- pbsdr: on a 403 pre-check (non-default storage id, no ACL yet) self-grant via the root wrapper then re-read, instead of aborting before the grant — closes F4/R-22. Red-proof TestSelfGrant_PreCheck403DoesNotAbortBeforeGrant.
- escrow preflight: late-bound CurrentPBSStorageID re-reads agent.json so a pbsdr-seeded pbs_storage_id flips the row green in-process (no restart). Red-proof TestEscrowPreflight_PBSStorageIDLiveReload.
- internal/poke: contentless UDP poke listener bound exclusively to the box WG /32 (port 51822), leading-edge debounced, fires the hub-loop out-of-band trigger for an immediate desired-state cycle. First slice of R-13. Red-proofs TestBindConfinement + TestDebounceCoalescesBurst.
Operator ruling 2026-07-13: walk the root's backing device through /sys/block/<dev>/slaves
recursively down to physical disks (dm AND md; topology, never VG names); those + any mounted-ESP
holder are system; the all-system fail-safe returns to being the WALK-FAILURE error case only.
SAFETY DIRECTION: a root-backing disk classified candidate is made impossible — per-branch
conservatism (any unresolvable slave fails the WHOLE walk -> ok=false -> the unchanged all-system
path).
- physicalDisksOf/walkSlaves in role.go (symlink canon -> wholeDiskOf fast path -> recursive
slaves walk; cycle/depth guard; non-/dev sources unwalkable)
- HostReader.BlockSlaves(name) — the ONE new seam method; ProcHostReader reads
/sys/block/<name>/slaves; all four test fakes mirror it
- role_walk_test.go: signature table (root-backing disk ALWAYS system across legacy-LVM /
md-raid / EFI+raw / EFI+LVM / nested dm-on-md — NEVER weaken) + dead-wizard-lives +
dangling-slave fail-safe (real sysKnown=false path) + cycle + empty-slaves; red-proofs A/B/D
run->fail->revert (recorded in REPORT)
- §3 spike transcripts (drill legacy: dm-1->sda3->sda; felhom-pve: ESP+walk agree on sda ->
byte-identical regression); caller audit: none relied on all-system as a feature
- format/mkfs paths, data-bearing guards, wizard UI untouched
Agent half of the verify-before-commit task (SPIKE-nas-verify-2026-07-11, b57f6c1):
retry=0 in the production NFS options (Q4-vi); ClassifyNetVerifyFailure on the live
Q4 strings (nfs_export merges not-found/not-permitted); add = sync fast-fail (2s TCP
pre-probe, nothing installed) + detached in-memory verify job judging /proc/mounts
only, auto-rollback on failure; GET /netstorage/verify-status (phase none = the
controller's Scenario-F rollback signal); unprivileged journalctl (systemd-journal
group, NO new sudoers grants).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Pool membership is what lets the pool-scoped token reach a guest; pct restore
--pool sets it only at CREATE, so a restore over an existing VMID drops the guest
from the felhom pool and 403s the next restore-test/DR on VM.Audit. This empty-pool
state is the true root cause of the campaign's "R1" (bind-mount restore failing was
a symptom — restore-test's existing bind neutralization never ran without config-read).
Add Client.PoolAddVMID (PUT /pools, additive+idempotent, Pool.Allocate) and call it
in bring-up after liveness when spec.Pool!="" — warn-not-fail on a hiccup (liveness
wins). B3 scratch-teardown 403 diagnosed as a cascade (restoretest already passes
Pool). Role/ACL untouched. Tests + red-proof.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
B3: Lookup re-reads the append-only store once on a miss (cross-process
coherence with the one-shot provisioner; size short-circuit bounds the cost;
behind the TokenAuthority seam). B2: fenced mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets
before the snippet install + the one narrow sudoers grant. Both red-proofed;
drill findings DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03 B3/B2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
staleLockController.Guests() = ListLXC ∩ GET /pools/felhom members (ownership
PROVEN via the pool registry, never assumed from enumeration scope); pool-read
failure fail-safes the whole recovery through the existing guest-list guard.
New Client.Pool read (needs Pool.Audit — host-install v1.9.0; Pool.Allocate
does NOT satisfy it, spike T2). Composed pve:pool-read capability (non-critical)
+ --selftest pool-read line. Red-proofed negative tests drive the REAL
controller over a broad-token-shaped fake.
Per SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03.md; audit A1
(AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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