R-105 (decision 169): remove the escrow-create -directive flag and the upload's directive field

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-07 10:02:19 +02:00
parent ce1a4b4758
commit 7b0a8b234b
2 changed files with 47 additions and 55 deletions
+3
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@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ updates (and the old binary's capability probe would read `controllerswap-write`
- `internal/pvegate` (new): the agent's own writes to /etc/pve wait while a pve step runs (pmxcfs restarts); the step waits for writes in flight (bounded, 2 min — then it fails and does not run). Wired at `proxmox.Client.doBody` (every non-GET) and `ExecRunner.RunStdin` (`WritesEtcPVE`: pct config verbs, pvesm, pveum, felhom-pbs-apply create/reconcile).
- `internal/osupdate`: `LayerPVE`; the night leg runs the pve step in ring 0 after a healthy host step (an appliance; ring 1 never in the night leg); `PVEHealthVerdict` = the host rule + every running container keeps its id + pveversion reads the installed pve-manager; the pve report carries Proxmox userspace only (the hub's candidate set). `PVEStepExecutor` (signed `os_pve_step`, ring 1, under the heavy-op gate and the /etc/pve gate); `reconcile.ClassOSPVEStep` (destructive-class); `felhom-opsign -op os_pve_step` (params by `-params`).
- Tests: wrapper `PVELane` (17; red first — the `pve-manager` plan was refused R12 on the old code), `pvegate` (5), `TestPVEGate_*` + `TestWritesEtcPVE`, `TestPVE_*`, `TestPVEHealthVerdict`, `TestPVEStepExecutor_*`. Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/day-2026-10-07/B/`.
## Unreleased (2026-10-07)
- R-105 option A (`09` §3 decision 169): the `--selftest=escrow-create -directive <file>` flag and the escrow upload's `directive` field are removed — nothing read the directive; the DR path reads the recipe, tenantsync and the escrow blob. The hub ignores a `directive` from an older agent.
## v0.150.0 — the Docker step proves the engine reports a memory kill; after a restart the agent remembers the last backup per tier; three more SMART counters on the wire (R-528, R-894, R-330; `09` §3 decisions 157, 161) (2026-10-07)
+44 -55
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@@ -135,39 +135,38 @@ func main() {
return
}
var (
cfgPath string
selftest selftestFlag
vmid int
watch time.Duration
archive string
mode string
hostname string
keep bool
rootfsGrow int
dataVolGrow int
dataVolMount string
sysDataGrow int
sysDataMount string
cores int
memoryMB int
pbsStorage string
paperkey bool
offline bool
upload bool
custID string
custDomain string
custName string
custEmail string
hubPassword string
blobPath string
expectedFP string
keyDest string
installWGKey bool
idBundlePath string
directivePath string
swapImage string
outputMode string
showVersion bool
cfgPath string
selftest selftestFlag
vmid int
watch time.Duration
archive string
mode string
hostname string
keep bool
rootfsGrow int
dataVolGrow int
dataVolMount string
sysDataGrow int
sysDataMount string
cores int
memoryMB int
pbsStorage string
paperkey bool
offline bool
upload bool
custID string
custDomain string
custName string
custEmail string
hubPassword string
blobPath string
expectedFP string
keyDest string
installWGKey bool
idBundlePath string
swapImage string
outputMode string
showVersion bool
)
flag.StringVar(&cfgPath, "config", envOr("FELHOM_AGENT_CONFIG", "/etc/felhom-agent/agent.json"), "path to the agent config file (JSON)")
flag.Var(&selftest, "selftest", "run a self-test and exit: bare/`read` = read-only queries; `task` = reversible mutating exercise (needs -vmid); `hub` = one collect+report; `storage` = observe storage (+ -watch); `backup` = one-shot backup of -vmid; `restore-test` = restore→boot→verify→teardown of -archive (or newest backup); `restore-test-due` = READ-ONLY: print the per-tier due verdict the scheduler would act on, with its cost; `pbs-verify` = trigger a PBS verify + print snapshot records; `bring-up` = restore→reset identity→size→start link-up of -archive into -vmid (needs -mode/-archive/-vmid; optional -cores/-memory cap; tears down unless -keep); `provision` = full slice-8A chain: bring-up provision + mint token + populate bootstrap config mount (needs -archive/-vmid/-customer-id/-hub-password; optional -rootfs-grow/-datavol-grow/-cores/-memory (-sysdata-grow is deprecated: folded into -datavol-grow); keeps the guest)")
@@ -198,7 +197,6 @@ func main() {
flag.StringVar(&keyDest, "keydest", "", "for --selftest=escrow-consume: where to install the recovered key (0600)")
flag.BoolVar(&installWGKey, "install-wg-key", false, "for --selftest=identity-consume: ALSO install the recovered wg_private_key into wgtunnel's key file (S5 DR; create-only, refuses to overwrite)")
flag.StringVar(&idBundlePath, "identity-bundle", "", "for --selftest=escrow-create: a 0600 JSON file {tunnel_token,pbs_token} to ALSO escrow under R (10D)")
flag.StringVar(&directivePath, "directive", "", "for --selftest=escrow-create: a JSON file with the non-secret DR directive (pbs repo/ns, expected fingerprint, tunnel id)")
flag.StringVar(&custID, "customer-id", "", "for --selftest=provision: the customer id — the hub config-pull target, baked into the guest's bootstrap")
flag.StringVar(&hubPassword, "hub-password", "", "for --selftest=provision: the customer's hub RETRIEVAL PASSPHRASE (SECRET) — baked into bootstrap.json so the controller pulls its config (and the customer-scoped hub key) from the hub. The customer must already exist in the hub.")
flag.StringVar(&swapImage, "image", "", "for --selftest=controller-swap: the target controller image ref (gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:<semver>) — must already be pulled in the guest")
@@ -269,7 +267,7 @@ func main() {
SysDataGrowGB: sysDataGrow, SysDataMount: sysDataMount, Cores: cores, MemoryMB: memoryMB},
}))
case "escrow-create":
os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowCreate(context.Background(), cfg, logger, pbsStorage, paperkey, offline, upload, idBundlePath, directivePath, outputMode))
os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowCreate(context.Background(), cfg, logger, pbsStorage, paperkey, offline, upload, idBundlePath, outputMode))
case "escrow-consume":
os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowConsume(context.Background(), logger, blobPath, expectedFP, keyDest))
case "identity-consume":
@@ -2699,7 +2697,6 @@ type escrowCeremonyOpts struct {
offline bool
upload bool
identityBundlePath string
directivePath string
}
// escrowCeremonyOutcome is the shared core's result. R is the ONLY secret; Sum mirrors the
@@ -2758,11 +2755,10 @@ func escrowCeremony(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger,
return out, &escrowCeremonyErr{kind: "setup", err: fmt.Errorf("PBS key for %q not found (%s): %v", storage, keyPath, err)}
}
// Slice 10D.1: optionally ALSO wrap the identity bundle under the same R, and carry the non-secret
// directive for the hub. The bundle file is a 0600 secret (tunnel/pbs tokens); the directive is
// non-secret (pbs repo/ns, expected fingerprint, tunnel id).
// Slice 10D.1: optionally ALSO wrap the identity bundle under the same R. The bundle file is a 0600 secret
// (tunnel/pbs tokens). The non-secret "directive" that used to ride along is retired (R-105, `09` §3 decision 169:
// nothing read it; the DR path reads the recipe, tenantsync and the escrow blob).
var identity *escrow.IdentityBundle
var directive json.RawMessage
if opts.identityBundlePath != "" {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(opts.identityBundlePath)
if err != nil {
@@ -2773,11 +2769,6 @@ func escrowCeremony(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger,
return out, &escrowCeremonyErr{kind: "setup", err: fmt.Errorf("identity bundle is not valid JSON {tunnel_token,pbs_token}: %v", err)}
}
identity = &b
if opts.directivePath != "" {
if d, err := os.ReadFile(opts.directivePath); err == nil && json.Valid(d) {
directive = d
}
}
}
// S3: auto-inject the offsite WG private key into the escrowed identity when the key file
// exists — a NEW escrow run should always capture the live tunnel identity. Field NAME only
@@ -2856,7 +2847,7 @@ func escrowCeremony(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger,
ResticPwSealed: resticStaged,
}
if opts.upload {
if err := uploadEscrowBlob(ctx, cfg, res, directive, resticPwSHA256); err != nil {
if err := uploadEscrowBlob(ctx, cfg, res, resticPwSHA256); err != nil {
// R is minted and the blob self-verified — only the hub leg failed. kind "upload" lets
// the text shell keep the pre-extraction order (R surfaced, THEN the failure).
return out, &escrowCeremonyErr{kind: "upload", err: err}
@@ -2913,7 +2904,7 @@ func printEscrowTextRBlock(out *escrowCeremonyOutcome) {
// NOTHING else there; every human/info line goes to stderr; failures exit non-zero with no
// partial JSON. This is the controller-driven ceremony's parse surface (spike §2.3: the text
// banner is positionally brittle).
func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, storage string, paperkey, offline, upload bool, identityBundlePath, directivePath, outputMode string) int {
func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, storage string, paperkey, offline, upload bool, identityBundlePath, outputMode string) int {
switch outputMode {
case "", "text", "json":
default:
@@ -2931,7 +2922,7 @@ func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slo
out, cerr := escrowCeremony(ctx, cfg, logger, escrowCeremonyOpts{
storage: storage, paperkey: paperkey, offline: offline, upload: upload,
identityBundlePath: identityBundlePath, directivePath: directivePath,
identityBundlePath: identityBundlePath,
})
if cerr != nil {
switch cerr.kind {
@@ -3114,20 +3105,19 @@ type escrowUploadRequest struct {
BlobB64 string `json:"blob_b64"` // base64 of the opaque R-wrapped blob (ciphertext)
KeyFingerprint string `json:"key_fingerprint"` // for operator display only
Posture string `json:"posture"` // e.g. "zero_knowledge"
// Slice 10D.1 — optional DR bundle (identity escrow + non-secret directive). Omitted in slice-7.
IdentityBlobB64 string `json:"identity_blob_b64,omitempty"`
DirectiveJSON json.RawMessage `json:"directive,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"` // RFC3339
// Slice 10D.1 — optional identity escrow. Omitted in slice-7. (The `directive` is retired — R-105.)
IdentityBlobB64 string `json:"identity_blob_b64,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"` // RFC3339
// SLICE 3 — sha256 hex of the offsite restic repo password sealed in the identity blob (present only
// when a staged password was folded in). Non-reversible hash of a 256-bit random secret — safe to
// store/serve; lets the controller VERIFY "the escrow covers the CURRENT key" and auto-confirm.
ResticPwSHA256 string `json:"restic_pw_sha256,omitempty"`
}
// uploadEscrowBlob PUTs the opaque blob (and, for 10D, the identity blob + non-secret directive) to
// uploadEscrowBlob PUTs the opaque blob (and, for 10D, the identity blob) to
// the hub, authed with the per-host key. The hub stores ciphertext + non-secret fields; no usable
// secret leaves the agent.
func uploadEscrowBlob(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, res escrow.CreateResult, directive json.RawMessage, resticPwSHA256 string) error {
func uploadEscrowBlob(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, res escrow.CreateResult, resticPwSHA256 string) error {
if cfg.Hub.URL == "" || cfg.Hub.HostID == "" || cfg.Hub.APIKey == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("hub not configured (url/host_id/api_key)")
}
@@ -3140,7 +3130,6 @@ func uploadEscrowBlob(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, res escrow.CreateR
}
if len(res.IdentityBlob) > 0 {
upReq.IdentityBlobB64 = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(res.IdentityBlob)
upReq.DirectiveJSON = directive
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(upReq)
url := strings.TrimRight(cfg.Hub.URL, "/") + "/api/v1/hosts/" + cfg.Hub.HostID + "/escrow"