS"])
+    s["kernel_panic"] = c["PANIC_SECONDS"]
+    save_state(env, s)
+    env.log(f"crash-guard: RE-ARMED by {by} (was tripped: {was}); kernel.panic={c['PANIC_SECONDS']}")
+    return 0
+
+
+def check(env):
+    c = load_conf(env)
+    now = env.now()
+    s = load_state(env)
+    if not s:
+        return 0
+    if s.get("tripped"):
+        since = max(parse_iso(s["tripped_at"]), parse_iso(s.get("last_boot_at", s["tripped_at"])))
+        if now - since >= c["REARM_HOURS"] * 3600:
+            return rearm(env, f"timer ({c['REARM_HOURS']} h of normal running)")
+    summarize(s, c, now)
+    save_state(env, s)
+    return 0
+
+
+def main(argv, env=None):
+    env = env or Env()
+    cmd = argv[1] if len(argv) == 2 else ""
+    if cmd == "boot":
+        return boot(env)
+    if cmd == "clean-stop":
+        return clean_stop(env)
+    if cmd == "check":
+        return check(env)
+    if cmd == "rearm":
+        return rearm(env, "operator")
+    if cmd == "status":
+        print(json.dumps(load_state(env), indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    print("usage: felhom-crash-guard boot|clean-stop|check|rearm|status", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 2
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    if os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print("felhom-crash-guard: must run as root", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv))

configs/felhom-crash-guard-check.service

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Hourly: a tripped crash guard re-arms after REARM_HOURS of normal running (felhom-crash-guard check).
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom crash guard re-arm check
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard check

configs/felhom-crash-guard-check.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom crash guard re-arm check (hourly)
+
+[Timer]
+OnBootSec=15min
+OnUnitActiveSec=1h
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

configs/felhom-crash-guard.service

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# felhom-crash-guard — a crashed host restarts by itself, with a limit (`09` decision 88, R-851, `11` §5.9).
+# Starts early at boot (sets kernel.panic for THIS boot); its ExecStop writes the clean-stop marker during an orderly
+# shutdown or reboot. A boot that finds no marker followed a crash, a power cut or a hard reset.
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom crash guard (restart after a kernel crash, with a limit)
+DefaultDependencies=no
+After=local-fs.target
+Before=sysinit.target shutdown.target
+Conflicts=shutdown.target
+RequiresMountsFor=/var/lib
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard boot
+ExecStop=/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard clean-stop
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sysinit.target

configs/felhom-guest-hook.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# felhom-agent guest pre-start self-heal hook (C1 net). PVE calls: <script> <vmid> <phase>.
+/usr/local/bin/felhom-agent guest-hook "$1" "$2" || true
+exit 0

configs/felhom-priv-apply

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+"""felhom-priv-apply — the ROOT half of every file the agent writes into a root-read place (R-861, `03` §3.1).
+
+Install as /usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply (0755 root:root) — it rides the signed config bundle (R-840).
+
+WHY IT EXISTS. Until agent v0.146.0 the agent's sudoers let it `install` a file it had written itself into a place a
+root program reads: a systemd .mount unit (a bind mount of an agent-owned directory over /etc/sudoers.d is a root
+shell), a dnsmasq drop-in (`dhcp-script=` runs as root), the WireGuard config (`PostUp=` runs as root) and the OOB
+sshd config (`AuthorizedKeysFile` + `StrictModes no`). A compromised agent PROCESS was therefore root on its host.
+Now the agent stages the file and this wrapper — root-owned, delivered only by an operator-signed bundle — checks
+the CONTENT against the exact grammar the agent's own renderers produce, and refuses anything else. The agent can no
+longer name the destination: each verb has a fixed source and a fixed (or strictly named) destination.
+
+Verbs (each one sudoers line, exact-match pattern):
+  unit <name>              /var/lib/felhom-agent/units/<name> -> /etc/systemd/system/<name>   (.mount | .automount)
+  dnsmasq <tmp> <name>     /tmp/felhom-resolver-<digits>.conf -> /etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-<...>.conf
+  wg                       /var/lib/felhom-agent/wg/wg-felhom.conf -> /etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf (0600)
+  sshd-config              /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/sshd_config -> /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config
+  sshd-key                 /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys.felhom-op -> /etc/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys/felhom-op
+  --self-check             prints "felhom-priv-apply ok verbs=..." (the bundle's self-check)
+
+Exit codes: 0 installed (or already identical), 2 usage, 3 refused (content or source), 4 install failed.
+Every refusal is logged to the journal (tag felhom-priv-apply) with its rule; file CONTENT is never logged.
+Pinned by configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py (one test per rule, red-proofs in the R-861 audit).
+"""
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+AGENT_USER = "felhom-agent"
+STATE = "/var/lib/felhom-agent"
+UNITS_SRC = STATE + "/units"
+UNIT_DIR = "/etc/systemd/system"
+DNSMASQ_DIR = "/etc/dnsmasq.d"
+WG_SRC, WG_DEST = STATE + "/wg/wg-felhom.conf", "/etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf"
+SSHD_SRC, SSHD_DEST = STATE + "/felhom-sshd/sshd_config", "/etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config"
+KEY_SRC, KEY_DEST = STATE + "/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys.felhom-op", "/etc/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys/felhom-op"
+MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+VERBS = ("unit", "dnsmasq", "wg", "sshd-config", "sshd-key")
+
+UNIT_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^mnt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\\-]+\.(mount|automount)$")
+DNSMASQ_TMP_RE = re.compile(r"^/tmp/felhom-resolver-[0-9]+\.conf$")
+DNSMASQ_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^felhom-[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.conf$")
+SEG = r"[A-Za-z0-9_-][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*"
+WHERE_RE = re.compile(r"^/mnt/(felhom-drives/)?" + SEG + r"$")
+UUID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Fa-f0-9]{4,}(-[A-Fa-f0-9]+){0,4}$")
+HOST_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,255}$")
+NET_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._/@+-]{1,512}$")
+OPT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.:/@+-]+(=[A-Za-z0-9_.:/@+-]+)?$")
+LOCAL_TYPES = {"ext4", "xfs", "btrfs", "exfat", "vfat", "ntfs3", "ntfs"}
+NET_TYPES = {"nfs", "nfs4", "cifs"}
+# Options that turn a device mount into something else, or let set-uid/device files act on the host.
+FORBIDDEN_OPTS = {"bind", "rbind", "move", "rmove", "remount", "suid", "dev", "user", "users", "owner", "group",
+                  "x-mount.mkdir", "helper"}
+DESC_RE = re.compile(r"^[^\x00-\x1f\x7f]{0,200}$")
+WG_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{42}[AEIMQUYcgkosw480]=$")
+KEY_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^(ssh-ed25519|ssh-rsa|ecdsa-sha2-nistp(256|384|521)|sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh\.com) "
+                         r"[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,3}( [ -~]{0,200})?$")
+
+
+class Refused(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, rule, reason):
+        super().__init__(reason)
+        self.rule, self.reason = rule, reason
+
+
+class Host:
+    """Every filesystem / process effect, so the tests can play the box in memory."""
+
+    def agent_uid(self):
+        import pwd
+        return pwd.getpwnam(AGENT_USER).pw_uid
+
+    def read_source(self, path):
+        """The staged file: a REGULAR file owned by the agent, never a symlink, at most MAX_BYTES."""
+        try:
+            fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_CLOEXEC)
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise Refused("P1", f"cannot open the staged file {path}: {e.strerror}")
+        try:
+            st = os.fstat(fd)
+            if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+                raise Refused("P1", f"{path} is not a regular file")
+            if st.st_uid != self.agent_uid():
+                raise Refused("P1", f"{path} is not owned by {AGENT_USER}")
+            if st.st_size > MAX_BYTES:
+                raise Refused("P1", f"{path} is larger than {MAX_BYTES} bytes")
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "rb") as f:
+                fd = -1
+                return f.read(MAX_BYTES + 1)
+        finally:
+            if fd >= 0:
+                os.close(fd)
+
+    def read_dest(self, path):
+        try:
+            with open(path, "rb") as f:
+                return f.read()
+        except OSError:
+            return None
+
+    def install(self, dest, data, mode):
+        """Atomic, root-owned: a temp file beside the destination, fsync, rename."""
+        d = os.path.dirname(dest)
+        os.makedirs(d, mode=0o755, exist_ok=True)
+        tmp = os.path.join(d, f".{os.path.basename(dest)}.felhom-new.{os.getpid()}")
+        fd = os.open(tmp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as f:
+                f.write(data)
+                f.flush()
+                os.fchown(f.fileno(), 0, 0)
+                os.fchmod(f.fileno(), mode)
+                os.fsync(f.fileno())
+            os.replace(tmp, dest)
+        except BaseException:
+            try:
+                os.remove(tmp)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        print(line, file=sys.stderr)
+        try:
+            subprocess.run(["logger", "-t", "felhom-priv-apply", "--", line], timeout=10, check=False)
+        except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+            pass
+
+
+def systemd_escape_path(path):
+    """`systemd-escape --path`: strip the slashes at both ends, `/` -> `-`, every byte outside [A-Za-z0-9:_.] (and a
+    leading `.`) -> `\\xNN`."""
+    p = path.strip("/")
+    out = []
+    for i, ch in enumerate(p):
+        if ch == "/":
+            out.append("-")
+        elif (ch.isascii() and (ch.isalnum() or ch in ":_.")) and not (i == 0 and ch == "."):
+            out.append(ch)
+        else:
+            out.extend("\\x%02x" % b for b in ch.encode())
+    return "".join(out)
+
+
+def text_of(data, what):
+    if len(data) > MAX_BYTES:
+        raise Refused("P1", f"{what} is too large")
+    try:
+        text = data.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        raise Refused("P2", f"{what} is not UTF-8 text")
+    if "\x00" in text or "\r" in text:
+        raise Refused("P2", f"{what} carries a NUL or CR byte")
+    return text
+
+
+def parse_ini(text, what):
+    """[Section] / Key=Value / comments / blank lines. A key outside a section or a repeated key is refused."""
+    sections, cur = {}, None
+    for n, raw in enumerate(text.split("\n"), 1):
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if line.endswith("\\"):
+            # systemd joins a line ending in a backslash with the next one; this parser does not. Refused, so the two
+            # can never read the same bytes differently (review 2026-10-05).
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{what}: line {n} ends with a backslash (a continuation)")
+        if not line or line.startswith("#") or line.startswith(";"):
+            continue
+        m = re.match(r"^\[([A-Za-z]+)\]$", line)
+        if m:
+            cur = m.group(1)
+            if cur in sections:
+                raise Refused("U2", f"{what}: section [{cur}] twice")
+            sections[cur] = {}
+            continue
+        if cur is None or "=" not in line:
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{what}: line {n} is not Key=Value inside a section")
+        k, v = line.split("=", 1)
+        k, v = k.strip(), v.strip()
+        if k in sections[cur]:
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{what}: {cur}.{k} given twice")
+        sections[cur][k] = v
+    return sections
+
+
+# ---------- the unit verb ----------
+def check_unit(name, text):
+    if not UNIT_NAME_RE.match(name) or "/" in name:
+        raise Refused("U1", f"unit name {name!r} is not mnt-<escaped path>.mount|.automount")
+    kind = "automount" if name.endswith(".automount") else "mount"
+    s = parse_ini(text, name)
+    body = "Automount" if kind == "automount" else "Mount"
+    # [Unit] holds ONLY what the renderers write: Description, and After=local-fs-pre.target on a local mount. A
+    # Wants=/Requires=/Before= naming any unit would start it with the mount (Wants=reboot.target — found by review
+    # 2026-10-05), so none of them is accepted.
+    allowed = {"Unit": {"Description", "After"},
+               body: {"Where", "TimeoutIdleSec"} if kind == "automount" else {"What", "Where", "Type", "Options"},
+               "Install": {"WantedBy"}}
+    for sec, keys in s.items():
+        if sec not in allowed:
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: section [{sec}] is not allowed")
+        bad = set(keys) - allowed[sec]
+        if bad:
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: [{sec}] key(s) {sorted(bad)} not allowed")
+    u = s.get("Unit", {})
+    if not DESC_RE.match(u.get("Description", "")):
+        raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: Description has control characters")
+    if "After" in u and u["After"] != "local-fs-pre.target":
+        raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: After= may only be local-fs-pre.target")
+    inst = s.get("Install", {})
+    if inst and inst.get("WantedBy") != "multi-user.target":
+        raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: WantedBy must be multi-user.target")
+    m = s.get(body)
+    if not m or "Where" not in m:
+        raise Refused("U3", f"{name}: no [{body}] Where=")
+    where = m["Where"]
+    if not WHERE_RE.match(where):
+        raise Refused("U3", f"{name}: Where={where} is not /mnt/<name> or /mnt/felhom-drives/<name>")
+    if systemd_escape_path(where) + "." + kind != name:
+        raise Refused("U3", f"{name}: the unit name does not match Where={where}")
+    if kind == "automount":
+        t = m.get("TimeoutIdleSec", "")
+        if t and not re.match(r"^[0-9]{1,6}$", t):
+            raise Refused("U2", f"{name}: TimeoutIdleSec must be seconds")
+        return
+    what, typ = m.get("What", ""), m.get("Type", "")
+    opts = [o for o in m.get("Options", "").split(",") if o]
+    net = False
+    mu = re.match(r"^/dev/disk/by-uuid/(.+)$", what)
+    if mu:
+        if not UUID_RE.match(mu.group(1)):
+            raise Refused("U4", f"{name}: What= is not a filesystem UUID")
+        if typ and typ not in LOCAL_TYPES:
+            raise Refused("U4", f"{name}: Type={typ} is not a local filesystem")
+    else:
+        net = True
+        if typ not in NET_TYPES:
+            raise Refused("U4", f"{name}: What= is neither /dev/disk/by-uuid/<uuid> nor a network source with Type=nfs/nfs4/cifs")
+        if typ == "cifs":
+            mm = re.match(r"^//([^/]+)/(.+)$", what)
+        else:
+            mm = re.match(r"^([^/:][^:]*):(/.*)$", what)
+        if not mm or not HOST_RE.match(mm.group(1)) or not NET_PATH_RE.match(mm.group(2)) or ".." in mm.group(2).split("/"):
+            raise Refused("U4", f"{name}: What= is not a clean {typ} source")
+        if not where.startswith("/mnt/felhom-drives/"):
+            raise Refused("U3", f"{name}: a network share mounts only under /mnt/felhom-drives/")
+    for o in opts:
+        if not OPT_RE.match(o):
+            raise Refused("U5", f"{name}: mount option {o!r} has characters a mount option never needs")
+        if o.split("=", 1)[0].lower() in FORBIDDEN_OPTS or o.lower().startswith("x-mount."):
+            raise Refused("U5", f"{name}: mount option {o.split('=', 1)[0]!r} is not allowed")
+    if net and not {"nosuid", "nodev"} <= set(opts):
+        # A network server is outside the box: a set-uid file on it must never run as root here.
+        raise Refused("U5", f"{name}: a network share must carry nosuid,nodev")
+
+
+# ---------- dnsmasq ----------
+def _ip(v, v6=True):
+    try:
+        a = ipaddress.ip_address(v)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return v6 or a.version == 4
+
+
+DOMAIN_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9-]{0,62})(\.[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9-]{0,62}))*$")
+
+
+def check_dnsmasq(text):
+    for n, raw in enumerate(text.split("\n"), 1):
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        if line in ("bind-interfaces", "no-resolv"):
+            continue
+        k, _, v = line.partition("=")
+        if k == "listen-address" and _ip(v, v6=False):
+            continue
+        if k == "server" and (_ip(v) or (v.count("#") == 1 and _ip(v.split("#")[0]) and v.split("#")[1].isdigit())):
+            continue
+        m = re.match(r"^/([^/]+)/$", v)
+        if k == "local" and m and DOMAIN_RE.match(m.group(1)):
+            continue
+        m = re.match(r"^/([^/]+)/([^/]+)$", v)
+        if k == "address" and m and DOMAIN_RE.match(m.group(1)) and _ip(m.group(2), v6=False):
+            continue
+        raise Refused("D1", f"dnsmasq line {n} ({k or line[:20]!r}) is not one the resolver writes")
+
+
+# ---------- WireGuard ----------
+def check_wg(text):
+    s = parse_ini(text, "wg-felhom.conf")
+    if set(s) != {"Interface", "Peer"}:
+        raise Refused("W1", "wg-felhom.conf must hold exactly [Interface] and [Peer]")
+    i, p = s["Interface"], s["Peer"]
+    if set(i) - {"PrivateKey", "Address", "MTU"} or set(p) - {"PublicKey", "Endpoint", "AllowedIPs", "PersistentKeepalive"}:
+        raise Refused("W1", "wg-felhom.conf carries a key the agent never writes (PostUp/PreUp/... run as root)")
+    if not WG_KEY_RE.match(i.get("PrivateKey", "")) or not WG_KEY_RE.match(p.get("PublicKey", "")):
+        raise Refused("W2", "a WireGuard key is not 32 bytes of base64")
+    try:
+        a = ipaddress.ip_network(i.get("Address", ""), strict=False)
+        if a.version != 4 or a.prefixlen != 32:
+            raise ValueError
+        if not (1280 <= int(i.get("MTU", "1280")) <= 1500):
+            raise ValueError
+        host, _, port = p.get("Endpoint", "").rpartition(":")
+        if ipaddress.ip_address(host).version != 4 or not (1 <= int(port) <= 65535):
+            raise ValueError
+        for n in p.get("AllowedIPs", "").split(","):
+            if ipaddress.ip_network(n.strip(), strict=True).prefixlen != 32:
+                raise ValueError
+        if not (0 <= int(p.get("PersistentKeepalive", "25")) <= 3600):
+            raise ValueError
+    except ValueError:
+        raise Refused("W2", "an Address/MTU/Endpoint/AllowedIPs/PersistentKeepalive value is not what the agent renders")
+
+
+# ---------- OOB sshd ----------
+def render_sshd(port):
+    """Byte-identical to felhomsshd.renderConfig (internal/felhomsshd/config.go) — pinned by a Go test."""
+    return ("# felhom OOB sshd — agent-managed (H1); DO NOT EDIT\n"
+            f"Port {port}\n"
+            "ListenAddress 0.0.0.0\n"
+            "ListenAddress ::\n"
+            "HostKey /etc/felhom-sshd/ssh_host_ed25519_key\n"
+            "PidFile /run/felhom-sshd.pid\n"
+            "AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys/%u\n"
+            "PasswordAuthentication no\n"
+            "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\n"
+            "PubkeyAuthentication yes\n"
+            "KbdInteractiveAuthentication no\n"
+            "UsePAM yes\n"
+            "AllowUsers root felhom-op\n"
+            "X11Forwarding no\n"
+            "Subsystem sftp internal-sftp\n")
+
+
+def check_sshd(text):
+    m = re.search(r"^Port ([0-9]{1,5})$", text, re.M)
+    if not m or not (1 <= int(m.group(1)) <= 65535) or int(m.group(1)) == 22:
+        raise Refused("S1", "sshd_config has no Port (or claims :22, the household's sshd)")
+    if text != render_sshd(int(m.group(1))):
+        raise Refused("S1", "sshd_config differs from the one fixed template (only the Port may vary)")
+
+
+def check_key(text):
+    lines = [l for l in text.split("\n") if l.strip()]
+    if len(lines) > 1:
+        raise Refused("S2", "felhom-op's authorized_keys holds more than one key")
+    if lines and not KEY_LINE_RE.match(lines[0]):
+        raise Refused("S2", "the key line is not a plain public key (no options such as command= or from=)")
+
+
+# ---------- main ----------
+def plan(argv):
+    """(verb, source, dest, mode, checker) for an argv, or Refused("A1")."""
+    if not argv or argv[0] not in VERBS:
+        raise Refused("A1", "usage: felhom-priv-apply unit <name> | dnsmasq <tmp> <name> | wg | sshd-config | sshd-key")
+    v, rest = argv[0], argv[1:]
+    if v == "unit" and len(rest) == 1:
+        if not UNIT_NAME_RE.match(rest[0]):
+            raise Refused("U1", f"unit name {rest[0]!r} is not mnt-<escaped path>.mount|.automount")
+        return v, os.path.join(UNITS_SRC, rest[0]), os.path.join(UNIT_DIR, rest[0]), 0o644, lambda t: check_unit(rest[0], t)
+    if v == "dnsmasq" and len(rest) == 2:
+        if not DNSMASQ_TMP_RE.match(rest[0]) or not DNSMASQ_NAME_RE.match(rest[1]):
+            raise Refused("D2", "dnsmasq wants /tmp/felhom-resolver-<digits>.conf and felhom-<name>.conf")
+        return v, rest[0], os.path.join(DNSMASQ_DIR, rest[1]), 0o644, check_dnsmasq
+    if v == "wg" and not rest:
+        return v, WG_SRC, WG_DEST, 0o600, check_wg
+    if v == "sshd-config" and not rest:
+        return v, SSHD_SRC, SSHD_DEST, 0o644, check_sshd
+    if v == "sshd-key" and not rest:
+        return v, KEY_SRC, KEY_DEST, 0o644, check_key
+    raise Refused("A1", f"wrong arguments for {v}")
+
+
+def main(argv, host=None):
+    host = host or Host()
+    if argv == ["--self-check"]:
+        print("felhom-priv-apply ok verbs=" + ",".join(VERBS))
+        return 0
+    if len(argv) >= 3 and argv[0] == "--check":
+        # CHECK ONLY (tests and the Go contract tests): `--check <verb> [<name>] <file>` validates <file> as that
+        # verb would and installs nothing. Not in sudoers. Prints OK or the rule; never the content.
+        verb, file = argv[1], argv[-1]
+        try:
+            _, _, _, _, checker = plan([verb] + argv[2:-1] if verb != "dnsmasq" else
+                                       [verb, "/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", argv[2]])
+            with open(file, "rb") as f:
+                checker(text_of(f.read(), file))
+        except Refused as e:
+            print(f"REFUSED [{e.rule}] {e.reason}")
+            return 3
+        print("OK")
+        return 0
+    try:
+        verb, src, dest, mode, checker = plan(argv)
+        data = host.read_source(src)
+        checker(text_of(data, src))
+    except Refused as e:
+        host.log(f"felhom-priv-apply: REFUSED [{e.rule}] {' '.join(argv)[:160]}: {e.reason}")
+        return 2 if e.rule == "A1" else 3
+    if host.read_dest(dest) == data:
+        host.log(f"felhom-priv-apply: SAME {verb} {dest}")
+        return 0
+    try:
+        host.install(dest, data, mode)
+    except OSError as e:
+        host.log(f"felhom-priv-apply: FAILED {verb} {dest}: {e}")
+        return 4
+    host.log(f"felhom-priv-apply: INSTALLED {verb} {dest} ({len(data)} bytes)")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

configs/felhom-selfupdate-guarded

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ set -u
 BIN=/usr/local/bin/felhom-agent
 PREV=$BIN.prev
 STAGING=/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate
+# R-861 (agent v0.146.1): `apply` takes ONLY the root-owned copy felhom-os-apply writes after it has verified the
+# operator's signature and hashed exactly those bytes (mode agent_update). The agent cannot call `apply` any more (it
+# left the sudoers), and the agent's own staging dir is no longer accepted: a file in a directory the agent owns can be
+# swapped between this script's sha check and its copy.
+ROOT_STAGING=/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/agent-update
 PENDING=$STAGING/pending.json
 UNIT=felhom-agent.service
 
@@ -42,11 +47,14 @@ apply)
         log "refusing apply: usage: apply <staged> <sha256>"
         exit 2
     fi
-    # Root-side path confinement: the staged binary MUST live in the agent's staging dir.
+    # Root-side path confinement: the staged binary MUST be felhom-os-apply's root-owned copy (R-861).
     case "$staged" in
-        "$STAGING"/*) ;;
-        *) log "refusing apply: staged path outside $STAGING: $staged"; exit 1 ;;
+        "$ROOT_STAGING"/*) ;;
+        *) log "refusing apply: staged path outside $ROOT_STAGING: $staged"; exit 1 ;;
     esac
+    if [ -L "$staged" ] || [ "$(stat -c %u "$staged" 2>/dev/null)" != "0" ]; then
+        log "refusing apply: $staged is a symlink or not root-owned"; exit 1
+    fi
     case "$staged" in
         *..*) log "refusing apply: staged path contains '..'"; exit 1 ;;
     esac

configs/felhom-shared-parent.service

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom stable drive parent (shared bind for live drive hot-swap)
+After=local-fs.target
+Before=pve-guests.service
+ConditionPathExists=/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=pve-guests.service multi-user.target

configs/felhom-shared-parent.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# felhom stable drive parent: a SHARED bind so the agent can swap backing drives underneath it and the
+# guest sees the change live (no restart). MUST run before pve-guests so the guest's parent bind inherits
+# the shared peer group (slave). Installed + enabled by felhom-agent. Idempotent.
+set -e
+mkdir -p /mnt/felhom-drives
+# Isolate + share ONLY when first creating the self-bind (a fresh boot). The self-bind inherits the root
+# mount's shared peer group, so make-private detaches it (else binds under it DOUBLE via the root peer),
+# then make-shared gives it its own group whose only slave is the guest's parent bind. Re-running this on
+# an existing parent would churn the peer-group id and orphan the guest's slave — so guard on mountpoint.
+if ! mountpoint -q /mnt/felhom-drives; then
+  mount --bind /mnt/felhom-drives /mnt/felhom-drives
+  mount --make-private /mnt/felhom-drives
+  mount --make-shared /mnt/felhom-drives
+fi

configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py

@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Tests for the config bundle (R-840, `11` §5.4.2): felhom-os-apply's `bundle` mode and `--install-bundle`, and
+scripts/build-config-bundle.py. An in-memory host plays the files; nothing real is written or run. Each refusal has a
+test; each test names the rule it pins. Red-proof: `audits/r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04/partB/redproof.txt`.
+
+Run: python3 configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py   (also run by internal/osupdate's Go test)
+"""
+import sys
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True  # importing the builder must not leave scripts/__pycache__ behind
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import hashlib
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import re
+import stat as statmod
+import unittest
+
+HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+REPO = HERE.parent
+_loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("osapply", os.environ.get("OSAPPLY_UNDER_TEST", str(HERE / "felhom-os-apply")))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("osapply", _loader)
+osapply = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+_loader.exec_module(osapply)
+_bl = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("bundlebuild", str(REPO / "scripts" / "build-config-bundle.py"))
+_bs = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("bundlebuild", _bl)
+builder = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_bs)
+_bl.exec_module(builder)
+
+PLAN = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-b1.json"
+BUNDLE = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os/bundle-0.143.0.json"
+HOST = "demo-hp-bb76ea"
+INSTALLER = REPO.parent / "felhom.eu" / "scripts" / "felhom-host-install.sh"
+
+
+class St:
+    def __init__(self, mode, uid):
+        self.st_mode, self.st_uid, self.st_size = mode, uid, 100
+
+
+class Box:
+    """An in-memory host. files: path -> bytes; modes/uids per path; dirs: a set."""
+
+    def __init__(self, bundle_bytes, signed, oob=False, signers=True):
+        self.files, self.modes, self.uids = {}, {}, {}
+        self.dirs = {osapply.OOB_DIR} if oob else set()
+        self.put(osapply.TRUST_FILE, json.dumps({"host_id": HOST, "ring0_slow_lane": False}).encode(), 0o644)
+        if signers:
+            self.put(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, b'felhom-op-1 namespaces="felhom-op-v1" ssh-ed25519 AAAA felhom-op-1\n', 0o644)
+        self.put("/proc/sys/kernel/panic", b"0\n", 0o644)
+        self.plan = {"release_id": "bundle-0.143.0", "layer": "host", "mode": "bundle", "bundle": BUNDLE, "signed": signed}
+        self.put(PLAN, json.dumps(self.plan).encode(), 0o600, uid=999)
+        self.put(BUNDLE, bundle_bytes, 0o600, uid=999)
+        self.sig_rc, self.nonces, self.clock = 0, {}, 1791115200.0  # 2026-10-04T12:00:00Z
+        self.calls, self.logs, self.writes = [], [], []
+        self.visudo_fail = False      # the WHOLE sudoers (`visudo -c`) after install
+        self.sudo_l = "    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-*.json\n"
+        self.guard = {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10}
+
+    def put(self, p, data, mode, uid=0):
+        self.files[p], self.modes[p], self.uids[p] = data, mode, uid
+
+    # Runner interface
+    def now(self):
+        return self.clock
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        self.logs.append(line)
+
+    def agent_uid(self):
+        return 999
+
+    def verify_sig(self, signers, key_id, ns, blob, sig):
+        self.verified = (signers, key_id, ns)
+        return self.sig_rc
+
+    def read_nonces(self):
+        return dict(self.nonces)
+
+    def write_nonces(self, d):
+        self.nonces = dict(d)
+
+    def read_file(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return self.files[p].decode()
+
+    def read_bytes(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return self.files[p]
+
+    def read_staged_once(self, p, owner_uid, limit):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        if self.uids[p] != owner_uid:
+            raise osapply.Refused("R19", f"{p} is not a regular file owned by felhom-agent")
+        self.staged_reads = getattr(self, "staged_reads", 0) + 1
+        return self.files[p]
+
+    def stat(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return St(statmod.S_IFREG | self.modes[p], self.uids[p])
+
+    def lexists(self, p):
+        return p in self.files
+
+    def isdir(self, p):
+        return p in self.dirs
+
+    def put_file(self, p, data, mode):
+        self.writes.append(p)
+        self.put(p, data, mode)
+
+    def remove(self, p):
+        self.writes.append("rm " + p)
+        del self.files[p]
+
+    def list_dir(self, p):
+        return sorted({k[len(p) + 1:].split("/")[0] for k in self.files if k.startswith(p + "/")})
+
+    def rmtree(self, p):
+        for k in [k for k in self.files if k.startswith(p + "/")]:
+            del self.files[k]
+
+    def check_content(self, kind, data):
+        return (1, f"{kind}: syntax error") if b"BROKEN-SYNTAX" in data else (0, "")
+
+    def host(self, argv, timeout=600, stdin=None):
+        self.calls.append(argv)
+        if argv[:2] == ["visudo", "-c"]:
+            return (1, "", "parse error") if self.visudo_fail else (0, "ok", "")
+        if argv[:2] == ["sudo", "-n"]:
+            return 0, self.sudo_l, ""
+        if argv[-2:] == ["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", "--self-check"]:
+            body = self.files.get("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", b"")
+            return (0, "felhom-priv-apply ok verbs=unit\n", "") if b"VERBS" in body else (1, "", "boom")
+        if argv[-1] == "--self-check":
+            body = self.files.get("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply", b"")
+            return (0, "felhom-os-apply ok bundle-format=1 files=22\n", "") if b"BUNDLE_OP" in body else (1, "", "boom")
+        if argv[-1] == "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded":
+            return 2, "", "felhom-selfupdate-guarded: usage: ...\n"
+        if argv[-1] == "status" and argv[0].endswith("felhom-crash-guard"):
+            return 0, json.dumps(self.guard), ""
+        if argv[:3] == ["systemctl", "enable", "--now"] and "felhom-crash-guard.service" in argv:
+            self.put("/proc/sys/kernel/panic", f"{self.guard['kernel_panic']}\n".encode(), 0o644)
+        return 0, "", ""
+
+
+def signed_job(sha, version="0.143.0", host=HOST, op="agent_config_update", nonce="b1",
+               issued="2026-10-04T11:50:00Z", expires="2026-10-04T12:30:00Z"):
+    blob = json.dumps({"expires_at": expires, "issued_at": issued, "key_id": "felhom-op-1", "nonce": nonce, "op": op,
+                       "params": {"agent_version": version, "bundle_sha256": sha},
+                       "target": {"guest_id": "", "host_id": host}}, sort_keys=True).encode()
+    return {"blob_b64": base64.b64encode(blob).decode(), "sig": "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\nx\n-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"}
+
+
+def real_bundle(version="0.143.0"):
+    data = builder.build(version)
+    return data, hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def edited_bundle(edit):
+    """The real bundle, with edit(files_list) applied and every sha recomputed — a SIGNED bundle with bad content."""
+    b = json.loads(builder.build("0.143.0"))
+    edit(b["files"])
+    for e in b["files"]:
+        e["sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(e["content_b64"])).hexdigest()
+    data = (json.dumps(b, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+    return data, hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def replace_content(files, path, fn):
+    for e in files:
+        if e["path"] == path:
+            e["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(fn(base64.b64decode(e["content_b64"]))).decode()
+
+
+def run(box, argv=None, environ=None):
+    buf = io.StringIO()
+    with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
+        rc = osapply.main(argv or ["felhom-os-apply", "--plan", PLAN], runner=box, environ=environ or {})
+    line = [l for l in buf.getvalue().splitlines() if l.startswith("OSAPPLY-REPORT ")][-1]
+    return rc, json.loads(line[len("OSAPPLY-REPORT "):])
+
+
+def box_files(box):
+    return {p: box.files[p] for p in box.files if p in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS}
+
+
+class Install(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fresh_box_gets_every_file_and_a_record(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        b = rep["bundle"]
+        # every path but the four OOB ones (no belt on this box)
+        self.assertEqual(len(b["written"]), len(osapply.BUNDLE_FILES) - 4, b)
+        self.assertEqual(len(b["skipped"]), 4)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-agent.sudoers").read_bytes())
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], 0o440)
+        rec = json.loads(box.files[osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD])
+        self.assertEqual((rec["agent_version"], rec["bundle_sha256"], rec["authority"]), ("0.143.0", sha, "signed"))
+        self.assertIn("b1", box.nonces, "the job is consumed")
+        self.assertEqual(b["self_check"]["crash_guard"], {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10})
+        self.assertIn(["systemctl", "daemon-reload"], box.calls)
+
+    def test_sudoers_is_written_after_every_wrapper(self):
+        """Order: a referenced wrapper is in place before the sudoers line that allows it."""
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: f.reverse())  # the bundle lists the sudoers FIRST; the wrapper must reorder
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        w = [p for p in box.writes if p in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS]
+        self.assertEqual(w[-1], "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent")
+        self.assertLess(w.index("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"), w.index("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"))
+
+    def test_identical_box_writes_nothing(self):
+        """The demo boxes' case: hand-copied files equal to the release → 0 written, all 'same'."""
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        for dest, src, mode, _, policy in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES:
+            if policy != "oob":
+                box.put(dest, (REPO / "configs" / src).read_bytes(), mode)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["written"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["same"], len(osapply.BUNDLE_FILES) - 5)  # 4 oob skipped + crash-guard.conf kept
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["kept"], ["/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf"])
+
+    def test_a_wrong_mode_is_rewritten(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-agent.sudoers").read_bytes(), 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertIn("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", rep["bundle"]["written"])
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], 0o440)
+
+    def test_tuned_crash_guard_conf_is_kept(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf", b"LIMIT=5\n", 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files["/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf"], b"LIMIT=5\n")
+
+    def test_oob_files_only_on_a_box_with_the_belt(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), oob=True)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertIn("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-op", rep["bundle"]["written"])
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["skipped"], [])
+
+    def test_previous_copies_are_kept(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n", 0o755)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files[rep["bundle"]["prev_dir"] + "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply"], b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n")
+
+
+class Refusals(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Each: refused, and NOTHING on the box changed."""
+
+    def refused(self, box, code):
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 2, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(rep["refused"]["code"], code, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box_files(box), before, "a refusal changed a file")
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+        return rep
+
+    def test_wrong_sha_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job("0" * 64))
+        self.refused(box, "R18")
+        self.assertEqual(box.nonces, {}, "a wrong sha must not burn the job")
+
+    def test_bad_signature_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.sig_rc = 255
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+    def test_other_op_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, op="agent_update")), "R3")
+
+    def test_other_host_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, host="demo-felhom-8363b5")), "R3")
+
+    def test_expired_job_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, expires="2026-10-04T11:55:00Z")), "R3")
+
+    def test_replayed_job_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.nonces = {"b1": box.clock + 600}
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+    def test_version_mismatch_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, version="0.142.1")), "R18")
+
+    def test_sudoers_failing_visudo_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", lambda c: c + b"BROKEN-SYNTAX\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_sudoers_dropping_the_route_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan", b"/bin/true --plan")))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_wrapper_without_bundle_mode_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b'BUNDLE_OP = "agent_config_update"', b'BUNDLE_OPX = 1')))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_python_syntax_error_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard", lambda c: c + b"\ndef (\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_unit_with_runtime_directory_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.service",
+                                                            lambda c: c + b"RuntimeDirectory=sshd\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_agent_unit_not_as_the_agent_user_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b"User=felhom-agent", b"User=root")))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_a_bundle_that_changes_a_signer_is_refused(self):
+        """R17: the trust root is not a bundle's to change — not even a signed one."""
+        def add(f):
+            f.append({"path": osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, "content_b64": base64.b64encode(b"evil-key\n").decode()})
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(add)
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        self.refused(box, "R17")
+        self.assertIn(b"felhom-op-1", box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS])
+
+    def test_a_path_outside_the_table_is_refused(self):
+        def add(f):
+            f.append({"path": "/etc/shadow", "content_b64": base64.b64encode(b"root::0:0\n").decode()})
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(add)
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R16")
+
+    def test_content_not_matching_its_sha_is_refused(self):
+        b = json.loads(builder.build("0.143.0"))
+        b["files"][0]["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(b"#!/bin/bash\nexit 0\n").decode()
+        data = json.dumps(b).encode()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest())), "R18")
+
+    def test_bundle_outside_the_plan_dir_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.plan["bundle"] = "/tmp/bundle-0.143.0.json"
+        box.files[PLAN] = json.dumps(box.plan).encode()
+        self.refused(box, "R1")
+
+    def test_bundle_not_owned_by_the_agent_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.uids[BUNDLE] = 0
+        self.refused(box, "R1")
+
+    def test_no_trust_file_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        del box.files[osapply.TRUST_FILE]
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+
+class SelfCheckUndo(unittest.TestCase):
+    def assert_restored(self, box, before, rep):
+        self.assertTrue(rep["bundle"]["rolled_back"], rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box_files(box), before, "the previous files must be back, byte for byte")
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+
+    def with_old_files(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n", 0o755)
+        box.put("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", b"# old sudoers\n", 0o440)
+        return box
+
+    def test_route_missing_after_install_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.sudo_l = "    (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/true\n"
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.calls[-1], ["visudo", "-c"], "the undo re-checks the whole sudoers")
+
+    def test_visudo_failing_after_install_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.visudo_fail = True
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+
+    def test_crash_guard_disagreeing_with_kernel_panic_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.guard = {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10}
+        box.host_orig = box.host
+
+        def host(argv, timeout=600, stdin=None):
+            if argv[:3] == ["systemctl", "enable", "--now"]:
+                box.calls.append(argv)
+                return 0, "", ""   # the unit "started" but kernel.panic stayed 0
+            return box.host_orig(argv, timeout, stdin)
+        box.host = host
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+
+
+class TrustBootstrap(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_missing_signers_verifies_against_the_pinned_key_and_creates_it(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), signers=False)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.verified[0], osapply.PINNED_SIGNERS, "verified against the pinned key, nothing else")
+        self.assertTrue(rep["bundle"]["signers_created"])
+        self.assertEqual(box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS], osapply.pinned_signers_line().encode())
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS], 0o644)
+
+    def test_missing_signers_and_a_job_the_pinned_key_did_not_sign(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), signers=False)
+        box.sig_rc = 255
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"))
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, box.files)
+
+    def test_present_signers_are_never_touched(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, b'felhom-op-2 namespaces="felhom-op-v1" ssh-ed25519 BBBB felhom-op-2\n', 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.verified[0], osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS)
+        self.assertFalse(rep["bundle"]["signers_created"])
+        self.assertIn(b"felhom-op-2", box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS])
+
+    def test_agent_writable_signers_are_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.uids[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS] = 999
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"))
+
+    def test_pinned_operator_key_equals_the_installers(self):
+        """The bootstrap key is exactly the one felhom-host-install.sh pins (OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_*)."""
+        text = INSTALLER.read_text()
+        kid = re.search(r'^OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_ID="([^"]+)"', text, re.M).group(1)
+        line = re.search(r'^OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_LINE="([^"]+)"', text, re.M).group(1)
+        self.assertEqual((osapply.PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID, osapply.PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_LINE), (kid, line))
+        # and the file format is the installer's printf, byte for byte
+        self.assertIn("printf '%s namespaces=\"felhom-op-v1\" %s\\n'", text)
+
+
+class InstallerEntry(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_installer_installs_without_a_signature(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", sha])
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(json.loads(box.files[osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD])["authority"], "installer")
+
+    def test_installer_entry_checks_the_sha(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", "1" * 64])
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R18"))
+
+    def test_installer_entry_is_refused_through_sudo(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", sha], {"SUDO_UID": "999"})
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R1"))
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+
+    def test_self_check_answers(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
+            rc = osapply.main(["felhom-os-apply", "--self-check"], runner=Box(b"", None))
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+        self.assertIn("bundle-format=1", buf.getvalue())
+
+
+class Facts(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_state_reports_drift_against_the_record(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        run(box)
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho by hand\n", 0o755)
+        a = osapply.Apply(box, PLAN)
+        st = osapply.Bundle(a).state()
+        self.assertEqual(st["version"], "0.143.0")
+        self.assertEqual(st["drift"], ["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply"])
+        self.assertTrue(st["signers_present"])
+
+    def test_state_without_a_record_says_none(self):
+        box = Box(b"", None)
+        st = osapply.Bundle(osapply.Apply(box, PLAN)).state()
+        self.assertEqual(st["version"], "none")
+        self.assertNotIn("drift", st)
+        self.assertEqual(st["live"]["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], "absent")
+
+
+class Builder(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_reproducible(self):
+        self.assertEqual(builder.build("0.143.0"), builder.build("0.143.0"))
+
+    def test_every_source_exists_and_every_dest_is_unique(self):
+        dests = [e[0] for e in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES]
+        self.assertEqual(len(dests), len(set(dests)))
+        for _, src, *_ in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES:
+            self.assertTrue((REPO / "configs" / src).is_file(), src)
+
+    def test_every_root_file_the_installer_writes_is_in_the_bundle(self):
+        """One source of truth: a felhom root-owned path the installer names must be a bundle path, a trust file, or a
+        path the AGENT itself writes at run time (named here, with why). Scope is a regex over the WHOLE installer."""
+        text = INSTALLER.read_text()
+        found = set(re.findall(r"(/usr/local/sbin/felhom-[a-z-]+|/etc/systemd/system/felhom-[a-z.-]+|"
+                               r"/etc/sudoers\.d/felhom-[a-z-]+|/etc/felhom-oob\.nft|/etc/tmpfiles\.d/felhom-[a-z.-]+|"
+                               r"/etc/felhom/[a-z.-]+)", text))
+        agent_writes = {"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent", "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-shared-parent.service"}
+        trust = {osapply.TRUST_FILE, osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS + ".tmp", osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD}
+        missing = sorted(p for p in found if p not in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS and p not in agent_writes | trust)
+        self.assertEqual(missing, [], "the installer writes these root files, but the bundle does not carry them")
+        # the limits drop-in is named through $AGENT_UNIT in the installer
+        self.assertIn("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service.d/felhom-agent-limits.conf", osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS)
+
+
+
+# ---------- R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the agent binary only by an operator-signed agent_update, checked as root ----------
+STAGED = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/felhom-agent-0.146.0"
+NEW_BIN = b"\x7fELF the new agent"
+
+
+def update_job(sha, version="0.146.0", op="agent_update", nonce="u1", host=HOST):
+    blob = json.dumps({"expires_at": "2026-10-04T12:30:00Z", "issued_at": "2026-10-04T11:50:00Z", "key_id": "felhom-op-1",
+                       "nonce": nonce, "op": op, "params": {"sha256": sha, "version": version},
+                       "target": {"guest_id": "", "host_id": host}}, sort_keys=True).encode()
+    return {"blob_b64": base64.b64encode(blob).decode(), "sig": "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\nx\n-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"}
+
+
+def update_box(job, staged=STAGED, content=NEW_BIN):
+    box = Box(b"{}", None)
+    box.put(PLAN, json.dumps({"release_id": "agent-0.146.0", "layer": "host", "mode": "agent_update",
+                              "signed": job, "staged": staged}).encode(), 0o600, uid=999)
+    box.put(STAGED, content, 0o755, uid=999)
+    return box
+
+
+def wrapper_calls(box):
+    return [c for c in box.calls if c and c[0] == osapply.SELFUPDATE_WRAPPER and c[1:2] == ["apply"]]
+
+
+class AgentUpdate(unittest.TestCase):
+    """RED-PROOF: make agent_update skip verify_signed → test_a_bad_signature_never_reaches_the_wrapper fails."""
+
+    def test_signed_update_flips_and_burns_the_nonce(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        root_copy = osapply.SELFUPDATE_ROOT_DIR + "/felhom-agent-0.146.0"
+        # the wrapper gets the ROOT-OWNED copy of the bytes that were hashed — never the agent's path (review 2026-10-05)
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box), [[osapply.SELFUPDATE_WRAPPER, "apply", root_copy, sha]])
+        self.assertIn(root_copy, box.writes)
+        self.assertNotIn(root_copy, box.files, "the root copy is removed after the flip")
+        self.assertEqual(box.staged_reads, 1, "the agent's file is read exactly once")
+        self.assertIn("u1", box.nonces)
+        self.assertEqual(rep["agent_update"]["version"], "0.146.0")
+
+    def test_a_staged_file_the_agent_does_not_own_is_refused(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha))
+        box.uids[STAGED] = 0
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R19"), rep)
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box), [])
+
+    def test_a_bad_signature_never_reaches_the_wrapper(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha))
+        box.sig_rc = 1
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertTrue(rep.get("refused"), f"a job whose signature does not verify was NOT refused: {rep}")
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"), rep)
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box), [])
+
+    def test_a_staged_binary_the_signature_does_not_pin_is_refused(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha), content=b"\x7fELF something the agent put there")
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R19"), rep)
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box), [])
+        self.assertNotIn("u1", box.nonces, "a refused job keeps its nonce (the operator fixes the file, not the key)")
+
+    def test_another_staging_path_is_refused(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha), staged="/tmp/felhom-agent-0.146.0")
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R19"), rep)
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box), [])
+
+    def test_a_bundle_job_is_not_an_agent_update(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha, op="agent_config_update"))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"), rep)
+
+    def test_another_hosts_job_and_a_replay_are_refused(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha, host="tester-1-d70be4"))
+        self.assertEqual(run(box)[1]["refused"]["code"], "R3")
+        box2 = update_box(update_job(sha))
+        box2.nonces["u1"] = 1999999999
+        self.assertEqual(run(box2)[1]["refused"]["code"], "R3")
+        self.assertEqual(wrapper_calls(box) + wrapper_calls(box2), [])
+
+    def test_a_failed_flip_keeps_the_nonce(self):
+        sha = hashlib.sha256(NEW_BIN).hexdigest()
+        box = update_box(update_job(sha))
+        orig = box.host
+        box.host = lambda argv, timeout=600, stdin=None: (1, "", "refusing apply: sha mismatch") if argv[:1] == [osapply.SELFUPDATE_WRAPPER] else orig(argv, timeout, stdin)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assertNotIn("u1", box.nonces)
+
+
+
+class SelfupdateWrapperConfinement(unittest.TestCase):
+    """R-861 (v0.146.1): the A/B wrapper takes only felhom-os-apply's root-owned copy, never the agent's staging dir
+    (a file there can be swapped between the wrapper's sha check and its copy). The path check runs before anything
+    is touched, so the real script can be run here unprivileged.
+    RED-PROOF: point ROOT_STAGING back at /var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate → this fails (the path is accepted and the
+    script goes on to `staged file missing`)."""
+
+    def test_the_agents_staging_dir_is_refused(self):
+        import subprocess
+        sha = "0" * 64
+        p = subprocess.run(["sh", str(HERE / "felhom-selfupdate-guarded"), "apply",
+                            "/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/felhom-agent-0.146.1", sha], capture_output=True, text=True)
+        self.assertEqual(p.returncode, 1, p.stderr)
+        self.assertIn("outside /var/lib/felhom-os-apply/agent-update", p.stderr)
+
+
+_sb = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("stepbuild", str(REPO / "scripts" / "build-step-bundle.py"))
+_ss = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("stepbuild", _sb)
+stepbuild = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_ss)
+_sb.exec_module(stepbuild)
+NEW_IN_0146 = {"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", "/var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh",
+               "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh", "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-shared-parent.service"}
+
+
+class StepBundle(unittest.TestCase):
+    """R-880 (agent v0.146.1): an INSTALLED wrapper checks an incoming bundle's paths against its OWN table (R16), so a
+    release that adds paths needs a step bundle: the boxes' current bundle with only felhom-os-apply replaced.
+    RED-PROOF: deliver the full bundle to the old table → R16 (test_the_full_bundle_is_refused_by_an_old_table)."""
+
+    def old_world(self):
+        """The base bundle an older wrapper (no R-861 paths) installed, and that wrapper's table."""
+        full = json.loads(builder.build("0.145.0"))
+        full["files"] = [e for e in full["files"] if e["path"] not in NEW_IN_0146]
+        old_wrapper = b'# the v0.145.0 wrapper stands in here\nBUNDLE_OP = "agent_config_update"\n'
+        for e in full["files"]:
+            if e["path"] == "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply":
+                e["content_b64"], e["sha256"] = base64.b64encode(old_wrapper).decode(), hashlib.sha256(old_wrapper).hexdigest()
+        base = (json.dumps(full, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+        old_dests = {k: v for k, v in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS.items() if k not in NEW_IN_0146}
+        return base, old_dests
+
+    def parse_with_table(self, data, dests, version):
+        saved = osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS
+        osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS = dests
+        try:
+            return osapply.Bundle(osapply.Apply(Box(b"{}", None), "")).parse(data, hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest(), version)
+        finally:
+            osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS = saved
+
+    def test_the_full_bundle_is_refused_by_an_old_table(self):
+        _, old_dests = self.old_world()
+        full = builder.build("0.146.1")
+        with self.assertRaises(osapply.Refused) as cm:
+            self.parse_with_table(full, old_dests, "0.146.1")
+        self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, "R16")
+
+    def test_the_step_bundle_is_accepted_by_the_old_table_and_changes_only_the_wrapper(self):
+        base, old_dests = self.old_world()
+        new_wrapper = (HERE / "felhom-os-apply").read_bytes()
+        step = stepbuild.build_step(base, "0.146.1-step1", new_wrapper)
+        ver, files = self.parse_with_table(step, old_dests, "0.146.1-step1")
+        self.assertEqual(ver, "0.146.1-step1")
+        b, s_ = json.loads(base), json.loads(step)
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(e["path"] for e in b["files"]), sorted(e["path"] for e in s_["files"]), "the paths must not change")
+        changed = [e["path"] for e, f in zip(sorted(b["files"], key=lambda x: x["path"]), sorted(s_["files"], key=lambda x: x["path"]))
+                   if e != f]
+        self.assertEqual(changed, ["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"], "exactly the wrapper changes")
+        installed = dict((d, c) for d, c, *_ in files)
+        self.assertEqual(installed["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"], new_wrapper)
+        # and the NEW wrapper (now installed) knows every path the release's full bundle names
+        self.assertTrue({e["path"] for e in json.loads(builder.build("0.146.1"))["files"]} <= set(osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS))
+
+    def test_a_step_version_must_carry_a_suffix(self):
+        base, _ = self.old_world()
+        with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+            stepbuild.build_step(base, "0.146.1", b"x")
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

configs/test_felhom_crash_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+"""Tests for felhom-crash-guard (`11` §5.9). Temp dirs only; nothing real is touched. Red-proof seam: CRASHGUARD_UNDER_TEST."""
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+_loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("crashguard", os.environ.get("CRASHGUARD_UNDER_TEST", str(HERE / "felhom-crash-guard")))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("crashguard", _loader)
+cg = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+_loader.exec_module(cg)
+
+T0 = 1791115200.0  # 2026-10-04T12:00:00Z
+
+
+class FakeEnv(cg.Env):
+    def __init__(self, d):
+        super().__init__(conf=os.path.join(d, "conf"), state_dir=os.path.join(d, "state"),
+                         panic_path=os.path.join(d, "panic"), uptime_path=os.path.join(d, "uptime"),
+                         boot_id_path=os.path.join(d, "bootid"))
+        self.t = T0
+        self.logs = []
+        open(self.panic_path, "w").write("0\n")
+        open(self.uptime_path, "w").write("20.00 10.00\n")
+
+    def now(self):
+        return self.t
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        self.logs.append(line)
+
+    def panic(self):
+        return int(open(self.panic_path).read())
+
+    def state(self):
+        return json.load(open(os.path.join(self.state_dir, "state.json")))
+
+
+class Guard(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.d = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.e = FakeEnv(self.d.name)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.d.cleanup()
+
+    def crash_boot(self, minutes_later):
+        self.e.t += minutes_later * 60
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)  # no clean-stop before it: an unclean stop
+
+    def clean_reboot(self, minutes_later):
+        cg.main(["x", "clean-stop"], self.e)
+        self.e.t += minutes_later * 60
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+
+    def test_first_boot_is_not_a_crash_and_arms(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        s = self.e.state()
+        self.assertFalse(s["last_boot_unclean"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 10)
+        self.assertTrue(s["armed"])
+
+    def test_clean_reboots_never_count(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        for _ in range(5):
+            self.clean_reboot(1)
+        s = self.e.state()
+        self.assertEqual(s["unclean_boots_in_window"], 0)
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 10)
+
+    def test_third_crash_in_an_hour_leaves_the_box_off(self):
+        # operator's words: "if it crashes 3 times within one hour, it stays off" — after crash 2 the guard trips,
+        # so crash 3 (kernel.panic = 0) does not restart the box.
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 10, "one crash: still restarts")
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        s = self.e.state()
+        self.assertTrue(s["tripped"], s)
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 0, "after the 2nd crash boot the 3rd crash must leave the box off")
+        self.assertIn("2 unclean boots within 60 minutes", s["tripped_reason"])
+
+    def test_crashes_spread_over_more_than_the_window_do_not_trip(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.crash_boot(61)
+        self.assertFalse(self.e.state()["tripped"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 10)
+
+    def test_tripped_stays_tripped_across_boots(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.clean_reboot(30)  # the operator switched it on; even a clean boot keeps the trip
+        self.assertTrue(self.e.state()["tripped"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 0)
+
+    def test_rearms_after_24h_of_normal_running(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.e.t += 23 * 3600
+        cg.main(["x", "check"], self.e)
+        self.assertTrue(self.e.state()["tripped"], "not before 24 h")
+        self.e.t += 3600
+        cg.main(["x", "check"], self.e)
+        s = self.e.state()
+        self.assertFalse(s["tripped"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 10)
+        self.assertIn("timer", s["rearmed_by"])
+
+    def test_operator_rearm_starts_a_fresh_window(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.e.t += 60
+        cg.main(["x", "rearm"], self.e)
+        s = self.e.state()
+        self.assertFalse(s["tripped"])
+        self.assertEqual(s["rearmed_by"], "operator")
+        self.assertEqual(s["unclean_boots_24h"], 2, "the history stays")
+        self.crash_boot(5)
+        self.assertFalse(self.e.state()["tripped"], "one crash after a re-arm must not trip at once")
+
+    def test_config_numbers_are_read(self):
+        open(self.e.conf, "w").write("LIMIT=2\nPANIC_SECONDS=30\n")
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        self.assertEqual(self.e.panic(), 30)
+        self.crash_boot(1)
+        self.assertTrue(self.e.state()["tripped"], "LIMIT=2: the first crash boot trips")
+
+    def test_state_is_world_readable_for_the_agent(self):
+        cg.main(["x", "boot"], self.e)
+        mode = os.stat(os.path.join(self.e.state_dir, "state.json")).st_mode & 0o777
+        self.assertEqual(mode, 0o644)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py

@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Tests for felhom-priv-apply (R-861, `03` §3.1). An in-memory host plays the files; nothing real is written or run.
+Each refusal rule has a test that feeds it the ATTACK it exists for; each accepted shape is a file the agent really
+renders (the Go contract tests feed the live renderers too). Red-proof: audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/.
+
+Run: python3 configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py   (also run by internal/privapply's Go test)
+"""
+import sys
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import pathlib
+import unittest
+
+HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+_loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("privapply", os.environ.get("PRIVAPPLY_UNDER_TEST", str(HERE / "felhom-priv-apply")))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("privapply", _loader)
+pa = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+_loader.exec_module(pa)
+
+AGENT_UID = 999
+
+
+class FakeHost:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.src, self.dest, self.logs, self.writes = {}, {}, [], []
+        self.owner, self.kind = {}, {}
+
+    def stage(self, path, text, uid=AGENT_UID, kind="file"):
+        self.src[path] = text.encode() if isinstance(text, str) else text
+        self.owner[path], self.kind[path] = uid, kind
+
+    def agent_uid(self):
+        return AGENT_UID
+
+    def read_source(self, path):
+        # mirrors Host.read_source's refusals: absent, not a regular file (a symlink is refused by O_NOFOLLOW), owner, size
+        if path not in self.src:
+            raise pa.Refused("P1", f"cannot open the staged file {path}")
+        if self.kind[path] != "file":
+            raise pa.Refused("P1", f"{path} is not a regular file")
+        if self.owner[path] != AGENT_UID:
+            raise pa.Refused("P1", f"{path} is not owned by felhom-agent")
+        if len(self.src[path]) > pa.MAX_BYTES:
+            raise pa.Refused("P1", f"{path} is larger than {pa.MAX_BYTES} bytes")
+        return self.src[path]
+
+    def read_dest(self, path):
+        return self.dest.get(path)
+
+    def install(self, dest, data, mode):
+        self.writes.append((dest, mode))
+        self.dest[dest] = data
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        self.logs.append(line)
+
+
+LOCAL_UNIT = """# Managed by felhom-agent — do not edit by hand.
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom storage mount 91d2dc2d-2d28-4929-9bdd-3e11fa2f41ae
+After=local-fs-pre.target
+
+[Mount]
+What=/dev/disk/by-uuid/91d2dc2d-2d28-4929-9bdd-3e11fa2f41ae
+Where=/mnt/hdd_1
+Type=ext4
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+"""
+NET_MOUNT = """# felhom network storage — do not edit by hand.
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom network storage media (nfs)
+
+[Mount]
+What=nas.lan:/volume1/media
+Where=/mnt/felhom-drives/media
+Type=nfs4
+Options=vers=4.1,soft,timeo=50,retrans=2,noatime,_netdev,retry=0,nosuid,nodev
+"""
+NET_AUTOMOUNT = """# felhom network storage — do not edit by hand.
+[Unit]
+Description=Felhom network storage automount media (nfs)
+
+[Automount]
+Where=/mnt/felhom-drives/media
+TimeoutIdleSec=600
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+"""
+NET_NAME = "mnt-felhom\\x2ddrives-media.mount"
+DNS_BASE = """# felhom split-horizon resolver — host base config (agent-managed; DO NOT EDIT)
+bind-interfaces
+listen-address=192.168.0.104
+listen-address=127.0.0.1
+no-resolv
+server=1.1.1.1
+server=9.9.9.9
+"""
+DNS_GUEST = """# felhom split-horizon DNS — customer demo-hp (agent-managed; DO NOT EDIT)
+local=/enkisfelhom.hu/
+address=/enkisfelhom.hu/192.168.0.138
+"""
+K = "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8="  # base64 of 32 bytes
+WG = f"""# felhom offsite tunnel — agent-managed (S3); DO NOT EDIT
+[Interface]
+PrivateKey = {K}
+Address = 10.77.0.3/32
+MTU = 1280
+
+[Peer]
+PublicKey = {K}
+Endpoint = 49.12.1.2:51820
+AllowedIPs = 10.77.0.1/32, 10.77.0.250/32
+PersistentKeepalive = 25
+"""
+KEYLINE = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIL8z0qCNgA3x2xxAB0Qj5ro8waFjGZ8Ta/sWB63tlLw+ felhom-op-1\n"
+
+
+def run(host, *argv):
+    return pa.main(list(argv), host=host)
+
+
+class Accepts(unittest.TestCase):
+    """What the agent really writes is accepted and installed, root-owned, at the fixed destination."""
+
+    def test_local_unit_installed(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/mnt-hdd_1.mount", LOCAL_UNIT)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "unit", "mnt-hdd_1.mount"), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(h.writes, [("/etc/systemd/system/mnt-hdd_1.mount", 0o644)])
+
+    def test_local_unit_without_type(self):  # the N100's unit has no Type= (autodetect)
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/mnt-hdd_1.mount", LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Type=ext4\n", ""))
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "unit", "mnt-hdd_1.mount"), 0)
+
+    def test_network_pair(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/" + NET_NAME, NET_MOUNT)
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/mnt-felhom\\x2ddrives-media.automount", NET_AUTOMOUNT)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "unit", NET_NAME), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "unit", "mnt-felhom\\x2ddrives-media.automount"), 0)
+
+    def test_identical_is_not_rewritten(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/mnt-hdd_1.mount", LOCAL_UNIT)
+        h.dest["/etc/systemd/system/mnt-hdd_1.mount"] = LOCAL_UNIT.encode()
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "unit", "mnt-hdd_1.mount"), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(h.writes, [])
+
+    def test_dnsmasq_both_dropins(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/tmp/felhom-resolver-123.conf", DNS_BASE)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-123.conf", "felhom-resolver-base.conf"), 0)
+        h.stage("/tmp/felhom-resolver-124.conf", DNS_GUEST)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-124.conf", "felhom-demo-hp.conf"), 0)
+        self.assertIn(("/etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-demo-hp.conf", 0o644), h.writes)
+
+    def test_wg_installed_0600(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.WG_SRC, WG)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "wg"), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(h.writes, [(pa.WG_DEST, 0o600)])
+
+    def test_sshd_template_and_key(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.SSHD_SRC, pa.render_sshd(8822))
+        h.stage(pa.KEY_SRC, KEYLINE)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "sshd-config"), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "sshd-key"), 0)
+        h.stage(pa.KEY_SRC, "")  # clearing the operator login is allowed
+        self.assertEqual(run(h, "sshd-key"), 0)
+
+    def test_escape_matches_systemd(self):
+        self.assertEqual(pa.systemd_escape_path("/mnt/felhom-drives/media"), "mnt-felhom\\x2ddrives-media")
+        self.assertEqual(pa.systemd_escape_path("/mnt/hdd_1"), "mnt-hdd_1")
+        self.assertEqual(pa.systemd_escape_path("/mnt/.x"), "mnt-.x")  # a dot is escaped only at the very start
+
+
+class Refuses(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Each rule, with the attack it exists for. Nothing is written on a refusal."""
+
+    def refused(self, h, argv, rule):
+        rc = run(h, *argv)
+        self.assertIn(rc, (2, 3), f"{argv} was accepted")
+        self.assertEqual(h.writes, [], f"{argv} wrote something")
+        self.assertTrue(any(f"[{rule}]" in l for l in h.logs), f"{argv}: rule {rule} not logged: {h.logs}")
+
+    def unit(self, text, name="mnt-hdd_1.mount"):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/" + name, text)
+        return h, ["unit", name]
+
+    def test_U1_name_outside_mnt(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        self.refused(h, ["unit", "etc-sudoers.d.mount"], "U1")
+        self.refused(h, ["unit", "../../etc/x.mount"], "U1")
+        self.refused(h, ["unit", "mnt-x.service"], "U1")
+
+    def test_U2_service_section(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT + "\n[Service]\nExecStart=/bin/sh -c id\n"), "U2")
+
+    def test_U2_wants_starts_another_unit(self):  # review 2026-10-05: Wants=reboot.target would reboot the host
+        for extra in ("Wants=reboot.target", "Requires=felhom-agent-rollback.service", "Before=pve-guests.service"):
+            self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("After=local-fs-pre.target", "After=local-fs-pre.target\n" + extra)), "U2")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("After=local-fs-pre.target", "After=poweroff.target")), "U2")
+
+    def test_U2_continuation_line(self):
+        t = LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Description=Felhom storage mount 91d2dc2d-2d28-4929-9bdd-3e11fa2f41ae",
+                               "Description=Felhom storage mount \\")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(t), "U2")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("# Managed by felhom-agent", "# comment \\\n# Managed by felhom-agent")), "U2")
+
+    def test_U2_unknown_key(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Type=ext4", "Type=ext4\nDirectoryMode=0777")), "U2")
+
+    def test_U3_bind_over_sudoers_dir(self):
+        # the R-861 attack: mount an agent-owned directory over /etc/sudoers.d
+        t = LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Where=/mnt/hdd_1", "Where=/etc/sudoers.d")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(t, "mnt-hdd_1.mount"), "U3")
+
+    def test_U3_name_must_match_where(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Where=/mnt/hdd_1", "Where=/mnt/other")), "U3")
+
+    def test_U3_traversal_in_where(self):
+        # the name passes U1 and equals the escaped Where — ONLY the Where rule stops a mount at /mnt/../etc = /etc
+        self.assertEqual(pa.systemd_escape_path("/mnt/../etc") + ".mount", "mnt-..-etc.mount")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Where=/mnt/hdd_1", "Where=/mnt/../etc"), "mnt-..-etc.mount"), "U3")
+
+    def test_U4_what_is_an_agent_directory(self):
+        t = LOCAL_UNIT.replace("What=/dev/disk/by-uuid/91d2dc2d-2d28-4929-9bdd-3e11fa2f41ae", "What=/var/lib/felhom-agent/evil")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(t), "U4")
+
+    def test_U4_tmpfs(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Type=ext4", "Type=tmpfs")), "U4")
+
+    def test_U5_bind_option(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Type=ext4", "Type=ext4\nOptions=bind")), "U5")
+
+    def test_U5_network_without_nosuid(self):
+        t = NET_MOUNT.replace(",nosuid,nodev", "")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(t, NET_NAME), "U5")
+
+    def test_U5_suid_option(self):
+        self.refused(*self.unit(LOCAL_UNIT.replace("Type=ext4", "Type=ext4\nOptions=suid,dev")), "U5")
+
+    def test_U3_network_outside_drives(self):
+        t = NET_MOUNT.replace("/mnt/felhom-drives/media", "/mnt/media")
+        self.refused(*self.unit(t, "mnt-media.mount"), "U3")
+
+    def test_D1_dhcp_script(self):  # runs as root
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage("/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", DNS_BASE + "dhcp-script=/var/lib/felhom-agent/x.sh\n")
+        self.refused(h, ["dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", "felhom-x.conf"], "D1")
+
+    def test_D1_conf_dir_and_log_file(self):
+        for extra in ("conf-dir=/var/lib/felhom-agent\n", "log-facility=/etc/sudoers.d/x\n", "user=root\n"):
+            h = FakeHost()
+            h.stage("/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", DNS_GUEST + extra)
+            self.refused(h, ["dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", "felhom-x.conf"], "D1")
+
+    def test_D2_paths(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        self.refused(h, ["dnsmasq", "/etc/shadow", "felhom-x.conf"], "D2")
+        self.refused(h, ["dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf", "../sudoers.d/x.conf"], "D2")
+
+    def test_W1_postup(self):  # wg-quick runs PostUp as root
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.WG_SRC, WG.replace("MTU = 1280", "MTU = 1280\nPostUp = /bin/sh -c id"))
+        self.refused(h, ["wg"], "W1")
+
+    def test_W2_values(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.WG_SRC, WG.replace("AllowedIPs = 10.77.0.1/32, 10.77.0.250/32", "AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0"))
+        self.refused(h, ["wg"], "W2")
+
+    def test_S1_sshd_strictmodes(self):  # an AuthorizedKeysFile the agent owns + StrictModes no = root login
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.SSHD_SRC, pa.render_sshd(8822) + "StrictModes no\n")
+        self.refused(h, ["sshd-config"], "S1")
+        h2 = FakeHost()
+        h2.stage(pa.SSHD_SRC, pa.render_sshd(8822).replace("/etc/felhom-sshd/authorized_keys/%u", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/k"))
+        self.refused(h2, ["sshd-config"], "S1")
+
+    def test_S1_port_22(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.SSHD_SRC, pa.render_sshd(22))
+        self.refused(h, ["sshd-config"], "S1")
+
+    def test_S2_key_options_and_two_keys(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.KEY_SRC, 'command="/bin/sh" ' + KEYLINE)
+        self.refused(h, ["sshd-key"], "S2")
+        h2 = FakeHost()
+        h2.stage(pa.KEY_SRC, KEYLINE + KEYLINE)
+        self.refused(h2, ["sshd-key"], "S2")
+
+    def test_P1_symlink_owner_size(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        h.stage(pa.WG_SRC, WG, kind="symlink")
+        self.refused(h, ["wg"], "P1")
+        h2 = FakeHost()
+        h2.stage(pa.WG_SRC, WG, uid=0)
+        self.refused(h2, ["wg"], "P1")
+        h3 = FakeHost()
+        h3.stage(pa.WG_SRC, "#" * (pa.MAX_BYTES + 1))
+        self.refused(h3, ["wg"], "P1")
+
+    def test_A1_usage(self):
+        h = FakeHost()
+        self.refused(h, ["install", "/etc/shadow"], "A1")
+        self.refused(h, ["wg", "/etc/shadow"], "A1")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)

internal/backup/r874_first_eval_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package backup
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/reconcile"
+)
+
+// R-874 (v0.145.0). THE MEASURED SHAPE (Part F spike, Tester 2): power-on sessions of ~1.5 h and ~5 min against a
+// 6 h evaluation ticker that restarts at every start — no restore-test ever evaluated. Now the first evaluation runs
+// FirstEval after start.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the first-evaluation timer in Run (back to the bare ticker) → "no evaluation within".
+func TestR874_FirstEvaluationAfterStart(t *testing.T) {
+	var picks int32
+	s := NewScheduler(SchedulerOptions{
+		Runner: &fakeRTRunner{res: reconcile.RestoreTestResult{Pass: true, Verified: "boot+running"}},
+		Pick: func(context.Context) (string, error) {
+			atomic.AddInt32(&picks, 1)
+			return fmt.Sprintf("local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-%d.tar.zst", atomic.LoadInt32(&picks)), nil
+		},
+		Store: NewStore(), Spec: (&specSpy{}).build,
+		Cadence: 6 * time.Hour, FirstEval: 30 * time.Millisecond, Logger: quiet(),
+	})
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { _ = s.Run(ctx); close(done) }()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
+	for atomic.LoadInt32(&picks) == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	cancel()
+	<-done
+	if atomic.LoadInt32(&picks) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no evaluation within 3 s of start (FirstEval 30 ms) — a box with short sessions never gets a restore-test")
+	}
+}
+
+// The earned restraint stays: an agent that restarts before FirstEval never evaluates (a crash loop does not
+// hammer a failing tier).
+func TestR874_CrashLoopNeverEvaluates(t *testing.T) {
+	var picks int32
+	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ { // five quick "restarts"
+		s := NewScheduler(SchedulerOptions{
+			Runner: &fakeRTRunner{res: reconcile.RestoreTestResult{Pass: true}},
+			Pick:   func(context.Context) (string, error) { atomic.AddInt32(&picks, 1); return "x", nil },
+			Store:  NewStore(), Spec: (&specSpy{}).build,
+			Cadence: 6 * time.Hour, FirstEval: 200 * time.Millisecond, Logger: quiet(),
+		})
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Millisecond)
+		_ = s.Run(ctx)
+		cancel()
+	}
+	if n := atomic.LoadInt32(&picks); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a restart before FirstEval evaluated %d time(s)", n)
+	}
+	if DefaultFirstEval != 30*time.Minute {
+		t.Fatalf("DefaultFirstEval = %s, the documented 30 min", DefaultFirstEval)
+	}
+}

internal/backup/schedule.go

@@ -60,12 +60,21 @@ type Scheduler struct {
 
 	// R-85 tier rotation. All optional: without them the scheduler behaves exactly as before
 	// (single tier via `pick`), which keeps every existing caller and test working untouched.
-	tiers    []string          // configured tier target ids, primary first
-	tierPick TierPicker        // newest archive on a named tier
-	rtState  *RestoreTestState // persisted last-successful-per-tier (drives oldest-first)
-	inFlight *InFlight         // shared with the backup path — Scenario F
+	tiers     []string          // configured tier target ids, primary first
+	tierPick  TierPicker        // newest archive on a named tier
+	rtState   *RestoreTestState // persisted last-successful-per-tier (drives oldest-first)
+	inFlight  *InFlight         // shared with the backup path — Scenario F
+	firstEval time.Duration     // R-874: the first evaluation after start
 }
 
+// DefaultFirstEval (R-874): the first due-ness evaluation runs 30 minutes after the agent starts, then every
+// cadence. MEASURED need (2026-10-05 Part F spike): a box whose power-on sessions are all shorter than the 6 h
+// interval (Tester 2: ~1.5 h and ~5 min) NEVER evaluated, because the ticker restarts at each start. 30 minutes
+// keeps the earned restraint below — a crash-looping agent restarts far more often than that and still never
+// evaluates — while a box that stays on for half an hour gets its due test. Pinned by
+// TestR874_FirstEvaluationAfterStart and TestR874_CrashLoopNeverEvaluates.
+const DefaultFirstEval = 30 * time.Minute
+
 // SchedulerOptions configures a Scheduler.
 type SchedulerOptions struct {
 	Runner RestoreTestRunner
@@ -81,6 +90,8 @@ type SchedulerOptions struct {
 	// 0 → no settle requirement (any archive is a candidate).
 	Settle time.Duration
 	Logger *slog.Logger
+	// FirstEval (R-874, v0.145.0) is when the FIRST evaluation runs after start; 0 → DefaultFirstEval.
+	FirstEval time.Duration
 
 	// R-85 (all optional — omit for the pre-R-85 single-tier behaviour):
 	// Tiers are the configured tier target ids (primary first); TierPick resolves an archive on a
@@ -110,6 +121,12 @@ func NewScheduler(opts SchedulerOptions) *Scheduler {
 		tierPick: opts.TierPick,
 		rtState:  opts.State,
 		inFlight: opts.InFlight,
+		firstEval: func() time.Duration {
+			if opts.FirstEval > 0 {
+				return opts.FirstEval
+			}
+			return DefaultFirstEval
+		}(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -120,8 +137,9 @@ func NewScheduler(opts SchedulerOptions) *Scheduler {
 // trigger any more: its phase is the process's uptime, and agent deploys reset it, which is exactly
 // the defect R-86 removes. What decides that a test happens is `EvaluateDue`.
 //
-// It still does NOT evaluate immediately on start — the first evaluation is one interval in. That
-// is an EARNED restraint, kept deliberately: a restore is heavy, agent restarts are routine, and a
+// It still does NOT evaluate immediately on start. v0.145.0 (R-874): the first evaluation is
+// firstEval (30 min) in, then every interval — it was one full interval in, which a box with short
+// power-on sessions never reached. The restraint itself is EARNED and kept: a restore is heavy, agent restarts are routine, and a
 // crash-loop that evaluated at start would hammer a permanently-failing tier as fast as it could
 // restart. Due-ness does not expire while we wait, so the only cost is up to one interval of
 // latency on a tier that just became due. On-demand runs use `--selftest=restore-test`.
@@ -135,6 +153,16 @@ func (s *Scheduler) Run(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}
 	s.logger.Info("backup: restore-test scheduler starting (per-archive due-check)",
 		"eval_interval", s.cadence, "settle", s.settle)
+	first := time.NewTimer(s.firstEval)
+	defer first.Stop()
+	select {
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		s.logger.Info("backup: restore-test scheduler shutting down", "reason", ctx.Err())
+		return nil
+	case <-first.C:
+		s.logger.Info("backup: restore-test first evaluation after start (R-874)", "after", s.firstEval)
+		s.tick(ctx)
+	}
 	t := time.NewTicker(s.cadence)
 	defer t.Stop()
 	for {

internal/backup/store.go

@@ -25,7 +25,11 @@ import (
 // merges the two — see hub.ProvenRestoreTestReporter. This store remains the ONLY place a FAILURE is
 // recorded, and that asymmetry is deliberate: a failing tier stays due and is retried, so a lost
 // failure heals itself, while a lost success leaves the system quietly less tested than it believes.
-// Backups are unaffected — their freshness has a ground truth on the storage (R-84).
+// Backups are NOT unaffected (corrected 2026-10-05, R-348): byTarget is in memory too, so after a restart the
+// reported backup LIST reads 0 until the next backup of each tier runs (daily local, weekly offsite) — measured
+// 2026-08-20, two consecutive host-reports with `0 backups` while `pvesm list` showed archives on both tiers. What
+// is unaffected is the hub's VERDICT: it looks back 7 days over stored reports (felhom.eu hub/internal/monitor/
+// deadline.go backupEvidenceLookback) and the storage stays the ground truth (R-84).
 type Store struct {
 	mu       sync.Mutex
 	byTarget map[string]hub.Backup // latest backup per target id

internal/capability/manifest.go

@@ -81,10 +81,8 @@ var manifest = []Capability{
 	{"drives-mkdir-sub", "per-drive stable dir create", "/usr/bin/mkdir", []string{"-p", "/mnt/felhom-drives/felhom-usb"}, false, ""},
 	{"drives-mkdir-data", "felhom-data namespace create", "/usr/bin/mkdir", []string{"-p", "/mnt/felhom-usb/felhom-data"}, false, ""},
 	{"drives-chown-data", "felhom-data guest-root chown", "/usr/bin/chown", []string{"100000:100000", "/mnt/felhom-usb/felhom-data"}, false, ""},
-	{"parent-script-install", "shared-parent boot script install", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-m", "0755", "--", "/tmp/felhom-shared-parent-123456789.sh", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh"}, false, ""},
-	{"parent-unit-install", "shared-parent boot unit install", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-m", "0644", "--", "/tmp/felhom-shared-parent-123456789.service", "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-shared-parent.service"}, false, ""},
 	{"parent-unit-enable", "shared-parent boot-persistence enable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"enable", "felhom-shared-parent.service"}, false, ""},
-	{"parent-bind-mp8", "parent bind into guest at provision", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "-mp8", "/mnt/felhom-drives"}, false, ""},
+	{"parent-bind-mp8", "parent bind into guest at provision", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "-mp8", "/mnt/felhom-drives,mp=/mnt/felhom-drives"}, false, ""},
 
 	// ---- Disk inspect / format gate (Critical: the data-bearing classifier + format) ----
 	{"disk-blkid", "disk data-bearing classify (format gate)", "/usr/sbin/blkid", []string{"-p", "-o", "export", "/dev/sda"}, true, ""},
@@ -95,11 +93,11 @@ var manifest = []Capability{
 	{"disk-lvs", "thin-pool usage read", "/usr/sbin/lvs", []string{"--reportformat", "json", "--units", "b", "-o", "lv_name,data_percent,metadata_percent", "--", "pve/data"}, false, ""},
 
 	// ---- Storage mount units (watchdog re-mount) ----
-	{"mount-unit-install", "fs-UUID mount unit install", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0644", "--", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/units/felhom-x.mount", "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-x.mount"}, false, ""},
+	{"mount-unit-install", "fs-UUID mount unit install (root content check, R-861)", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", []string{"unit", "mnt-felhom\\x2dx.mount"}, false, ""},
 	{"mount-daemon-reload", "systemd reload after unit write", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"daemon-reload"}, false, ""},
-	{"mount-unit-enable", "mount unit enable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"enable", "--now", "--", "felhom-x.mount"}, false, ""},
-	{"mount-unit-disable", "mount unit disable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"disable", "--", "felhom-x.mount"}, false, ""},
-	{"mount-unit-stop", "mount unit stop", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"stop", "--", "felhom-x.mount"}, false, ""},
+	{"mount-unit-enable", "mount unit enable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"enable", "--now", "--", "mnt-felhom\\x2dx.mount"}, false, ""},
+	{"mount-unit-disable", "mount unit disable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"disable", "--", "mnt-felhom\\x2dx.mount"}, false, ""},
+	{"mount-unit-stop", "mount unit stop", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"stop", "--", "mnt-felhom\\x2dx.mount"}, false, ""},
 
 	// ---- Network storage re-arm + cleanup (CAMPAIGN-3 F10/F1) ----
 	{"netmount-reset-failed", "NAS automount re-arm after start-limit (F10)", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"reset-failed", "--", "mnt-felhom\\x2ddrives-media.automount"}, false, ""},
@@ -110,19 +108,21 @@ var manifest = []Capability{
 
 	// ---- Provisioning back-half ----
 	{"provision-chown", "bootstrap mount guest-root chown", "/usr/bin/chown", []string{"-R", "100000:100000", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/9201"}, false, ""},
-	{"provision-config-mount", "bootstrap config bind mount", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "-mp0", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/9201"}, false, ""},
+	{"provision-config-mount", "bootstrap config bind mount", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "-mp0", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/9201/bootstrap,mp=/etc/felhom-bootstrap,ro=1"}, false, ""},
 	{"provision-onboot", "customer guest autostart (onboot)", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "-onboot", "1"}, false, ""},
 
 	// ---- Pre-start self-heal hook + guest lifecycle ----
-	{"guesthook-install", "pre-start hook snippet install", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-m", "0755", "--", "/tmp/felhom-guest-hook-123456789.sh", "/var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh"}, false, ""},
 	{"guesthook-register", "pre-start hook register", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "--hookscript", "local:snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh"}, false, ""},
 	{"guesthook-delete-mp", "dead mountpoint slot delete (C1 net)", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"set", "9201", "--delete", "mp0"}, false, ""},
 	{"guest-reboot", "enroll activate-binds reboot", "/usr/sbin/pct", []string{"reboot", "9201"}, false, ""},
 
 	// ---- LAN split-horizon resolver (dnsmasq) ----
 	{"dnsmasq-install", "dnsmasq package install", "/usr/bin/apt-get", []string{"install", "-y", "-q", "dnsmasq"}, false, ""},
-	{"dnsmasq-write", "dnsmasq drop-in write", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-m", "0644", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-x.conf", "/etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-x.conf"}, false, ""},
+	{"dnsmasq-write", "dnsmasq drop-in write (root content check, R-861)", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", []string{"dnsmasq", "/tmp/felhom-resolver-123456789.conf", "felhom-x.conf"}, false, ""},
 	{"dnsmasq-enable", "dnsmasq enable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"enable", "--now", "dnsmasq"}, false, ""},
+
+	// ---- OS updates, guest fast lane (`11` §5.4.1; the wrapper holds every rule) ----
+	{"osapply-run", "OS update wrapper (guest fast lane)", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply", []string{"--plan", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-x.json"}, false, ""},
 	{"dnsmasq-reload", "dnsmasq reload", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"reload", "dnsmasq"}, false, ""},
 	{"dnsmasq-restart", "dnsmasq restart (LAN-DNS self-heal)", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"restart", "dnsmasq"}, false, ""},
 	{"dnsmasq-rm", "dnsmasq drop-in remove (decommission)", "/usr/bin/rm", []string{"-f", "/etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-x.conf"}, false, ""},
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ var manifest = []Capability{
 	// (one-time bootstrap) and disable (revocation, a deliberate teardown) stay non-critical. The
 	// handshake read is the ONLY wg invocation (never `dump`). ----
 	{"wg-tools-install", "wireguard-tools package install", "/usr/bin/apt-get", []string{"install", "-y", "-q", "wireguard-tools"}, false, ""},
-	{"wg-conf-install", "wg-felhom conf install", "/usr/bin/install", []string{"-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0600", "--", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/wg/wg-felhom.conf", "/etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf"}, true, ""},
+	{"wg-conf-install", "wg-felhom conf install (root content check, R-861)", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply", []string{"wg"}, true, ""},
 	{"wg-enable", "wg-quick@wg-felhom enable", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"enable", "--now", "wg-quick@wg-felhom"}, true, ""},
 	{"wg-restart", "wg-quick@wg-felhom restart (conf change)", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"restart", "wg-quick@wg-felhom"}, true, ""},
 	{"wg-disable", "wg-quick@wg-felhom disable (revocation)", "/usr/bin/systemctl", []string{"disable", "--now", "wg-quick@wg-felhom"}, false, ""},
@@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ var manifest = []Capability{
 	// operator-driven op, not a steady-state serving path — a degraded grant means "can't
 	// self-update" (fall back to a manual SSH deploy), not a serving outage. The apply repr uses a
 	// staging-dir path + a placeholder sha (list-mode never runs it). ----
-	{"selfupdate-apply", "agent self-update apply (A/B flip)", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded", []string{"apply", "/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/felhom-agent-0.0.0", "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"}, false, ""},
 	{"selfupdate-commit", "agent self-update commit", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded", []string{"commit"}, false, ""},
 	{"selfupdate-rollback", "agent self-update rollback", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded", []string{"rollback"}, false, ""},
 }

internal/capability/manifest_test.go

@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ func parseSudoersEntries(t *testing.T, text string) []string {
 	var cur strings.Builder
 	for i := 0; i < len(raw); i++ {
 		c := raw[i]
-		if c == '\\' && i+1 < len(raw) {
-			cur.WriteByte(raw[i+1]) // unescape: keep the next char literally (\, → , ; \: → :)
+		if c == '\\' && i+1 < len(raw) && strings.IndexByte(",:=", raw[i+1]) >= 0 {
+			// unescape the sudoers grammar escapes only (\, → , ; \: → : ; \= → =). Every other backslash is kept: in
+			// a regex entry (R-861) `\.` `\{` `\\` mean exactly what sudo's regex engine reads.
+			cur.WriteByte(raw[i+1])
 			i++
 			continue
 		}
@@ -108,10 +110,24 @@ func globToRegex(pat string) *regexp.Regexp {
 	return regexp.MustCompile(b.String())
 }
 
+// entryRegex compiles one sudoers entry. R-861 (v0.146.0): an entry whose ARGUMENTS are a sudo regular expression
+// (`^...$`, sudo >= 1.9.10) is matched as one — the binary literally, then a space, then the arguments joined by spaces
+// (sudo's own rule). Every other entry is an fnmatch glob (globToRegex). The parser has already undone the sudoers
+// escapes (`\,` `\:` `\=` `\\`), which leaves a valid RE2 pattern.
+func entryRegex(e string) *regexp.Regexp {
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(e, ' '); i > 0 {
+		bin, args := e[:i], e[i+1:]
+		if strings.HasPrefix(args, "^") && strings.HasSuffix(args, "$") {
+			return regexp.MustCompile("^" + regexp.QuoteMeta(bin) + " " + args[1:])
+		}
+	}
+	return globToRegex(e)
+}
+
 // matchesAny reports whether cmdline matches at least one sudoers entry pattern.
 func matchesAny(cmdline string, entries []string) bool {
 	for _, e := range entries {
-		if globToRegex(e).MatchString(cmdline) {
+		if entryRegex(e).MatchString(cmdline) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}

internal/capability/r861_injection_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package capability
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the attacks the old globs let through, each as the exact argv a compromised agent would
+// send. NONE may match any entry of the new sudoers. The same list ran against the REAL sudo 1.9.16 (a throwaway
+// container, and `sudo -l -U felhom-agent` on both demo boxes after the bundle): audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: run this list against the v0.145.0 sudoers (git show v0.145.0:configs/felhom-agent.sudoers) → most of
+// these MATCH (recorded in the same evidence folder).
+var r861Injections = []string{
+	// a raw host disk for a guest (pct options smuggled through a vmid glob)
+	"/usr/sbin/pct set 9201 --dev0 /dev/sda -onboot 1",
+	"/usr/sbin/pct set 9201 --dev0 /dev/sda -mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives",
+	"/usr/sbin/pct set 9201 --delete mp0 --dev0 /dev/sda",
+	"/usr/sbin/pct set 9201 -mp0 /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/9201/bootstrap,mp=/x --dev0 /dev/sda",
+	// a bind mount over /etc through traversal
+	"/usr/bin/mount --bind /mnt/../var/lib/felhom-agent/x/felhom-data /mnt/felhom-drives/x",
+	"/usr/bin/mount --bind /mnt/a/felhom-data /mnt/felhom-drives/../../etc/sudoers.d",
+	"/usr/bin/umount /mnt/felhom-drives/x /",
+	"/usr/bin/chown 100000:100000 /mnt/a/felhom-data /etc/shadow",
+	"/usr/bin/mkdir -p /mnt/felhom-drives/x /etc/systemd/system/evil.mount",
+	// root-read files the agent writes: gone as `install` lines
+	"/usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/units/x.mount /etc/systemd/system/etc-sudoers.d.mount",
+	"/usr/bin/install -m 0755 -- /tmp/felhom-guest-hook-1.sh /var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh",
+	"/usr/bin/install -m 0755 -- /tmp/felhom-shared-parent-1.sh /usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh",
+	"/usr/bin/install -m 0644 /tmp/felhom-resolver-1.conf /etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-x.conf",
+	"/usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0600 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/wg/wg-felhom.conf /etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf",
+	"/usr/bin/install -o root -g root -m 0644 -- /var/lib/felhom-agent/felhom-sshd/sshd_config /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config",
+	// the unsigned binary flip
+	"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply /var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate/felhom-agent-9.9.9 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+	// enabling or removing anything that is not ours
+	"/usr/bin/systemctl enable --now -- mnt-hdd_1.mount evil.service",
+	"/usr/bin/systemctl enable --now -- etc-sudoers.d.mount",
+	"/usr/bin/rm -f /etc/systemd/system/mnt-felhomx /etc/passwd",
+	"/usr/bin/rm -f /etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-x.conf /etc/shadow",
+	"/usr/bin/rmdir /mnt/felhom-drives/x /etc",
+	// nftables commands chained after a set element
+	"/usr/sbin/nft add element inet felhom_oob operator_ips { 10.77.0.250 } ; flush ruleset",
+	// extra options to read-only tools
+	"/usr/sbin/smartctl -a -j /dev/sda -s off",
+	"/usr/sbin/lvs --reportformat json --units b -o lv_name,data_percent,metadata_percent -- pve/data --config x",
+	"/usr/sbin/pct exec 9201 --keep-env -- docker inspect -f x felhom-controller",
+	"/usr/sbin/pct unlock 9201 --whatever",
+	// the checker with a path it must never take
+	"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply unit ../../etc/x.mount",
+	"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply dnsmasq /etc/shadow felhom-x.conf",
+	"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply wg /etc/shadow",
+}
+
+func TestSudoersRefusesTheR861Injections(t *testing.T) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(sudoersPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	entries := parseSudoersEntries(t, string(data))
+	for _, c := range r861Injections {
+		if matchesAny(c, entries) {
+			t.Errorf("the sudoers still allows: %s", c)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/escrow/identity.go

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
+	"syscall"
 )
 
 // Slice 10D.1 — IDENTITY escrow. The K-escrow (above) wraps the PBS *encryption key* via the
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ func HashResticPassword(pw string) string {
 // (non-empty) but NEVER logged by callers — log the field NAME only (mirrors AttachWGKey). A missing file
 // is a clean no-attach (pre-fork-4 behavior, byte-compatible bundle).
 func AttachResticPassword(b *IdentityBundle, stagePath string) (bool, error) {
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(stagePath)
+	raw, err := readStagedNoFollow(stagePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
 			return false, nil
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ func AttachResticPassword(b *IdentityBundle, stagePath string) (bool, error) {
 // no-attach (pre-S3 behavior, byte-compatible bundle); a corrupt one is an error (the operator
 // should know their escrow would silently lack a live identity).
 func AttachWGKey(b *IdentityBundle, keyPath string) (bool, error) {
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
+	raw, err := readStagedNoFollow(keyPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
 			return false, nil
@@ -180,3 +182,47 @@ func UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx context.Context, blob []byte, recoveryCode string)
 	}
 	return b, nil
 }
+
+// readStagedNoFollow reads a file the AGENT staged, for the escrow ceremony that runs as ROOT (FELHOM_ESCROW). R-861
+// (agent v0.146.0/0.146.1): both files live in the agent's own directory, so a compromised agent could put a SYMLINK
+// there — at the file OR at any directory on the way (review 2026-10-05) — to a root-only file, and the root ceremony
+// would seal that file into the blob and hand the agent R. So the path is walked from "/" one component at a time with
+// openat(O_NOFOLLOW): no symlink anywhere, the last a regular file of at most 4 KiB. Once a directory is open, renaming
+// it does not redirect the walk. A missing file keeps its os.IsNotExist meaning. Pinned by TestAttach_RefusesASymlink*.
+func readStagedNoFollow(path string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is not an absolute path", path)
+	}
+	clean := filepath.Clean(path)
+	parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(clean, "/"), "/")
+	dirfd, err := syscall.Open("/", syscall.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscall.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for i, part := range parts {
+		last := i == len(parts)-1
+		flags := syscall.O_RDONLY | syscall.O_NOFOLLOW | syscall.O_CLOEXEC
+		if !last {
+			flags |= syscall.O_DIRECTORY
+		}
+		fd, err := syscall.Openat(dirfd, part, flags, 0)
+		syscall.Close(dirfd)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "open", Path: clean, Err: err}
+		}
+		dirfd = fd
+	}
+	f := os.NewFile(uintptr(dirfd), clean)
+	defer f.Close()
+	fi, err := f.Stat()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !fi.Mode().IsRegular() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is not a regular file", path)
+	}
+	if fi.Size() > 4096 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is larger than 4 KiB", path)
+	}
+	return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(f, 4097))
+}

internal/escrow/r861_staged_read_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package escrow
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the root escrow ceremony reads two files from the AGENT's directory. A symlink there to a
+// root-only file must never be read (it would be sealed under R and handed to the agent).
+// RED-PROOF (audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt): use os.ReadFile in readStagedNoFollow → this fails.
+func TestAttach_RefusesASymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	d := t.TempDir()
+	secret := filepath.Join(d, "root-only")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("ROOT-ONLY-CANARY"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	link := filepath.Join(d, "restic_repo_password")
+	if err := os.Symlink(secret, link); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var b IdentityBundle
+	if ok, err := AttachResticPassword(&b, link); err == nil || ok || b.ResticRepoPassword != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a symlinked staged file was read: ok=%v err=%v value-set=%v", ok, err, b.ResticRepoPassword != "")
+	}
+	if ok, err := AttachWGKey(&b, link); err == nil || ok {
+		t.Fatalf("a symlinked wg key was read: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
+	}
+	// control: the real staged file is still read; a missing one is still a clean no-attach
+	real := filepath.Join(d, "real")
+	_ = os.WriteFile(real, []byte("pw\n"), 0o600)
+	if ok, err := AttachResticPassword(&b, real); err != nil || !ok || b.ResticRepoPassword != "pw" {
+		t.Fatalf("control: the plain staged file was not read: %v %v", ok, err)
+	}
+	if ok, err := AttachResticPassword(&b, filepath.Join(d, "absent")); err != nil || ok {
+		t.Fatalf("control: a missing file must stay a clean no-attach: %v %v", ok, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Review 2026-10-05: a symlinked DIRECTORY on the way must stop the read too (O_NOFOLLOW alone guards only the last
+// component). RED-PROOF: open the full path with O_NOFOLLOW only → this fails.
+func TestAttach_RefusesASymlinkedDirectory(t *testing.T) {
+	d := t.TempDir()
+	secretDir := filepath.Join(d, "root-only-dir")
+	_ = os.Mkdir(secretDir, 0o700)
+	_ = os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(secretDir, "private.key"), []byte("AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8=\n"), 0o600)
+	agentDir := filepath.Join(d, "agent")
+	_ = os.Mkdir(agentDir, 0o700)
+	if err := os.Symlink(secretDir, filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var b IdentityBundle
+	if ok, err := AttachWGKey(&b, filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg", "private.key")); err == nil || ok || b.WGPrivateKey != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a key behind a symlinked directory was read: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
+	}
+	// control: the same key under a REAL directory is read
+	_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg"))
+	_ = os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg"), 0o700)
+	_ = os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg", "private.key"), []byte("AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8=\n"), 0o600)
+	if ok, err := AttachWGKey(&b, filepath.Join(agentDir, "wg", "private.key")); err != nil || !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("control: a key under a real directory was not read: %v %v", ok, err)
+	}
+}

internal/felhomsshd/config.go

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ const (
 	PortFile = ConfDir + "/port"
 	// PidFile is the instance pidfile (NOT a RuntimeDirectory — that is the G1 incident cause).
 	PidFile = "/run/felhom-sshd.pid"
+	// PrivApply is the root content checker that installs the config and felhom-op's key (R-861, agent v0.146.0).
+	PrivApply = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply"
 	// Unit is the systemd unit name.
 	Unit = "felhom-sshd"
 	// OperatorUser is the default operator login (scoped sudo; key in AuthKeysDir only).

internal/felhomsshd/manager.go

@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ func (m *Manager) Apply(ctx context.Context, block *hub.WireWireguard) (int, err
 		m.logger.Error("felhomsshd: staged config failed sshd -t — NOT installing", "err", err, "stderr", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)))
 		return port, err
 	}
-	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, "install", "-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0644", "--", m.stagedConfPath(), ConfPath); err != nil {
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): the root checker installs it, and only if it is renderConfig's template for some port.
+	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, PrivApply, "sshd-config"); err != nil {
 		m.logger.Error("felhomsshd: config install failed", "err", err, "stderr", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)))
 		return port, err
 	}
@@ -181,7 +182,9 @@ func (m *Manager) applyAuthorizedKeys(ctx context.Context, sshKey string) {
 		m.logger.Error("felhomsshd: staging authorized_keys", "err", err)
 		return
 	}
-	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, "install", "-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0644", "--", staged, AuthKeysUserPath); err != nil {
+	// R-861: the root checker installs it — one plain public key, no options (command=, from=, …), or empty.
+	_ = staged
+	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, PrivApply, "sshd-key"); err != nil {
 		m.logger.Error("felhomsshd: authorized_keys install failed", "err", err, "stderr", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)))
 		return
 	}

internal/felhomsshd/r861_privapply_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+package felhomsshd
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/privapplytest"
+)
+
+// R-861: renderConfig is byte-identical to the checker's template (only the Port varies); a changed line is refused.
+// RED-PROOF: change one directive in renderConfig → this fails (the two templates drifted).
+func TestPrivApply_AcceptsTheRenderedConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, port := range []int{2222, 8822, 60022} {
+		conf, err := renderConfig(port)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "sshd-config", "", conf); got != "OK" {
+			t.Errorf("port %d: %s", port, got)
+		}
+	}
+	conf, _ := renderConfig(8822)
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "sshd-config", "", conf+"StrictModes no\n"); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "REFUSED") {
+		t.Fatalf("control: an extra directive was not refused: %s", got)
+	}
+}

internal/guesthook/install.go

@@ -38,35 +38,26 @@ const snippetBody = `#!/bin/sh
 exit 0
 `
 
-// InstallSnippet writes the pre-start hook wrapper into the PVE snippets dir (idempotent, root-owned,
-// executable). The agent runs as a non-root service user, so it writes an agent-writable temp file then
-// `install`s it host-root (same pattern as the bootstrap mount + dnsmasq drop-ins). Safe to call repeatedly.
-// The temp file is a RANDOM-named os.CreateTemp (audit B1): a fixed, predictable /tmp name could be
-// pre-created by another local user and rewritten between our write and root's install (TOCTOU into a
-// root-executed hookscript). The final mode comes from `install -m`, so the 0600 temp is fine.
-func InstallSnippet(ctx context.Context, runner proxmox.Runner) error {
-	f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "felhom-guest-hook-*.sh")
+// SnippetReady (R-861, agent v0.146.0) reports whether the pre-start hook is in place: a regular file at path whose
+// content is exactly snippetBody. The hook is a FIXED, ROOT-OWNED file that arrives with the signed config bundle
+// (configs/felhom-guest-hook.sh, pinned byte-identical by TestSnippetEqualsTheBundle). The agent no longer installs it:
+// until v0.146.0 it `install`ed it from /tmp, and Proxmox runs a hookscript as root at every guest start — so the
+// install grant was a root shell for a compromised agent. A missing or different hook is an error the caller logs; it
+// then does NOT register the hook (a guest whose hookscript is missing does not start).
+func SnippetReady(path string) error {
+	fi, err := os.Lstat(path)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: create temp snippet: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: %s is missing — it arrives with the signed config bundle (agent_config_update): %w", path, err)
 	}
-	tmp := f.Name()
-	defer os.Remove(tmp)
-	if _, err := f.WriteString(snippetBody); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
-		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: write temp snippet: %w", err)
+	if !fi.Mode().IsRegular() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: %s is not a regular file", path)
 	}
-	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: close temp snippet: %w", err)
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: read %s: %w", path, err)
 	}
-	// Ensure the snippets dir exists FIRST (B2, DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03): a fresh PVE has
-	// no /var/lib/vz/snippets, and `install` (without -D) won't create the parent — the whole
-	// hook install silently failed on a freshly-bootstrapped box. Fenced root op like the install
-	// itself; idempotent.
-	if _, stderr, err := runner.Run(ctx, "mkdir", "-p", SnippetDir); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: ensure snippets dir %s: %w: %s", SnippetDir, err, string(stderr))
-	}
-	if _, stderr, err := runner.Run(ctx, "install", "-m", "0755", "--", tmp, SnippetPath); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: install snippet to %s: %w: %s", SnippetPath, err, string(stderr))
+	if string(b) != snippetBody {
+		return fmt.Errorf("guesthook: %s differs from this agent's hook — the next config bundle replaces it", path)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/guesthook/install_test.go

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"io"
 	"os"
-	"regexp"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 )
 
@@ -29,100 +29,34 @@ func (r *recordingRunner) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string
 	return r.Run(ctx, name, args...)
 }
 
-// TestInstallSnippet_RandomTempName is the audit-B1 negative test: the staged install SOURCE must be a
-// RANDOM os.CreateTemp name (felhom-guest-hook-<random>.sh), never the fixed, pre-creatable
-// /tmp/felhom-guest-hook.sh (a local TOCTOU into a root-executed hookscript), and two consecutive
-// installs must stage through DIFFERENT paths.
-func TestInstallSnippet_RandomTempName(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &recordingRunner{}
-	if err := InstallSnippet(context.Background(), r); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("InstallSnippet #1: %v", err)
+// R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the hook file comes with the signed config bundle; the agent never installs it, only checks.
+// RED-PROOF (audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt): make SnippetReady accept any content → the
+// "differs" case fails.
+func TestSnippetReady(t *testing.T) {
+	d := t.TempDir()
+	p := filepath.Join(d, "felhom-guest-hook.sh")
+	if err := SnippetReady(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a missing hook read as ready — the guest would get a hookscript that does not exist")
 	}
-	if err := InstallSnippet(context.Background(), r); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("InstallSnippet #2: %v", err)
+	_ = os.WriteFile(p, []byte("#!/bin/sh\nid > /tmp/x\n"), 0o755)
+	if err := SnippetReady(p); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a hook with other content read as ready")
 	}
-	var installs [][]string
-	for _, call := range r.calls {
-		if call[0] == "install" {
-			installs = append(installs, call)
-		}
+	_ = os.WriteFile(p, []byte(snippetBody), 0o755)
+	if err := SnippetReady(p); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("the bundle's hook was not accepted: %v", err)
 	}
-	if len(installs) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected 2 install calls, got %d: %v", len(installs), r.calls)
-	}
-
-	randomName := regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-guest-hook-[^/\\]+\.sh$`)
-	fixedName := regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-guest-hook\.sh$`)
-	var srcs []string
-	for i, call := range installs {
-		// install -m 0755 -- <src> <dest>
-		if len(call) != 6 {
-			t.Fatalf("call %d: unexpected vector %v", i, call)
-		}
-		src, dest := call[4], call[5]
-		if dest != SnippetPath {
-			t.Errorf("call %d: dest = %q, want %q", i, dest, SnippetPath)
-		}
-		if !randomName.MatchString(src) {
-			t.Errorf("call %d: source %q does not match the random felhom-guest-hook-*.sh pattern", i, src)
-		}
-		if fixedName.MatchString(src) {
-			t.Errorf("call %d: source %q is the FIXED predictable temp name (B1 TOCTOU)", i, src)
-		}
-		srcs = append(srcs, src)
-	}
-	if srcs[0] == srcs[1] {
-		t.Errorf("two consecutive installs staged through the SAME source path %q — must be random per call", srcs[0])
-	}
-	// Non-hollow: the staged file must actually carry the snippet body at install time.
-	for i, c := range r.srcContent {
-		if c != snippetBody {
-			t.Errorf("call %d: staged content is not the snippet body (got %d bytes)", i, len(c))
-		}
-	}
-	// And the temp is cleaned up after.
-	for _, src := range srcs {
-		if _, err := os.Stat(src); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("staged temp %q left behind (defer os.Remove missing)", src)
-		}
+	l := filepath.Join(d, "link.sh")
+	_ = os.Symlink(p, l)
+	if err := SnippetReady(l); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a symlink read as the hook")
 	}
 }
 
-// B2 Scenario D (DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03): on a fresh PVE, /var/lib/vz/snippets does not
-// exist and `install` (no -D) cannot create it — the drill saw
-// `install: cannot create regular file … No such file or directory` and the guest silently got no
-// pre-start self-heal hook. InstallSnippet must therefore issue a `mkdir -p <SnippetDir>` fenced op
-// BEFORE the `install` op. Pre-fix wrong outcome: no mkdir call at all — only the doomed install.
-func TestInstallSnippet_EnsuresSnippetsDirFirst(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &recordingRunner{}
-	if err := InstallSnippet(context.Background(), r); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("InstallSnippet: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	mkdirIdx, installIdx := -1, -1
-	for i, call := range r.calls {
-		switch call[0] {
-		case "mkdir":
-			if mkdirIdx == -1 {
-				mkdirIdx = i
-				want := []string{"mkdir", "-p", SnippetDir}
-				if len(call) != 3 || call[1] != want[1] || call[2] != want[2] {
-					t.Errorf("mkdir vector = %v, want %v (the sudoers fence matches exactly this argv)", call, want)
-				}
-			}
-		case "install":
-			if installIdx == -1 {
-				installIdx = i
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if mkdirIdx == -1 {
-		t.Fatalf("no `mkdir -p %s` op issued — on a fresh box the snippet install fails ENOENT (B2); calls: %v", SnippetDir, r.calls)
-	}
-	if installIdx == -1 {
-		t.Fatalf("no install op issued; calls: %v", r.calls)
-	}
-	if mkdirIdx > installIdx {
-		t.Fatalf("mkdir (call %d) must PRECEDE install (call %d) — order: %v", mkdirIdx, installIdx, r.calls)
+// The bundle's copy is byte-identical to the body the agent checks against.
+func TestSnippetEqualsTheBundle(t *testing.T) {
+	got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "configs", "felhom-guest-hook.sh"))
+	if err != nil || string(got) != snippetBody {
+		t.Fatalf("configs/felhom-guest-hook.sh differs from snippetBody (err %v)", err)
 	}
 }

internal/hub/bundle_record_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+package hub
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-840: the agent reports the bundle record itself — "none" when no bundle ever reached the box (so an old wrapper
+// cannot hide that), "unknown" when it cannot be read, else the version and sha the root wrapper recorded.
+func TestReadBundleRecord(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	p := filepath.Join(dir, "config-bundle.json")
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"version":"none"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("absent: %s", got)
+	}
+	os.WriteFile(p, []byte("{broken"), 0o644)
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"version":"unknown"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("broken: %s", got)
+	}
+	os.WriteFile(p, []byte(`{"format":1,"agent_version":"0.143.0","bundle_sha256":"abc","installed_at":"2026-10-04T20:00:00Z","authority":"signed","files":{"/x":"y"}}`), 0o644)
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"authority":"signed","bundle_sha256":"abc","installed_at":"2026-10-04T20:00:00Z","version":"0.143.0"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("record: %s", got)
+	}
+}

internal/hub/client.go

@@ -425,3 +425,27 @@ func (c *Client) FetchRetainedIdentityEscrow(ctx context.Context) (*RetainedEscr
 	}
 	return &out, nil
 }
+
+// PostOSReport sends the OS-update leg's report after every run (hub v0.130.0): POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/os-report.
+// Per-host key, self-scoped on the hub. Errors are typed like RegisterWG's and never include the bearer.
+func (c *Client) PostOSReport(ctx context.Context, body []byte) error {
+	if c.hostID == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hub: PostOSReport requires a configured host_id")
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+"/api/v1/hosts/"+c.hostID+"/os-report", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hub: building os-report request: %w", err)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &TransportError{Err: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64<<10))
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, BodyTail: tail(raw, 256)}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/hub/cloudflared.go

@@ -2,45 +2,111 @@ package hub
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"os/exec"
+	"fmt"
 	"strings"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/proxmox"
 )
 
-// CloudflaredProber reports the cloudflared tunnel service health. It is a
-// READ-ONLY probe: the agent does NOT manage or restart cloudflared in this slice
-// (that is the tunnel-management slice — this is the seam for it). Injectable so
-// tests use a fake and never exec.
+// Tunnel states the agent reports (R-841, agent v0.141.0). THREE, never two: a probe that could not ask is
+// `unknown`, which the hub never shows as up or down and never alarms on (R-96 rule 3).
+const (
+	TunnelRunning    = "running"     // the cloudflared container runs AND its readiness check says CONNECTED
+	TunnelNotRunning = "not_running" // stopped / exited / absent, or running but NOT connected (Detail says which)
+	TunnelUnknown    = "unknown"     // the probe could not ask (guest down, pct/sudo error, health still starting)
+)
+
+// CloudflaredProber reports the box's tunnel. Injectable so tests use a fake and never exec.
 type CloudflaredProber interface {
-	// Status returns one of: "active" | "inactive" | "failed" | "unknown".
-	Status(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
+	// Status returns one of the Tunnel* states and a short detail (why not_running / why unknown).
+	Status(ctx context.Context) (status, detail string)
 }
 
-// SystemctlProber runs `systemctl is-active cloudflared`. This is NOT a Privileged
-// (root-CLI) op — `is-active` is non-root readable and is not one of the three
-// proven root exceptions, so it does not go through internal/proxmox.Privileged.
-type SystemctlProber struct {
-	Unit string // defaults to "cloudflared"
+// GuestTunnelProber reads the REAL tunnel: the `cloudflared` container in the box's own customer guest.
+//
+// Before v0.141.0 the agent ran `systemctl is-active cloudflared` on the HOST — a unit that does not exist (cloudflared
+// is a guest container, `11-os-updates.md` C8), so every box reported `inactive` (R-841).
+//
+// It uses ONLY the existing sudoers line `pct exec [0-9]* -- docker inspect -f *` (03 §3): the container's state, exit
+// code and Docker health status. The health status comes from the compose health check controller v0.292.0 adds
+// (`cloudflared tunnel --metrics localhost:20241 ready` → /ready: 200 only with ≥ 1 connection). Measured 2026-10-04:
+// with a wrong token the container stays "running" while /ready answers 503 — so the container state alone would lie.
+// A container with no health check (an older controller) is judged on its state alone, and Detail says so.
+type GuestTunnelProber struct {
+	Runner proxmox.Runner
+	// Guests returns the box's customer guest vmids (running pool guests that bind /mnt/felhom-drives).
+	Guests func(ctx context.Context) ([]int, error)
 }
 
-// Status maps `systemctl is-active` output to the report vocabulary. systemctl
-// exits non-zero for inactive/failed, so the output string is authoritative over
-// the exit code; any exec error (binary missing, etc.) maps to "unknown".
-func (p SystemctlProber) Status(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
-	unit := p.Unit
-	if unit == "" {
-		unit = "cloudflared"
+const tunnelInspect = `{{.State.Status}}|{{.State.ExitCode}}|{{if .State.Health}}{{.State.Health.Status}}{{else}}none{{end}}`
+
+// Status probes every customer guest and reports the worst state (normally there is exactly one guest).
+func (p GuestTunnelProber) Status(ctx context.Context) (string, string) {
+	if p.Runner == nil || p.Guests == nil {
+		return TunnelUnknown, "no probe wired"
 	}
-	out, _ := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "is-active", unit).Output()
-	switch strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) {
-	case "active":
-		return "active", nil
-	case "failed":
-		return "failed", nil
-	case "inactive", "deactivating", "activating":
-		return "inactive", nil
-	case "":
-		return "unknown", nil // no output → systemctl/exec problem
-	default:
-		return "unknown", nil
+	vmids, err := p.Guests(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return TunnelUnknown, "could not list the customer guest: " + err.Error()
 	}
+	if len(vmids) == 0 {
+		return TunnelUnknown, "no running customer guest"
+	}
+	worst, wdetail := "", ""
+	rank := map[string]int{TunnelRunning: 0, TunnelUnknown: 1, TunnelNotRunning: 2}
+	for _, v := range vmids {
+		out, errOut, err := p.Runner.Run(ctx, "/usr/sbin/pct", "exec", fmt.Sprint(v), "--", "docker", "inspect", "-f", tunnelInspect, "cloudflared")
+		st, d := ClassifyTunnel(string(out), string(errOut), err)
+		if len(vmids) > 1 {
+			d = fmt.Sprintf("guest %d: %s", v, d)
+		}
+		if worst == "" || rank[st] > rank[worst] {
+			worst, wdetail = st, d
+		}
+	}
+	return worst, wdetail
+}
+
+// ClassifyTunnel maps one `docker inspect` answer to a state. Pure; pinned by TestClassifyTunnel.
+func ClassifyTunnel(stdout, stderr string, err error) (string, string) {
+	out := strings.TrimSpace(stdout)
+	if err != nil || out == "" {
+		if strings.Contains(stderr, "No such object") || strings.Contains(stderr, "No such container") {
+			return TunnelNotRunning, "no cloudflared container in the guest"
+		}
+		return TunnelUnknown, "could not ask the guest: " + firstLine(stderr, err)
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(out, "|")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		return TunnelUnknown, "unreadable docker answer: " + out
+	}
+	state, code, health := parts[0], parts[1], parts[2]
+	if state != "running" {
+		return TunnelNotRunning, fmt.Sprintf("container %s, exit code %s", state, code)
+	}
+	switch health {
+	case "healthy":
+		return TunnelRunning, "connected"
+	case "unhealthy":
+		return TunnelNotRunning, "container running but the tunnel is NOT connected (cloudflared /ready fails)"
+	case "starting":
+		return TunnelUnknown, "container running, readiness check still starting"
+	case "none":
+		return TunnelRunning, "container running (no readiness check on this controller — connection not checked)"
+	}
+	return TunnelUnknown, "unknown health state " + health
+}
+
+func firstLine(stderr string, err error) string {
+	s := strings.TrimSpace(stderr)
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(s, '\n'); i >= 0 {
+		s = s[:i]
+	}
+	if s == "" && err != nil {
+		s = err.Error()
+	}
+	if len(s) > 160 {
+		s = s[:160]
+	}
+	return s
 }

internal/hub/cloudflared_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+package hub
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-841: the three states from one `docker inspect` answer. Red-proof: map "unhealthy" to running (the container
+// state alone — what a plain "is it running" probe would say) and the "running but not connected" case fails.
+func TestClassifyTunnel(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name, out, errOut string
+		err               error
+		want              string
+		detail            string
+	}{
+		{"connected", "running|0|healthy\n", "", nil, TunnelRunning, "connected"},
+		{"running but not connected", "running|0|unhealthy\n", "", nil, TunnelNotRunning, "NOT connected"},
+		{"stopped", "exited|137|unhealthy\n", "", nil, TunnelNotRunning, "exit code 137"},
+		{"absent", "", "Error: No such object: cloudflared", errors.New("exit status 1"), TunnelNotRunning, "no cloudflared container"},
+		{"still starting", "running|0|starting\n", "", nil, TunnelUnknown, "starting"},
+		{"no health check (older controller)", "running|0|none\n", "", nil, TunnelRunning, "connection not checked"},
+		{"guest not running", "", "CT 9201 not running", errors.New("exit status 255"), TunnelUnknown, "could not ask"},
+		{"sudo refused", "", "sudo: a password is required", errors.New("exit status 1"), TunnelUnknown, "could not ask"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		st, d := ClassifyTunnel(c.out, c.errOut, c.err)
+		if st != c.want || !strings.Contains(d, c.detail) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %q (%s), want %q (…%s…)", c.name, st, d, c.want, c.detail)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+type tunnelRunner struct {
+	calls []string
+	out   map[string]string
+}
+
+func (r *tunnelRunner) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	line := name + " " + strings.Join(args, " ")
+	r.calls = append(r.calls, line)
+	return []byte(r.out[args[1]]), nil, nil
+}
+func (r *tunnelRunner) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	return r.Run(ctx, name, args...)
+}
+
+// The probe uses EXACTLY the existing sudoers shape `pct exec <vmid> -- docker inspect -f <tmpl> cloudflared`, and
+// with no customer guest it is unknown, never down.
+func TestGuestTunnelProber(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &tunnelRunner{out: map[string]string{"9201": "running|0|healthy"}}
+	p := GuestTunnelProber{Runner: r, Guests: func(context.Context) ([]int, error) { return []int{9201}, nil }}
+	if st, d := p.Status(context.Background()); st != TunnelRunning || d != "connected" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q %q", st, d)
+	}
+	want := "/usr/sbin/pct exec 9201 -- docker inspect -f " + tunnelInspect + " cloudflared"
+	if len(r.calls) != 1 || r.calls[0] != want {
+		t.Fatalf("command = %q, want %q", r.calls, want)
+	}
+	none := GuestTunnelProber{Runner: r, Guests: func(context.Context) ([]int, error) { return nil, nil }}
+	if st, _ := none.Status(context.Background()); st != TunnelUnknown {
+		t.Fatalf("no guest → %q, want unknown", st)
+	}
+}

internal/hub/collect.go

@@ -4,10 +4,12 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/capability"
@@ -90,29 +92,31 @@ type GuestNetReporter interface {
 // Collector builds a HostReport from read-only sources. All deps are behind narrow
 // interfaces for unit testing.
 type Collector struct {
-	px           proxmoxReader
-	cf           CloudflaredProber
-	storage      StorageObserver
-	backups      BackupReporter
-	restoreTests RestoreTestReporter
-	provenTests  ProvenRestoreTestReporter
-	pbs          PBSReporter
-	temp         TempReader                                    // slice 9: host CPU/chassis temp (nil-safe → nil temp)
-	capProbe     func(ctx context.Context) []capability.Status // v0.44.0: privileged-capability self-check (nil → empty)
-	leafFP       string                                        // v0.48.0: served local-API leaf fp (static per process; "" when local API disabled)
-	addrEnum     AddressEnumerator                             // v0.119.0: host interface enumeration; nil => the REAL one (see collectAddresses)
-	wg           WireguardReporter                             // S3: offsite-tunnel status (nil → stanza omitted)
-	pbsdr        PBSDRReporter                                 // slice 2: PBS DR tier bridge state (nil → stanza omitted)
-	ctrlSup      ControllerSupervisorReporter                  // R-523: in-guest controller supervisor (nil → stanza omitted)
-	guestNet     GuestNetReporter                              // R-54: per-guest network watchdog (nil → stanza omitted)
-	selfUpdate   SelfUpdateReporter                            // D1: agent self-update pending status (nil → false)
-	mgmtPlane    MgmtPlaneReporter                             // G1: management-plane health (nil → stanza omitted)
-	oob          OOBReporter                                   // H1: operator-access health (nil → stanza omitted)
-	backupTarget func() ConfiguredBackupTarget                 // R-109: primary backup tier id (nil → recipe records unknown)
-	hostID       string
-	agentVersion string
-	logger       *slog.Logger
-	now          func() time.Time
+	px               proxmoxReader
+	cf               CloudflaredProber
+	storage          StorageObserver
+	backups          BackupReporter
+	restoreTests     RestoreTestReporter
+	provenTests      ProvenRestoreTestReporter
+	pbs              PBSReporter
+	temp             TempReader                                    // slice 9: host CPU/chassis temp (nil-safe → nil temp)
+	capProbe         func(ctx context.Context) []capability.Status // v0.44.0: privileged-capability self-check (nil → empty)
+	leafFP           string                                        // v0.48.0: served local-API leaf fp (static per process; "" when local API disabled)
+	addrEnum         AddressEnumerator                             // v0.119.0: host interface enumeration; nil => the REAL one (see collectAddresses)
+	wg               WireguardReporter                             // S3: offsite-tunnel status (nil → stanza omitted)
+	pbsdr            PBSDRReporter                                 // slice 2: PBS DR tier bridge state (nil → stanza omitted)
+	ctrlSup          ControllerSupervisorReporter                  // R-523: in-guest controller supervisor (nil → stanza omitted)
+	guestNet         GuestNetReporter                              // R-54: per-guest network watchdog (nil → stanza omitted)
+	selfUpdate       SelfUpdateReporter                            // D1: agent self-update pending status (nil → false)
+	mgmtPlane        MgmtPlaneReporter                             // G1: management-plane health (nil → stanza omitted)
+	oob              OOBReporter                                   // H1: operator-access health (nil → stanza omitted)
+	system           SystemReporter                                // R-852: the box versions (nil → API fields only)
+	bundleRecordPath string                                        // R-840: test seam; "" = BundleRecordPath
+	backupTarget     func() ConfiguredBackupTarget                 // R-109: primary backup tier id (nil → recipe records unknown)
+	hostID           string
+	agentVersion     string
+	logger           *slog.Logger
+	now              func() time.Time
 }
 
 // NewCollector builds a collector. hostID echoes config.Hub.HostID; agentVersion is
@@ -248,6 +252,69 @@ type OOBReporter interface {
 }
 
 // SetOOBReporter wires the operator-access health source (H1; nil-safe → stanza omitted).
+// SystemReporter reads the box's versions (R-852): the customer guest's vmid and the wrapper's raw facts.
+type SystemReporter interface {
+	SystemFacts(ctx context.Context) (vmid int, facts json.RawMessage, err error)
+}
+
+// SetSystemReporter wires the facts read (agent v0.142.0). Without it the stanza carries the Proxmox API fields only.
+func (c *Collector) SetSystemReporter(r SystemReporter) *Collector {
+	c.system = r
+	return c
+}
+
+// BundleRecordPath is the root-owned record felhom-os-apply writes after a config bundle installs (R-840).
+const BundleRecordPath = "/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json"
+
+// readBundleRecord returns the record's summary: version/sha/installed_at, "none" when the file is absent, "unknown"
+// when it cannot be read or parsed (never a guess).
+func readBundleRecord(path string) json.RawMessage {
+	if path == "" {
+		path = BundleRecordPath
+	}
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return json.RawMessage(`{"version":"none"}`)
+	}
+	var rec struct {
+		AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"`
+		BundleSHA256 string `json:"bundle_sha256"`
+		InstalledAt  string `json:"installed_at"`
+		Authority    string `json:"authority"`
+	}
+	if err != nil || json.Unmarshal(b, &rec) != nil || rec.AgentVersion == "" {
+		return json.RawMessage(`{"version":"unknown"}`)
+	}
+	out, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"version": rec.AgentVersion, "bundle_sha256": rec.BundleSHA256,
+		"installed_at": rec.InstalledAt, "authority": rec.Authority})
+	return out
+}
+
+func unknownIfEmpty(s string) string {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// systemInfo builds the `system` stanza. Never fatal: a failed facts read is FactsError, the API fields stay.
+func (c *Collector) systemInfo(ctx context.Context, ns proxmox.NodeStatus) *SystemInfo {
+	si := &SystemInfo{PVEVersion: unknownIfEmpty(ns.PVEVersion), KernelVersion: unknownIfEmpty(ns.KVersion),
+		ReadAt: c.now().Format(time.RFC3339)}
+	si.ConfigBundle = readBundleRecord(c.bundleRecordPath)
+	if c.system == nil {
+		si.FactsError = "no facts reader wired"
+		return si
+	}
+	vmid, f, err := c.system.SystemFacts(ctx)
+	si.VMID, si.Facts = vmid, f
+	if err != nil {
+		si.FactsError = err.Error()
+		c.logger.Debug("hub: system facts unavailable", "err", err)
+	}
+	return si
+}
+
 func (c *Collector) SetOOBReporter(o OOBReporter) *Collector {
 	c.oob = o
 	return c
@@ -280,10 +347,11 @@ func (c *Collector) Collect(ctx context.Context) (*HostReport, error) {
 		PBSSnapshots:   c.collectPBSSnapshots(ctx),
 
 		AuditTail:       []AuditEntry{},
-		Cloudflared:     Cloudflared{Status: c.cloudflaredStatus(ctx)},
+		Cloudflared:     c.cloudflared(ctx),
 		Capabilities:    c.capabilities(ctx),
 		LeafFingerprint: c.leafFP,
 		Addresses:       c.collectAddresses(),
+		System:          c.systemInfo(ctx, ns),
 	}
 	// DR recipe host-half — derived from the just-collected guest/storage/PBS facts (no new reads).
 	// Secret-free by construction (identifiers/intents/sizes/coordinates only).
@@ -555,16 +623,18 @@ func (c *Collector) collectPBSSnapshots(ctx context.Context) []PBSSnapshot {
 	return []PBSSnapshot{}
 }
 
-func (c *Collector) cloudflaredStatus(ctx context.Context) string {
+func (c *Collector) cloudflared(ctx context.Context) Cloudflared {
 	if c.cf == nil {
-		return "unknown"
+		return Cloudflared{Status: TunnelUnknown, Detail: "no probe wired"}
 	}
-	st, err := c.cf.Status(ctx)
-	if err != nil || st == "" {
-		c.logger.Warn("hub: cloudflared probe failed", "err", err)
-		return "unknown"
+	st, d := c.cf.Status(ctx)
+	if st == "" {
+		st = TunnelUnknown
 	}
-	return st
+	if st == TunnelUnknown {
+		c.logger.Debug("hub: tunnel probe could not decide", "detail", d)
+	}
+	return Cloudflared{Status: st, Detail: d}
 }
 
 func percent(used, total int64) float64 {

internal/hub/collect_guestnet_test.go

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ func (f fakeGuestNet) GuestNetStatus(context.Context) *GuestNetStatus { return f
 
 func TestCollect_GuestNetOmittedWhenReporterNil(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.92.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.92.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Collect: %v", err)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func TestCollect_GuestNetOmittedWhenReporterNil(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_GuestNetPopulatedWhenWired(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.92.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.92.0", quietLogger())
 	c.SetGuestNetReporter(fakeGuestNet{st: &GuestNetStatus{
 		CheckedAt: "2026-07-21T10:00:00Z",
 		Guests: []GuestNetGuest{{

internal/hub/collect_mgmtplane_test.go

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ func (f fakeMgmtPlane) MgmtPlaneStatus(context.Context) *MgmtPlaneStatus { retur
 
 func TestCollect_MgmtPlaneOmittedWhenReporterNil(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.71.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.71.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Collect: %v", err)
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ func TestCollect_MgmtPlaneOmittedWhenReporterNil(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_MgmtPlanePopulatedWhenWired(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.71.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.71.0", quietLogger())
 	c.SetMgmtPlaneReporter(fakeMgmtPlane{st: &MgmtPlaneStatus{
 		PrivsepDirOK: true, SshdReachable: true, HealedRecently: true, PrivsepHealedAt: "2026-07-05T16:42:17Z",
 	}})
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func (f fakeOOB) OOBStatus(context.Context) *OOBStatus { return f.st }
 
 func TestCollect_OOBOmittedWhenNil(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.72.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.72.0", quietLogger())
 	r, _ := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if r.OOB != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("no reporter → oob omitted, got %+v", r.OOB)
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func TestCollect_OOBOmittedWhenNil(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_OOBPopulatedWhenWired(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.72.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.72.0", quietLogger())
 	c.SetOOBReporter(fakeOOB{st: &OOBStatus{FelhomSshdActive: true, FelhomSshdPort: 8822, Reachable: true}})
 	r, _ := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if r.OOB == nil || r.OOB.FelhomSshdPort != 8822 || !r.OOB.Reachable {

internal/hub/collect_test.go

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func TestCollect_StorageTargetsFromObserver(t *testing.T) {
 	obs := fakeObserver{targets: []StorageTarget{
 		{Name: "local-lvm", Type: StorageTypeLVMThin, State: StorageStateAttached, Reachable: true},
 	}}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, obs, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.5.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, obs, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.5.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Collect: %v", err)
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func TestCollect_StorageTargetsFromObserver(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_StorageObserverErrorDegradesToEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{err: errors.New("proxmox down")}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.5.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{err: errors.New("proxmox down")}, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.5.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("a storage observe error must not sink the heartbeat: %v", err)
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func TestCollect_HostAndGuests(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 		cfg: map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{100: {Cores: 2, Memory: 2048}},
 	}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "demo-host-01", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "demo-host-01", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Collect: %v", err)
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestCollect_HostAndGuests(t *testing.T) {
 	if g.Spec.Cores != 2 || g.Spec.MemoryBytes != 2147483648 || g.Spec.DiskBytes != 21474836480 {
 		t.Errorf("spec = %+v", g.Spec)
 	}
-	if r.Cloudflared.Status != "active" {
+	if r.Cloudflared.Status != "running" || r.Cloudflared.Detail != "connected" {
 		t.Errorf("cloudflared = %q", r.Cloudflared.Status)
 	}
 }
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestCollect_GuestConfigFailureKeepsStatusOmitsSpec(t *testing.T) {
 		cfg:    map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{100: {Cores: 2}},
 		cfgErr: map[int]error{200: errors.New("config read failed")},
 	}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.1", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.1", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("a per-guest failure must NOT fail the whole report: %v", err)
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ func TestCollect_GuestConfigFailureKeepsStatusOmitsSpec(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_NodeStatusFailureIsHardError(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", nsErr: errors.New("proxmox down")}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
 	if _, err := c.Collect(context.Background()); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("NodeStatus failure must be a hard error (no useful report)")
 	}
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func TestCollect_NodeStatusFailureIsHardError(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCollect_CloudflaredProbeErrorIsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{err: errors.New("no systemctl")}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "", detail: "could not ask"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.3.0", quietLogger())
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("cloudflared failure must not be fatal: %v", err)
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func TestCollect_LeafFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
 	const fp = "60b5974d586f5f3c8ec41eb998d0f07406178219c36bf6d3ff377570279d8245"
 
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.48.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.48.0", quietLogger())
 	c.SetLeafFingerprint(fp)
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func TestCollect_LeafFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Companion: no SetLeafFingerprint (local API disabled) → empty, never a fabricated value.
-	c2 := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.48.0", quietLogger())
+	c2 := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.48.0", quietLogger())
 	r2, _ := c2.Collect(context.Background())
 	if r2.LeafFingerprint != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("unset leaf_fingerprint = %q, want empty", r2.LeafFingerprint)

internal/hub/dr_recipe.go

@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ const (
 	DRReasonNoPBSStorage = "no_pbs_storage_observed"
 )
 
-// PBSRootNamespace is how the recipe spells PBS's root namespace. The PBS API spells it as the EMPTY
-// string (and `pct restore --ns root` would name a namespace that does not exist) — "root" is a display
-// convention this wire has always used, kept here so the field's meaning did not change under R-106.
-// Only a box with no `namespace` line in its pbs storage.cfg stanza ever emits it.
-const PBSRootNamespace = "root"
+// PBSRootNamespace is how the recipe spells PBS's root namespace: the EMPTY string, PBS's own spelling (R-124,
+// agent v0.147.0). It used to be the display word "root", which no PBS namespace is named — an operator pasting it
+// into `proxmox-backup-client … --ns root` during a real recovery got a failure. An empty namespace is ambiguous on
+// its own, so READ IT WITH namespace_state: resolved + "" = the root namespace (pass no --ns, or --ns ""); unknown +
+// "" = the agent could not tell. Only a box with no `namespace` line in its pbs storage.cfg stanza emits it.
+// Pinned by TestDRRecipe_PBSNamespaceRootIsResolvedNotUnknown and TestR124_RootNamespaceOnTheWireIsPBSSpelling.
+const PBSRootNamespace = ""
 
 // DRRecipeHostHalf is the agent-emitted half (guest/drive/storage/PBS scaffolding). Derived entirely
 // from facts the report already collects — no new privileged reads.
@@ -123,8 +125,8 @@ type DRPBSCoord struct {
 	RepoID string `json:"repo_id"` // the PVE pbs storage id (e.g. "felhom-pbs") — not a token
 	// Namespace is the PBS namespace the restore targets, resolved from the pbs storage's storage.cfg
 	// stanza — the same field `vzdump --storage <pbs>` makes PVE read, so the recipe cannot disagree
-	// with the backup that produced the snapshot. PBSRootNamespace when the box has no namespace
-	// configured; "" when NamespaceState is unknown.
+	// with the backup that produced the snapshot. PBSRootNamespace ("", PBS's spelling, R-124) when the box has no
+	// namespace configured; also "" when NamespaceState is unknown — consult NamespaceState.
 	//
 	// R-106: this used to come from the listed snapshot's own `ns`, which PBS does not echo per item once
 	// the request is already namespace-scoped via `?ns=` (internal/pbs/client.go). The field was

internal/hub/dr_recipe_test.go

@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ func TestBuildDRRecipeHostHalf(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("felhom-flash (local-dir user-data drive) missing from drives")
 	}
 	// pbs: latest snapshot's coords + the pbs storage id as repo_id.
-	if h.PBS == nil || h.PBS.RepoID != "felhom-pbs" || h.PBS.Namespace != "root" || h.PBS.LatestSnapshotID != "9201" {
-		t.Errorf("pbs coord = %+v, want repo felhom-pbs/root/9201", h.PBS)
+	if h.PBS == nil || h.PBS.RepoID != "felhom-pbs" || h.PBS.Namespace != PBSRootNamespace || h.PBS.LatestSnapshotID != "9201" {
+		t.Errorf("pbs coord = %+v, want repo felhom-pbs, the root namespace (\"\", R-124), snapshot 9201", h.PBS)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ func TestDRRecipe_PBSNamespaceIsThePerCustomerOne(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestDRRecipe_PBSNamespaceRootIsResolvedNotUnknown: a box with a pbs storage and NO namespace line is
-// genuinely in the root namespace. That is an answer, not a gap — it must read resolved/"root", so the
+// genuinely in the root namespace. That is an answer, not a gap — it must read resolved/"" (PBS's spelling, R-124), so the
 // honest root case is never confused with "I could not tell".
 func TestDRRecipe_PBSNamespaceRootIsResolvedNotUnknown(t *testing.T) {
 	h := BuildDRRecipeHostHalf(nil,
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func TestCollectDRRecipe_ProductionPath(t *testing.T) {
 	obs := fakeObserver{targets: capturedDemoFelhomTargets()}
 	pbsRep := fakePBSReporter{snaps: capturedDemoFelhomSnapshots()}
 
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, obs, nil, nil, pbsRep, "h", "0.118.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, obs, nil, nil, pbsRep, "h", "0.118.0", quietLogger())
 	c.SetBackupTargetResolver(func() ConfiguredBackupTarget {
 		return ConfiguredBackupTarget{StorageID: "felhom-backup", Known: true}
 	})
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ func TestCollectDRRecipe_ProductionPath(t *testing.T) {
 // test that would have caught shipping the seam without wiring it.
 func TestCollectDRRecipe_UnwiredSeamReportsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, fakeObserver{targets: capturedDemoFelhomTargets()},
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, fakeObserver{targets: capturedDemoFelhomTargets()},
 		nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.118.0", quietLogger())
 
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
@@ -453,3 +453,39 @@ func assertNoSecretKeys(t *testing.T, jsonBytes []byte) {
 	}
 	walk("<root>", v)
 }
+
+// R-124: on the WIRE the root namespace is PBS's own spelling — an empty string, present (not omitted), beside
+// namespace_state "resolved". The display word "root" names no PBS namespace, and `--ns root` fails in a recovery.
+// RED-PROOF: set PBSRootNamespace back to "root" → this test fails.
+func TestR124_RootNamespaceOnTheWireIsPBSSpelling(t *testing.T) {
+	h := BuildDRRecipeHostHalf(nil,
+		[]StorageTarget{{Name: "felhom-pbs", Type: StorageTypePBS, Content: "backup", PBSNamespace: ""}},
+		capturedDemoFelhomSnapshots(),
+		ConfiguredBackupTarget{StorageID: "felhom-pbs", Known: true})
+	b, err := json.Marshal(h.PBS)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var m map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &m); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	ns, present := m["namespace"]
+	if !present {
+		t.Fatalf("namespace key missing from %s — an omitted key reads as 'unknown', not 'root'", b)
+	}
+	if ns != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("root namespace on the wire = %q, want \"\" (PBS's spelling; no namespace is named %q)", ns, ns)
+	}
+	if m["namespace_state"] != DRStateResolved {
+		t.Fatalf("namespace_state = %v, want %q beside the empty root namespace", m["namespace_state"], DRStateResolved)
+	}
+	// A configured namespace still passes through unchanged.
+	h2 := BuildDRRecipeHostHalf(nil,
+		[]StorageTarget{{Name: "felhom-pbs", Type: StorageTypePBS, Content: "backup", PBSNamespace: "demo-felhom"}},
+		capturedDemoFelhomSnapshots(),
+		ConfiguredBackupTarget{StorageID: "felhom-pbs", Known: true})
+	if h2.PBS.Namespace != "demo-felhom" {
+		t.Fatalf("configured namespace = %q, want demo-felhom", h2.PBS.Namespace)
+	}
+}

internal/hub/hostmetrics_test.go

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ func intp(v int) *int { return &v }
 // HostMetricsNow returns a fresh host block with cpu% from NodeStatus and the temp from the reader.
 func TestHostMetricsNow_PopulatesTemp(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "demo-felhom", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
 		SetTempReader(fakeTemp{c: intp(46)})
 	h, err := c.HostMetricsNow(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func TestHostMetricsNow_PopulatesTemp(t *testing.T) {
 // A missing temp sensor gracefully nulls cpu_temp_c without failing the host read.
 func TestHostMetricsNow_GracefulNullTemp(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
 		SetTempReader(fakeTemp{c: nil})
 	h, err := c.HostMetricsNow(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestHostMetricsNow_GracefulNullTemp(t *testing.T) {
 // A NodeStatus failure is a hard error (no useful host view).
 func TestHostMetricsNow_NodeStatusErrorIsHard(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", nsErr: errors.New("proxmox down")}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger())
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger())
 	if _, err := c.HostMetricsNow(context.Background()); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("NodeStatus failure must be a hard error")
 	}
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestHostMetricsNow_NodeStatusErrorIsHard(t *testing.T) {
 // Collect() (the hub report) also carries the temp now — the operator freebie.
 func TestCollect_HostReportCarriesTemp(t *testing.T) {
 	px := &fakePx{node: "n", ns: newTestNodeStatus()}
-	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "active"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
+	c := NewCollector(px, fakeProber{status: "running", detail: "connected"}, nil, nil, nil, nil, "h", "0.14.0", quietLogger()).
 		SetTempReader(fakeTemp{c: intp(51)})
 	r, err := c.Collect(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {

internal/hub/mock_test.go

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func (f *fakePx) GuestConfig(ctx context.Context, vmid int) (proxmox.GuestConfig
 // fakeProber is a fake CloudflaredProber.
 type fakeProber struct {
 	status string
-	err    error
+	detail string
 }
 
-func (p fakeProber) Status(ctx context.Context) (string, error) { return p.status, p.err }
+func (p fakeProber) Status(ctx context.Context) (string, string) { return p.status, p.detail }

internal/hub/osupdate_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package hub
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// The os_update block is a cross-repo contract: testdata/desired-state-osupdate.golden.json is byte-identical with
+// felhom.eu/hub/internal/api/testdata (the hub's TestOSUpdate_DesiredBlockMatchesTheGolden proves the hub SERVES
+// it). Here: the agent DECODES every field. A renamed json tag on either side fails one of the two tests.
+func TestOSUpdateGolden_Decodes(t *testing.T) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/desired-state-osupdate.golden.json")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var resp DesiredStateResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	o := resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate
+	if o == nil || o.Ring != 1 || !o.Enabled || o.Release == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("os_update = %+v", o)
+	}
+	r := o.Release
+	if r.ID != "os-guest-20261004-120000" || r.Snapshot != "20261004T120000Z" || len(r.Packages) != 2 ||
+		r.Packages[1].Name != "openssl" || r.Packages[1].Version != "3.5.7-1~deb13u3" || r.Packages[1].Origin != "Debian-Security" {
+		t.Fatalf("release = %+v", r)
+	}
+	// v0.141.0: the host layer's own approved set (`11` §8 step 3).
+	h := o.HostRelease
+	if h == nil || h.ID != "os-host-20261004-120000" || h.Snapshot != "20261004T120000Z" || len(h.Packages) != 1 ||
+		h.Packages[0].Name != "libssl3t64" || h.Packages[0].Origin != "Debian-Security" {
+		t.Fatalf("host_release = %+v", h)
+	}
+}

internal/hub/report.go

@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ type HostReport struct {
 	// hub-schema change and are absent when the reporter is not wired.
 	MgmtPlane *MgmtPlaneStatus `json:"mgmt_plane,omitempty"`
 
+	// System is the box's versions for the hub's System page (agent v0.142.0, R-852, `09` decision 89): Proxmox and the
+	// running kernel from the Proxmox API, and the wrapper's read-only facts (host Debian, next-boot kernel, held
+	// packages, taint, the crash guard; guest Debian, Docker engine, containerd, live-restore). A value nobody could
+	// read is "unknown", never empty and never guessed. The hub v0.132.0 consumes it (hosts + System pages).
+	System *SystemInfo `json:"system,omitempty"`
+
 	// PBSDR is the PBS-DR-tier bridge status stanza (slice 2). Present only when the pbsdr
 	// consumer is wired. `consumed_failed` is the LOUD persistent state: the one-time token
 	// secret was consumed but the apply failed afterwards — the secret is burned, the bridge
@@ -241,6 +247,20 @@ type WireguardStatus struct {
 	AssignedIP        string `json:"assigned_ip,omitempty"` // from the marker, e.g. "10.77.0.2/32"
 }
 
+// SystemInfo is the `system` stanza (see HostReport.System).
+type SystemInfo struct {
+	PVEVersion    string          `json:"pve_version"`    // GET /nodes/{node}/status pveversion
+	KernelVersion string          `json:"kernel_version"` // GET /nodes/{node}/status kversion
+	VMID          int             `json:"vmid,omitempty"` // the customer guest the facts read
+	Facts         json.RawMessage `json:"facts,omitempty"`
+	FactsError    string          `json:"facts_error,omitempty"`
+	ReadAt        string          `json:"read_at"`
+	// ConfigBundle is the box's root-owned config bundle record (R-840, agent v0.143.0), read by the agent itself from
+	// /etc/felhom/config-bundle.json (0644): {"version":"none"} on a box no bundle reached, so an OLD wrapper cannot
+	// hide it. The wrapper's facts carry the same record plus the drift (files changed by hand).
+	ConfigBundle json.RawMessage `json:"config_bundle,omitempty"`
+}
+
 // HostMetrics is the host block, sourced from proxmox NodeStatus.
 type HostMetrics struct {
 	Node             string   `json:"node"`
@@ -289,9 +309,10 @@ type GuestSpec struct {
 	DiskBytes   int64 `json:"disk_bytes"`
 }
 
-// Cloudflared is the tunnel service health (read-only probe this slice).
+// Cloudflared is the box's tunnel (R-841, agent v0.141.0): the cloudflared container in the customer guest.
 type Cloudflared struct {
-	Status string `json:"status"` // active | inactive | failed | unknown
+	Status string `json:"status"`           // running | not_running | unknown (TunnelRunning …)
+	Detail string `json:"detail,omitempty"` // why not_running / unknown, or "connected"
 }
 
 // The following element types are declared now so the empty collections above are
@@ -548,6 +569,35 @@ type WireDesiredState struct {
 	RestoreDirective *WireRestoreDirective `json:"restore_directive,omitempty"` // slice 10D (forward-compat)
 	Wireguard        *WireWireguard        `json:"wireguard,omitempty"`         // S3 (doc 06 §3.2; golden-pinned)
 	PBSDR            *WirePBSDR            `json:"pbs_dr,omitempty"`            // PBS DR tier (slice 2 consumer)
+	OSUpdate         *WireOSUpdate         `json:"os_update,omitempty"`         // OS updates, guest fast lane (agent v0.140.0)
+}
+
+// WireOSUpdate is the hub-OWNED OS-update block (hub v0.130.0, `11-os-updates.md` §5.3), merged into the served
+// document at read time. Ring 0 installs every pending Debian / Debian-Security fix; ring 1 installs exactly the
+// newest approved release. Absent (older hub) → the agent treats the box as ring 1, ON, no release: it reports
+// and installs nothing. Golden: testdata/desired-state-osupdate.golden.json (byte-identical with the hub's).
+type WireOSUpdate struct {
+	Ring    int            `json:"ring"`
+	Enabled bool           `json:"enabled"`
+	Release *WireOSRelease `json:"release,omitempty"`
+	// HostRelease is the newest approved HOST release (hub v0.131.0, `11` §8 step 3) — a separate set: a version
+	// approved for the guest is not approved for the host by that fact alone.
+	HostRelease *WireOSRelease `json:"host_release,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// WireOSRelease is an approved version set; Snapshot is the approval time (YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ) the wrapper uses
+// for snapshot.debian.org when Debian has already replaced a version (decision 79).
+type WireOSRelease struct {
+	ID       string          `json:"id"`
+	Snapshot string          `json:"snapshot"`
+	Packages []WireOSPackage `json:"packages"`
+}
+
+// WireOSPackage is one approved name=version and its origin ("Debian" | "Debian-Security").
+type WireOSPackage struct {
+	Name    string `json:"name"`
+	Version string `json:"version"`
+	Origin  string `json:"origin"`
 }
 
 // WirePBSDR is the hub's PBS-DR-tier descriptor (PBS DR slice 1, hub/internal/web/pbsdr.go

internal/hub/testdata/desired-state-osupdate.golden.json

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+  "generation": 1,
+  "desired_state": {
+    "os_update": {
+      "ring": 1,
+      "enabled": true,
+      "release": {
+        "id": "os-guest-20261004-120000",
+        "snapshot": "20261004T120000Z",
+        "packages": [
+          {"name": "libc6", "version": "2.41-12+deb13u4", "origin": "Debian"},
+          {"name": "openssl", "version": "3.5.7-1~deb13u3", "origin": "Debian-Security"}
+        ]
+      },
+      "host_release": {
+        "id": "os-host-20261004-120000",
+        "snapshot": "20261004T120000Z",
+        "packages": [
+          {"name": "libssl3t64", "version": "3.5.7-1~deb13u3", "origin": "Debian-Security"}
+        ]
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

internal/lanresolver/ensure_dnsmasq_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package lanresolver
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// recRunner records every privileged command EnsureDnsmasq would run and succeeds — nothing reaches
+// apt, systemctl or the root checker.
+type recRunner struct {
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	calls []string
+}
+
+func (r *recRunner) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.calls = append(r.calls, strings.Join(append([]string{name}, args...), " "))
+	return nil, nil, nil
+}
+
+func (r *recRunner) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	return r.Run(ctx, name, args...)
+}
+
+func (r *recRunner) installed() bool {
+	for _, c := range r.calls {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(c, "apt-get install") && strings.HasSuffix(c, " dnsmasq") {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// fixtureRoot builds a fake host root holding exactly the given relative files and points the REAL
+// probe at it for the test's duration.
+func fixtureRoot(t *testing.T, files ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	for _, f := range files {
+		p := filepath.Join(root, f)
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(p), 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(p, nil, 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	prev := hostRoot
+	hostRoot = root
+	t.Cleanup(func() { hostRoot = prev })
+}
+
+func ensure(t *testing.T) *recRunner {
+	t.Helper()
+	r := &recRunner{}
+	m := NewManager(r, "192.0.2.10", []string{"1.1.1.1"}, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
+	if err := m.EnsureDnsmasq(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureDnsmasq: %v", err)
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+// R-317: a host with `dnsmasq-base` (the /usr/sbin/dnsmasq binary) but WITHOUT the `dnsmasq` package
+// (the service unit) must get the package installed — else the following `systemctl enable --now
+// dnsmasq` hits a unit that does not exist and LAN name resolution silently never comes up.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: probe "usr/sbin/dnsmasq" instead of the unit paths in dnsmasqUnitInstalled → this fails
+// with "install was skipped".
+func TestEnsureDnsmasq_BinaryWithoutUnitInstalls(t *testing.T) {
+	fixtureRoot(t, "usr/sbin/dnsmasq")
+	r := ensure(t)
+	if !r.installed() {
+		t.Fatalf("install was skipped on a dnsmasq-base-only host (binary present, unit absent) — "+
+			"the enable that follows targets a missing unit (R-317). calls: %q", r.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnsureDnsmasq_UnitPresentSkipsInstall(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, unit := range []string{"usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service", "lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service"} {
+		t.Run(unit, func(t *testing.T) {
+			fixtureRoot(t, "usr/sbin/dnsmasq", unit)
+			if r := ensure(t); r.installed() {
+				t.Fatalf("apt-get install ran although the dnsmasq unit is present at %s: %q", unit, r.calls)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnsureDnsmasq_NothingPresentInstalls(t *testing.T) {
+	fixtureRoot(t)
+	if r := ensure(t); !r.installed() {
+		t.Fatalf("install skipped on a host with no dnsmasq at all: %q", r.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+// Production wiring for the hostRoot seam: the shipped probe resolves against the real root and asks
+// about the unit the `dnsmasq` package owns — never the dnsmasq-base binary.
+func TestEnsureDnsmasq_ProductionProbeIsTheUnit(t *testing.T) {
+	if hostRoot != "/" {
+		t.Fatalf("hostRoot default = %q, want \"/\" — the production probe would look in the wrong tree", hostRoot)
+	}
+	var sawUsrLib bool
+	for _, p := range dnsmasqUnitPaths {
+		full := filepath.Join(hostRoot, p)
+		if strings.HasSuffix(full, "/sbin/dnsmasq") || strings.HasSuffix(full, "/bin/dnsmasq") {
+			t.Errorf("probe path %s is the dnsmasq-base binary, not the dnsmasq unit (R-317)", full)
+		}
+		if full == "/usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service" {
+			sawUsrLib = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !sawUsrLib {
+		t.Errorf("probe paths %q miss /usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service (dpkg -S: owned by dnsmasq)", dnsmasqUnitPaths)
+	}
+}

internal/lanresolver/lanresolver.go

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ const (
 	DropinDir = "/etc/dnsmasq.d"
 	// BaseDropin holds the host-wide listen/upstream config (one per host).
 	BaseDropin = "felhom-resolver-base.conf"
+	// PrivApply is the root content checker that installs a drop-in (R-861).
+	PrivApply = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply"
 )
 
 // RenderBase returns the host-wide dnsmasq drop-in: bind to the host LAN IP (+ loopback), no-resolv,
@@ -99,11 +101,35 @@ func NewManager(runner proxmox.Runner, hostIP string, upstreams []string, logger
 	}
 }
 
+// hostRoot is the filesystem root the install probe resolves against: "/" in production; a test
+// points it at a fixture tree so the REAL probe runs against files it controls.
+var hostRoot = "/"
+
+// dnsmasqUnitPaths are where the `dnsmasq` package ships its systemd unit (Debian; /lib is the
+// pre-usrmerge spelling). R-317: probe the UNIT, never /usr/sbin/dnsmasq — that binary belongs to
+// `dnsmasq-base`, so a host carrying dnsmasq-base without dnsmasq used to skip the install and then
+// `systemctl enable --now dnsmasq` failed against a unit that is not there (resolver never up).
+// Pinned by TestEnsureDnsmasq_BinaryWithoutUnitInstalls.
+var dnsmasqUnitPaths = []string{
+	"usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service",
+	"lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.service",
+}
+
+// dnsmasqUnitInstalled reports whether the dnsmasq service unit (the `dnsmasq` package) is present.
+func dnsmasqUnitInstalled() bool {
+	for _, p := range dnsmasqUnitPaths {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(hostRoot, p)); err == nil {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // EnsureDnsmasq makes dnsmasq present + enabled and writes the host base config. Idempotent: it
 // installs the package only when absent, and writes the base drop-in only when its content changes.
 func (m *Manager) EnsureDnsmasq(ctx context.Context) error {
-	if _, err := os.Stat("/usr/sbin/dnsmasq"); err != nil { // metadata read, no privilege needed
-		m.logger.Info("lanresolver: dnsmasq absent — installing")
+	if !dnsmasqUnitInstalled() { // metadata read, no privilege needed
+		m.logger.Info("lanresolver: dnsmasq service unit absent — installing")
 		if out, errOut, ierr := m.runner.Run(ctx, "apt-get", "install", "-y", "-q", "dnsmasq"); ierr != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("install dnsmasq: %s: %w", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut))+string(out), ierr)
 		}
@@ -263,7 +289,13 @@ func (m *Manager) writeFileIfChanged(ctx context.Context, path, content, mode st
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("write temp: %w", err)
 	}
 	tmp.Close()
-	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, "install", "-m", mode, tmpName, path); err != nil {
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): a dnsmasq drop-in reaches /etc/dnsmasq.d only through the root checker, which allows exactly
+	// the lines RenderBase/RenderGuestDropin write (a `dhcp-script=` would run as root). Mode is fixed (0644) there.
+	_ = mode
+	if filepath.Dir(path) != DropinDir {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("drop-in %s is not in %s", path, DropinDir)
+	}
+	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, PrivApply, "dnsmasq", tmpName, filepath.Base(path)); err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("install %s: %s: %w", path, strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)), err)
 	}
 	return true, nil

internal/lanresolver/r861_privapply_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package lanresolver
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/privapplytest"
+)
+
+// R-861: both drop-ins the resolver renders are accepted by the root checker; a dhcp-script line is not.
+func TestPrivApply_AcceptsTheRenderedDropins(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "dnsmasq", BaseDropin, RenderBase("192.168.0.104", []string{"1.1.1.1", "8.8.8.8"})); got != "OK" {
+		t.Errorf("base drop-in: %s", got)
+	}
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "dnsmasq", DropinName("demo-hp"), RenderGuestDropin("demo-hp", "enkisfelhom.hu", "192.168.0.138")); got != "OK" {
+		t.Errorf("guest drop-in: %s", got)
+	}
+	evil := RenderGuestDropin("demo-hp", "enkisfelhom.hu", "192.168.0.138") + "dhcp-script=/var/lib/felhom-agent/x\n"
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "dnsmasq", "felhom-x.conf", evil); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "REFUSED") {
+		t.Fatalf("control: dhcp-script was not refused: %s", got)
+	}
+}

internal/localapi/afterbackup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package localapi
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/backup"
+)
+
+// The OS leg (agent v0.140.0) runs after a SUCCESSFUL primary backup, and only then; and it runs BEFORE the
+// host-wide heavy-op gate is released, so a restore-test cannot start in the middle of it (`11` C10).
+// Red-proof: drop the `b.Success &&` guard and the failed-backup sub-case fails; move the call after release()
+// and the gate sub-case fails.
+func TestAfterPrimaryBackup(t *testing.T) {
+	run := func(t *testing.T, failErr string) (calls []int, gateHeld bool) {
+		gate := &backup.InFlight{}
+		b := &fakeBackups{failErr: failErr}
+		srv := newTestServerS(t, &fakeGuests{}, b, &fakeStore{}, nil)
+		srv.inFlight = gate
+		var mu sync.Mutex
+		done := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+		srv.SetAfterPrimaryBackup(func(_ context.Context, vmid int) {
+			rel, _, ok := gate.TryAcquire("probe")
+			mu.Lock()
+			calls = append(calls, vmid)
+			gateHeld = !ok
+			mu.Unlock()
+			if ok {
+				rel()
+			}
+			done <- struct{}{}
+		})
+		h := srv.Handler()
+		if do(t, h, "POST", "/backup", "A", "").Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatal("POST /backup not accepted")
+		}
+		select {
+		case <-done:
+		case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		}
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+		mu.Lock()
+		defer mu.Unlock()
+		return calls, gateHeld
+	}
+	t.Run("success runs the leg under the gate", func(t *testing.T) {
+		calls, held := run(t, "")
+		if len(calls) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("the leg ran %d time(s), want 1", len(calls))
+		}
+		if !held {
+			t.Fatal("the heavy-op gate was free while the leg ran — a restore-test could overlap it")
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("a failed backup runs nothing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		if calls, _ := run(t, "vzdump exploded"); len(calls) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("the leg ran after a FAILED backup: %v", calls)
+		}
+	})
+}

internal/localapi/disks.go

@@ -398,9 +398,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleDisks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
 						di.Smart = &sm
 					}
 				}
-				if total, used, okc := statfsCapacity(d.MountPath); okc {
-					di.TotalBytes, di.UsedBytes = total, used
-					di.UsedFraction = float64(used) / float64(total)
+				// R-118: statfs ONLY while the drive's device is present. With the device gone the raw
+				// mountpoint reverts to a bare directory on the ROOT filesystem, and statfs would report
+				// pve-root's size as this drive's (measured: a 4 GB drive advertising 46 GiB). Same trap
+				// observe.go guards on the Observe path. Absent → capacity left zero (unknown), never root's.
+				// Pinned by TestDisks_UnionPath_AbsentDeviceReportsNoRootCapacity.
+				if s.devicePresent(d.MountPath) {
+					if total, used, okc := statfsCapacity(d.MountPath); okc {
+						di.TotalBytes, di.UsedBytes = total, used
+						di.UsedFraction = float64(used) / float64(total)
+					}
 				}
 				out = append(out, di)
 			}

internal/localapi/disks_device_presence_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
+	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -184,3 +185,39 @@ func TestDisks_DevicePresence_WireFieldIsFalseOnDeviceLoss(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("the drive never reached the wire: %s", body)
 	}
 }
+
+// ── R-118 — an absent drive must not advertise the ROOT filesystem's capacity ───────────────────
+
+// TestDisks_UnionPath_AbsentDeviceReportsNoRootCapacity drives the REAL statfsCapacity (no capacity
+// seam): the registry drive's mount path is a real, bare temp directory — exactly what /mnt/<name>
+// becomes once its device is gone (a plain directory on the host's filesystem). With the device absent
+// the row must carry NO capacity; before R-118 the union path statfs'd that bare directory and reported
+// the host filesystem's size and usage as the drive's (46 GiB at 9.2 % for a 4 GB drive, measured).
+// The present half proves the test is not hollow: the same directory DOES yield capacity when the
+// device is there, so a zero on the absent half is the guard's doing, not a statfs failure.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop the `if s.devicePresent(d.MountPath)` guard around statfsCapacity in disks.go → the
+// absent subtest fails with "advertises ... bytes".
+func TestDisks_UnionPath_AbsentDeviceReportsNoRootCapacity(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
+		t.Skip("statfsCapacity is linux-only; production target is linux")
+	}
+	bare := t.TempDir()
+	known := []storage.KnownTarget{
+		{Name: "cel", Type: hub.StorageTypeUSB, MountPath: bare, DurableID: "uuid:4242", UUID: "4242"},
+	}
+	t.Run("absent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		di := diskByMount(t, presenceServer(t, nil, known, true, false), bare)
+		if di.TotalBytes != 0 || di.UsedBytes != 0 || di.UsedFraction != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("absent drive advertises total=%d used=%d frac=%.3f — that is the filesystem UNDER "+
+				"the bare mountpoint, not the drive (R-118)", di.TotalBytes, di.UsedBytes, di.UsedFraction)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("present", func(t *testing.T) {
+		di := diskByMount(t, presenceServer(t, nil, known, true, true), bare)
+		if di.TotalBytes <= 0 {
+			t.Errorf("present drive reports no capacity (total=%d) — the guard over-corrected and the "+
+				"size bar is gone for every healthy registry drive", di.TotalBytes)
+		}
+	})
+}

internal/localapi/intermediary.go

@@ -121,32 +121,33 @@ func (b *GuestBinder) EnsureSharedParent(ctx context.Context) error {
 	// only the script (the unit was unchanged), so the earlier unit-only gate never redeployed it —
 	// leaving hosts running the pre-fix script (no make-private), whose self-bind stays in root's shared
 	// peer group and DOUBLES every drive bind. Comparing both files closes that deploy gap.
-	if sharedParentInstallStale(sharedParentUnitPath, sharedParentScriptPath) {
-		if ierr := b.installSharedParentUnit(ctx); ierr != nil {
-			b.logger.Warn("shared-parent: boot-persistence (re)install failed (live setup OK; survives until host reboot)", "err", ierr)
-		}
+	if err := b.ensureSharedParentBoot(ctx, sharedParentUnitPath, sharedParentScriptPath, sharedParentWantsLink); err != nil {
+		b.logger.Warn("shared-parent: boot persistence not enabled (live setup OK; survives until host reboot)", "err", err)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
-// stageTemp writes content to a fresh random-named temp file (os.CreateTemp pattern — `*` is replaced
-// by a random string) and returns its path. Caller removes it after the privileged `install`.
-func stageTemp(pattern, content string) (string, error) {
-	f, err := os.CreateTemp("", pattern)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
+// sharedParentWantsLink exists once `systemctl enable felhom-shared-parent.service` ran (WantedBy=pve-guests.service).
+const sharedParentWantsLink = "/etc/systemd/system/pve-guests.service.wants/felhom-shared-parent.service"
+
+// ensureSharedParentBoot (R-861, agent v0.146.0) — the boot script and its unit are ROOT-OWNED FIXED files that arrive
+// with the signed config bundle (configs/felhom-shared-parent.{sh,service}, byte-identical to the constants above,
+// pinned by TestSharedParentFilesEqualTheBundle). The agent NEVER installs them any more: until v0.146.0 it installed
+// them from /tmp, and a script a root unit runs at boot was a root shell for a compromised agent. Here it only checks
+// them, and enables the unit (a fixed sudoers line) when the bundle has put it in place but nothing has enabled it — a
+// fresh install. Missing or different files: one warning, nothing run (the next bundle brings them).
+func (b *GuestBinder) ensureSharedParentBoot(ctx context.Context, unitPath, scriptPath, wantsLink string) error {
+	if sharedParentInstallStale(unitPath, scriptPath) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s or %s is missing or differs from this agent's — it arrives with the signed config bundle (agent_config_update); the agent does not install it (R-861)", scriptPath, unitPath)
 	}
-	name := f.Name()
-	if _, err := f.WriteString(content); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
-		os.Remove(name)
-		return "", err
+	if _, err := os.Lstat(wantsLink); err == nil {
+		return nil
 	}
-	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
-		os.Remove(name)
-		return "", err
+	if err := b.run(ctx, "systemctl", "enable", "felhom-shared-parent.service"); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("enable unit: %w", err)
 	}
-	return name, nil
+	b.logger.Info("shared-parent: boot-persistence unit enabled (files from the config bundle)")
+	return nil
 }
 
 // sharedParentInstallStale reports whether the on-disk boot script OR unit is missing or differs from
@@ -162,37 +163,6 @@ func sharedParentInstallStale(unitPath, scriptPath string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-// installSharedParentUnit writes the script + unit (from agent-written temps) and enables the unit so the
-// shared parent is re-established on every host boot before pve-guests. Idempotent. The temps are
-// RANDOM-named os.CreateTemp files (audit B1): a fixed, predictable /tmp name could be pre-created by
-// another local user and rewritten between our write and root's install (TOCTOU into a root-executed
-// boot script). The final modes come from `install -m`, so the 0600 temps are fine.
-func (b *GuestBinder) installSharedParentUnit(ctx context.Context) error {
-	tmpScript, err := stageTemp("felhom-shared-parent-*.sh", sharedParentScript)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write temp script: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer os.Remove(tmpScript)
-	if err := b.run(ctx, "install", "-m", "0755", "--", tmpScript, sharedParentScriptPath); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("install script: %w", err)
-	}
-	tmpUnit, err := stageTemp("felhom-shared-parent-*.service", sharedParentUnit)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write temp unit: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer os.Remove(tmpUnit)
-	if err := b.run(ctx, "install", "-m", "0644", "--", tmpUnit, sharedParentUnitPath); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("install unit: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := b.run(ctx, "systemctl", "daemon-reload"); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("daemon-reload: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := b.run(ctx, "systemctl", "enable", "felhom-shared-parent.service"); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("enable unit: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 // AttachDrive binds a drive's felhom-data namespace under the stable parent so it appears live in the
 // guest at the returned stable path (via propagation — no pct, no reboot). `where` is the drive's RAW
 // host PVE mount (/mnt/<name>); only `<where>/felhom-data` crosses into the guest (confinement). The

internal/localapi/intermediary_install_test.go

@@ -4,94 +4,82 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"io"
 	"os"
-	"regexp"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 )
 
-// stagingRecorderRunner is a fake proxmox.Runner recording every call vector and snapshotting each
-// install SOURCE file's content at call time (the deferred os.Remove erases it afterwards).
-type stagingRecorderRunner struct {
-	calls      [][]string
-	srcContent map[string]string // install dest → staged source content
-}
+// R-861 (agent v0.146.0): the shared-parent boot script and unit arrive with the signed config bundle; the agent never
+// installs them. It checks them and enables the unit when nothing has.
+//
+// RED-PROOF (audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt): put the old installSharedParentUnit call back (an
+// `install` of a /tmp file) → TestSharedParentBoot_NeverInstalls fails.
 
-func (r *stagingRecorderRunner) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+type callRecorder struct{ calls [][]string }
+
+func (r *callRecorder) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
 	r.calls = append(r.calls, append([]string{name}, args...))
-	if name == "install" && len(args) >= 2 {
-		src, dest := args[len(args)-2], args[len(args)-1]
-		if r.srcContent == nil {
-			r.srcContent = map[string]string{}
-		}
-		b, _ := os.ReadFile(src)
-		r.srcContent[dest] = string(b)
-	}
 	return nil, nil, nil
 }
 
-func (r *stagingRecorderRunner) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+func (r *callRecorder) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
 	return r.Run(ctx, name, args...)
 }
 
-// installSources returns the install-call source paths keyed by destination.
-func (r *stagingRecorderRunner) installSources() map[string][]string {
-	out := map[string][]string{}
-	for _, c := range r.calls {
-		if c[0] == "install" && len(c) >= 3 {
-			src, dest := c[len(c)-2], c[len(c)-1]
-			out[dest] = append(out[dest], src)
-		}
+func bootFiles(t *testing.T, script, unit string) (string, string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	d := t.TempDir()
+	sp, up := filepath.Join(d, "felhom-shared-parent.sh"), filepath.Join(d, "felhom-shared-parent.service")
+	if script != "" {
+		_ = os.WriteFile(sp, []byte(script), 0o755)
 	}
-	return out
+	if unit != "" {
+		_ = os.WriteFile(up, []byte(unit), 0o644)
+	}
+	return sp, up, filepath.Join(d, "wants-link")
 }
 
-// TestInstallSharedParent_RandomTempName is the audit-B1 negative test for the shared-parent boot
-// persistence install: both staged install SOURCES (script + unit) must be RANDOM os.CreateTemp names
-// (felhom-shared-parent-<random>.sh / .service), never the fixed, pre-creatable /tmp names (a local
-// TOCTOU into a root-executed boot script), and two consecutive installs must use DIFFERENT paths.
-func TestInstallSharedParent_RandomTempName(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &stagingRecorderRunner{}
+func TestSharedParentBoot_NeverInstalls(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, c := range []struct{ name, script, unit string }{
+		{"both missing", "", ""},
+		{"script differs", "#!/bin/sh\necho old\n", sharedParentUnit},
+		{"unit missing", sharedParentScript, ""},
+	} {
+		r := &callRecorder{}
+		b := NewGuestBinder(r, nil)
+		sp, up, link := bootFiles(t, c.script, c.unit)
+		if err := b.ensureSharedParentBoot(context.Background(), up, sp, link); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: no error — the operator would not learn the bundle is missing", c.name)
+		}
+		if len(r.calls) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("%s: the agent ran %v — it must install nothing (R-861)", c.name, r.calls)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSharedParentBoot_EnablesOnceTheBundleBroughtTheFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &callRecorder{}
 	b := NewGuestBinder(r, nil)
-	if err := b.installSharedParentUnit(context.Background()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("installSharedParentUnit #1: %v", err)
+	sp, up, link := bootFiles(t, sharedParentScript, sharedParentUnit)
+	if err := b.ensureSharedParentBoot(context.Background(), up, sp, link); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if err := b.installSharedParentUnit(context.Background()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("installSharedParentUnit #2: %v", err)
+	if len(r.calls) != 1 || len(r.calls[0]) != 3 || r.calls[0][0] != "systemctl" || r.calls[0][1] != "enable" ||
+		r.calls[0][2] != "felhom-shared-parent.service" {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly `systemctl enable felhom-shared-parent.service`, got %v", r.calls)
 	}
+	_ = os.Symlink(up, link)
+	r.calls = nil
+	if err := b.ensureSharedParentBoot(context.Background(), up, sp, link); err != nil || len(r.calls) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("already enabled: want no calls, got %v (%v)", r.calls, err)
+	}
+}
 
-	srcs := r.installSources()
-	cases := []struct {
-		dest    string
-		random  *regexp.Regexp
-		fixed   *regexp.Regexp
-		content string
-	}{
-		{sharedParentScriptPath, regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-shared-parent-[^/\\]+\.sh$`),
-			regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-shared-parent\.sh$`), sharedParentScript},
-		{sharedParentUnitPath, regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-shared-parent-[^/\\]+\.service$`),
-			regexp.MustCompile(`felhom-shared-parent\.service$`), sharedParentUnit},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		got := srcs[tc.dest]
-		if len(got) != 2 {
-			t.Fatalf("dest %s: expected 2 install calls, got %d (%v)", tc.dest, len(got), got)
-		}
-		for i, src := range got {
-			if !tc.random.MatchString(src) {
-				t.Errorf("dest %s call %d: source %q does not match the random temp pattern", tc.dest, i, src)
-			}
-			if tc.fixed.MatchString(src) {
-				t.Errorf("dest %s call %d: source %q is the FIXED predictable temp name (B1 TOCTOU)", tc.dest, i, src)
-			}
-			if _, err := os.Stat(src); err == nil {
-				t.Errorf("dest %s: staged temp %q left behind (defer os.Remove missing)", tc.dest, src)
-			}
-		}
-		if got[0] == got[1] {
-			t.Errorf("dest %s: two consecutive installs staged through the SAME source %q — must be random per call", tc.dest, got[0])
-		}
-		// Non-hollow: the staged file carried the real content at install time.
-		if r.srcContent[tc.dest] != tc.content {
-			t.Errorf("dest %s: staged content mismatch (got %d bytes, want %d)", tc.dest, len(r.srcContent[tc.dest]), len(tc.content))
+// The bundle's copies are byte-identical to the constants the agent compares against.
+func TestSharedParentFilesEqualTheBundle(t *testing.T) {
+	for file, want := range map[string]string{"felhom-shared-parent.sh": sharedParentScript, "felhom-shared-parent.service": sharedParentUnit} {
+		got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "configs", file))
+		if err != nil || string(got) != want {
+			t.Errorf("configs/%s differs from the agent's constant (err %v)", file, err)
 		}
 	}
 }

internal/localapi/server.go

@@ -160,6 +160,10 @@ type Options struct {
 	// NetStorage is the privileged network-mount (NAS) surface (Part A1). OPTIONAL — when nil, the
 	// /netstorage endpoints report "not configured". Satisfied by *storage.SudoHostOps.
 	NetStorage NetworkStorageOps
+	// AfterPrimaryBackup (agent v0.140.0, `11-os-updates.md` §8 step 2) runs right after a SUCCESSFUL backup on the
+	// PRIMARY tier, inside the backup goroutine and BEFORE the host-wide heavy-op gate is released — so the OS leg
+	// that it starts can never overlap another backup or a restore-test (`11` C10). OPTIONAL — nil → nothing runs.
+	AfterPrimaryBackup func(ctx context.Context, vmid int)
 	// Privileged runs the fenced root wrappers (E-2a: felhom-backup-target-apply). OPTIONAL — when
 	// nil, POST /backup/target reports "not configured". Satisfied by *proxmox.ExecRunner.
 	Privileged PrivilegedRunner
@@ -276,6 +280,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	tiers []BackupTier
 	// inFlight (R-85) is shared with the restore-test scheduler so the two never run together.
 	inFlight *backup.InFlight
+	afterPrimaryBackup func(ctx context.Context, vmid int) // the OS leg (agent v0.140.0); nil = none
 	logger   *slog.Logger
 	now      func() time.Time
 
@@ -469,6 +474,7 @@ func NewServer(o Options) (*Server, error) {
 	// the primary is always first, because that is what the untargeted endpoints act on.
 	s.tiers = normalizeBackupTiers(o.BackupTiers, o.Backups, cadence)
 	s.inFlight = o.InFlight
+	s.afterPrimaryBackup = o.AfterPrimaryBackup
 	if s.backups == nil && len(s.tiers) > 0 {
 		s.backups = s.tiers[0].Service
 	}
@@ -894,6 +900,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int)
 		}
 		s.store.RecordBackup(b)
 		s.finishJob(key, jobID, b)
+		// OS leg (agent v0.140.0): after the night's whole-guest copy exists, still holding the heavy-op gate.
+		if b.Success && tier.Primary && s.afterPrimaryBackup != nil {
+			s.afterPrimaryBackup(base, vmid)
+		}
 	}()
 	writeStatus(w, http.StatusAccepted, true, BackupResponse{VMID: vmid, JobID: jobID, Phase: PhaseRunning}, "")
 }
@@ -1465,3 +1475,6 @@ func writeStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, ok bool, data any, errMsg stri
 	w.WriteHeader(code)
 	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(apiResponse{OK: ok, Data: data, Error: errMsg})
 }
+
+// SetAfterPrimaryBackup wires the hook that runs after a successful primary-tier backup (the OS leg, agent v0.140.0).
+func (s *Server) SetAfterPrimaryBackup(fn func(ctx context.Context, vmid int)) { s.afterPrimaryBackup = fn }

internal/localapi/tokenstore.go

@@ -154,12 +154,15 @@ func (s *TokenStore) Mint(vmid int) (string, error) {
 // looks it up; the per-candidate comparison is constant-time to avoid a timing oracle on the
 // stored hash. ok is false for an unknown/empty token.
 //
-// Reload-on-miss (B3): the store FILE is shared across processes — the one-shot provisioner
-// (`--selftest=provision`) Mints into it while the long-lived daemon serves Lookup from an index
-// built at open. On a miss, re-read the file ONCE and re-check, so a token minted after this
-// process started authorizes without a daemon restart (the drill's fresh-install 401). The
-// append-only log makes an unchanged file size proof of no new records, so a genuinely unknown
-// token costs at most one stat once the index is current — never a reload loop.
+// Reload-on-change (B3, R-269): the store FILE is shared across processes — the one-shot
+// provisioner (`--selftest=provision`) Mints into it while the long-lived daemon serves Lookup from
+// an index built at open. Every Lookup stats the file first and re-reads it when the append-only
+// log has grown, BEFORE answering — so a token minted elsewhere authorizes without a restart AND a
+// token rotated out elsewhere stops authorizing on its very next presentation. (Before R-269 the
+// re-read ran only on a MISS, so a superseded token was a direct map hit and kept authorizing until
+// some unrelated miss forced the reload.) An unchanged size is proof of no new records, so the
+// steady state costs one stat per call and never a reload loop. Pinned by
+// TestTokenStore_RotatedOutTokenRejectedFirst.
 func (s *TokenStore) Lookup(token string) (int, bool) {
 	if token == "" {
 		return 0, false
@@ -167,23 +170,34 @@ func (s *TokenStore) Lookup(token string) (int, bool) {
 	want := hashToken(token)
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	// Direct map hit is the common path; the constant-time compare guards against a timing
-	// side-channel by re-checking the matched key (map lookup itself is not the secret-bearing
-	// comparison — the hash of a random 256-bit token is not feasibly guessable regardless).
-	if vmid, ok := s.byHash[want]; ok {
-		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(want), []byte(s.byVMID[vmid])) == 1 {
-			return vmid, true
+	st, statErr := os.Stat(s.path)
+	if statErr == nil && st.Size() != s.loadedSize {
+		// The log changed under us (another process minted/rotated): converge first, then answer.
+		s.reloads++
+		if err := s.reloadLocked(); err != nil {
+			return 0, false // unreadable store: fail closed, never crash the auth path
 		}
+		return s.matchLocked(want)
 	}
-	// Miss: skip the re-read when the append-only log has not grown (nothing new to see).
-	// A stat error falls through to the reload, which handles a missing file as empty.
-	if st, err := os.Stat(s.path); err == nil && st.Size() == s.loadedSize {
-		return 0, false
+	if vmid, ok := s.matchLocked(want); ok {
+		return vmid, true
 	}
+	if statErr == nil {
+		return 0, false // file unchanged since the last (re)load: genuinely unknown
+	}
+	// Stat failed (e.g. the file vanished): reload, which treats a missing file as empty.
 	s.reloads++
 	if err := s.reloadLocked(); err != nil {
-		return 0, false // unreadable store: fail closed, never crash the auth path
+		return 0, false
 	}
+	return s.matchLocked(want)
+}
+
+// matchLocked answers from the in-memory index. Direct map hit is the common path; the
+// constant-time compare re-checks the matched key against the guest's CURRENT hash (map lookup
+// itself is not the secret-bearing comparison — the hash of a random 256-bit token is not
+// feasibly guessable regardless). Caller holds the mutex.
+func (s *TokenStore) matchLocked(want string) (int, bool) {
 	if vmid, ok := s.byHash[want]; ok {
 		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(want), []byte(s.byVMID[vmid])) == 1 {
 			return vmid, true

internal/localapi/tokenstore_test.go

@@ -210,6 +210,51 @@ func TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_RemintCoherence(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// R-269: a token rotated out by ANOTHER process must stop authorizing on its very next
+// presentation — with NO intervening lookup of the new token. This is the order the operator hits
+// after rotating a leaked token: the leaked one is presented first. RemintCoherence above looks the
+// NEW token up first, and that miss is what used to evict the old hash, so it passed while the leaked
+// token kept returning HTTP 200 on hardware (2026-08-09) until something unrelated forced a reload.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: restore the reload-on-MISS-only Lookup (answer a map hit before stat-ing the file) and
+// this fails with "rotated-out token still authorizes".
+func TestTokenStore_RotatedOutTokenRejectedFirst(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tokens.log")
+	daemon, err := OpenTokenStore(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open daemon store: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer daemon.Close()
+	minter, err := OpenTokenStore(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open minter store: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer minter.Close()
+
+	old, err := minter.Mint(130)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mint old: %v", err)
+	}
+	if vmid, ok := daemon.Lookup(old); !ok || vmid != 130 { // the daemon has learned the old token
+		t.Fatalf("old token before rotation: (%d,%v), want (130,true)", vmid, ok)
+	}
+	fresh, err := minter.Mint(130) // rotation, written by another process
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mint fresh: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if vmid, ok := daemon.Lookup(old); ok { // the leaked token FIRST
+		t.Fatalf("rotated-out token still authorizes vmid %d on its first presentation after rotation — "+
+			"Mint's 'any previous token for this guest is revoked' is false across processes (R-269)", vmid)
+	}
+	if vmid, ok := daemon.Lookup(fresh); !ok || vmid != 130 {
+		t.Fatalf("fresh token after rotation: (%d,%v), want (130,true)", vmid, ok)
+	}
+	if vmid, ok := daemon.Lookup(old); ok {
+		t.Fatalf("rotated-out token authorizes vmid %d after the fresh one was seen", vmid)
+	}
+}
+
 // §8 edge: the store file deleted between open and a miss — reload treats it as empty; Lookup
 // fails closed, no crash.
 func TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_MissingFile(t *testing.T) {

internal/osupdate/bundle.go

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// OpConfigUpdate is the signed op that brings a box's ROOT-OWNED files (sudoers, wrappers, units) to a release's config
+// bundle (R-840, `11` §5.4.2). The params pin the agent version and the bundle's sha256; the root wrapper re-verifies
+// the signature, the host binding, the nonce and the sha ITSELF — this executor is only the courier.
+const OpConfigUpdate = "agent_config_update"
+
+// BundleFileName is the bundle's name beside the binary in the Gitea generic package felhom-agent/<version>/.
+const BundleFileName = "felhom-config-bundle.json"
+
+var (
+	bundleVersionRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$`)
+	bundleSHARe     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{64}$`)
+)
+
+// ConfigUpdateParams are the signed params (the wrapper reads the same two names out of the signed blob).
+type ConfigUpdateParams struct {
+	AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"`
+	BundleSHA256 string `json:"bundle_sha256"`
+}
+
+// BundleURL derives the bundle's URL from the agent binary's URL template (".../felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent").
+func BundleURL(binaryTemplate, version string) (string, error) {
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(binaryTemplate, "/felhom-agent") || !strings.Contains(binaryTemplate, "{version}") {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("cannot derive the bundle URL from %q (want …/{version}/felhom-agent)", binaryTemplate)
+	}
+	t := strings.TrimSuffix(binaryTemplate, "felhom-agent") + BundleFileName
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(t, "{version}", version), nil
+}
+
+// ConfigUpdateExecutor runs a verified agent_config_update (signedjobs.Executor).
+type ConfigUpdateExecutor struct {
+	Leg         *Leg
+	URLTemplate string // the agent binary's template (config.SelfUpdate.URLTemplate)
+	Username    string
+	Token       string
+	HTTPClient  *http.Client
+	// AfterInstall runs after a bundle installed (the capability re-probe; nil = none).
+	AfterInstall func(ctx context.Context)
+}
+
+// Execute implements signedjobs.Executor.
+func (e ConfigUpdateExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.RawMessage) error {
+	if op != OpConfigUpdate {
+		return signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor
+	}
+	so, ok := signedjobs.SignedOpFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: no signed envelope in the context — the wrapper could not verify it")
+	}
+	var p ConfigUpdateParams
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: bad params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !bundleVersionRe.MatchString(p.AgentVersion) || !bundleSHARe.MatchString(p.BundleSHA256) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: params must pin agent_version (semver) and bundle_sha256 (64 hex)")
+	}
+	lg := e.Leg.log().With("op", OpConfigUpdate, "agent_version", p.AgentVersion)
+	url, err := BundleURL(e.URLTemplate, p.AgentVersion)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: %w", err)
+	}
+	dir := e.Leg.PlanDir
+	if dir == "" {
+		dir = DefaultPlanDir
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: plan dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "bundle-"+p.AgentVersion+".json")
+	start := time.Now()
+	got, err := e.download(ctx, url, path)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(path)
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: download %s: %w", url, err)
+	}
+	defer os.Remove(path)
+	// The agent's own check is a courtesy (an early, clear error); the wrapper's is the gate.
+	if got != p.BundleSHA256 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: the downloaded bundle's sha256 is %s, the signed job pins %s — nothing installed", got, p.BundleSHA256)
+	}
+	lg.Info("osupdate: config bundle downloaded; handing it to the root wrapper", "sha256", got[:16], "duration_ms", time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
+	runID := "bundle-" + e.Leg.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	wr, err := e.Leg.call(ctx, runID, map[string]any{"release_id": "bundle-" + p.AgentVersion, "layer": LayerHost,
+		"mode": "bundle", "bundle": path,
+		"signed": map[string]string{"blob_b64": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(so.Blob), "sig": string(so.Sig)}})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: %w", err)
+	}
+	if wr.refused() {
+		lg.Warn("osupdate: config bundle REFUSED by the wrapper — nothing changed", "refused", string(wr.Refused))
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: refused: %s", wr.Refused)
+	}
+	if wr.failed() {
+		lg.Error("osupdate: config bundle FAILED — the wrapper put the previous files back", "failed", string(wr.Failed), "bundle", string(wr.Bundle))
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: failed (previous files restored): %s", wr.Failed)
+	}
+	lg.Warn("osupdate: config bundle INSTALLED", "bundle", string(wr.Bundle), "pass_seconds", wr.PassSeconds)
+	if e.AfterInstall != nil {
+		e.AfterInstall(ctx)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (e ConfigUpdateExecutor) download(ctx context.Context, url, dest string) (string, error) {
+	hc := e.HTTPClient
+	if hc == nil {
+		hc = &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Minute}
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if e.Username != "" || e.Token != "" {
+		req.SetBasicAuth(e.Username, e.Token)
+	}
+	resp, err := hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	h := sha256.New()
+	// 4 MB is the wrapper's own limit; read one byte more so an oversized bundle fails there, visibly.
+	if _, err := io.Copy(io.MultiWriter(f, h), io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4*1024*1024+1)); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
+}

internal/osupdate/bundle_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/reconcile"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// bundleWrapper plays felhom-os-apply for mode "bundle": it records the plan and the bundle file's bytes AT CALL TIME
+// (the executor deletes the file afterwards), and answers with rep.
+type bundleWrapper struct {
+	t      *testing.T
+	rep    string
+	plans  []map[string]any
+	bodies [][]byte
+}
+
+func (b *bundleWrapper) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	if name != WrapperPath || len(args) != 2 || args[0] != "--plan" {
+		b.t.Fatalf("unexpected command %s %v", name, args)
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(args[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var plan map[string]any
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &plan)
+	b.plans = append(b.plans, plan)
+	body, _ := os.ReadFile(plan["bundle"].(string))
+	b.bodies = append(b.bodies, body)
+	return []byte("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + b.rep + "\n"), nil, nil
+}
+
+func serveBundle(t *testing.T, body []byte) (*httptest.Server, string) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/felhom-agent/0.143.0/"+BundleFileName {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write(body)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	return srv, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+func bundleExec(t *testing.T, w *bundleWrapper, srvURL string) (ConfigUpdateExecutor, *bool) {
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, &fakeWrapper{t: t}, nil)
+	l.Runner = w
+	called := false
+	return ConfigUpdateExecutor{Leg: l, URLTemplate: srvURL + "/felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent",
+		AfterInstall: func(context.Context) { called = true }}, &called
+}
+
+func signedCtx() context.Context {
+	return signedjobs.WithSignedOp(context.Background(), &reconcile.SignedOp{Blob: []byte(`{"op":"agent_config_update"}`), Sig: []byte("SIG")})
+}
+
+func params(v, sha string) json.RawMessage {
+	p, _ := json.Marshal(ConfigUpdateParams{AgentVersion: v, BundleSHA256: sha})
+	return p
+}
+
+// The courier hands the wrapper the bundle bytes it downloaded and the RAW signed envelope (the wrapper verifies both
+// itself), then runs the capability probe. Red-proof: drop "signed" from the plan → the plan check below fails.
+func TestConfigUpdate_PassesBundleAndEnvelopeToTheWrapper(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{"format":1,"agent_version":"0.143.0","files":[]}`)
+	srv, sha := serveBundle(t, body)
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t, rep: `{"mode":"bundle","bundle":{"agent_version":"0.143.0","written":["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"]}}`}
+	e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", sha)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p := w.plans[0]
+	sg, _ := p["signed"].(map[string]any)
+	if p["mode"] != "bundle" || p["layer"] != "host" || sg == nil || sg["sig"] != "SIG" ||
+		sg["blob_b64"] != base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"op":"agent_config_update"}`)) {
+		t.Fatalf("plan = %v", p)
+	}
+	if string(w.bodies[0]) != string(body) || !strings.HasSuffix(p["bundle"].(string), "/bundle-0.143.0.json") {
+		t.Fatalf("the wrapper got %q at %v", w.bodies[0], p["bundle"])
+	}
+	if !*called {
+		t.Fatal("the capability probe must run after an install")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(p["bundle"].(string)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("the downloaded bundle must be removed after the call")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_WrongShaNeverReachesTheWrapper(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, _ := serveBundle(t, []byte("tampered"))
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t}
+	e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+	err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", strings.Repeat("a", 64)))
+	if err == nil || len(w.plans) != 0 || *called {
+		t.Fatalf("err=%v plans=%d", err, len(w.plans))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_RefusedAndFailedAreErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, rep := range []string{`{"refused":{"code":"R17","reason":"trust root"}}`, `{"failed":{"rc":3},"bundle":{"rolled_back":["/x"]}}`} {
+		srv, sha := serveBundle(t, []byte("{}"))
+		w := &bundleWrapper{t: t, rep: rep}
+		e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+		if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", sha)); err == nil || *called {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: err=%v called=%v", rep, err, *called)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_GuardsBeforeAnyDownload(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t}
+	e, _ := bundleExec(t, w, "http://127.0.0.1:1")
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), "agent_update", nil); !errors.Is(err, signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor) {
+		t.Fatalf("another op must pass through the chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", strings.Repeat("a", 64))); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no envelope must refuse")
+	}
+	for _, p := range []json.RawMessage{params("0.143", strings.Repeat("a", 64)), params("0.143.0", "ABC"), json.RawMessage(`nope`)} {
+		if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, p); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("bad params %s must refuse", p)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(w.plans) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no wrapper call on a refusal")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBundleURL(t *testing.T) {
+	u, err := BundleURL("https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent", "0.143.0")
+	if err != nil || u != "https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/0.143.0/felhom-config-bundle.json" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s %v", u, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := BundleURL("https://example/felhom-agent-{version}.bin", "0.143.0"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("an underivable template must refuse")
+	}
+}
+
+func (b *bundleWrapper) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	return b.Run(ctx, name, args...)
+}

internal/osupdate/dockerjob.go

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// OpDockerStep is the signed op class of a Docker engine step (`11` §5.8): a ring-1 box takes an approved engine set,
+// and every box takes an UNDO, only through it. CC may sign it until the first paying customer (R-530 ruling).
+const OpDockerStep = "os_docker_step"
+
+// DockerStepParams are the signed params. The wrapper compares Packages and Undo with the plan byte-for-byte.
+type DockerStepParams struct {
+	ReleaseID string    `json:"release_id"`
+	Packages  []Package `json:"packages"`
+	Undo      bool      `json:"undo"`
+	VMID      int       `json:"vmid,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// DockerStepExecutor runs a verified os_docker_step (signedjobs.Executor). Guest finds the box's customer guest when
+// the params name none; Gate (optional) takes the host-wide heavy-op gate so a step never runs beside a backup.
+type DockerStepExecutor struct {
+	Leg   *Leg
+	Guest func(ctx context.Context) (int, error)
+	Gate  func(ctx context.Context) (release func(), err error)
+}
+
+// Execute implements signedjobs.Executor.
+func (e DockerStepExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.RawMessage) error {
+	if op != OpDockerStep {
+		return signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor
+	}
+	so, ok := signedjobs.SignedOpFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: no signed envelope in the context — the wrapper could not verify it")
+	}
+	var p DockerStepParams
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil || len(p.Packages) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: params must name the engine set: %v", err)
+	}
+	vmid := p.VMID
+	if vmid == 0 {
+		if e.Guest == nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: no vmid and no guest finder")
+		}
+		v, err := e.Guest(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: find the customer guest: %w", err)
+		}
+		vmid = v
+	}
+	if e.Gate != nil {
+		release, err := e.Gate(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: heavy-op gate busy (a backup or restore-test runs): %w", err)
+		}
+		defer release()
+	}
+	rep := e.Leg.RunDockerSigned(ctx, vmid, p, so.Blob, string(so.Sig))
+	switch rep.Outcome {
+	case "applied", "nothing":
+		if rep.Healthy {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("os_docker_step: %s (%s) %s", rep.Outcome, rep.HealthReason, string(rep.Refused))
+}
+
+// RunDockerSigned is one signed Docker step (ring 1 or an undo): live-restore first (decision 87, a no-op when on),
+// then the docker layer with the signed envelope, which the wrapper verifies itself.
+func (l *Leg) RunDockerSigned(ctx context.Context, vmid int, p DockerStepParams, blob []byte, sig string) Report {
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	defer unlock()
+	l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx) // R-868
+	runID := l.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	lg := l.log().With("run", runID, "vmid", vmid, "trigger", "signed", "release", p.ReleaseID, "undo", p.Undo)
+	if err := l.EnsureLiveRestore(ctx, runID, vmid); err != nil {
+		return l.finish(ctx, lg, Report{RunID: runID, Layer: LayerDocker, Trigger: "signed", Ring: l.Block().Ring, VMID: vmid,
+			Mode: "apply", ReleaseID: p.ReleaseID, Outcome: "failed", HealthReason: "live-restore could not be turned on: " + err.Error()})
+	}
+	rid := p.ReleaseID
+	if rid == "" {
+		rid = "signed-" + runID
+	}
+	return l.runLayer(ctx, runID, LayerDocker, vmid, "signed", l.Block(), dockerOpts{releaseID: rid, packages: p.Packages,
+		undo: p.Undo, signed: map[string]string{"blob_b64": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(blob), "sig": sig}})
+}

internal/osupdate/dockerjob_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/reconcile"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// The executor hands the RAW signed bytes to the wrapper (which verifies them itself) and the exact signed package
+// list. Red-proof: drop the `signed` field from the docker plan in runLayer and the plan check fails.
+func TestDockerStepExecutor_PassesTheSignedEnvelope(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerDocker: {
+		Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie"}}, DockerEngine: "29.8.2", Authority: "signed"}}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true})
+	e := DockerStepExecutor{Leg: l, Guest: func(context.Context) (int, error) { return 9201, nil }}
+	params, _ := json.Marshal(DockerStepParams{ReleaseID: "os-docker-1", Packages: []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie", Origin: "Docker CE"}}})
+	ctx := signedjobs.WithSignedOp(context.Background(), &reconcile.SignedOp{Blob: []byte(`{"op":"os_docker_step"}`), Sig: []byte("SIG")})
+	if err := e.Execute(ctx, OpDockerStep, params); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	dp := w.plans[len(w.plans)-1]
+	sg, _ := dp["signed"].(map[string]any)
+	if dp["layer"] != "docker" || dp["lane"] != "slow" || dp["release_id"] != "os-docker-1" || sg == nil ||
+		sg["blob_b64"] != base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"op":"os_docker_step"}`)) || sg["sig"] != "SIG" {
+		t.Fatalf("docker plan = %v", dp)
+	}
+	if calls(w) != "guest:live-restore-on,docker:apply" || len(h.reports) != 1 || h.reports[0].Trigger != "signed" {
+		t.Fatalf("calls=%s reports=%+v", calls(w), h.reports)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDockerStepExecutor_RefusesWithoutEnvelopeAndPassesOtherOps(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true})
+	e := DockerStepExecutor{Leg: l, Guest: func(context.Context) (int, error) { return 9201, nil }}
+	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), "agent_update", nil); !errors.Is(err, signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor) {
+		t.Fatalf("another op must pass through the chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	params, _ := json.Marshal(DockerStepParams{Packages: []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "1"}}})
+	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), OpDockerStep, params); err == nil || len(w.plans) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no envelope must refuse before any wrapper call: err=%v calls=%s", err, calls(w))
+	}
+}

internal/osupdate/leg.go

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+// Package osupdate is the agent's OS-update leg (`11-os-updates.md` §8 steps 2–3, §5.8): the customer GUEST's Debian
+// fast lane (agent v0.140.0), after it in the same pass the HOST's (agent v0.141.0), and then — ring 0 only — the
+// guest's DOCKER engine set, the slow lane (agent v0.142.0; a ring-1 box takes a Docker step only inside a signed
+// operator job, DockerStepExecutor). It also reads the box's versions for the hub's System page (Facts, R-852).
+//
+// It runs right after the night's successful whole-guest backup, while the backup goroutine still holds the host-wide
+// heavy-op gate (so it never overlaps a backup or a restore-test, `11` C10), at most once per night. All root work is
+// the wrapper `felhom-os-apply` (configs/, its own tests); this package only builds plans, calls the wrapper through
+// sudo, judges health and reports to the hub — one report per layer.
+//
+// NO AUTOMATIC UNDO (R-837 measured; `09` §3 decision 81): a failed health check stops, reports `health_failed` and the
+// hub mails the operator; the whole-guest backup taken minutes earlier is the guest's undo, by hand; a host package is
+// put back by hand from the previous release's snapshot (runbook). The host is NEVER rebooted by this package.
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/proxmox"
+)
+
+// WrapperPath is the pinned sudoers vector (configs/felhom-agent.sudoers FELHOM_OSAPPLY).
+const WrapperPath = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"
+
+// DefaultPlanDir is where plans are written (the sudoers glob names it).
+const DefaultPlanDir = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os"
+
+// Layers.
+const (
+	LayerGuest  = "guest"
+	LayerHost   = "host"
+	LayerDocker = "docker" // the guest's Docker engine set — slow lane (`11` §5.8)
+)
+
+// DockerNames are the six packages of the Docker engine set (the wrapper's DOCKER_NAMES).
+var DockerNames = map[string]bool{"containerd.io": true, "docker-buildx-plugin": true, "docker-ce": true,
+	"docker-ce-cli": true, "docker-ce-rootless-extras": true, "docker-compose-plugin": true}
+
+// Package is one name=version with its origin.
+type Package struct {
+	Name    string `json:"name"`
+	Version string `json:"version"`
+	Origin  string `json:"origin"`
+}
+
+// Pending is one update the sources offer (origin as apt names it, possibly several).
+type Pending struct {
+	Name   string   `json:"name"`
+	From   string   `json:"from"`
+	To     string   `json:"to"`
+	Origin []string `json:"origin"`
+}
+
+// Container is one container's state as the wrapper saw it.
+type Container struct {
+	State  string `json:"state"`
+	Health string `json:"health"` // healthy | unhealthy | starting | none
+	ID     string `json:"id,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Health is one health reading. Guest layer: DockerOK..Containers. Host layer: HostServices, GuestRunning and the
+// guest's own reading in Guest.
+type Health struct {
+	DockerOK   bool                 `json:"docker_ok"`
+	NetworkOK  bool                 `json:"network_ok"`
+	Controller string               `json:"controller"`
+	Containers map[string]Container `json:"containers"`
+	// ControllerDockerOK: the controller reaches the engine from INSIDE its container (R-858, wrapper ≥ v0.142.1;
+	// nil from an older wrapper = not checked). Its own health check stayed "healthy" while it was blind.
+	ControllerDockerOK *bool             `json:"controller_docker_ok,omitempty"`
+	HostServices       map[string]string `json:"host_services,omitempty"`
+	GuestRunning       *bool             `json:"guest_running,omitempty"`
+	Guest              *Health           `json:"guest,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// WrapperReport is the wrapper's OSAPPLY-REPORT object.
+type WrapperReport struct {
+	Mode                string          `json:"mode"`
+	Layer               string          `json:"layer"`
+	Refused             json.RawMessage `json:"refused"`
+	Failed              json.RawMessage `json:"failed"`
+	Upgraded            []Package       `json:"upgraded"`
+	Installed           []Package       `json:"installed"`
+	Pending             []Pending       `json:"pending"`
+	RestartNeeded       []string        `json:"restart_needed"`
+	DockerRestartNeeded bool            `json:"docker_restart_needed"`
+	RebootNeeded        bool            `json:"reboot_needed"`
+	RebootScanned       bool            `json:"reboot_scanned"`
+	HealthBefore        *Health         `json:"health_before"`
+	HealthAfter         *Health         `json:"health_after"`
+	Health              *Health         `json:"health"`
+	PassSeconds         float64         `json:"pass_seconds"`
+	DockerEngine        string          `json:"docker_engine"`
+	Authority           string          `json:"authority"`
+	Undo                bool            `json:"undo"`
+	LiveRestore         json.RawMessage `json:"live_restore"`
+	Facts               json.RawMessage `json:"facts"`
+	Bundle              json.RawMessage `json:"bundle"` // the config bundle's result (R-840, mode "bundle")
+	// R-868 (v0.144.0): the agent's ids, echoed from the plan, so a report kept on disk can be sent without the
+	// agent process that started the pass. ReleaseID / VMID were always in the report.
+	RunID     string `json:"run_id"`
+	Trigger   string `json:"trigger"`
+	Ring      *int   `json:"ring"`
+	ReleaseID string `json:"release_id"`
+	VMID      int    `json:"vmid"`
+}
+
+func (w WrapperReport) refused() bool { return len(w.Refused) > 0 && string(w.Refused) != "null" }
+func (w WrapperReport) failed() bool  { return len(w.Failed) > 0 && string(w.Failed) != "null" }
+
+// Report is what the hub receives per layer (hub osupdates.Report — field-exact).
+type Report struct {
+	RunID               string          `json:"run_id"`
+	Layer               string          `json:"layer"`
+	Trigger             string          `json:"trigger"`
+	Mode                string          `json:"mode"`
+	Ring                int             `json:"ring"`
+	ReleaseID           string          `json:"release_id"`
+	Outcome             string          `json:"outcome"`
+	Healthy             bool            `json:"healthy"`
+	HealthReason        string          `json:"health_reason,omitempty"`
+	VMID                int             `json:"vmid"`
+	Upgraded            []Package       `json:"upgraded,omitempty"`
+	Installed           []Package       `json:"installed,omitempty"`
+	Pending             []Pending       `json:"pending,omitempty"`
+	NotCovered          []string        `json:"not_covered,omitempty"`
+	RestartNeeded       []string        `json:"restart_needed,omitempty"`
+	DockerRestartNeeded bool            `json:"docker_restart_needed,omitempty"`
+	RebootNeeded        bool            `json:"reboot_needed,omitempty"`
+	RebootScanned       bool            `json:"reboot_scanned,omitempty"` // the pass looked (host: every pass) — a false RebootNeeded then means "not needed"
+	Refused             json.RawMessage `json:"refused,omitempty"`
+	PassSeconds         float64         `json:"pass_seconds,omitempty"`
+	DockerEngine        string          `json:"docker_engine,omitempty"` // docker layer: the engine after the step
+	Authority           string          `json:"authority,omitempty"`     // docker layer: ring0 | signed
+	Undo                bool            `json:"undo,omitempty"`          // docker layer: a signed undo (downgrade)
+
+	unsent string // R-868: the wrapper's kept copy of this pass's report — deleted once the hub has it
+}
+
+// Reporter posts a report to the hub (*hub.Client).
+type Reporter interface {
+	PostOSReport(ctx context.Context, body []byte) error
+}
+
+// Leg runs one OS-update pass for the customer guest and then the host.
+type Leg struct {
+	Runner     proxmox.Runner
+	Hub        Reporter
+	Tunnel     hub.CloudflaredProber // the host health rule needs the tunnel `running` (R-841)
+	Appliance  bool                  // agent.json deployment_mode; the wrapper re-checks the ROOT-owned record (R12)
+	Logger     *slog.Logger
+	PlanDir    string
+	StatePath  string        // last night run (once per night)
+	HealthWait time.Duration // how long health may take to come back (default 5 min)
+	HealthPoll time.Duration // default 15 s
+	MinGap     time.Duration // between night runs (default 20 h)
+	Now        func() time.Time
+	Sleep      func(context.Context, time.Duration)
+
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	block *hub.WireOSUpdate
+}
+
+// planFile / reportFile: the plan the agent writes and the copy of the report the wrapper keeps beside it (R-868).
+func planFile(dir, runID, layer, mode string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("plan-%s-%s-%s.json", runID, layer, mode))
+}
+
+func reportFile(dir, runID, layer, mode string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("report-%s-%s-%s.json", runID, layer, mode))
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) planDir() string {
+	if l.PlanDir == "" {
+		return DefaultPlanDir
+	}
+	return l.PlanDir
+}
+
+// OnDesiredState stores the hub's os_update block (desired.RawConsumer — store only, never block).
+func (l *Leg) OnDesiredState(_ context.Context, resp *hub.DesiredStateResponse) {
+	if resp == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	l.block = resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate
+	l.mu.Unlock()
+	l.saveBlock(resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate)
+}
+
+// SavedBlockFile is the hub's newest os_update block as the daemon last received it (R-866, v0.144.0): the debug
+// pass falls back to it when the hub cannot be reached, and says so.
+const SavedBlockFile = "os-update-block.json"
+
+type savedBlock struct {
+	SavedAt time.Time         `json:"saved_at"`
+	Block   *hub.WireOSUpdate `json:"block"`
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) saveBlock(b *hub.WireOSUpdate) {
+	dir := l.planDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(savedBlock{SavedAt: l.now().UTC(), Block: b})
+	tmp := filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile+".tmp")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, body, 0o600); err == nil {
+		_ = os.Rename(tmp, filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile))
+	}
+}
+
+// LoadSavedBlock reads the block the daemon saved (R-866). ok=false: none saved yet.
+func LoadSavedBlock(dir string) (b *hub.WireOSUpdate, savedAt time.Time, ok bool) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, time.Time{}, false
+	}
+	var s savedBlock
+	if json.Unmarshal(raw, &s) != nil {
+		return nil, time.Time{}, false
+	}
+	return s.Block, s.SavedAt, true
+}
+
+// Block returns the newest os_update block. No block (an older hub, or nothing fetched yet) = ring 1, ON, no
+// release: the box reports and installs nothing.
+func (l *Leg) Block() hub.WireOSUpdate {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	if l.block == nil {
+		return hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true}
+	}
+	return *l.block
+}
+
+// SetBlock sets the block directly (the selftest fetches the desired state itself).
+func (l *Leg) SetBlock(b *hub.WireOSUpdate) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	l.block = b
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) now() time.Time {
+	if l.Now != nil {
+		return l.Now()
+	}
+	return time.Now()
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) log() *slog.Logger {
+	if l.Logger != nil {
+		return l.Logger
+	}
+	return slog.Default()
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) sleep(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) {
+	if l.Sleep != nil {
+		l.Sleep(ctx, d)
+		return
+	}
+	select {
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+	case <-time.After(d):
+	}
+}
+
+// IsFast reports whether every origin apt names is Debian / Debian-Security (the fast lane, `11` C3).
+func IsFast(origins []string) bool {
+	if len(origins) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, o := range origins {
+		if o != "Debian" && o != "Debian-Security" {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// HealthVerdict is THE guest health rule (`11` §8.1; pinned by TestHealthVerdict*): docker answers, the guest's
+// network resolves, the controller's own health check is `healthy`, and every container that was running at the
+// start of the pass runs again — and healthy again if it was. "starting" is not yet healthy.
+func HealthVerdict(before, after *Health) (bool, string) {
+	if after == nil {
+		return false, "no health reading"
+	}
+	if !after.DockerOK {
+		return false, "docker does not answer"
+	}
+	if !after.NetworkOK {
+		return false, "the guest cannot resolve deb.debian.org"
+	}
+	if after.Controller != "healthy" {
+		return false, "the controller is " + after.Controller
+	}
+	if after.ControllerDockerOK != nil && !*after.ControllerDockerOK {
+		return false, "the controller cannot reach Docker (it holds an old socket — R-858)"
+	}
+	if before == nil {
+		return true, ""
+	}
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(before.Containers))
+	for n := range before.Containers {
+		names = append(names, n)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(names)
+	for _, n := range names {
+		b := before.Containers[n]
+		if b.State != "running" {
+			continue
+		}
+		a, ok := after.Containers[n]
+		if !ok || a.State != "running" {
+			return false, n + " was running and is not"
+		}
+		if b.Health == "healthy" && a.Health != "healthy" {
+			return false, n + " was healthy and is " + a.Health
+		}
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// HostHealthVerdict is THE host health rule (`11` §8.2; pinned by TestHostHealthVerdict): the Proxmox daemons and the
+// agent are active, the customer guest still runs, the guest's own rule still passes against the start of the pass,
+// and the tunnel is `running` (R-841).
+func HostHealthVerdict(before, after *Health, tunnel string) (bool, string) {
+	if after == nil {
+		return false, "no health reading"
+	}
+	svcs := make([]string, 0, len(after.HostServices))
+	for s := range after.HostServices {
+		svcs = append(svcs, s)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(svcs)
+	if len(svcs) == 0 {
+		return false, "no host service reading"
+	}
+	for _, s := range svcs {
+		if after.HostServices[s] != "active" {
+			return false, s + " is " + after.HostServices[s]
+		}
+	}
+	if after.GuestRunning == nil || !*after.GuestRunning {
+		return false, "the customer guest is not running"
+	}
+	var gb *Health
+	if before != nil {
+		gb = before.Guest
+	}
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(gb, after.Guest); !ok {
+		return false, "guest: " + why
+	}
+	if tunnel != hub.TunnelRunning {
+		return false, "the tunnel is " + tunnel
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// EngineOf is the engine version `docker version` prints for a docker-ce package version: "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie"
+// → "29.8.2" (no epoch, no Debian revision).
+func EngineOf(pkgVersion string) string {
+	v := pkgVersion
+	if i := strings.Index(v, ":"); i >= 0 {
+		v = v[i+1:]
+	}
+	if i := strings.Index(v, "-"); i >= 0 {
+		v = v[:i]
+	}
+	return v
+}
+
+// DockerHealthVerdict is THE Docker-step health rule (`11` §5.8; pinned by TestDockerHealthVerdict): the guest rule,
+// plus every container running at the start still runs as the SAME container (same id — a changed id means the
+// household's apps restarted, which `live-restore` exists to prevent), plus the engine now reports the version the step
+// installed (wantEngine "" = no engine change expected).
+func DockerHealthVerdict(before, after *Health, wantEngine, gotEngine string) (bool, string) {
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(before, after); !ok {
+		return false, why
+	}
+	if before != nil {
+		names := make([]string, 0, len(before.Containers))
+		for n := range before.Containers {
+			names = append(names, n)
+		}
+		sort.Strings(names)
+		for _, n := range names {
+			b := before.Containers[n]
+			if b.State != "running" || b.ID == "" {
+				continue
+			}
+			if a := after.Containers[n]; a.ID != b.ID {
+				return false, n + " is a new container (id changed) — the engine step restarted it"
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if wantEngine != "" && gotEngine != wantEngine {
+		return false, "the engine is " + gotEngine + ", not " + wantEngine
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// call writes the plan and runs the wrapper once.
+func (l *Leg) call(ctx context.Context, runID string, plan map[string]any) (WrapperReport, error) {
+	dir := l.planDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return WrapperReport{}, fmt.Errorf("osupdate: plan dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	b, _ := json.Marshal(plan)
+	path := planFile(dir, runID, fmt.Sprint(plan["layer"]), fmt.Sprint(plan["mode"]))
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, b, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return WrapperReport{}, fmt.Errorf("osupdate: write plan: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer os.Remove(path)
+	stdout, stderr, err := l.Runner.Run(ctx, WrapperPath, "--plan", path)
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(stderr)), "\n") {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "os-apply: ") {
+			l.log().Info("osupdate: wrapper", "line", line)
+		}
+	}
+	var rep WrapperReport
+	found := false
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(stdout), "\n") {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "OSAPPLY-REPORT ") {
+			if jerr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "OSAPPLY-REPORT ")), &rep); jerr == nil {
+				found = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return rep, fmt.Errorf("osupdate: wrapper gave no report (err %v): %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(stderr)))
+	}
+	return rep, nil // a refusal / failure is IN the report (exit 2 / 3), not an error here
+}
+
+// Pass is one leg's reports; an empty Layer means the step did not run.
+type Pass struct {
+	Guest, Host, Docker Report
+}
+
+// Run is one pass: the guest layer, then (on an appliance, after a good guest step) the host layer, then (ring 0
+// only, after good earlier steps) the Docker engine set. trigger is "night" or "debug".
+func (l *Leg) Run(ctx context.Context, vmid int, trigger string) Pass {
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	defer unlock()
+	l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx) // R-868: a report a killed agent never sent goes first
+	g, h := l.runFast(ctx, vmid, trigger)
+	p := Pass{Guest: g, Host: h}
+	if g.Outcome == "skipped" {
+		return p
+	}
+	blk := l.Block()
+	okStep := func(r Report) bool {
+		return (r.Outcome == "applied" || r.Outcome == "nothing" || r.Outcome == "inventory") && r.Healthy
+	}
+	lg := l.log().With("run", g.RunID, "vmid", vmid, "trigger", trigger)
+	switch {
+	case blk.Ring != 0 || !blk.Enabled:
+		lg.Info("osupdate: docker step skipped — ring 1 takes an engine set only inside a signed operator job (`11` §5.8)", "ring", blk.Ring, "enabled", blk.Enabled)
+	case !okStep(g) || (h.Layer != "" && !okStep(h)):
+		lg.Warn("osupdate: docker step skipped — an earlier step did not end healthy")
+	default:
+		if err := l.EnsureLiveRestore(ctx, g.RunID, vmid); err != nil {
+			p.Docker = l.finish(ctx, lg, Report{RunID: g.RunID, Layer: LayerDocker, Trigger: trigger, Ring: 0, VMID: vmid,
+				Mode: "apply", Outcome: "failed", HealthReason: "live-restore could not be turned on: " + err.Error()})
+			return p
+		}
+		p.Docker = l.runLayer(ctx, g.RunID, LayerDocker, vmid, trigger, blk, dockerOpts{})
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+// dockerOpts is a signed Docker step (DockerStepExecutor); the zero value is ring 0's unsigned "pending-docker".
+type dockerOpts struct {
+	releaseID string
+	packages  []Package
+	undo      bool
+	signed    map[string]string // blob_b64, sig — the wrapper verifies them ITSELF
+}
+
+// EnsureLiveRestore is the ONE-TIME step of `09` decision 87: the wrapper merges `"live-restore": true` into the guest's
+// daemon.json and RELOADS docker (never a restart, R-835). A no-op when it is already on.
+func (l *Leg) EnsureLiveRestore(ctx context.Context, runID string, vmid int) error {
+	wr, err := l.call(ctx, runID, map[string]any{"release_id": "live-restore", "layer": LayerGuest, "lane": "fast",
+		"vmid": vmid, "mode": "live-restore-on", "packages": []Package{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if wr.refused() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refused: %s", wr.Refused)
+	}
+	if wr.failed() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed: %s", wr.Failed)
+	}
+	l.log().Info("osupdate: live-restore", "vmid", vmid, "result", string(wr.LiveRestore))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Facts reads the box's versions through the wrapper's read-only facts mode (R-852): host Debian, kernels, held
+// packages, taint, the crash guard; guest Debian, Docker engine, containerd, live-restore. Raw JSON, the wrapper's shape.
+func (l *Leg) Facts(ctx context.Context, vmid int) (json.RawMessage, error) {
+	wr, err := l.call(ctx, "facts"+l.now().UTC().Format("150405"), map[string]any{"release_id": "facts", "layer": LayerHost,
+		"lane": "fast", "vmid": vmid, "mode": "facts", "packages": []Package{}})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if wr.refused() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("facts refused: %s", wr.Refused)
+	}
+	if len(wr.Facts) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("facts: the wrapper returned none (an older wrapper?)")
+	}
+	return wr.Facts, nil
+}
+
+// runFast is the guest + host fast lane (agent v0.141.x behaviour).
+func (l *Leg) runFast(ctx context.Context, vmid int, trigger string) (guest Report, host Report) {
+	runID := l.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	lg := l.log().With("run", runID, "vmid", vmid, "trigger", trigger)
+	if trigger == "night" && l.StatePath != "" {
+		gap := l.MinGap
+		if gap == 0 {
+			gap = 20 * time.Hour
+		}
+		if b, err := os.ReadFile(l.StatePath); err == nil {
+			if last, perr := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, strings.TrimSpace(string(b))); perr == nil && l.now().Sub(last) < gap {
+				lg.Info("osupdate: skipped — already ran tonight", "last", last.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
+				return Report{RunID: runID, Layer: LayerGuest, Outcome: "skipped"}, Report{}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	blk := l.Block()
+	guest = l.runLayer(ctx, runID, LayerGuest, vmid, trigger, blk, dockerOpts{})
+	if trigger == "night" && l.StatePath != "" {
+		_ = os.WriteFile(l.StatePath, []byte(l.now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)), 0o600)
+	}
+	switch {
+	case !l.Appliance:
+		lg.Info("osupdate: host step skipped — not an appliance install (a BYO host belongs to its owner, `11` §1)")
+	case !(guest.Outcome == "applied" || guest.Outcome == "nothing" || guest.Outcome == "inventory") || !guest.Healthy:
+		lg.Warn("osupdate: host step skipped — the guest step did not end healthy", "guest_outcome", guest.Outcome, "reason", guest.HealthReason)
+	default:
+		host = l.runLayer(ctx, runID, LayerHost, vmid, trigger, blk, dockerOpts{})
+	}
+	return guest, host
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) runLayer(ctx context.Context, runID, layer string, vmid int, trigger string, blk hub.WireOSUpdate, do dockerOpts) Report {
+	rel := hub.WireOSRelease{ID: "ring0-" + runID}
+	var wire *hub.WireOSRelease
+	switch layer {
+	case LayerGuest:
+		wire = blk.Release
+	case LayerHost:
+		wire = blk.HostRelease
+	}
+	lane := "fast"
+	if layer == LayerDocker {
+		lane = "slow"
+		if do.signed != nil {
+			rel = hub.WireOSRelease{ID: do.releaseID}
+		}
+	} else if blk.Ring == 1 {
+		rel = hub.WireOSRelease{}
+		if wire != nil {
+			rel = *wire
+		}
+	}
+	rep := Report{RunID: runID, Layer: layer, Trigger: trigger, Ring: blk.Ring, VMID: vmid, ReleaseID: rel.ID}
+	lg := l.log().With("run", runID, "layer", layer, "vmid", vmid, "ring", blk.Ring, "trigger", trigger)
+	lg.Info("osupdate: START", "enabled", blk.Enabled, "release", rel.ID)
+
+	plan := map[string]any{"release_id": rel.ID, "layer": layer, "lane": lane, "vmid": vmid, "snapshot": rel.Snapshot,
+		"packages": []Package{}, "mode": "apply", "select": "listed",
+		"run_id": runID, "trigger": trigger, "ring": blk.Ring} // R-868: echoed into the wrapper's kept copy
+	if rel.ID == "" {
+		plan["release_id"] = "none"
+	}
+	planned := map[string]bool{}
+	switch {
+	case layer == LayerDocker && do.signed != nil:
+		plan["packages"], plan["signed"] = do.packages, do.signed
+		if do.undo {
+			plan["undo"] = true
+		}
+		for _, p := range do.packages {
+			planned[p.Name] = true
+		}
+	case layer == LayerDocker:
+		plan["select"] = "pending-docker" // ring 0: the wrapper checks the box's ROOT-OWNED ring-0 mark itself
+	case !blk.Enabled:
+		plan["mode"] = "inventory"
+		lg.Info("osupdate: switched OFF for this box — reporting only")
+	case blk.Ring == 0:
+		plan["select"] = "pending-fast" // the wrapper picks every pending Debian / Debian-Security upgrade
+	case len(rel.Packages) == 0:
+		plan["mode"] = "inventory" // ring 1 with no approved release for this layer: nothing to install
+	default:
+		var pk []Package
+		for _, p := range rel.Packages {
+			pk = append(pk, Package{Name: p.Name, Version: p.Version, Origin: p.Origin})
+			planned[p.Name] = true
+		}
+		plan["packages"] = pk
+	}
+	rep.Mode = plan["mode"].(string)
+	wr, err := l.call(ctx, runID, plan)
+	if rep.Mode == "apply" {
+		rep.unsent = reportFile(l.planDir(), runID, layer, rep.Mode) // the wrapper kept a copy (R-868)
+	}
+	switch {
+	case err != nil:
+		rep.Outcome, rep.HealthReason = "failed", err.Error()
+		return l.finish(ctx, lg, rep)
+	case wr.refused():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused = "refused", wr.Refused
+		return l.finish(ctx, lg, rep)
+	case wr.failed():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused = "failed", wr.Failed
+	}
+	rep.Upgraded, rep.PassSeconds = wr.Upgraded, wr.PassSeconds
+	rep.DockerEngine, rep.Authority, rep.Undo = wr.DockerEngine, wr.Authority, wr.Undo
+	if rep.Outcome == "" {
+		switch {
+		case rep.Mode == "inventory" && !blk.Enabled:
+			rep.Outcome = "inventory"
+		case len(wr.Upgraded) == 0:
+			rep.Outcome = "nothing"
+		default:
+			rep.Outcome = "applied"
+		}
+	}
+	if blk.Ring == 0 {
+		for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+			planned[u.Name] = true
+		}
+	}
+	// Health: compare with the start of the pass; give restarted services time (only after an install).
+	cur := wr.HealthAfter
+	wantEngine := ""
+	for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+		if u.Name == "docker-ce" {
+			wantEngine = EngineOf(u.Version)
+		}
+	}
+	verdict := func(h *Health) (bool, string) {
+		if layer == LayerDocker {
+			return DockerHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, wantEngine, wr.DockerEngine)
+		}
+		if layer == LayerHost {
+			t := hub.TunnelUnknown
+			if l.Tunnel != nil {
+				t, _ = l.Tunnel.Status(ctx)
+			}
+			return HostHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, t)
+		}
+		return HealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h)
+	}
+	if len(wr.Upgraded) > 0 {
+		wait, poll := l.HealthWait, l.HealthPoll
+		if wait == 0 {
+			wait = 5 * time.Minute
+		}
+		if poll == 0 {
+			poll = 15 * time.Second
+		}
+		deadline := l.now().Add(wait)
+		for {
+			ok, why := verdict(cur)
+			rep.Healthy, rep.HealthReason = ok, why
+			if ok || !l.now().Before(deadline) || ctx.Err() != nil {
+				break
+			}
+			l.sleep(ctx, poll)
+			hp := map[string]any{"release_id": plan["release_id"], "layer": layer, "lane": lane, "vmid": vmid, "mode": "health", "packages": []Package{}}
+			hr, herr := l.call(ctx, runID, hp)
+			if herr == nil && hr.Health != nil {
+				cur = hr.Health
+			}
+		}
+		if !rep.Healthy && rep.Outcome == "applied" {
+			rep.Outcome = "health_failed"
+		}
+	} else {
+		rep.Healthy, rep.HealthReason = verdict(cur)
+	}
+	rep.Installed, rep.Pending = wr.Installed, wr.Pending
+	rep.RestartNeeded, rep.DockerRestartNeeded, rep.RebootNeeded = wr.RestartNeeded, wr.DockerRestartNeeded, wr.RebootNeeded
+	rep.RebootScanned = wr.RebootScanned
+	if layer == LayerDocker {
+		// the docker report carries the engine set only (the guest report already carries the Debian packages)
+		rep.Installed, rep.Pending = onlyDocker(wr.Installed), onlyDockerPending(wr.Pending)
+		rep.NotCovered = nil
+	} else {
+		rep.NotCovered = notCovered(wr.Pending, blk.Ring, planned)
+	}
+	return l.finish(ctx, lg, rep)
+}
+
+func onlyDocker(in []Package) []Package {
+	var out []Package
+	for _, p := range in {
+		if DockerNames[p.Name] {
+			out = append(out, p)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func onlyDockerPending(in []Pending) []Pending {
+	var out []Pending
+	for _, p := range in {
+		if DockerNames[p.Name] {
+			out = append(out, p)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// notCovered lists pending updates no approved release covers: in ring 0 everything outside the fast lane; in ring 1
+// also every fast-lane update the release did not name.
+func notCovered(pending []Pending, ring int, planned map[string]bool) []string {
+	var out []string
+	for _, p := range pending {
+		if !IsFast(p.Origin) || (ring == 1 && !planned[p.Name]) {
+			out = append(out, p.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) finish(ctx context.Context, lg *slog.Logger, rep Report) Report {
+	lg.Info("osupdate: DONE", "outcome", rep.Outcome, "healthy", rep.Healthy, "reason", rep.HealthReason,
+		"upgraded", len(rep.Upgraded), "pending", len(rep.Pending), "not_covered", len(rep.NotCovered),
+		"restart_needed", len(rep.RestartNeeded), "reboot_needed", rep.RebootNeeded, "wrapper_seconds", rep.PassSeconds)
+	if l.Hub != nil {
+		body, _ := json.Marshal(rep)
+		rctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), time.Minute)
+		defer cancel()
+		if err := l.Hub.PostOSReport(rctx, body); err != nil {
+			lg.Warn("osupdate: reporting to the hub failed (the run itself is done; the kept copy is sent at the next start or pass)", "err", err)
+		} else if rep.unsent != "" {
+			if rerr := os.Remove(rep.unsent); rerr != nil && !os.IsNotExist(rerr) {
+				lg.Warn("osupdate: could not delete the sent report's kept copy (it may be sent twice)", "path", rep.unsent, "err", rerr)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return rep
+}

internal/osupdate/leg_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// fakeWrapper plays /usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply: it reads the plan the leg wrote and answers per layer and mode.
+type fakeWrapper struct {
+	t         *testing.T
+	pending   []Pending
+	applyRep  map[string]WrapperReport // per layer
+	healthSeq map[string][]*Health     // per layer: answers to successive "health" calls
+	plans     []map[string]any
+	keep      bool // R-868: like the real wrapper, keep an apply report beside the plan
+}
+
+func yes() *bool { b := true; return &b }
+
+func guestOK() *Health {
+	return &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{
+		"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}, "app": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}}}
+}
+
+func hostOK() *Health {
+	return &Health{HostServices: map[string]string{"pveproxy": "active", "pvedaemon": "active", "pvestatd": "active",
+		"pve-cluster": "active", "felhom-agent": "active"}, GuestRunning: yes(), Guest: guestOK()}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeWrapper) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	if name != WrapperPath || len(args) != 2 || args[0] != "--plan" {
+		f.t.Fatalf("unexpected command %s %v", name, args)
+	}
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(args[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		f.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var plan map[string]any
+	json.Unmarshal(b, &plan)
+	f.plans = append(f.plans, plan)
+	layer := plan["layer"].(string)
+	ok := guestOK()
+	if layer == LayerHost {
+		ok = hostOK()
+	}
+	var rep WrapperReport
+	switch plan["mode"] {
+	case "inventory":
+		rep = WrapperReport{Mode: "inventory", Pending: f.pending, HealthBefore: ok, HealthAfter: ok,
+			Installed: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u3", Origin: "Debian"}}}
+	case "apply":
+		rep = f.applyRep[layer]
+		rep.Mode = "apply"
+		if rep.HealthBefore == nil {
+			rep.HealthBefore = ok
+		}
+		if rep.HealthAfter == nil {
+			rep.HealthAfter = ok
+		}
+	case "health":
+		if seq := f.healthSeq[layer]; len(seq) > 0 {
+			rep.Health, f.healthSeq[layer] = seq[0], seq[1:]
+		} else {
+			rep.Health = ok
+		}
+	}
+	if f.keep && plan["mode"] == "apply" {
+		kept := rep
+		kept.Layer, kept.RunID, _ = layer, fmt.Sprint(plan["run_id"]), 0
+		if tr, ok := plan["trigger"].(string); ok {
+			kept.Trigger = tr
+		}
+		if r, ok := plan["ring"].(float64); ok {
+			ri := int(r)
+			kept.Ring = &ri
+		}
+		kb, _ := json.Marshal(kept)
+		dst := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(args[1]), "report-"+strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(args[1]), "plan-"))
+		if err := os.WriteFile(dst, kb, 0o600); err != nil {
+			f.t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	out, _ := json.Marshal(rep)
+	return []byte("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + string(out) + "\n"), []byte("os-apply: DONE rc=0\n"), nil
+}
+
+func (f *fakeWrapper) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	return f.Run(ctx, name, args...)
+}
+
+type fakeHub struct{ reports []Report }
+
+func (h *fakeHub) PostOSReport(_ context.Context, body []byte) error {
+	var r Report
+	json.Unmarshal(body, &r)
+	h.reports = append(h.reports, r)
+	return nil
+}
+
+type fakeTunnel struct{ st string }
+
+func (t fakeTunnel) Status(context.Context) (string, string) { return t.st, "" }
+
+func newLeg(t *testing.T, w *fakeWrapper, blk *hub.WireOSUpdate) (*Leg, *fakeHub) {
+	h := &fakeHub{}
+	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	if w.applyRep == nil {
+		w.applyRep = map[string]WrapperReport{}
+	}
+	if w.healthSeq == nil {
+		w.healthSeq = map[string][]*Health{}
+	}
+	l := &Leg{Runner: w, Hub: h, PlanDir: t.TempDir(), StatePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "last"),
+		HealthWait: time.Minute, HealthPoll: 10 * time.Second, Appliance: true, Tunnel: fakeTunnel{hub.TunnelRunning},
+		Now:   func() time.Time { return now },
+		Sleep: func(_ context.Context, d time.Duration) { now = now.Add(d) }}
+	if blk != nil {
+		l.SetBlock(blk)
+	}
+	return l, h
+}
+
+var pend = []Pending{
+	{Name: "libc6", From: "u3", To: "u4", Origin: []string{"Debian"}},
+	{Name: "openssl", From: "u1", To: "u3", Origin: []string{"Debian-Security", "Debian"}},
+	{Name: "docker-ce", From: "29.7", To: "29.8", Origin: []string{"Docker CE"}},
+}
+
+func calls(w *fakeWrapper) string {
+	var m []string
+	for _, p := range w.plans {
+		m = append(m, p["layer"].(string)+":"+p["mode"].(string))
+	}
+	return strings.Join(m, ",")
+}
+
+// Ring 0: ONE wrapper call per layer (R-845), select pending-fast (the wrapper picks every Debian / Debian-Security
+// upgrade), from live sources; the guest step first, then the host step.
+func TestRing0_OneCallPerLayer(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{
+		LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}, {Name: "openssl", Version: "u3"}}, Pending: pend[2:]},
+		LayerHost:  {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "openssl", Version: "u3"}}},
+	}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.Outcome != "applied" || !g.Healthy || ho.Outcome != "applied" || !ho.Healthy {
+		t.Fatalf("guest %+v\nhost %+v", g, ho)
+	}
+	if calls(w) != "guest:apply,host:apply,guest:live-restore-on,docker:apply" {
+		t.Fatalf("calls = %s, want one apply per layer, guest first, then live-restore and the ring-0 docker step", calls(w))
+	}
+	for _, p := range w.plans[:2] {
+		if p["select"] != "pending-fast" || p["snapshot"] != "" || len(p["packages"].([]any)) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("ring-0 plan = %v", p)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(g.NotCovered) != 1 || g.NotCovered[0] != "docker-ce" {
+		t.Fatalf("not covered = %v", g.NotCovered)
+	}
+	if len(h.reports) != 3 || h.reports[0].Layer != LayerGuest || h.reports[1].Layer != LayerHost || h.reports[2].Layer != LayerDocker {
+		t.Fatalf("hub got %+v", h.reports)
+	}
+}
+
+// Ring 1 installs EXACTLY each layer's own approved release (a guest release is not a host release).
+func TestRing1_EachLayerItsOwnRelease(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{
+		LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "g-u4"}}, Pending: pend[1:]},
+		LayerHost:  {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "openssl", Version: "h-u3"}}},
+	}}
+	gr := &hub.WireOSRelease{ID: "os-g", Snapshot: "20261004T080000Z", Packages: []hub.WireOSPackage{{Name: "libc6", Version: "g-u4", Origin: "Debian"}}}
+	hr := &hub.WireOSRelease{ID: "os-h", Snapshot: "20261004T090000Z", Packages: []hub.WireOSPackage{{Name: "openssl", Version: "h-u3", Origin: "Debian-Security"}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true, Release: gr, HostRelease: hr})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.ReleaseID != "os-g" || ho.ReleaseID != "os-h" {
+		t.Fatalf("release ids %q %q", g.ReleaseID, ho.ReleaseID)
+	}
+	gp, hp := w.plans[0], w.plans[1]
+	if gp["snapshot"] != "20261004T080000Z" || gp["packages"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["version"] != "g-u4" {
+		t.Fatalf("guest plan %v", gp)
+	}
+	if hp["layer"] != LayerHost || hp["snapshot"] != "20261004T090000Z" || hp["packages"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["name"] != "openssl" {
+		t.Fatalf("host plan %v", hp)
+	}
+	if strings.Join(g.NotCovered, ",") != "openssl,docker-ce" {
+		t.Fatalf("guest not covered = %v", g.NotCovered)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRing1_NoReleaseIsInventory(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.Outcome != "nothing" || ho.Outcome != "nothing" || calls(w) != "guest:inventory,host:inventory" {
+		t.Fatalf("g=%+v h=%+v calls=%s", g, ho, calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// No block from the hub (an older hub): ring 1, ON, no release → reports, installs nothing.
+func TestNoBlock_IsRing1Nothing(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, nil)
+	if g, _ := run2(l, "night"); g.Outcome != "nothing" || g.Ring != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("g=%+v calls=%s", g, calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// Switched OFF: the box reports but installs nothing, on both layers.
+func TestSwitchOff_ReportsOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: false})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.Outcome != "inventory" || ho.Outcome != "inventory" || calls(w) != "guest:inventory,host:inventory" || len(h.reports) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("g=%+v h=%+v calls=%s", g, ho, calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// Not an appliance (BYO, `11` §1): the host step never runs — no host plan at all.
+func TestBYO_NoHostPlan(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}}}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Appliance = false
+	_, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	// the guest (and so its Docker engine) is ours on a BYO box too: only the HOST is the owner's
+	if ho.Outcome != "" || calls(w) != "guest:apply,guest:live-restore-on,docker:apply" || len(h.reports) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("a BYO box got a host step: host=%+v calls=%s", ho, calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// A failed guest step skips the host step that night.
+func TestGuestFailure_SkipsTheHost(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{
+		LayerGuest: {Refused: json.RawMessage(`{"code":"R6","reason":"x"}`)}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.Outcome != "refused" || ho.Outcome != "" || calls(w) != "guest:apply" {
+		t.Fatalf("g=%+v h=%+v calls=%s", g, ho, calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// Unhealthy after the run, and still unhealthy at the end of the wait → health_failed; the host step is skipped.
+func TestHealth_FailsAfterTheWait(t *testing.T) {
+	bad := &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{
+		"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}, "app": {State: "exited"}}}
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}, HealthAfter: bad}},
+		healthSeq: map[string][]*Health{LayerGuest: {bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad}}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	g, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if g.Outcome != "health_failed" || g.Healthy || !strings.Contains(g.HealthReason, "app was running") || ho.Outcome != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("g=%+v h=%+v", g, ho)
+	}
+	if h.reports[0].Outcome != "health_failed" {
+		t.Fatal("the hub was not told")
+	}
+}
+
+// A service that takes a moment to come back is not a failure: the poll sees it recover inside the wait.
+func TestHealth_RecoversInsideTheWait(t *testing.T) {
+	starting := &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "starting"}
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}, HealthAfter: starting}},
+		healthSeq: map[string][]*Health{LayerGuest: {starting}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	if g, _ := run2(l, "night"); g.Outcome != "applied" || !g.Healthy {
+		t.Fatalf("g = %+v", g)
+	}
+}
+
+// The host step judged unhealthy when the tunnel is down after it.
+func TestHost_TunnelDownFailsTheHostStep(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerHost: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "openssl"}}}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Tunnel = fakeTunnel{hub.TunnelNotRunning}
+	_, ho := run2(l, "night")
+	if ho.Outcome != "health_failed" || !strings.Contains(ho.HealthReason, "tunnel") {
+		t.Fatalf("host = %+v", ho)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHealthVerdict(t *testing.T) {
+	ok := &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{"a": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}}}
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		before *Health
+		after  *Health
+		want   bool
+	}{
+		{"all good", ok, ok, true},
+		{"no reading", ok, nil, false},
+		{"docker down", ok, &Health{NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy"}, false},
+		{"no network", ok, &Health{DockerOK: true, Controller: "healthy"}, false},
+		{"controller starting", ok, &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "starting"}, false},
+		{"only the controller differs", ok, &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "unhealthy", Containers: map[string]Container{"a": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}}}, false},
+		{"app gone", ok, &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{}}, false},
+		{"app unhealthy", ok, &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{"a": {State: "running", Health: "unhealthy"}}}, false},
+		{"stopped before stays stopped", &Health{Containers: map[string]Container{"x": {State: "exited"}}}, &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy"}, true},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got, why := HealthVerdict(c.before, c.after); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %v (%s), want %v", c.name, got, why, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The host rule: every listed daemon active, the guest running and passing its own rule, the tunnel running.
+// Red-proofs: drop any one check and its case fails.
+func TestHostHealthVerdict(t *testing.T) {
+	no := false
+	svcDown := hostOK()
+	svcDown.HostServices["pveproxy"] = "failed"
+	guestDown := hostOK()
+	guestDown.GuestRunning = &no
+	guestApp := hostOK()
+	guestApp.Guest = &Health{DockerOK: true, NetworkOK: true, Controller: "healthy", Containers: map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy"}}}
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		after  *Health
+		tunnel string
+		want   bool
+		why    string
+	}{
+		{"all good", hostOK(), hub.TunnelRunning, true, ""},
+		{"a daemon down", svcDown, hub.TunnelRunning, false, "pveproxy"},
+		{"the guest stopped", guestDown, hub.TunnelRunning, false, "guest is not running"},
+		{"an app in the guest gone", guestApp, hub.TunnelRunning, false, "app was running"},
+		{"the tunnel down", hostOK(), hub.TunnelNotRunning, false, "tunnel"},
+		{"the tunnel unknown", hostOK(), hub.TunnelUnknown, false, "tunnel"},
+		{"no services read", &Health{GuestRunning: yes(), Guest: guestOK()}, hub.TunnelRunning, false, "no host service"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		got, why := HostHealthVerdict(hostOK(), c.after, c.tunnel)
+		if got != c.want || !strings.Contains(why, c.why) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %v (%s), want %v (…%s…)", c.name, got, why, c.want, c.why)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOncePerNight(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, pending: pend, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	run2(l, "night")
+	n := len(w.plans)
+	if g, _ := run2(l, "night"); g.Outcome != "skipped" || len(w.plans) != n {
+		t.Fatalf("a second night run in the same night ran: %+v", g)
+	}
+	if g, _ := run2(l, "debug"); g.Outcome == "skipped" {
+		t.Fatal("the debug action must not be throttled")
+	}
+}
+
+// The root wrapper's own suite (configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py) runs with `go test ./...` so CI covers it.
+func TestWrapperSuite(t *testing.T) {
+	py, err := exec.LookPath("python3")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skip("python3 not available")
+	}
+	// the OS wrapper and (agent v0.142.0) the crash guard — both root programs in configs/ with their own suites
+	for _, suite := range []string{"../../configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_crash_guard.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_priv_apply.py"} {
+		cmd := exec.Command(py, "-B", suite)
+		out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s failed: %v\n%s", suite, err, out)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(string(out), "OK") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s did not report OK:\n%s", suite, out)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The host's restart scan result reaches the hub with reboot_scanned, so the hub can tell "looked: not needed" (a
+// reboot cleared it) from "did not look". Red-proof: drop the RebootScanned copy in runLayer and this fails.
+func TestHostReport_CarriesRebootScanned(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{
+		LayerGuest: {},
+		LayerHost:  {RebootScanned: true, RebootNeeded: true, RestartNeeded: []string{"lxc-start"}},
+	}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	run2(l, "night")
+	if len(h.reports) != 3 || !h.reports[1].RebootScanned || !h.reports[1].RebootNeeded || h.reports[0].RebootScanned {
+		t.Fatalf("hub got %+v", h.reports)
+	}
+}
+
+// run2 is the guest + host reports of one pass (the tests written before the docker step).
+func run2(l *Leg, trigger string) (Report, Report) {
+	p := l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, trigger)
+	return p.Guest, p.Host
+}
+
+// ---- the Docker step (`11` §5.8, agent v0.142.0) ----
+
+// Ring 1 never takes an engine step in the night leg — only inside a signed operator job. Red-proof: drop the
+// `blk.Ring != 0` case in Run and the ring-1 pass makes a docker call.
+func TestDocker_Ring1NightLegNeverSteps(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true})
+	p := l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	if p.Docker.Layer != "" || strings.Contains(calls(w), "docker") || strings.Contains(calls(w), "live-restore") {
+		t.Fatalf("ring 1 took a docker step: %s", calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// An unhealthy earlier step skips the docker step.
+func TestDocker_SkippedAfterAnUnhealthyStep(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}}},
+		healthSeq: map[string][]*Health{}}
+	bad := guestOK()
+	bad.Controller = "unhealthy"
+	w.applyRep[LayerGuest] = WrapperReport{Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6"}}, HealthAfter: bad}
+	w.healthSeq[LayerGuest] = []*Health{bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	p := l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	if p.Docker.Layer != "" || strings.Contains(calls(w), "docker") {
+		t.Fatalf("docker step ran after an unhealthy guest step: %s", calls(w))
+	}
+}
+
+// The docker plan is the slow lane, pending-docker for ring 0; the report carries only the engine set.
+func TestDocker_Ring0PlanAndReport(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerDocker: {
+		Upgraded:     []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie"}},
+		Installed:    []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie", Origin: "Docker"}, {Name: "libc6", Version: "u4", Origin: "Debian"}},
+		DockerEngine: "29.8.2", Authority: "ring0"}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	p := l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	dp := w.plans[len(w.plans)-1]
+	if dp["layer"] != "docker" || dp["lane"] != "slow" || dp["select"] != "pending-docker" {
+		t.Fatalf("docker plan = %v", dp)
+	}
+	d := p.Docker
+	if d.Outcome != "applied" || !d.Healthy || d.DockerEngine != "29.8.2" || len(d.Installed) != 1 || d.Installed[0].Name != "docker-ce" {
+		t.Fatalf("docker report = %+v", d)
+	}
+}
+
+// THE docker health rule. Red-proof: drop the id comparison (or the engine check) in DockerHealthVerdict and a case fails.
+func TestDockerHealthVerdict(t *testing.T) {
+	before := guestOK()
+	before.Containers = map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "a"},
+		"app": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "b"}}
+	same := guestOK()
+	same.Containers = map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "a"},
+		"app": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "b"}}
+	moved := guestOK()
+	moved.Containers = map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "a"},
+		"app": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "c"}}
+	if ok, why := DockerHealthVerdict(before, same, "29.8.2", "29.8.2"); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("same ids, right engine: %s", why)
+	}
+	if ok, _ := DockerHealthVerdict(before, moved, "29.8.2", "29.8.2"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("a changed container id passed — live-restore failed and the apps restarted")
+	}
+	if ok, _ := DockerHealthVerdict(before, same, "29.8.2", "29.7.2"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("the engine did not move and the step passed")
+	}
+	if EngineOf("5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie") != "29.8.2" {
+		t.Fatalf("EngineOf = %q", EngineOf("5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie"))
+	}
+}
+
+// A changed id after the step → health_failed (the consequence, not only the verdict).
+func TestDocker_ChangedIDIsHealthFailed(t *testing.T) {
+	before := guestOK()
+	before.Containers = map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "a"}}
+	after := guestOK()
+	after.Containers = map[string]Container{"felhom-controller": {State: "running", Health: "healthy", ID: "z"}}
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerDocker: {
+		Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "docker-ce", Version: "5:29.8.2-1"}}, DockerEngine: "29.8.2",
+		HealthBefore: before, HealthAfter: after}}, healthSeq: map[string][]*Health{}}
+	w.healthSeq[LayerDocker] = []*Health{after, after, after, after, after, after, after, after}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	p := l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	if p.Docker.Outcome != "health_failed" || !strings.Contains(p.Docker.HealthReason, "id changed") {
+		t.Fatalf("docker = %+v", p.Docker)
+	}
+}
+
+// R-858: a controller that cannot reach Docker fails the health rule even though its own check says healthy.
+// Red-proof: drop the ControllerDockerOK check in HealthVerdict and this fails.
+func TestHealthVerdict_ControllerBlindToDockerFails(t *testing.T) {
+	no, yes2 := false, true
+	after := guestOK()
+	after.ControllerDockerOK = &no
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), after); ok || !strings.Contains(why, "R-858") {
+		t.Fatalf("a blind controller passed: %v %q", ok, why)
+	}
+	if ok, _ := DockerHealthVerdict(guestOK(), after, "", ""); ok {
+		t.Fatal("the Docker rule passed a blind controller")
+	}
+	after.ControllerDockerOK = &yes2
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), after); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("a seeing controller failed: %s", why)
+	}
+	if ok, _ := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), guestOK()); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("an older wrapper (no field) must not fail")
+	}
+}

internal/osupdate/unsent.go

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// ── R-868 (v0.144.0): a pass whose agent was killed still reports ─────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// MEASURED 2026-10-05 02:57 UTC on demo-hp (night drill A5): the debug pass and the agent daemon were kill -9-ed while
+// apt-get ran. The root wrapper (its own process under sudo) finished all six packages, but the agent that would have
+// read its stdout and posted the report was gone; the hub never learned what the pass installed.
+//
+// THE MECHANISM: the wrapper writes its apply report to <plan dir>/report-<run>-<layer>-apply.json BEFORE printing
+// it (configs/felhom-os-apply save_report). The agent deletes that copy once the hub has the report (finish). A copy
+// still on disk is a report nobody sent: SendUnsent posts it — at the agent's start, and before every pass — and then
+// deletes it. A pass lock (flock on <plan dir>/pass.lock, released by the kernel when a process dies) keeps the
+// sender from picking up the copy of a pass that is still running, also across the daemon and a selftest process.
+// Pinned by TestR868_* (unsent_test.go).
+
+// lockPass takes the pass lock. block=false returns ok=false at once when another pass holds it. A lock that cannot
+// be opened at all (no plan dir yet) does not stop a pass: the unlock is then a no-op.
+func (l *Leg) lockPass(block bool) (unlock func()) {
+	u, _ := l.tryLockPass(block)
+	return u
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) tryLockPass(block bool) (unlock func(), ok bool) {
+	dir := l.planDir()
+	_ = os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700)
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "pass.lock"), os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		l.log().Warn("osupdate: pass lock unavailable — continuing without it", "err", err)
+		return func() {}, true
+	}
+	how := syscall.LOCK_EX
+	if !block {
+		how |= syscall.LOCK_NB
+	}
+	if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), how); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		return func() {}, false
+	}
+	return func() { _ = syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_UN); f.Close() }, true
+}
+
+// SendUnsent posts every report a pass kept on disk and nobody sent (R-868). It skips when a pass runs now (that
+// pass sends them first). Called at the agent's start.
+func (l *Leg) SendUnsent(ctx context.Context) int {
+	unlock, ok := l.tryLockPass(false)
+	if !ok {
+		l.log().Info("osupdate: a pass is running — its start sends any kept report")
+		return 0
+	}
+	defer unlock()
+	return l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx)
+}
+
+// SendUnsentLoop runs SendUnsent now and then every `every` until ctx ends (v0.144.1). MEASURED live on demo-hp
+// 2026-10-05: after a kill -9 the daemon restarted in ~5 s, while the orphaned root wrapper was still installing — its
+// copy appeared ~7 s AFTER the start-time sender had looked. One look at start is therefore not enough. A glob of the
+// plan dir every few minutes costs nothing; the pass lock keeps it off a running pass. Pinned by
+// TestR868_ACopyWrittenAfterTheStartIsSentByTheLoop.
+func (l *Leg) SendUnsentLoop(ctx context.Context, every time.Duration, onSent func(int)) {
+	for {
+		if n := l.SendUnsent(ctx); n > 0 && onSent != nil {
+			onSent(n)
+		}
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-time.After(every):
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) sendUnsentLocked(ctx context.Context) int {
+	if l.Hub == nil {
+		return 0 // nobody to send to: keep the copies for a process that has the hub
+	}
+	files, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.planDir(), "report-*.json"))
+	sent := 0
+	for _, f := range files {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			l.log().Warn("osupdate: a kept report cannot be read", "path", f, "err", err)
+			continue
+		}
+		var wr WrapperReport
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wr); err != nil || wr.Layer == "" {
+			l.log().Warn("osupdate: a kept report is not a report — moved aside", "path", f, "err", err)
+			_ = os.Rename(f, f+".bad")
+			continue
+		}
+		rep := l.reportFromKept(ctx, wr, f)
+		lg := l.log().With("run", rep.RunID, "layer", rep.Layer, "vmid", rep.VMID, "ring", rep.Ring, "trigger", rep.Trigger)
+		lg.Info("osupdate: sending a kept report late (the agent was stopped mid-pass or the hub was away, R-868)", "path", f)
+		before := rep.unsent
+		_ = l.finish(ctx, lg, rep)
+		if _, err := os.Stat(before); os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			sent++
+			// the pass's plan file is left behind too when the agent was killed inside call()
+			_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(f), "plan-"+strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(f), "report-")))
+		}
+	}
+	return sent
+}
+
+// reportFromKept builds the hub report from a kept wrapper report, as runLayer would have. Health: the copy's own
+// before/after reading; when that is not healthy after an install, one fresh reading (services restart after an
+// install, and the pass that would have waited for them is gone).
+func (l *Leg) reportFromKept(ctx context.Context, wr WrapperReport, path string) Report {
+	ring := 1
+	if wr.Ring != nil {
+		ring = *wr.Ring
+	}
+	runID, trigger := wr.RunID, wr.Trigger
+	if runID == "" {
+		runID = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(path), "report-"), ".json")
+	}
+	if trigger == "" {
+		trigger = "unknown"
+	}
+	rep := Report{RunID: runID, Layer: wr.Layer, Trigger: trigger, Mode: wr.Mode, Ring: ring, ReleaseID: wr.ReleaseID,
+		VMID: wr.VMID, unsent: path}
+	prefix := "sent late — kept on the box until the hub could take it (R-868, R-875)"
+	switch {
+	case wr.refused():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused, rep.HealthReason = "refused", wr.Refused, prefix
+		return rep
+	case wr.failed():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused = "failed", wr.Failed
+	case len(wr.Upgraded) == 0:
+		rep.Outcome = "nothing"
+	default:
+		rep.Outcome = "applied"
+	}
+	rep.Upgraded, rep.PassSeconds = wr.Upgraded, wr.PassSeconds
+	rep.DockerEngine, rep.Authority, rep.Undo = wr.DockerEngine, wr.Authority, wr.Undo
+	wantEngine := ""
+	for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+		if u.Name == "docker-ce" {
+			wantEngine = EngineOf(u.Version)
+		}
+	}
+	verdict := func(h *Health) (bool, string) {
+		switch wr.Layer {
+		case LayerDocker:
+			return DockerHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, wantEngine, wr.DockerEngine)
+		case LayerHost:
+			t := hub.TunnelUnknown
+			if l.Tunnel != nil {
+				t, _ = l.Tunnel.Status(ctx)
+			}
+			return HostHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, t)
+		}
+		return HealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h)
+	}
+	ok, why := verdict(wr.HealthAfter)
+	if !ok && len(wr.Upgraded) > 0 && wr.VMID > 0 {
+		lane := "fast"
+		if wr.Layer == LayerDocker {
+			lane = "slow"
+		}
+		if hr, err := l.call(ctx, "kept-"+runID, map[string]any{"release_id": "kept", "layer": wr.Layer, "lane": lane,
+			"vmid": wr.VMID, "mode": "health", "packages": []Package{}}); err == nil && hr.Health != nil {
+			ok, why = verdict(hr.Health)
+		}
+	}
+	rep.Healthy, rep.HealthReason = ok, prefix
+	if why != "" {
+		rep.HealthReason = prefix + ": " + why
+	}
+	if !ok && rep.Outcome == "applied" {
+		rep.Outcome = "health_failed"
+	}
+	rep.Installed, rep.Pending = wr.Installed, wr.Pending
+	rep.RestartNeeded, rep.DockerRestartNeeded, rep.RebootNeeded = wr.RestartNeeded, wr.DockerRestartNeeded, wr.RebootNeeded
+	rep.RebootScanned = wr.RebootScanned
+	if wr.Layer == LayerDocker {
+		rep.Installed, rep.Pending = onlyDocker(wr.Installed), onlyDockerPending(wr.Pending)
+	} else {
+		planned := map[string]bool{}
+		for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+			planned[u.Name] = true
+		}
+		rep.NotCovered = notCovered(wr.Pending, ring, planned)
+	}
+	return rep
+}

internal/osupdate/unsent_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// R-868 (v0.144.0). THE NIGHT'S SHAPE (A5, demo-hp 2026-10-05 02:57 UTC): the wrapper finished six packages, the agent
+// was kill -9-ed before it read the report; the hub never got it. Here: the wrapper's kept copy and the plan file are
+// on disk, a NEW agent process starts — it must send exactly one `applied` report and delete both files.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the SendUnsent body (return 0) → "the hub got no report".
+func TestR868_KilledPassIsReportedAtStart(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	ring := 0
+	kept := WrapperReport{Mode: "apply", Layer: LayerGuest, RunID: "20261005T025700Z", Trigger: "debug", Ring: &ring, VMID: 9201,
+		ReleaseID: "ring0-20261005T025700Z", HealthBefore: guestOK(), HealthAfter: guestOK(),
+		Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}, {Name: "openssl", Version: "u3"}}}
+	b, _ := json.Marshal(kept)
+	rp := reportFile(l.PlanDir, kept.RunID, LayerGuest, "apply")
+	pp := planFile(l.PlanDir, kept.RunID, LayerGuest, "apply")
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(rp, b, 0o600))
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(pp, []byte("{}"), 0o600))
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d, want 1", n)
+	}
+	if len(h.reports) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("the hub got no report (or several): %+v", h.reports)
+	}
+	r := h.reports[0]
+	if r.Outcome != "applied" || !r.Healthy || r.Trigger != "debug" || r.RunID != kept.RunID || r.Ring != 0 || len(r.Upgraded) != 2 || r.VMID != 9201 {
+		t.Fatalf("report = %+v", r)
+	}
+	// R-875 (v0.145.0): neutral — the copy cannot tell a killed agent from an absent hub.
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(r.HealthReason, "sent late") || strings.Contains(r.HealthReason, "stopped mid-pass") {
+		t.Fatalf("health_reason = %q, want the neutral \"sent late …\"", r.HealthReason)
+	}
+	for _, p := range []string{rp, pp} {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(p); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s still on disk after the hub got it", filepath.Base(p))
+		}
+	}
+	// a second start sends nothing again — no duplicate report
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 0 || len(h.reports) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent again: %d, reports %d", n, len(h.reports))
+	}
+}
+
+// A normal pass: the hub gets ONE report per layer and the kept copies are gone after it (nothing resent later).
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the os.Remove(rep.unsent) in finish → the next pass resends → "2 guest reports".
+func TestR868_NormalPassLeavesNoCopyAndNoDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, keep: true, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}}}}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "debug")
+	left, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.PlanDir, "report-*.json"))
+	if len(left) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("kept copies left after the hub got them: %v", left)
+	}
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "debug") // the next pass sends kept copies first
+	guest := 0
+	for _, r := range h.reports {
+		if r.Layer == LayerGuest && r.Outcome == "applied" {
+			guest++
+		}
+	}
+	if guest != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d guest reports for 2 passes (a duplicate or a loss)", guest)
+	}
+}
+
+type failingHub struct{ n int }
+
+func (h *failingHub) PostOSReport(context.Context, []byte) error {
+	h.n++
+	return errors.New("hub away")
+}
+
+// The hub away: the copy stays, and goes at the next chance.
+func TestR868_HubAwayKeepsTheCopy(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, keep: true, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}}}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Appliance = false
+	l.Hub = &failingHub{}
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	left, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.PlanDir, "report-*.json"))
+	if len(left) != 2 { // ring 0: the guest step and the Docker step each kept one
+		t.Fatalf("the copies must stay while the hub is away: %v", left)
+	}
+	h := &fakeHub{}
+	l.Hub = h
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d: %+v", n, h.reports)
+	}
+	for _, r := range h.reports {
+		if r.Trigger != "night" || r.Ring != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("the kept report lost its ids: %+v", r)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A pass in progress holds the lock: the sender at start must not take that pass's copy (it would be sent twice).
+func TestR868_RunningPassKeepsTheSenderOff(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, nil)
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(reportFile(l.PlanDir, "r1", LayerGuest, "apply"), []byte(`{"mode":"apply","layer":"guest"}`), 0o600))
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 0 || len(h.reports) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent while a pass ran: %d", n)
+	}
+	unlock()
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("not sent after the pass: %d", n)
+	}
+}
+
+// v0.144.1 — THE LIVE SHAPE (demo-hp 2026-10-05 05:45 UTC): the restarted daemon looked at 05:45:09, the orphaned
+// wrapper wrote its copy at ~05:45:16. The loop must still send it.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: make SendUnsentLoop return after the first look → "the late copy was never sent".
+func TestR868_ACopyWrittenAfterTheStartIsSentByTheLoop(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, nil)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	sent := make(chan int, 4)
+	go l.SendUnsentLoop(ctx, 20*time.Millisecond, func(n int) { sent <- n })
+	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) // the start-time look found nothing
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(reportFile(l.PlanDir, "late", LayerGuest, "apply"),
+		[]byte(`{"mode":"apply","layer":"guest","run_id":"late","trigger":"debug","ring":0,"vmid":9201,"upgraded":[{"name":"openssl","version":"u3"}]}`), 0o600))
+	select {
+	case n := <-sent:
+		if n != 1 || len(h.reports) != 1 || h.reports[0].RunID != "late" || h.reports[0].Outcome == "" {
+			t.Fatalf("sent %d: %+v", n, h.reports)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("the late copy was never sent")
+	}
+}
+
+func must(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}

internal/pbs/live_reporter_test.go

@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ func TestLiveReporter_CoordPresentWithoutPriorVerify(t *testing.T) {
 	if h.PBS == nil {
 		t.Fatal("pbs coord absent despite a reachable PBS — the gap this fixes")
 	}
-	if h.PBS.RepoID != "felhom-pbs" || h.PBS.Namespace != "root" || h.PBS.LatestSnapshotID != "9201" {
-		t.Errorf("pbs coord = %+v, want felhom-pbs/root/9201", h.PBS)
+	if h.PBS.RepoID != "felhom-pbs" || h.PBS.Namespace != hub.PBSRootNamespace || h.PBS.LatestSnapshotID != "9201" {
+		t.Errorf("pbs coord = %+v, want felhom-pbs, the root namespace (\"\", R-124), 9201", h.PBS)
 	}
 
 	// COMPANION (pre-fix): the bare SnapshotStore (no live read) with an empty store omits pbs.

internal/privapplytest/check.go

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+// Package privapplytest runs configs/felhom-priv-apply in CHECK-ONLY mode from Go tests (R-861): each renderer's
+// real output must be accepted by the root checker, so the two can never drift apart unnoticed. Test-only helper.
+package privapplytest
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Check writes content to a temp file and runs `felhom-priv-apply --check <verb> [name] <file>`. It returns the
+// checker's verdict line ("OK" or "REFUSED [rule] …"). Skips when python3 is absent.
+func Check(t *testing.T, verb, name, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	py, err := exec.LookPath("python3")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skip("python3 not available")
+	}
+	_, here, _, _ := runtime.Caller(0)
+	wrapper := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(here), "..", "..", "configs", "felhom-priv-apply")
+	f := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "staged")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(f, []byte(content), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	args := []string{"-B", wrapper, "--check", verb}
+	if name != "" {
+		args = append(args, name)
+	}
+	out, _ := exec.Command(py, append(args, f)...).CombinedOutput()
+	return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+}

internal/provision/backhalf.go

@@ -186,8 +186,9 @@ func (b *BackHalf) Provision(ctx context.Context, in Input) (Result, error) {
 	// 6. Install + register the pre-start self-heal hook (C1 net): if a data drive is absent at a future
 	//    boot, the hook creates a placeholder for its missing bind source so the guest still starts.
 	//    Best-effort + non-fatal — it's defense-in-depth; a provision must not fail over the hook.
-	if err := guesthook.InstallSnippet(ctx, b.runner); err != nil {
-		b.logger.Warn("provision: pre-start hook snippet install failed (non-fatal)", "vmid", in.VMID, "err", err)
+	//    R-861 (v0.146.0): the hook FILE comes with the signed config bundle; the agent only checks it and registers it.
+	if err := guesthook.SnippetReady(guesthook.SnippetPath); err != nil {
+		b.logger.Warn("provision: pre-start hook not in place — not registering it (non-fatal)", "vmid", in.VMID, "err", err)
 	} else if err := guesthook.Register(ctx, b.runner, in.VMID); err != nil {
 		b.logger.Warn("provision: pre-start hook registration failed (non-fatal)", "vmid", in.VMID, "err", err)
 	}

internal/reconcile/bringup.go

@@ -302,6 +302,19 @@ func (e *Engine) runBringUp(ctx context.Context, spec BringUpSpec, res *BringUpR
 		}
 	}
 
+	// R-834: DR keeps the archive's `onboot: 1`, binds the host's REAL drives (4d) and STARTS the guest
+	// — right on a replaced host, where the original is gone. Beside a LIVE original it would be a
+	// second controller for the same household on the same drives. So DR refuses when this host
+	// still carries the original (the archive's source VMID) or any guest that binds the drives.
+	// A copy beside the original is the restore-test's job (onboot=0, throwaway stand-ins, torn
+	// down) or the runbook's beside-restore. Pinned by TestRunBringUp_DRRefusesBesideALiveOriginal.
+	if spec.Mode == ModeDRGuestLoss {
+		if why := e.liveOriginalBeside(ctx, lxc, spec.Archive); why != "" {
+			res.Err = fmt.Errorf("reconcile: dr bring-up refused: %s — a DR restore beside a live original would run two boxes on the same drives (R-834)", why)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
 	base := JournalEntry{OpID: e.bringUpOpID(spec.VMID), VMID: spec.VMID, Kind: bringUpKind, Rollback: true}
 
 	// OWN the rollback BEFORE any mutation. From here a crash leaves an in-flight Rollback
@@ -734,3 +747,47 @@ func net0MAC(cfg proxmox.GuestConfig) string {
 	}
 	return ""
 }
+
+// archiveSourceVMID reads the source guest's VMID from a backup volid: a vzdump file
+// (`…/vzdump-lxc-<vmid>-<date>.tar.zst`) or a PBS snapshot (`…:backup/ct/<vmid>/<time>`). 0 = unknown.
+func archiveSourceVMID(archive string) int {
+	if i := strings.Index(archive, "vzdump-lxc-"); i >= 0 {
+		rest := archive[i+len("vzdump-lxc-"):]
+		if j := strings.Index(rest, "-"); j > 0 {
+			if n, err := strconv.Atoi(rest[:j]); err == nil {
+				return n
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if i := strings.Index(archive, "ct/"); i >= 0 {
+		rest := archive[i+len("ct/"):]
+		if j := strings.Index(rest, "/"); j > 0 {
+			if n, err := strconv.Atoi(rest[:j]); err == nil {
+				return n
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// liveOriginalBeside says why a DR bring-up would land beside a live original ("" = it would not):
+// the archive's source guest still exists here, or a guest binds the drives parent. Fails CLOSED: a
+// guest whose config cannot be read cannot be ruled out.
+func (e *Engine) liveOriginalBeside(ctx context.Context, lxc []proxmox.Guest, archive string) string {
+	src := archiveSourceVMID(archive)
+	for _, g := range lxc {
+		if src > 0 && g.VMID == src {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("the archive's source guest %d still exists on this host (status %s)", g.VMID, g.Status)
+		}
+		cfg, err := e.api.GuestConfig(ctx, g.VMID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("guest %d's config could not be read to rule out a live original: %v", g.VMID, err)
+		}
+		for slot, v := range cfg.MountPoints() {
+			if source, _, _ := strings.Cut(v, ","); source == structuralParentDir {
+				return fmt.Sprintf("guest %d binds the household drives (%s %s)", g.VMID, slot, structuralParentDir)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}

internal/reconcile/bringup_beside_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+package reconcile
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/proxmox"
+)
+
+// R-834: a whole-guest restore BESIDE a live original must never come up as a second box on the same
+// drives. The DR route keeps `onboot: 1`, binds the real drives and starts the guest, so it refuses
+// when the original (or any guest binding the drives) is still on this host; on a replaced host it
+// proceeds and keeps its binds. Red-proof: make liveOriginalBeside return "" and the refusals pass
+// the restore through (the "refused" sub-tests fail).
+func TestRunBringUp_DRRefusesBesideALiveOriginal(t *testing.T) {
+	const target = 9299
+	drivesBind := proxmox.GuestConfig{Extra: map[string]json.RawMessage{
+		"mp8": json.RawMessage(`"/mnt/felhom-drives,mp=/mnt/felhom-drives"`),
+	}}
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		archive string
+		lxc     []proxmox.Guest
+		cfg     map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig
+		refuse  string // substring of the refusal; "" = must proceed
+	}{
+		{"the source guest still exists", "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_10_04-04_34_55.tar.zst",
+			[]proxmox.Guest{{VMID: 9201, Status: "running"}}, map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{9201: scratchCfg()}, "source guest 9201"},
+		{"another guest binds the drives (PBS archive)", "felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-10-04T02:34:55Z",
+			[]proxmox.Guest{{VMID: 9300, Status: "stopped"}}, map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{9300: drivesBind}, "binds the household drives"},
+		{"a guest whose config cannot be read", "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-x.tar.zst",
+			[]proxmox.Guest{{VMID: 9400, Status: "running"}}, map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{}, "could not be read"},
+		{"replaced host: only an unrelated scratch guest", "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-x.tar.zst",
+			[]proxmox.Guest{{VMID: 9202, Status: "running"}}, map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{9202: scratchCfg()}, ""},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cfg := c.cfg
+			cfg[target] = scratchCfg()
+			api := &fakeAPI{lxc: c.lxc, cfg: cfg}
+			e, fr, _, q := newDREngine(t, api)
+			defer q.Close()
+			res := e.RunBringUp(context.Background(), BringUpSpec{
+				Mode: ModeDRGuestLoss, Archive: c.archive, VMID: target, RestoreStorage: "local-lvm", KeepMAC: true,
+			})
+			if c.refuse != "" {
+				if res.Err == nil || !strings.Contains(res.Err.Error(), c.refuse) || !strings.Contains(res.Err.Error(), "R-834") {
+					t.Fatalf("want a refusal naming %q, got %+v", c.refuse, res)
+				}
+				if len(api.restores) != 0 || len(api.starts) != 0 || len(fr.cmds) != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("a refused DR touched the host: restores=%d starts=%v cmds=%v", len(api.restores), api.starts, fr.cmds)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if res.Err != nil || !res.Pass {
+				t.Fatalf("a DR on a replaced host must proceed, got %+v", res)
+			}
+			// … and there it keeps the REAL drives bind (the right binds on a replaced host).
+			joined := strings.Join(fr.cmds, "\n")
+			if !strings.Contains(joined, "-mp8 /mnt/felhom-drives,mp=/mnt/felhom-drives") {
+				t.Fatalf("the DR guest lost its drives bind: %v", fr.cmds)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// Provisioning restores the GOLDEN (no drives, onboot set by the back-half on purpose): a drives-
+// binding guest on the host does not block it — the rule is DR's alone.
+func TestRunBringUp_ProvisionNotBlockedByADrivesBind(t *testing.T) {
+	api := &fakeAPI{
+		lxc: []proxmox.Guest{{VMID: 9201, Status: "running"}},
+		cfg: map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{
+			9201: {Extra: map[string]json.RawMessage{"mp8": json.RawMessage(`"/mnt/felhom-drives,mp=/mnt/felhom-drives"`)}},
+			9203: scratchCfg(),
+		},
+	}
+	e, _, q := newEngine(t, api, EmptyProvider{})
+	defer q.Close()
+	res := e.RunBringUp(context.Background(), BringUpSpec{Mode: ModeProvision, Archive: "local:vztmpl/felhom-golden.tar.zst", VMID: 9203, RestoreStorage: "local-lvm"})
+	if res.Err != nil || !res.Pass {
+		t.Fatalf("provision must proceed, got %+v", res)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArchiveSourceVMID(t *testing.T) {
+	for in, want := range map[string]int{
+		"local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_10_04-04_34_55.tar.zst": 9201,
+		"felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-10-04T02:34:55Z":           9201,
+		"tmp-dooplex-copy:backup/ct/9201/2026-10-03T19:00:00Z":     9201,
+		"local:vztmpl/felhom-golden.tar.zst":                       0,
+		"vol":                                                      0,
+	} {
+		if got := archiveSourceVMID(in); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("archiveSourceVMID(%q) = %d, want %d", in, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// R-834, the restore-test route: its scratch guest sits BESIDE the live original by design, so it must
+// carry no host-path bind — the archive's mp8 (the household's drives) and mp9 (the original's
+// bootstrap) are replaced by throwaway volumes AT restore time. Measured live 2026-10-04 on demo-hp
+// (`audits/backup-close-2026-10-04/partA/`): onboot 0 and no host bind on every poll. Red-proof:
+// make drRestoreOverrides return the archive's own mp8 value and this fails.
+func TestRestoreTest_NoHostPathBindBesideTheOriginal(t *testing.T) {
+	api := &fakeAPI{
+		cfg: map[int]proxmox.GuestConfig{990000: scratchCfg()},
+		extractCfg: "hostname: demo-hp\nonboot: 1\nrootfs: local-lvm:vm-9201-disk-0,size=16G\n" +
+			"mp0: local-lvm:vm-9201-disk-1,mp=/var/lib/felhom,backup=1,size=70G\n" +
+			"mp8: /mnt/felhom-drives,mp=/mnt/felhom-drives\n" +
+			"mp9: /var/lib/felhom-agent/guests/9201/bootstrap,mp=/etc/felhom-bootstrap,ro=1\n",
+	}
+	e, _, q := newEngine(t, api, EmptyProvider{})
+	defer q.Close()
+	_ = e.RunRestoreTest(context.Background(), RestoreTestSpec{
+		Archive: "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9201-x.tar.zst", RestoreStorage: "local-lvm",
+		ScratchMin: 990000, ScratchMax: 990009, SourceTier: "local",
+	})
+	if len(api.restores) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want one restore, got %+v", api.restores)
+	}
+	r := api.restores[0]
+	for _, slot := range []string{"mp8", "mp9"} {
+		v, ok := r.MountOverrides[slot]
+		if !ok || strings.HasPrefix(v, "/") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s = %q (present=%v): the scratch beside the original must get a throwaway volume, never the host path", slot, v, ok)
+		}
+	}
+	for slot, v := range r.MountOverrides {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(v, "/") {
+			t.Fatalf("%s carries a host path %q into the scratch guest", slot, v)
+		}
+	}
+	if r.ConfigOverrides["onboot"] != "0" {
+		t.Fatalf("onboot = %q, want 0", r.ConfigOverrides["onboot"])
+	}
+}

internal/reconcile/classify.go

@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ const (
 	// Destructive for unknown classes — this named constant documents the class and keeps the
 	// signed-op vocabulary explicit, it does not (and must not) loosen anything.
 	ClassAgentUpdate OpClass = "agent_update"
+
+	// A Docker engine step in the customer guest (agent v0.142.0, `11` §5.8) — ring 1, and every undo. Destructive-class
+	// (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the same signature itself.
+	ClassOSDockerStep OpClass = "os_docker_step"
+
+	// The config bundle (agent v0.143.0, R-840, `11` §5.4.2): the box's ROOT-OWNED files (sudoers, wrappers, units).
+	// Destructive-class (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the signature itself.
+	ClassAgentConfigUpdate OpClass = "agent_config_update"
 )
 
 // Disposition is the classifier verdict.
@@ -115,7 +123,7 @@ func Classify(class OpClass, prov Provenance) Disposition {
 		return Destructive
 	case ClassKeyRotation:
 		return Destructive
-	case ClassAgentUpdate:
+	case ClassAgentUpdate, ClassOSDockerStep, ClassAgentConfigUpdate:
 		// Never benign — no agent-internal provenance can make replacing the agent binary
 		// unsigned-safe (a compromised process must not be able to self-bless an update).
 		return Destructive

internal/selfupdate/executor.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package selfupdate
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ type Executor struct {
 	username    string
 	token       string
 	stateDir    string
+	planDir     string // felhom-os-apply's plan dir; "" = defaultPlanDir (tests set a temp dir)
 	runner      WrapperRunner
 	httpClient  *http.Client
 	logger      *slog.Logger
@@ -126,18 +129,70 @@ func (e *Executor) Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.RawMessag
 		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: chmod staged: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Hand off to the root wrapper. It re-verifies the sha, flips A/B, writes the pending marker,
-	// and schedules the detached restart. After this the new binary starts; the commit is the
-	// Manager's job once it has dwelled cleanly.
-	e.logger.Warn("agent_update: handing staged binary to the guarded wrapper", "staged", staged, "version", p.Version)
-	stdout, stderr, err := e.runner.Run(ctx, wrapperPath, "apply", staged, p.SHA256)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: wrapper apply failed: %w (stderr: %s)", err, string(stderr))
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): hand the SIGNED job to the root wrapper felhom-os-apply (mode agent_update). It verifies the
+	// operator's signature itself (root-owned signers file, this host, the window, the nonce), re-hashes the staged
+	// file against the SIGNED sha, and only then runs the A/B flip (felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply, no longer in the
+	// agent's sudoers). Until v0.146.0 the agent passed the sha to the flip itself, so a compromised agent could
+	// install any binary — and the binary is what the escrow ceremony and the guest hook run as root.
+	so, ok := signedjobs.SignedOpFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: no signed envelope in the context — the root wrapper could not verify it")
 	}
-	e.logger.Warn("agent_update: apply handed off; restart scheduled", "version", p.Version, "wrapper", trim(stdout))
+	planDir := e.planDir
+	if planDir == "" {
+		planDir = defaultPlanDir
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(planDir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: plan dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	plan, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"release_id": "agent-" + p.Version, "layer": "host", "mode": "agent_update",
+		"staged": staged, "signed": map[string]string{"blob_b64": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(so.Blob), "sig": string(so.Sig)}})
+	planPath := filepath.Join(planDir, "plan-agentupdate-"+p.Version+".json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(planPath, plan, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: write plan: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer os.Remove(planPath)
+	e.logger.Warn("agent_update: handing the signed job to the root wrapper (felhom-os-apply agent_update)", "staged", staged, "version", p.Version)
+	stdout, stderr, err := e.runner.Run(ctx, osApplyPath, "--plan", planPath)
+	rep := parseOSApplyReport(stdout)
+	var r struct {
+		Refused     json.RawMessage `json:"refused"`
+		Failed      json.RawMessage `json:"failed"`
+		AgentUpdate json.RawMessage `json:"agent_update"`
+	}
+	jerr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(rep), &r)
+	refused := len(r.Refused) > 0 && string(r.Refused) != "null"
+	if err != nil || jerr != nil || refused || len(r.Failed) > 0 || len(r.AgentUpdate) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_update: the root wrapper did not apply it: %v (report: %s; stderr: %s)", err, trimStr(rep), trim(stderr))
+	}
+	e.logger.Warn("agent_update: signed update verified as root and handed off; restart scheduled", "version", p.Version, "report", trimStr(rep))
 	return nil
 }
 
+// osApplyPath is the root wrapper that verifies the signed agent_update (R-861). Fixed, never config-overridable.
+const osApplyPath = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"
+
+// defaultPlanDir is felhom-os-apply's ONLY plan directory (PLAN_DIR there; osupdate.DefaultPlanDir here).
+const defaultPlanDir = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os"
+
+// parseOSApplyReport returns the JSON after the wrapper's last "OSAPPLY-REPORT " line ("" when there is none).
+func parseOSApplyReport(stdout []byte) string {
+	rep := ""
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(stdout), "\n") {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "OSAPPLY-REPORT ") {
+			rep = strings.TrimPrefix(line, "OSAPPLY-REPORT ")
+		}
+	}
+	return rep
+}
+
+func trimStr(s string) string {
+	if len(s) > 400 {
+		return s[:400] + "…"
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
 // download streams url → dest (0644, fsync'd) and returns the lowercase-hex sha256 of the bytes.
 func (e *Executor) download(ctx context.Context, url, dest string) (string, error) {
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)

internal/selfupdate/executor_test.go

@@ -15,34 +15,56 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/reconcile"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
 )
 
-// fakeWrapper records the verbs the executor/manager shell out, and returns a configurable error.
+// fakeWrapper records the verbs the executor/manager shell out, and returns a configurable error. For the os-apply
+// call it snapshots the plan file at call time (the executor removes it afterwards) and answers with report.
 type fakeWrapper struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
-	calls [][]string
-	err   error
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	calls  [][]string
+	err    error
+	plans  []map[string]any
+	report string // the OSAPPLY-REPORT JSON; "" = a successful agent_update
 }
 
 func (f *fakeWrapper) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
 	f.mu.Lock()
 	defer f.mu.Unlock()
 	f.calls = append(f.calls, append([]string{name}, args...))
+	if name == osApplyPath && len(args) == 2 && args[0] == "--plan" {
+		var p map[string]any
+		b, _ := os.ReadFile(args[1])
+		_ = json.Unmarshal(b, &p)
+		f.plans = append(f.plans, p)
+		rep := f.report
+		if rep == "" {
+			rep = `{"agent_update": {"version": "x", "wrapper_rc": 0}, "mode": "agent_update", "refused": null}`
+		}
+		return []byte("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + rep + "\n"), nil, f.err
+	}
 	return []byte("ok"), nil, f.err
 }
+
+// applyCalls are the hand-offs to the root wrapper (felhom-os-apply --plan …). Since v0.146.0 the agent never calls
+// `felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply` itself.
 func (f *fakeWrapper) applyCalls() [][]string {
 	f.mu.Lock()
 	defer f.mu.Unlock()
 	var out [][]string
 	for _, c := range f.calls {
-		if len(c) >= 2 && c[1] == "apply" {
+		if c[0] == osApplyPath || (len(c) >= 2 && c[1] == "apply") {
 			out = append(out, c)
 		}
 	}
 	return out
 }
 
+func signedCtx() context.Context {
+	return signedjobs.WithSignedOp(context.Background(), &reconcile.SignedOp{Blob: []byte(`{"op":"agent_update"}`), Sig: []byte("SIG")})
+}
+
 func sha256Of(b []byte) string {
 	h := sha256.Sum256(b)
 	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
@@ -65,6 +87,7 @@ func newExec(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server, wrap WrapperRunner) (*Executor,
 		Runner:      wrap,
 		Logger:      slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)),
 	})
+	e.planDir = t.TempDir()
 	return e, stateDir
 }
 
@@ -84,7 +107,7 @@ func TestExecutor_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 	e, stateDir := newExec(t, srv, wrap)
 
 	sha := sha256Of(body)
-	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha)); err != nil {
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha)); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err)
 	}
 	staged := filepath.Join(stateDir, "selfupdate", "felhom-agent-0.70.1")
@@ -93,11 +116,46 @@ func TestExecutor_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("staged binary missing/mismatch: %v", err)
 	}
 	calls := wrap.applyCalls()
-	if len(calls) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("apply invoked %d times, want 1 (%v)", len(calls), wrap.calls)
+	if len(calls) != 1 || calls[0][0] != osApplyPath || calls[0][1] != "--plan" {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly one hand-off to felhom-os-apply --plan, got %v", wrap.calls)
 	}
-	if calls[0][2] != staged || calls[0][3] != sha {
-		t.Errorf("apply args = %v, want [.. apply %s %s]", calls[0], staged, sha)
+	// R-861: the plan carries the SIGNED envelope and the staged path; the wrapper, not the agent, decides.
+	p := wrap.plans[0]
+	sg, _ := p["signed"].(map[string]any)
+	if p["mode"] != "agent_update" || p["layer"] != "host" || p["staged"] != staged || sg["sig"] != "SIG" || sg["blob_b64"] == "" {
+		t.Errorf("plan = %v, want mode agent_update + the staged path + the signed envelope", p)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(calls[0][2]); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Error("the plan file was left behind")
+	}
+}
+
+// R-861: without the signed envelope nothing reaches the root wrapper.
+// RED-PROOF (audits/hub-safety-2026-10-05/partF/red-proof.txt): call `felhom-selfupdate-guarded apply` directly again
+// → the happy path's "exactly one hand-off to felhom-os-apply" fails.
+func TestExecutor_NoEnvelopeNoHandOff(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte("good bytes")
+	srv := artifactServer(t, body)
+	defer srv.Close()
+	wrap := &fakeWrapper{}
+	e, _ := newExec(t, srv, wrap)
+	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha256Of(body))); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("an update with no signed envelope was handed on")
+	}
+	if len(wrap.applyCalls()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("the root wrapper was called without an envelope: %v", wrap.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+// A refusal in the wrapper's report is a failure, even when its exit code reads 0.
+func TestExecutor_WrapperRefusalSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte("good bytes")
+	srv := artifactServer(t, body)
+	defer srv.Close()
+	wrap := &fakeWrapper{report: `{"mode": "agent_update", "refused": {"code": "R3", "reason": "the operator signature does not verify"}}`}
+	e, _ := newExec(t, srv, wrap)
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha256Of(body))); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a refused signed update read as applied")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -158,7 +216,7 @@ func TestExecutor_WrapperFailureSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
 	defer srv.Close()
 	wrap := &fakeWrapper{err: errors.New("wrapper refused: sha mismatch")}
 	e, _ := newExec(t, srv, wrap)
-	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha256Of(body))); err == nil {
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), "agent_update", updateParamsJSON(t, "0.70.1", sha256Of(body))); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("wrapper failure must surface")
 	}
 }

internal/signedjobs/runner.go

@@ -49,6 +49,21 @@ type Executor interface {
 	Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.RawMessage) error
 }
 
+type signedOpKey struct{}
+
+// WithSignedOp / SignedOpFrom carry the RAW verified envelope (blob bytes + armored signature) to an executor whose
+// ROOT half verifies it AGAIN against a root-owned key file (agent v0.142.0, the Docker slow lane: the agent's own
+// config is agent-writable, so a root wrapper must not take the agent's word for a signature).
+func WithSignedOp(ctx context.Context, s *reconcile.SignedOp) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, signedOpKey{}, s)
+}
+
+// SignedOpFrom returns the envelope set by WithSignedOp.
+func SignedOpFrom(ctx context.Context) (*reconcile.SignedOp, bool) {
+	s, ok := ctx.Value(signedOpKey{}).(*reconcile.SignedOp)
+	return s, ok && s != nil
+}
+
 // ErrNoExecutor signals an op class with no executor wired in this build (don't clear the job).
 var ErrNoExecutor = fmt.Errorf("signedjobs: no executor for this op class in this build")
 
@@ -158,7 +173,7 @@ func (r *Runner) processJob(ctx context.Context, j hub.JobWire) bool {
 	// Allowed: the nonce is already durably burned (Verify, before this point). Execute.
 	r.logger.Warn("signedjobs: AUTHORIZED signed op — executing",
 		"job", j.JobID, "op", ob.Op, "key_id", dec.Verified.KeyID, "nonce", dec.Verified.Nonce)
-	err := r.exec.Execute(ctx, ob.Op, ob.Params)
+	err := r.exec.Execute(WithSignedOp(ctx, signed), ob.Op, ob.Params)
 	switch {
 	case err == nil:
 		r.logger.Warn("signedjobs: signed op COMPLETED", "job", j.JobID, "op", ob.Op)

internal/storage/hostops.go

@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ type MountSpec struct {
 type Binaries struct {
 	Systemctl   string
 	Install     string
+	// PrivApply is the root content checker (R-861, agent v0.146.0): a unit file reaches /etc/systemd/system only
+	// through `felhom-priv-apply unit <name>`, which reads the staged copy from /var/lib/felhom-agent/units/ and
+	// refuses anything the renderers here never produce (a bind over /etc, a Where outside /mnt, …).
+	PrivApply string
 	Smartctl    string
 	Lvs         string
 	Blkid       string // device signature probe (8C data-bearing detection)
@@ -119,6 +123,9 @@ func (b Binaries) withDefaults() Binaries {
 	if b.Install == "" {
 		b.Install = "/usr/bin/install"
 	}
+	if b.PrivApply == "" {
+		b.PrivApply = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply"
+	}
 	if b.Smartctl == "" {
 		b.Smartctl = "/usr/sbin/smartctl"
 	}
@@ -246,9 +253,9 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) EnsureMount(ctx context.Context, spec MountSpec) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("storage: staging unit: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	dest := filepath.Join(h.unitDir, unitName)
-	// install as root (atomic copy with fixed mode/owner) — fixed arg vector.
-	if err := h.run(ctx, h.bins.Install, "-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0644", "--", stagePath, dest); err != nil {
+	// R-861: the root checker installs it (fixed source dir, fixed destination dir, content checked) — never a
+	// plain `install` of a file the agent wrote.
+	if err := h.run(ctx, h.bins.PrivApply, "unit", unitName); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("storage: installing unit %s: %w", unitName, err)
 	}
 	if err := h.run(ctx, h.bins.Systemctl, "daemon-reload"); err != nil {

internal/storage/hostops_test.go

@@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ func TestHostOps_MountLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(rr.calls) != 3 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected 3 commands, got %d: %v", len(rr.calls), rr.calls)
 	}
-	if rr.calls[0][0] != "/usr/bin/install" || !contains(rr.calls[0], "0644") {
-		t.Errorf("call[0] not the install: %v", rr.calls[0])
+	// R-861: the unit is installed by the root content checker, named — never a plain `install` of a staged path.
+	if rr.calls[0][0] != "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply" || len(rr.calls[0]) != 3 || rr.calls[0][1] != "unit" {
+		t.Errorf("call[0] not the checker's unit install: %v", rr.calls[0])
 	}
 	if !contains(rr.calls[1], "daemon-reload") {
 		t.Errorf("call[1] not daemon-reload: %v", rr.calls[1])

internal/storage/netmigrate_test.go

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func TestMigrateNetworkUnits_RewritesDriftedOnceIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
 		if strings.Contains(joined, "daemon-reload") {
 			reloads++
 		}
-		if strings.Contains(joined, "install") {
+		if strings.Contains(joined, "felhom-priv-apply unit") {
 			installs++
 		}
 	}

internal/storage/netmount.go

@@ -236,9 +236,13 @@ func (s NetworkMountSpec) mountOptions() string {
 			"file_mode=0664",
 			"dir_mode=0775",
 			"_netdev",
+			"nosuid",
+			"nodev",
 		}, ",")
 	}
-	return "vers=4.1,soft,timeo=50,retrans=2,noatime,_netdev,retry=0"
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): nosuid,nodev — a set-uid file or a device node on a server outside the box must never act on
+	// the host. felhom-priv-apply refuses a network unit without them.
+	return "vers=4.1,soft,timeo=50,retrans=2,noatime,_netdev,retry=0,nosuid,nodev"
 }
 
 // renderNetworkMountUnit builds the .mount unit (triggered by the .automount; deliberately NO [Install]
@@ -409,8 +413,8 @@ func (h *SudoHostOps) installUnit(ctx context.Context, unitName, content string)
 	if err := os.WriteFile(stagePath, []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("netmount: staging unit %s: %w", unitName, err)
 	}
-	dest := filepath.Join(h.unitDir, unitName)
-	if err := h.run(ctx, h.bins.Install, "-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0644", "--", stagePath, dest); err != nil {
+	// R-861: through the root checker (felhom-priv-apply unit), never a plain install of an agent-written file.
+	if err := h.run(ctx, h.bins.PrivApply, "unit", unitName); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("netmount: installing unit %s: %w", unitName, err)
 	}
 	return nil

internal/storage/netmount_test.go

@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ func TestEnsureNetworkMount_Commands(t *testing.T) {
 		switch {
 		case strings.Contains(joined, "mkdir") && strings.Contains(joined, "/mnt/felhom-drives/media"):
 			sawMkdir = true
-		case strings.Contains(joined, "install"):
+		case strings.Contains(joined, "felhom-priv-apply unit"):
 			installs++
 		case strings.Contains(joined, "daemon-reload"):
 			sawReload = true

internal/storage/r861_privapply_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/privapplytest"
+)
+
+// R-861: every unit the agent renders is one the root checker installs — the name it computes, the Where, the
+// options. RED-PROOF: drop "nosuid","nodev" from mountOptions → the network cases are REFUSED [U5].
+func TestPrivApply_AcceptsTheRenderedUnits(t *testing.T) {
+	local := MountSpec{Name: "x", UUID: "91d2dc2d-2d28-4929-9bdd-3e11fa2f41ae", Where: "/mnt/hdd_1", FSType: "ext4"}
+	name, _ := UnitNameForMount(local.Where)
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "unit", name, renderMountUnit(local)); got != "OK" {
+		t.Errorf("local unit %s: %s", name, got)
+	}
+	local.FSType = ""
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "unit", name, renderMountUnit(local)); got != "OK" {
+		t.Errorf("local unit without Type: %s", got)
+	}
+	for _, spec := range []NetworkMountSpec{
+		{Name: "media", Protocol: ProtocolNFS, Server: "10.0.0.5", Export: "/srv/media", MappedUID: 1000, MappedGID: 1000},
+		{Name: "photos", Protocol: ProtocolSMB, Server: "nas.lan", Export: "photos", CredsRef: "/etc/felhom/netmount/photos.cred", MappedUID: 1000, MappedGID: 1000},
+	} {
+		mu, err := UnitNameForMount(spec.Where())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "unit", mu, renderNetworkMountUnit(spec)); got != "OK" {
+			t.Errorf("%s .mount: %s", spec.Name, got)
+		}
+		au := strings.TrimSuffix(mu, ".mount") + ".automount"
+		if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "unit", au, renderNetworkAutomountUnit(spec)); got != "OK" {
+			t.Errorf("%s .automount: %s", spec.Name, got)
+		}
+	}
+	// control: the checker is really looking — a unit over /etc is refused
+	evil := strings.Replace(renderMountUnit(MountSpec{UUID: local.UUID, Where: "/mnt/hdd_1"}), "Where=/mnt/hdd_1", "Where=/etc/sudoers.d", 1)
+	if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "unit", name, evil); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "REFUSED") {
+		t.Fatalf("control: a unit over /etc/sudoers.d was not refused: %s", got)
+	}
+}

internal/wgtunnel/manager.go

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ const (
 	Iface = "wg-felhom"
 	// confDest is the installed conf path — must match the FELHOM_WG sudoers entry EXACTLY.
 	confDest = "/etc/wireguard/wg-felhom.conf"
+	// privApply is the root content checker that installs confDest (R-861).
+	privApply = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-priv-apply"
 	// unit is the systemd unit the sudoers allowlists.
 	unit = "wg-quick@wg-felhom"
 
@@ -507,8 +509,9 @@ func (m *Manager) ensureTunnelLocked(ctx context.Context, block *hub.WireWiregua
 		m.logger.Error("wgtunnel: staging conf", "err", err)
 		return
 	}
-	// argv matches the FELHOM_WG sudoers entry exactly (fixed source + dest).
-	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, "install", "-o", "root", "-g", "root", "-m", "0600", "--", m.stagedConfPath(), confDest); err != nil {
+	// R-861 (v0.146.0): the root checker installs the staged conf (fixed source /var/lib/felhom-agent/wg/, fixed
+	// destination, 0600) and refuses any key renderConf never writes — PostUp/PreUp run as root under wg-quick.
+	if _, errOut, err := m.runner.Run(ctx, privApply, "wg"); err != nil {
 		m.logger.Error("wgtunnel: conf install failed", "err", err, "stderr", strings.TrimSpace(string(errOut)))
 		return
 	}

internal/wgtunnel/manager_test.go

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func TestScenarioA_RegisterThenApplyOrdering(t *testing.T) {
 	// Block arrives → conf staged + installed + enabled.
 	pub := localPub(t, m)
 	m.Apply(ctx, true, testBlock(pub))
-	if rr.count("install") != 1 || rr.count("systemctl") != 1 {
+	if rr.count(privApply) != 1 || rr.count("systemctl") != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("apply execs = %v", rr.calls)
 	}
 	if got := rr.lastSystemctl(); strings.Join(got, " ") != "systemctl enable --now wg-quick@wg-felhom" {
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func TestAdoptLostMarkerWithKnownKey(t *testing.T) {
 	if mk == nil || mk.Pubkey != pub || mk.AssignedIP != "10.77.0.2/32" {
 		t.Fatalf("adoption marker = %+v", mk)
 	}
-	if rr.count("install") != 1 {
+	if rr.count(privApply) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("adopt did not proceed to conf apply: %v", rr.calls)
 	}
 }
@@ -686,13 +686,13 @@ func TestInitialResolveFailureNoTeardown(t *testing.T) {
 	m.Apply(ctx, false, nil) // register (no DNS)
 	pub := localPub(t, m)
 	m.Apply(ctx, true, testBlock(pub)) // resolve fails → cannot apply
-	if rr.count("install") != 0 || rr.count("systemctl") != 0 {
+	if rr.count(privApply) != 0 || rr.count("systemctl") != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("applied/tore-down despite a resolve failure: %v", rr.calls)
 	}
 	// DNS returns → the tunnel comes up on the next tick.
 	fr.set(netip.MustParseAddr("167.233.158.164"))
 	m.Apply(ctx, true, testBlock(pub))
-	if rr.count("install") != 1 {
+	if rr.count(privApply) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("did not recover after DNS returned: %v", rr.calls)
 	}
 }

internal/wgtunnel/r861_privapply_contract_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+package wgtunnel
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/privapplytest"
+)
+
+// R-861: the conf renderConf writes (with and without the operator OOB peer) is accepted; a PostUp line is not.
+func TestPrivApply_AcceptsTheRenderedConf(t *testing.T) {
+	priv := "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8="
+	b := testBlock("CQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQk=")
+	for _, oob := range []string{"", "10.77.0.250"} {
+		b.OOBPeerIP = oob
+		conf, err := renderConf(b, priv, "49.12.1.2")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "wg", "", conf); got != "OK" {
+			t.Errorf("rendered conf (oob=%q): %s", oob, got)
+		}
+		if got := privapplytest.Check(t, "wg", "", strings.Replace(conf, "MTU = 1280", "MTU = 1280\nPostUp = id", 1)); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "REFUSED") {
+			t.Fatalf("control: PostUp was not refused: %s", got)
+		}
+	}
+}

scripts/build-config-bundle.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""build-config-bundle.py — build the agent's CONFIG BUNDLE (R-840, `11` §5.4.2).
+
+Usage:  python3 scripts/build-config-bundle.py <agent-version> <out.json>     (prints the bundle's sha256)
+
+The bundle is every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes for the agent (sudoers, wrappers, units), as ONE
+JSON file published beside the binary (felhom-agent/<version>/felhom-config-bundle.json). A box takes it by a signed
+`agent_config_update` job; a new box takes the SAME file from the installer. The list of files is NOT kept here: it is
+`BUNDLE_FILES` in configs/felhom-os-apply, the root wrapper that installs it — one table, so the builder cannot put in a
+path the wrapper would refuse, nor leave out one it expects.
+
+Reproducible by construction: no timestamps, sorted keys, the table's order. The same source at the same version gives
+the same sha256 every time (pinned by configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py).
+"""
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import pathlib
+import re
+import sys
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+CONFIGS = REPO / "configs"
+
+
+def load_wrapper(configs=CONFIGS):
+    loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("osapply_for_bundle", str(configs / "felhom-os-apply"))
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("osapply_for_bundle", loader)
+    mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    loader.exec_module(mod)
+    return mod
+
+
+def build(version, configs=CONFIGS):
+    if not re.match(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$", version):
+        raise SystemExit(f"build-config-bundle: version {version!r} is not semver")
+    w = load_wrapper(configs)
+    files = []
+    for dest, src, mode, check, policy in w.BUNDLE_FILES:
+        data = (configs / src).read_bytes()
+        files.append({"path": dest, "source": f"configs/{src}", "mode": oct(mode), "check": check, "policy": policy,
+                      "sha256": hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest(), "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode()})
+    body = {"format": w.BUNDLE_FORMAT, "agent_version": version, "files": files}
+    return (json.dumps(body, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def main(argv):
+    if len(argv) != 3:
+        print(__doc__, file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    data = build(argv[1])
+    pathlib.Path(argv[2]).write_bytes(data)
+    print(hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest())
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv))

scripts/build-step-bundle.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""build-step-bundle.py — the TRANSITION bundle for a release whose bundle ADDS a path (R-880, `11` §5.4.2).
+
+Usage:  python3 scripts/build-step-bundle.py <base-bundle.json> <step-version> <out.json>    (prints the sha256)
+
+WHY. A box's INSTALLED felhom-os-apply checks every path of an incoming bundle against ITS OWN table (rule R16) — so a
+bundle that adds a path (v0.146.1 adds felhom-priv-apply, the guest hook and the shared-parent files, R-861) is refused
+by every box still running an older wrapper. The fix is a step: first a bundle the old wrapper accepts that brings ONLY
+the new felhom-os-apply (the new table), then the release's own bundle, which the new wrapper accepts.
+
+WHAT IT BUILDS. <base-bundle.json> is the bundle the boxes run now (download it from the package registry, e.g.
+felhom-agent/0.145.0/felhom-config-bundle.json, and check its sha against the hub's record). The step bundle is that
+bundle with EXACTLY ONE change: the /usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply entry's content is replaced by configs/felhom-os-apply
+(this tree). Same paths, same modes, same checks, every other byte identical; agent_version is <step-version> (e.g.
+0.146.1-step1). The old wrapper verifies it like any bundle (signature, sha, R16, content checks, self-check of the new
+wrapper) — nothing about the trust route changes.
+
+Pinned by configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py (StepBundle): same paths as the base, only the wrapper differs, the
+new wrapper's table is a superset of the base's paths.
+"""
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import pathlib
+import re
+import sys
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+OSAPPLY_DEST = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"
+
+
+def build_step(base_bytes, version, new_osapply_bytes):
+    if not re.match(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+-[0-9A-Za-z.]+$", version):
+        raise SystemExit(f"build-step-bundle: {version!r} must be a semver with a step suffix, e.g. 0.146.1-step1")
+    base = json.loads(base_bytes)
+    files = base.get("files")
+    if base.get("format") != 1 or not isinstance(files, list):
+        raise SystemExit("build-step-bundle: the base is not a format-1 bundle")
+    hit = [e for e in files if e.get("path") == OSAPPLY_DEST]
+    if len(hit) != 1:
+        raise SystemExit(f"build-step-bundle: the base has {len(hit)} {OSAPPLY_DEST} entries, want exactly 1")
+    hit[0]["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(new_osapply_bytes).decode()
+    hit[0]["sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(new_osapply_bytes).hexdigest()
+    base["agent_version"] = version
+    return (json.dumps(base, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def main(argv):
+    if len(argv) != 4:
+        print(__doc__, file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    data = build_step(pathlib.Path(argv[1]).read_bytes(), argv[2], (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-os-apply").read_bytes())
+    pathlib.Path(argv[3]).write_bytes(data)
+    print(hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest())
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv))

scripts/release-agent.sh

@@ -100,6 +100,15 @@ built_ver="$("$BIN" --version 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}')"
 BUILT_SHA="$(sha256sum "$BIN" | awk '{print $1}')"
 log "built ok: sha256 $BUILT_SHA"
 
+# ── 3b. The config bundle (R-840) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes (sudoers, wrappers, units), as ONE file beside the binary. A box
+# takes it by a signed agent_config_update; a new box from the installer. Reproducible: same source → same sha.
+BUNDLE="$(mktemp -t felhom-config-bundle-XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -f "$BIN" "$BUNDLE"' EXIT
+BUNDLE_SHA="$(python3 "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/build-config-bundle.py" "$VERSION" "$BUNDLE")" || die "config bundle build failed"
+[[ "$BUNDLE_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]] || die "config bundle build printed no sha256"
+log "config bundle built: sha256 $BUNDLE_SHA"
+
 # ── 4. Tag LOCALLY (the push comes after the publish — see step 6) ──────────────────────────────
 #
 # THE ORDER CHANGED, AND ONLY THE PUSH MOVED (R-188, 2026-08-03).
@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ if ! bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/publish-agent.sh" "$VERSION" "$BIN"; then
     die "publish failed"
 fi
 
+# ── 5b. Publish the config bundle beside the binary (same package version, same credentials) ──
+BURL="$GITEA_BASE/api/packages/$GITEA_OWNER/generic/felhom-agent/$VERSION/felhom-config-bundle.json"
+bcode="$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -u "${GITEA_USER}:${GITEA_TOKEN}" -X PUT --upload-file "$BUNDLE" "$BURL")"
+[[ "$bcode" == "201" || "$bcode" == "200" ]] || die "config bundle upload failed: HTTP $bcode (the binary IS published; re-run only the bundle upload)"
+log "config bundle published (HTTP $bcode)"
+
 # ── 6. Push the tag, now that the package exists ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # This is the step that makes the release VISIBLE — to CI, and to every `raw/tag/v<version>/` fetch
 # the installer makes. It runs last of the two so CI can never see a tag whose package is not there.
@@ -193,6 +208,11 @@ DL_SHA="$(sha256sum "$DL" | awk '{print $1}')"
 [[ "$DL_SHA" == "$BUILT_SHA" ]] \
     || die "published sha $DL_SHA != built sha $BUILT_SHA — the artifact is not what was built"
 
+BDL="$(mktemp -t felhom-config-bundle-dl-XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -f "$BIN" "$DL" "$BUNDLE" "$BDL"' EXIT
+curl -fsS -o "$BDL" "$BURL" || die "round-trip GET of the config bundle failed"
+[[ "$(sha256sum "$BDL" | awk '{print $1}')" == "$BUNDLE_SHA" ]] || die "published config bundle sha != built sha"
+
 # The tag must also serve the configs the installer will fetch from it.
 cfg_code="$(curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
     "$GITEA_BASE/$GITEA_OWNER/felhom-agent/raw/tag/$TAG/configs/felhom-agent.service" 2>/dev/null || true)"
@@ -206,6 +226,7 @@ cat <<EOF
     version : $VERSION
     tag     : $TAG
     sha256  : $BUILT_SHA
+    bundle  : $BUNDLE_SHA   (felhom-config-bundle.json — vouch it with the agent)
 
   NOT VOUCHED. Vouching is what points machines at this version and stays your deliberate act:
   hub operator UI → Configs → Day-0 artifacts. Until then boxes keep installing the previous one.

scripts/retention-policy.json

@@ -10,13 +10,11 @@
     "CI went red at a commit whose own run had been green the day before, on a true finding that",
     "no one could act on. The red will return at the next publish unless the two read one number.",
     "",
-    "HOW THE NUMBER WAS ARRIVED AT — stated honestly, because it is weaker than it looks.",
-    "generic_versions_kept is 10 because that is what the registry demonstrably holds today",
-    "(felhom-agent 0.121.0..0.128.0 = 10 versions, queried 2026-08-09). It is an OBSERVED state,",
-    "NOT a ruling anyone has been able to locate: no register row records a package prune, R-210",
-    "is WAITING-ON-OPERATOR and says 'Nothing was deleted; this is a list, not an action', and it",
-    "concerns local Docker images rather than this registry. Container packages currently hold 19",
-    "each, so there is no uniform ten-per-package cap visible either. See R-287.",
+    "HOW THE NUMBER WAS ARRIVED AT. generic_versions_kept is 10 because that is what the registry",
+    "keeps: the deleter was ESTABLISHED on 2026-08-10 (R-287) — the newest-10 prune of generic packages",
+    "run under R-267 (felhom-agent and felhom-golden generic held exactly 10 afterwards). Until then this",
+    "file called the 10 an observed state with no located ruling; that is superseded (corrected",
+    "2026-10-05, R-291). Container packages are not pruned by that rule.",
     "",
     "SO THIS FILE IS A FLOOR, NOT A LICENCE. It says: CI may assume nothing older than the newest",
     "N generic versions is still downloadable. It does NOT authorise deleting anything, and the",
@@ -36,9 +34,8 @@
   ],
   "generic_versions_kept": 10,
   "readers": [
-    "scripts/check-published-versions.py — bounds its assertion to the newest N versions",
-    "documentation/runbooks/registry-retention.md (felhom.eu) — the prune procedure"
+    "scripts/check-published-versions.py — bounds its assertion to the newest N versions"
   ],
   "recorded": "2026-08-09",
-  "recorded_by": "CC, from the registry's observed state; NOT from a located operator ruling"
+  "recorded_by": "CC 2026-08-09; the number's source (the R-267 newest-10 prune, established 2026-08-10 by R-287) recorded 2026-10-05 (R-291)"
 }