Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin 9d6e49236c v0.5.0: slice 5 Phase B — the host-root surface (mounts + SMART + grow + destructive gate)
The privileged write surface, isolated behind a narrow, arg-validated, adversarially-
tested seam (HostOps), the same discipline as the slice-4 gate. Completes slice 5.

- internal/storage: HostOps seam + SudoHostOps (systemd .mount units by fs-UUID, detach,
  SMART, lvs) via sudoers allowlist + fixed arg vectors, no shell; NoopHostOps fallback.
- validate.go: strict UUID/mount-path/device/LVM validators + in-process systemd-escape.
  Headline test: adversarial matrix (metacharacters/traversal/malformed) refused with
  zero exec.
- smart.go: smartctl SATA + NVMe parse, UNKNOWN-degrade; lvs thin-pool metadata fill.
- observer enrichment (Observe only): fills smart + thin-pool metadata.
- watchdog: benign re-mount response off the poll path (DevicePresent probe, rate-limited).
- reconcile: ActionResize (benign, grow-only) + proxmox.ResizeLXC; destructive storage ops
  (ClassStorageWipe/Decommission) through the slice-4 gate, target-scoped; built+tested,
  inert live.
- --selftest=storage [-watch] live harness; configs/felhom-agent.sudoers; privileged.* knobs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 10:53:38 +02:00
admin 27b68f043b v0.5.0-rc1: slice 5 Phase A — storage observe/report + watchdog (read-only, live)
Fill the slice-3 storage_targets stub and add the fast-poll storage watchdog.
Read-only this phase; the host-root surface (mounts/SMART/grow/destructive gate)
is Phase B. Hub-owned desired manifest is slice 10, so reconcile against it is
built-but-unfed.

- internal/storage: StorageTarget wire contract, durable_id derivation per type,
  HostReader seam (procfs/sysfs, root-free), Observer (storage_targets from
  ListStorage/NodeStorage + host reads, lvmthin thin-pool fill), and the watchdog
  (third daemon goroutine; debounced out-of-band report on a known target's
  attach/disconnect transition).
- proxmox.Storage: additive parse-only config fields (durable_id sources).
- collector StorageObserver seam; Loop.SetTrigger out-of-band report; daemon runs
  the watchdog as a third goroutine; StorageConfig knobs.
- cross-repo golden kept byte-identical with felhom.eu/hub; bidirectional key-set test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 09:59:05 +02:00
admin ab77fa3544 feat(hub): host-report client + collector + first daemon loop (slice 3, v0.3.0)
internal/hub: the agent's first daemon — a periodic read-only host-report POSTed to
the hub (the heartbeat; no separate ping).

- HostReport wire contract (shared field-for-field with the hub ingest): host
  metrics, guests (vmid + spec), cloudflared status; storage/backups/restore-tests/
  pbs/audit collections DEFINED but emitted empty (slices 5/6 fill).
- Collector over a read-only proxmoxReader (adapted to the real proxmox surface;
  no proxmox changes) + a CloudflaredProber. Partial-failure: NodeStatus fail = hard
  (skip POST); per-guest GuestConfig fail = status "unknown", still report.
- Client: Bearer-auth POST, standard TLS (system roots / optional ca_file), typed
  TransportError/HTTPError, token never in errors.
- Loop: immediate first report, adopt hub poll_interval (clamp [60,3600]), resilient
  to collect/report errors, clean ctx-cancel shutdown.
- ControlEnvelope: only poll_interval_seconds acted on; blocked/desired_generation/
  has_signed_ops parsed-but-ignored (slice 4).
- config: HubConfig + FELHOM_AGENT_HUB_* overlay + mode-aware HubConfig.Validate +
  WithDefaults + hub-key redaction; example config updated.
- main: no-selftest mode is now the daemon; added --selftest=hub. Version -> 0.3.0.

Tests: report serialization, client (incl. token-redaction), collector partial-
failure, loop continuation+interval adoption, config. internal/proxmox + internal/
authz untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 16:20:09 +02:00
admin f0fee7e193 feat(authz): operator signed-op verifier + durable nonce store (slice 2, v0.2.0)
internal/authz: production form of the Phase-4 SSHSIG signing primitive.

- Verifier.New/Verify with the LOCKED pipeline (namespace → allow-list by key
  material → crypto over RAW bytes → target → time → nonce LAST); each post-crypto
  stage rejects even with a valid sig; an invalid sig never burns a nonce.
- SSHSIG framing via x/crypto/ssh (no hand-rolled crypto); key-type-agnostic
  (ed25519 / sk-ssh-ed25519 / rsa / ecdsa via pub.Verify). Fixed namespace
  felhom-op-v1. Typed errors. OpBlob (fixed host_id/guest_id tags) + VerifiedOp.
- NonceStore: MemoryNonceStore + durable crash-safe FileNonceStore (fsync'd append
  log, replay-on-open, compaction, expiry-only pruning; survives restart).
- config.AuthzConfig (nonce path + pinned operational/recovery signer keys).
- Tests (14): real ssh-keygen fixture, per-stage rejection, nonce-not-burned,
  replay, persistence-across-restart, synthetic sk, byte-exactness.

Dep: golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 (declares go 1.25 — the Phase-4 doc's "Go 1.24.4 /
x/crypto v0.52.0" pairing doesn't build; build server upgraded to go1.26.0,
backward-compatible). Version 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 15:23:02 +02:00
admin a042316d6d feat(agent): scaffold + proxmox interaction layer (slice 1)
Stand up the felhom-agent project (module gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent,
binary felhom-agent) and the internal/proxmox package: the typed library every
other agent module calls to talk to Proxmox.

- API-first Client (hand-rolled REST over net/http, PVEAPIToken auth) with typed
  read ops (version/nodes/status/lxc/config/storage) and async mutating ops
  (restore/vzdump/snapshot/rollback/delete-snapshot/setconfig/start/stop), each
  returning a UPID. WaitTask polls task status until stopped and asserts
  exitstatus OK (authz can surface at task exec, not the POST — phase1-2 §1.3).
- Fenced Privileged (root-CLI) backend for the THREE proven exceptions only
  (keyctl pct create, USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors); each cites why it can't be
  the API. Fence is structural (Client never shells out, Privileged never HTTPs)
  and asserted in routing_test.go.
- TLS: SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning or CA file; insecure mode explicit + off by
  default. No blanket verification disable.
- 403 -> privilege-named APIError; failed task -> privilege-named TaskError.
- JSON config + env overrides (token never logged); slog logging.
- cmd/felhom-agent --selftest (read-only health report) + gated --selftest=task
  (reversible snapshot/rollback/delete exercise of WaitTask). No daemon loop yet.
- Types grounded in the spike findings and exact JSON shapes captured live from
  demo-felhom (PVE 9.2.2). Unit tests use a mock transport + runner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 14:34:32 +02:00