f0fee7e193
internal/authz: production form of the Phase-4 SSHSIG signing primitive. - Verifier.New/Verify with the LOCKED pipeline (namespace → allow-list by key material → crypto over RAW bytes → target → time → nonce LAST); each post-crypto stage rejects even with a valid sig; an invalid sig never burns a nonce. - SSHSIG framing via x/crypto/ssh (no hand-rolled crypto); key-type-agnostic (ed25519 / sk-ssh-ed25519 / rsa / ecdsa via pub.Verify). Fixed namespace felhom-op-v1. Typed errors. OpBlob (fixed host_id/guest_id tags) + VerifiedOp. - NonceStore: MemoryNonceStore + durable crash-safe FileNonceStore (fsync'd append log, replay-on-open, compaction, expiry-only pruning; survives restart). - config.AuthzConfig (nonce path + pinned operational/recovery signer keys). - Tests (14): real ssh-keygen fixture, per-stage rejection, nonce-not-burned, replay, persistence-across-restart, synthetic sk, byte-exactness. Dep: golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 (declares go 1.25 — the Phase-4 doc's "Go 1.24.4 / x/crypto v0.52.0" pairing doesn't build; build server upgraded to go1.26.0, backward-compatible). Version 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
171 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
171 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
// Package config loads the felhom-agent configuration the proxmox layer needs.
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//
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// Format: a JSON file (stdlib-only — no YAML dep, consistent with the agent's
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// "pure stdlib" constraint), with per-field environment overrides. Secrets (the
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// API token) are never logged; see Config.Redacted.
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//
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// OPEN item (noted in the slice reply): the controller/hub use YAML; if matching
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// that house style is preferred over the zero-dependency constraint, the loader
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// can swap to yaml.v3 without touching call sites.
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package config
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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// Config is the agent configuration.
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type Config struct {
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Proxmox ProxmoxConfig `json:"proxmox"`
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Privileged PrivilegedConfig `json:"privileged"`
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Authz AuthzConfig `json:"authz"`
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LogLevel string `json:"log_level"` // debug|info|warn|error (default info)
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}
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// AuthzConfig configures operator-signed-op verification (internal/authz). The
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// pinned operator public keys are kept here as raw authorized_keys-style lines
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// (this package stays dependency-free); the authz package parses them into its
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// AllowedSigner set. Role-scoping (recovery keys authorize only key-rotation) is
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// enforced by the consuming layer, not loaded here.
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type AuthzConfig struct {
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// NonceStorePath is the durable, crash-safe nonce log (anti-replay). Must be on
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// persistent host storage so replay protection survives agent restarts.
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NonceStorePath string `json:"nonce_store_path"`
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// Signers are the pinned operator public keys (doc 04 §3 two-key model).
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Signers []SignerKey `json:"signers"`
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}
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// SignerKey is one pinned operator public key.
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type SignerKey struct {
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KeyID string `json:"key_id"`
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// Role is "operational" (signs destructive ops) or "recovery" (cold key;
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// authorizes only key-rotation/break-glass).
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Role string `json:"role"`
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// PublicKey is a standard authorized_keys line, e.g.
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// "ssh-ed25519 AAAA… felhom-op-1" or "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAA… …".
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PublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
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}
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// ProxmoxConfig configures the API client.
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type ProxmoxConfig struct {
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// Endpoint defaults to https://127.0.0.1:8006 (agent runs on the host).
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Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
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// Node is the Proxmox node name; confirm on the box (GET /nodes).
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Node string `json:"node"`
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// Token is the full API token "USER@REALM!TOKENID=SECRET".
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//
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// Provisioning note: this is a privilege-SEPARATED token. Its role
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// (FelhomAgent, 16 privileges) must be granted on BOTH the user AND the token
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// for the same path, or the intersection is empty and every call 403s
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// (phase1-2 §1.2). Role setup is out-of-band; the agent only consumes the token.
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Token string `json:"token"`
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// TLS trust to the host's (self-signed) cert.
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TLS TLSTrust `json:"tls"`
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}
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// TLSTrust mirrors proxmox.TLSConfig (kept dependency-free here).
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type TLSTrust struct {
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CAFile string `json:"ca_file"`
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Fingerprint string `json:"fingerprint"` // SHA-256 of the host leaf cert
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InsecureSkipVerify bool `json:"insecure_skip_verify"` // off by default; selftest-only
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}
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// PrivilegedConfig configures the fenced root-CLI runner.
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type PrivilegedConfig struct {
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// Mode: "sudo" (default — non-root agent + narrow sudoers) or "direct".
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Mode string `json:"mode"`
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// SudoPath overrides the sudo binary (default "sudo").
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SudoPath string `json:"sudo_path"`
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}
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// Default returns a Config pre-populated with sane defaults.
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func Default() Config {
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return Config{
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Proxmox: ProxmoxConfig{Endpoint: "https://127.0.0.1:8006"},
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Privileged: PrivilegedConfig{Mode: "sudo"},
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Authz: AuthzConfig{NonceStorePath: "/var/lib/felhom-agent/nonces.log"},
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LogLevel: "info",
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}
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}
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// Load reads the config file at path (if non-empty) over the defaults, then
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// applies environment overrides. A missing path with all-env config is allowed.
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func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
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cfg := Default()
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if path != "" {
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b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: reading %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &cfg); err != nil {
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return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: parsing %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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}
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applyEnv(&cfg)
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return cfg, nil
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}
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// applyEnv overlays FELHOM_AGENT_* environment variables. Useful for the token in
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// particular (keep the secret out of the file on disk if desired).
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func applyEnv(cfg *Config) {
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_ENDPOINT"); v != "" {
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cfg.Proxmox.Endpoint = v
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_NODE"); v != "" {
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cfg.Proxmox.Node = v
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TOKEN"); v != "" {
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cfg.Proxmox.Token = v
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_CA_FILE"); v != "" {
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cfg.Proxmox.TLS.CAFile = v
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_FINGERPRINT"); v != "" {
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cfg.Proxmox.TLS.Fingerprint = v
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE"); v != "" {
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if b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v); err == nil {
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cfg.Proxmox.TLS.InsecureSkipVerify = b
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}
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}
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if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_LOG_LEVEL"); v != "" {
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cfg.LogLevel = v
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}
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}
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// Validate checks the config is usable for talking to the API.
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func (c Config) Validate() error {
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if c.Proxmox.Endpoint == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.endpoint is required")
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}
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if c.Proxmox.Node == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.node is required (confirm with `pvesh get /nodes`)")
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}
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if c.Proxmox.Token == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.token is required (set proxmox.token or FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TOKEN)")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(c.Proxmox.Token, "!") || !strings.Contains(c.Proxmox.Token, "=") {
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return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.token must be USER@REALM!TOKENID=SECRET")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Redacted returns a copy safe to log: the token secret is masked.
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func (c Config) Redacted() Config {
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if c.Proxmox.Token != "" {
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c.Proxmox.Token = redactToken(c.Proxmox.Token)
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}
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return c
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}
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// redactToken keeps the public "USER@REALM!TOKENID=" prefix and masks the secret.
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func redactToken(tok string) string {
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if i := strings.LastIndex(tok, "="); i >= 0 {
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return tok[:i+1] + "********"
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}
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return "********"
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}
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