Files
felhom-agent/internal/config/config.go
T
admin f0fee7e193 feat(authz): operator signed-op verifier + durable nonce store (slice 2, v0.2.0)
internal/authz: production form of the Phase-4 SSHSIG signing primitive.

- Verifier.New/Verify with the LOCKED pipeline (namespace → allow-list by key
  material → crypto over RAW bytes → target → time → nonce LAST); each post-crypto
  stage rejects even with a valid sig; an invalid sig never burns a nonce.
- SSHSIG framing via x/crypto/ssh (no hand-rolled crypto); key-type-agnostic
  (ed25519 / sk-ssh-ed25519 / rsa / ecdsa via pub.Verify). Fixed namespace
  felhom-op-v1. Typed errors. OpBlob (fixed host_id/guest_id tags) + VerifiedOp.
- NonceStore: MemoryNonceStore + durable crash-safe FileNonceStore (fsync'd append
  log, replay-on-open, compaction, expiry-only pruning; survives restart).
- config.AuthzConfig (nonce path + pinned operational/recovery signer keys).
- Tests (14): real ssh-keygen fixture, per-stage rejection, nonce-not-burned,
  replay, persistence-across-restart, synthetic sk, byte-exactness.

Dep: golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 (declares go 1.25 — the Phase-4 doc's "Go 1.24.4 /
x/crypto v0.52.0" pairing doesn't build; build server upgraded to go1.26.0,
backward-compatible). Version 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 15:23:02 +02:00

171 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

// Package config loads the felhom-agent configuration the proxmox layer needs.
//
// Format: a JSON file (stdlib-only — no YAML dep, consistent with the agent's
// "pure stdlib" constraint), with per-field environment overrides. Secrets (the
// API token) are never logged; see Config.Redacted.
//
// OPEN item (noted in the slice reply): the controller/hub use YAML; if matching
// that house style is preferred over the zero-dependency constraint, the loader
// can swap to yaml.v3 without touching call sites.
package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// Config is the agent configuration.
type Config struct {
Proxmox ProxmoxConfig `json:"proxmox"`
Privileged PrivilegedConfig `json:"privileged"`
Authz AuthzConfig `json:"authz"`
LogLevel string `json:"log_level"` // debug|info|warn|error (default info)
}
// AuthzConfig configures operator-signed-op verification (internal/authz). The
// pinned operator public keys are kept here as raw authorized_keys-style lines
// (this package stays dependency-free); the authz package parses them into its
// AllowedSigner set. Role-scoping (recovery keys authorize only key-rotation) is
// enforced by the consuming layer, not loaded here.
type AuthzConfig struct {
// NonceStorePath is the durable, crash-safe nonce log (anti-replay). Must be on
// persistent host storage so replay protection survives agent restarts.
NonceStorePath string `json:"nonce_store_path"`
// Signers are the pinned operator public keys (doc 04 §3 two-key model).
Signers []SignerKey `json:"signers"`
}
// SignerKey is one pinned operator public key.
type SignerKey struct {
KeyID string `json:"key_id"`
// Role is "operational" (signs destructive ops) or "recovery" (cold key;
// authorizes only key-rotation/break-glass).
Role string `json:"role"`
// PublicKey is a standard authorized_keys line, e.g.
// "ssh-ed25519 AAAA… felhom-op-1" or "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAA… …".
PublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
}
// ProxmoxConfig configures the API client.
type ProxmoxConfig struct {
// Endpoint defaults to https://127.0.0.1:8006 (agent runs on the host).
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
// Node is the Proxmox node name; confirm on the box (GET /nodes).
Node string `json:"node"`
// Token is the full API token "USER@REALM!TOKENID=SECRET".
//
// Provisioning note: this is a privilege-SEPARATED token. Its role
// (FelhomAgent, 16 privileges) must be granted on BOTH the user AND the token
// for the same path, or the intersection is empty and every call 403s
// (phase1-2 §1.2). Role setup is out-of-band; the agent only consumes the token.
Token string `json:"token"`
// TLS trust to the host's (self-signed) cert.
TLS TLSTrust `json:"tls"`
}
// TLSTrust mirrors proxmox.TLSConfig (kept dependency-free here).
type TLSTrust struct {
CAFile string `json:"ca_file"`
Fingerprint string `json:"fingerprint"` // SHA-256 of the host leaf cert
InsecureSkipVerify bool `json:"insecure_skip_verify"` // off by default; selftest-only
}
// PrivilegedConfig configures the fenced root-CLI runner.
type PrivilegedConfig struct {
// Mode: "sudo" (default — non-root agent + narrow sudoers) or "direct".
Mode string `json:"mode"`
// SudoPath overrides the sudo binary (default "sudo").
SudoPath string `json:"sudo_path"`
}
// Default returns a Config pre-populated with sane defaults.
func Default() Config {
return Config{
Proxmox: ProxmoxConfig{Endpoint: "https://127.0.0.1:8006"},
Privileged: PrivilegedConfig{Mode: "sudo"},
Authz: AuthzConfig{NonceStorePath: "/var/lib/felhom-agent/nonces.log"},
LogLevel: "info",
}
}
// Load reads the config file at path (if non-empty) over the defaults, then
// applies environment overrides. A missing path with all-env config is allowed.
func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
cfg := Default()
if path != "" {
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: reading %s: %w", path, err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &cfg); err != nil {
return cfg, fmt.Errorf("config: parsing %s: %w", path, err)
}
}
applyEnv(&cfg)
return cfg, nil
}
// applyEnv overlays FELHOM_AGENT_* environment variables. Useful for the token in
// particular (keep the secret out of the file on disk if desired).
func applyEnv(cfg *Config) {
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_ENDPOINT"); v != "" {
cfg.Proxmox.Endpoint = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_NODE"); v != "" {
cfg.Proxmox.Node = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TOKEN"); v != "" {
cfg.Proxmox.Token = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_CA_FILE"); v != "" {
cfg.Proxmox.TLS.CAFile = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_FINGERPRINT"); v != "" {
cfg.Proxmox.TLS.Fingerprint = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TLS_INSECURE"); v != "" {
if b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v); err == nil {
cfg.Proxmox.TLS.InsecureSkipVerify = b
}
}
if v := os.Getenv("FELHOM_AGENT_LOG_LEVEL"); v != "" {
cfg.LogLevel = v
}
}
// Validate checks the config is usable for talking to the API.
func (c Config) Validate() error {
if c.Proxmox.Endpoint == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.endpoint is required")
}
if c.Proxmox.Node == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.node is required (confirm with `pvesh get /nodes`)")
}
if c.Proxmox.Token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.token is required (set proxmox.token or FELHOM_AGENT_PROXMOX_TOKEN)")
}
if !strings.Contains(c.Proxmox.Token, "!") || !strings.Contains(c.Proxmox.Token, "=") {
return fmt.Errorf("config: proxmox.token must be USER@REALM!TOKENID=SECRET")
}
return nil
}
// Redacted returns a copy safe to log: the token secret is masked.
func (c Config) Redacted() Config {
if c.Proxmox.Token != "" {
c.Proxmox.Token = redactToken(c.Proxmox.Token)
}
return c
}
// redactToken keeps the public "USER@REALM!TOKENID=" prefix and masks the secret.
func redactToken(tok string) string {
if i := strings.LastIndex(tok, "="); i >= 0 {
return tok[:i+1] + "********"
}
return "********"
}