8b8c04a487
Concurrency fixes: - Deep-copy stacks in GetStack/GetStacks to prevent shared state mutation (C04) - Add per-state mutex to watchdog pathProbeState (C05) - Guard MetricsCollector.Start() with sync.Once against double-start (C06) - Hold diskJobMu across entire raw mount operation (C07) - Add mutex to SetEncryptionKey (C08), MigrateEncryption write lock (H03) - Use sync.Once for sync.Stop() channel close (H08) - Set syncing=true before releasing lock in TriggerSync (H09) - Deep-copy lastDBDump/lastBackup in GetFullStatus (H11) - Add WaitGroup for stderr goroutine in MigrateDrive (H19) - Add mutex to SetBackupRunningCheck (M18) Security fixes: - Validate Bearer token against Hub API key in CSRF middleware (H16) - Validate backup paths start with expected prefix in RemoveStack (M12) - Guard uuid[:8] slice with length check (H20) - Parse fstab fields exactly for mount target matching (H21) Bug fixes: - Use decrypted env vars for compose deploy (C01) - Log decrypt failures in DecryptMap instead of swallowing (C02) - Move Deployed=false inside lock in runComposeDeploy (C03) - Fix activeDrives() to skip disconnected drives (H02) - Fix Snapshot() stderr extraction from exec.ExitError (H01) - Check unlockCmd.Run() error in restic (H01) - Buffer template rendering via bytes.Buffer (H07) - Thread context.Context through cloudflare client (H10) - Fix leaf-name collision detection in cross-drive backup (H15) - Add nil check for crossDriveRunner (H17) - Use strings.TrimSpace instead of slice on command output (H18) - Make SaveAppConfig atomic with write-to-tmp+rename (H04) - Pass encKey on deploy failure SaveAppConfig (H05) - Fix IPv6 address format in TCP health probe Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
100 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
100 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
package web
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"fmt"
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"html/template"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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const csrfFormField = "_csrf"
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const csrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
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// CsrfProtect validates CSRF tokens on unsafe HTTP methods (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
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// Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) pass through unchanged.
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//
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// Exempt cases:
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// - Auth is disabled (no password configured)
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// - Request has a valid Authorization: Bearer header (API key / hub auth)
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func (s *Server) CsrfProtect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Safe methods: no CSRF check needed
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Skip CSRF if auth is disabled (no password set = open access)
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if !s.authEnabled() {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Skip CSRF for Bearer-token authenticated requests.
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// Validate the token against the configured API key before skipping.
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if auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
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token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
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apiKey := s.cfg.Hub.APIKey
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if apiKey != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(apiKey)) == 1 {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Invalid Bearer token — fall through to CSRF validation
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}
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// Get the session's CSRF token
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
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if err != nil {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "no session cookie")
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return
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}
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expected := s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
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if expected == "" {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "invalid or expired session")
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return
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}
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// Check form field first, then header (for fetch/AJAX calls)
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submitted := r.FormValue(csrfFormField)
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if submitted == "" {
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submitted = r.Header.Get(csrfHeaderName)
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}
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if submitted == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(submitted), []byte(expected)) != 1 {
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s.csrfReject(w, r, "token mismatch")
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// csrfReject sends a 403 response. Returns JSON for /api/ paths, plain text otherwise.
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func (s *Server) csrfReject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, reason string) {
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s.logger.Printf("[WARN] CSRF rejected: %s %s from %s (%s)", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.RemoteAddr, reason)
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if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
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fmt.Fprint(w, `{"ok":false,"error":"CSRF token missing or invalid"}`)
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return
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}
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http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing or invalid. Please reload the page and try again.", http.StatusForbidden)
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}
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// csrfToken returns the CSRF token for the current request's session.
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func (s *Server) csrfToken(r *http.Request) string {
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
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if err != nil {
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return ""
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}
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return s.csrfTokenForSession(cookie.Value)
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}
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// csrfField returns an HTML hidden input for embedding in forms.
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func (s *Server) csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
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token := s.csrfToken(r)
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return template.HTML(`<input type="hidden" name="` + csrfFormField + `" value="` + template.HTMLEscapeString(token) + `">`)
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}
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