docs: REPORT for v0.46.0 leaf-regenerate loud-log (live-validated)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pg8ANF97SEeKYSN5Jxw3qJ
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# REPORT — felhom-agent v0.45.0: controller-swap under non-root (stdin `tee` + narrow grants)
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# REPORT — leaf lifecycle: signal + loud-log a regenerated leaf, v0.46.0
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**Date:** 2026-06-29 · **Class:** Risky/supervised · **Baseline:** `main` @ `8a4ccab` was v0.44.0 →
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**v0.45.0** @ `8a4ccab` (this change). Build sha `a393c8bc…`. **No `felhom-controller` change.**
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**Task:** Part B.1 of the F2 + prevention slice — make an accidental local-API leaf **regeneration**
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(the 2026-06-28 root→non-root migration class: a state-dir move silently minted a new leaf → every
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controller's pin invalidated for days, R1) **visible immediately** instead of silent.
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## What & why
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**Baseline:** agent `main` @ `1958204` (live 0.45.0) → **v0.46.0** @ `9b0d6c2`, sha `03966da3…`.
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Restores fleet controller-swap / managed auto-update under the **non-root** agent — the capability the
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2026-06-29 sudoers audit deliberately left broken (its only write vector, `bash -c "printf … >"`,
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needed arbitrary in-guest execution). Option A, spike-proven GO
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(`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-controllerswap-narrow-grants-2026-06-29.md`).
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## Change
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## The `writeImage` diff (the only orchestration change)
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- **`internal/localapi/cert.go` — `EnsureLeaf` now returns `generated bool`:** false = an existing
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pair was LOADED (stable fingerprint); true = a fresh leaf was GENERATED.
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- **`cmd/felhom-agent/main.go` — loud call-site:** a load logs `INFO local-api leaf LOADED`; a
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regeneration logs **`WARN local-api leaf REGENERATED — any previously issued bootstrap pins are now
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INVALID; controllers will fail the pin check until re-bootstrapped (or restore the prior leaf)`**
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(with the new fingerprint). The `--selftest=provision` caller updated to the new signature.
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- No new sudo/capability surface — pure return + log change. The companion install-script preservation
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(`--preserve-state-from` + populated-host guard) is in `felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh`.
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```
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- cmd := fmt.Sprintf("printf '%%s\\n' '%s' > %s", image, controllerImageFile)
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- _, err := c.exec.GuestExec(ctx, vmid, "bash", "-c", cmd)
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+ _, err := c.exec.GuestExecStdin(ctx, vmid, strings.NewReader(image+"\n"), "tee", controllerImageFile)
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```
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The image ref is piped on **stdin** into an in-guest `tee` — no shell, no interpolation. `image+"\n"`
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is byte-identical to the golden's `printf '%s\n'`; the bootstrap reads `IMAGE=$(cat …)`
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(newline-stripping), so the write is consumed identically. `ValidControllerImage` still gates upstream
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in `Swap`. Swap orchestration / rollback / state-file logic are **unchanged**.
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## Tests (green: `go build/vet/test ./...`)
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`TestEnsureLeaf_StableFingerprintAcrossReload`: first call `generated==true`, second `generated==false`
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**AND same fingerprint** — persistence keeps the pin stable (a regression that regenerated would flip
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gen2 true and change the fp, failing both asserts).
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New stdin seam (routes through the SAME `sudo -n` fenced runner — no hand-rolled exec):
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`proxmox.Runner.RunStdin` + `ExecRunner.RunStdin` (Run with `cmd.Stdin`), `GuestBinder.GuestExecStdin`,
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`GuestExecutor.GuestExecStdin`. The 5 proxmox.Runner test mocks gained a delegating `RunStdin`.
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## Live validation (felhom-pve) — both paths PASS
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- **Quiet load (the normal case):** deployed 0.46.0; the agent restart logged
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`INFO local-api leaf LOADED` fp `60b5974d…` (the leaf existed → loaded, not regenerated).
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- **Loud regenerate:** during the F2 born-down test, moving the leaf aside + restart produced
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`WARN local-api leaf REGENERATED — any previously issued bootstrap pins are now INVALID …` fp
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`751367a2…` — the loud signal fires exactly when a new leaf is minted. Restored cleanly (`leaf
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LOADED` `60b5974d…` again). capabilities 45/45 ok throughout.
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## Sudoers — `FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP` (5 narrow grants)
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```
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/usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- cat /etc/felhom-controller-image # read (fixed)
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/usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- docker image inspect * # read (target present?)
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/usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- docker inspect -f * # read (running/health/image)
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/usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- systemctl restart felhom-controller-bootstrap.service # restart (fixed unit)
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/usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- tee /etc/felhom-controller-image # write (FIXED path, stdin-fed)
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```
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No general `pct exec`, no `bash -c`. Added to the NOPASSWD line. Capability **manifest** gains the 5
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(Critical: a silently-broken fleet auto-update is operator-alert-worthy) — so the v0.44.0 self-probe
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watches them and the build-test asserts grant↔code coverage.
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## Tests — all green (`go build/vet/test ./...`, 0 failures)
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- New `TestControllerSwap_WriteViaStdinTee_NoShell`: the write is stdin-`tee` with exact `image\n`, the
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`tee` target is the fixed path, and **no** shell vector (`bash`/`-c`/`printf`) appears — would FAIL on
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the pre-change impl.
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- Existing swap tests (happy / rollback-on-unhealthy / image-absent / no-healthcheck / bad-image /
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single-flight) pass over the new write path (fake `GuestExecutor` now models `tee` via stdin).
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- `RunStdin` forwards stdin; the 5 mock runners implement it.
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- **Build-time coverage:** `TestManifestCoveredBySudoers` covers the 5 new vectors. **Two red-proofs:**
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`TestRedProof_DroppedGrantFailsCheck` (lxc-info) + new `TestRedProof_DroppedControllerSwapTeeFailsCheck`.
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**Demonstrated red→green on the REAL file:** dropping the `tee` grant →
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`capability "controllerswap-write" … NOT covered by any sudoers grant` → FAIL; restored → PASS.
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## Live validation (felhom-pve, guest 9201) — deployed + verified
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- **Deploy:** built `0.45.0` on 180 (sha `a393c8bc…`), shipped 180→local→felhom-pve (sha verified),
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backed up prior (`felhom-agent.bak-0.44.0`), `install` + restart → `is-active` = **active**. Sudoers
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redeployed via the install mechanism (`visudo -cf` staged → `install -m 0440 -o root -g root` →
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re-validate `/etc/sudoers` OK). (Staged file needed a `\r` strip — Windows checkout CRLF — before
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visudo; the installed drop-in is LF-clean.)
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- **Self-probe (live):** `capabilities self-check ok=45 total=45 degraded=0` — the 5 swap vectors are
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granted AND watched.
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- **Grant matches (`sudo -n -l`, as felhom-agent):** all 5 → exit 0
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(`cat` / `docker image inspect <ref>` / `docker inspect -f '<real template>' felhom-controller` /
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`systemctl restart <unit>` / `tee <image file>`).
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- **Negative controls → denied (exit 1):** `bash -c 'echo pwned'`, `tee /etc/passwd`,
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`docker rm -f felhom-controller`, `rm -rf /etc`. The grants are scoped, not a blanket `pct exec`.
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## NOT yet run — live swap (Scenario D) — **awaiting supervised**
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The full end-to-end live swap (controller pre-pulls → swap endpoint → `tee` write → restart → healthy
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on target; then a bad image → rollback) **restarts the live controller** and per §13.4 is
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operator-supervised. It was NOT run (this session is unattended). When supervised, trigger it via the
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controller's real update flow (not a hand-set state) and confirm the tee-write → restart → healthy and
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the bad-image rollback over the new write path.
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## Forward note
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No code→manifest drift auto-check yet (a future static check of `runner.Run`/`GuestExec*` call sites
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vs the manifest). The controller↔agent channel self-health check remains a separate slice.
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## NOT changed
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The pin/transport, the token store, the sudoers/capability surface, the drive gate. Cert lifecycle
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signalling + logging only.
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