D4 (R-982) moved out of main into a ready patch — its installer half would publish the installer (forbidden tonight); R-1204 stays; unreleased
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gates / gates (push) Successful in 2m45s
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## Unreleased (2026-10-22 night) — root SSH from the LAN by key only (R-982, operator ruling D4); the tunnel's future-stamped handshake is reported (R-1204) — COMMITTED, NOT RELEASED (no agent release tonight)
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## Unreleased (2026-10-22 night) — the tunnel's future-stamped handshake is reported (R-1204) — COMMITTED, NOT RELEASED (no agent release tonight); root SSH by key only (R-982, D4) is a READY PATCH, not on main
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- **R-982 / D4 — the host's own sshd: root by key only.** New bundle file `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-felhom-root-key-only.conf`
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(`PermitRootLogin prohibit-password`; source `configs/felhom-root-ssh-key-only.conf`, policy `replace`). Debian's
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`sshd_config` reads that folder before its own `PermitRootLogin yes`, and the first value wins (read on demo-hp).
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The root password still works on the console; the operator's door (felhom-sshd, port 8822) reads only
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`/etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config`, which includes nothing from there. `felhom-os-apply`: a new content check `sshd`
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(`sshd -t -f` on the snippet, and the snippet must set exactly `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password` — `yes` undoes the
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ruling, `no` would shut the root KEY out too), and after an install that wrote it: `sshd -t` (the whole config; a
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failure is a refusal and the bundle undo puts the old files back), then `systemctl reload ssh` (open sessions stay).
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A new box gets it from the installer's `--install-bundle` (the same bundle). Tests `RootKeyOnly` (3) in
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`configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py`, red-proved both ways.
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- **R-982 / D4 — a ready patch, NOT on main.** Built and proven the same night (felhom.eu
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`audits/night-2026-10-22/P2-D4/`): a bundle drop-in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-felhom-root-key-only.conf`
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(`PermitRootLogin prohibit-password`), a `sshd` content check (exactly `prohibit-password`; `sshd -t -f`), and after
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an install that wrote it `sshd -t` + `systemctl reload ssh`; tests `RootKeyOnly` (3), red-proved. Live on a fresh
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nested box from ISO 1.30.0: root password over SSH refused, root key works, the console and the web page still take
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the password. It was committed (`a0c88e5`) and moved back out (this commit): the installer's uninstall must remove
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every bundle file (felhom.eu `scripts/test_hostinstall.py`), and a push of `felhom-host-install.sh` publishes the
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installer to every new box — forbidden tonight. Both halves are patches: `felhom-agent-bundle-D4.patch` and
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`felhom.eu-installer-D4.patch` in that folder; apply them together with the agent release.
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- **R-1204 — `wireguard.handshake_future_s`.** A box that ran once with its clock ahead keeps a handshake stamped in the
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future; ep0 refuses every newer one, and `last_handshake_age_s` (clamped at 0) read „just now" for ever. The heartbeat
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now carries how many seconds the handshake lies ahead (> 60 s only); the age keeps its clamp. The hub alarms on it
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+3
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@@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ KERNEL_ACTIVE = ("staged", "oneshot", "judging", "reverting")
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# dest: (source file under configs/, mode, check, policy)
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# check: the content check BEFORE anything is written (R18): sudoers → visudo -cf; sh / bash → -n; python → compile;
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# unit → a [Unit]/[Service]/[Timer] section; unit-nort → that, and never RuntimeDirectory= (the G1 incident);
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# agent-unit → User=felhom-agent; dropin → a [Unit] section (SF-3); nft → nft -c -f; plain → none;
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# sshd → `sshd -t -f` on the snippet alone (R-982).
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# agent-unit → User=felhom-agent; dropin → a [Unit] section (SF-3); nft → nft -c -f; plain → none.
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# policy: replace → always written when it differs; if-absent → only when the box has none (a setting the operator may
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# have tuned); oob → only on a box with the OOB belt (/etc/felhom-sshd exists — the installer's --no-oob leaves none).
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# Order matters: the sudoers files come LAST, so a referenced wrapper is in place before the line that allows it.
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@@ -222,9 +221,6 @@ BUNDLE_FILES = [
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("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-sshd.service", "felhom-sshd.service", 0o644, "unit-nort", "oob"),
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("/etc/felhom-oob.nft", "felhom-oob.nft", 0o644, "nft", "oob"),
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("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-oob-nft.service", "felhom-oob-nft.service", 0o644, "unit", "oob"),
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# R-982, operator ruling D4 (2026-10-22): the host's own sshd (port 22, the LAN): root by key only. The console
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# password stays; felhom-sshd (the operator's door) reads nothing from sshd_config.d. Reloaded in after_install.
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("/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-felhom-root-key-only.conf", "felhom-root-ssh-key-only.conf", 0o644, "sshd", "replace"),
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("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-op", "felhom-op.sudoers", 0o440, "sudoers", "oob"),
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("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", "felhom-agent.sudoers", 0o440, "sudoers", "replace"),
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]
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@@ -438,8 +434,7 @@ class Runner:
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def check_content(self, kind, data):
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"""Run an external syntax check on a root-only temp copy. Returns (rc, message)."""
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import tempfile
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cmd = {"sudoers": ["visudo", "-cf"], "sh": ["sh", "-n"], "bash": ["bash", "-n"], "nft": ["nft", "-c", "-f"],
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"sshd": ["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-t", "-f"]}[kind]
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cmd = {"sudoers": ["visudo", "-cf"], "sh": ["sh", "-n"], "bash": ["bash", "-n"], "nft": ["nft", "-c", "-f"]}[kind]
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="felhom-bundle-") as d:
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p = os.path.join(d, "f")
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with open(p, "wb") as f:
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@@ -1937,16 +1932,10 @@ class Bundle:
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text = content.decode("utf-8")
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except UnicodeDecodeError:
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raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} is not UTF-8 text")
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if check in ("sudoers", "sh", "bash", "nft", "sshd"):
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if check in ("sudoers", "sh", "bash", "nft"):
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rc, msg = self.r.check_content(check, content)
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if rc != 0:
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raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} fails its {check} check: {msg}")
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if check == "sshd":
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# R-982: the drop-in may only ever make root KEY-ONLY. `no` would also shut the root key out (Proxmox's own
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# node-to-node SSH and the LAN key route), `yes` would undo the ruling — both refused.
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vals = re.findall(r"^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+(\S+)\s*$", text, re.M | re.I)
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if vals != ["prohibit-password"]:
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raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} must set exactly `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password` (found {vals})")
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elif check == "python":
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try:
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compile(text, dest, "exec")
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@@ -2084,12 +2073,6 @@ class Bundle:
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"enable the crash guard")
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if "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer" in dests:
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self.must(["systemctl", "enable", "--now", "felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer"], "enable the mgmt watchdog timer")
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# R-982: the host's sshd takes the root-key-only drop-in. The WHOLE config is tested first (a failure is a
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# refusal, and the bundle undo puts the old files back); `reload` keeps every open session, including the
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# operator's. felhom-sshd is not touched.
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if "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-felhom-root-key-only.conf" in written:
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self.must(["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-t"], "sshd -t (the host's whole sshd config)")
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self.must(["systemctl", "reload", "ssh"], "systemctl reload ssh")
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def must(self, argv, what):
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rc, out, err = self.r.host(argv, 120)
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
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# MANAGED BY FELHOM (the agent's config bundle) — R-982, operator ruling D4 (2026-10-22).
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# The Proxmox host's OWN sshd — the listener the household network reaches on port 22: root logs in with a KEY only.
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# The root password still works on the console (the break-glass password, `03` §8a). The operator's door
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# (felhom-sshd, port 8822, /etc/felhom-sshd/sshd_config) is a separate daemon whose config includes nothing from
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# here, so it is not changed. Debian's sshd_config reads this folder BEFORE its own `PermitRootLogin yes`, and for
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# sshd the first value wins.
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PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
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@@ -429,48 +429,6 @@ class SelfCheckUndo(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
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class RootKeyOnly(unittest.TestCase):
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"""R-982, operator ruling D4 (2026-10-22): the bundle gives the host's own sshd a root-key-only drop-in, tests the
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whole config and reloads sshd — only when the file was written; a drop-in that says anything but
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`prohibit-password` is refused before anything is written.
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RED-PROOF: with the after_install block removed, test_fresh_box_takes_the_dropin_and_reloads fails (no reload);
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with the content rule removed, test_a_dropin_that_says_yes_or_no_is_refused fails — seen failing 2026-10-22."""
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DEST = "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-felhom-root-key-only.conf"
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def test_fresh_box_takes_the_dropin_and_reloads(self):
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data, sha = real_bundle()
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box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
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rc, rep = run(box)
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self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
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self.assertIn(b"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password", box.files[self.DEST])
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self.assertEqual(box.modes[self.DEST], 0o644)
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self.assertIn(["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-t"], box.calls)
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self.assertIn(["systemctl", "reload", "ssh"], box.calls)
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self.assertLess(box.calls.index(["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-t"]), box.calls.index(["systemctl", "reload", "ssh"]))
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self.assertFalse(any("felhom-sshd" in " ".join(c) for c in box.calls), "the operator's door must not be touched")
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def test_an_unchanged_dropin_is_not_reloaded(self):
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data, sha = real_bundle()
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box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
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box.put(self.DEST, (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-root-ssh-key-only.conf").read_bytes(), 0o644)
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rc, rep = run(box)
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self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
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self.assertNotIn(["systemctl", "reload", "ssh"], box.calls)
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def test_a_dropin_that_says_yes_or_no_is_refused(self):
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for bad in (b"PermitRootLogin yes\n", b"PermitRootLogin no\n", b"# nothing\n",
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b"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\nPermitRootLogin yes\n"):
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def edit(files, bad=bad):
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for e in files:
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if e["path"] == self.DEST:
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e["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(bad).decode()
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data, sha = edited_bundle(edit)
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box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
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rc, rep = run(box)
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self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0, bad)
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self.assertNotIn(self.DEST, box.files, bad)
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class TrustBootstrap(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_missing_signers_verifies_against_the_pinned_key_and_creates_it(self):
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data, sha = real_bundle()
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