This reverts commit 6ce3f65, reverted EARLY — as soon as the update under test had advanced its pin,
which is the last moment the catalog value mattered to Scenario F. Flagged by the commit security
review (supply-chain: a catalog push is a deploy, and any fresh uptime-kuma install in that window
would have received an image that exits at once). Measured exposure: demo-hp's throwaway was the only
uptime-kuma install on either demo box. catalog_since is back to its original value.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Scenario F of the guarded-update live validation, the same way the 2026-09-01 spike did it: the new
"version" is an image that starts and exits immediately, so the app never becomes healthy and must be
HELD — and then restored from its named copy. catalog_since moves with the image line; the revert
restores it.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Scenario E of the guarded-update live validation: the catalog names a tag that does not resolve, so
the update's pull must fail and the pin must be PUT BACK with the app untouched. catalog_since moves
with the image line, as the catalog rule requires; the revert restores it.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This reverts commit 01c631d — and is itself the real catalog tag change (2.3.2 -> 2.4.0) that
Scenario A of the slice-4 live validation updates the deployed throwaway across. catalog_since is
back to its original value.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The throwaway app for the guarded-update live validation on demo-hp is installed from this older
tag, so the revert that follows is a real catalog tag change for Scenario A (2.3.2 -> 2.4.0).
catalog_since moves with the image line, as the catalog rule requires; the revert restores it.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This reverts commit a1f1c38. glance was abandoned as the live-test app: its template crash-loops on
a FRESH install (the image exits with "reading /app/config/glance.yml: no such file or directory"
and nothing seeds that file) — filed in felhom.eu OPEN-ITEMS.md. uptime-kuma is used instead.
catalog_since is back to 2026-07-18.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The throwaway app for the guarded-update live validation on demo-hp is installed from this older
tag, so the revert commit that follows is a real catalog tag change for Scenario A. catalog_since
moves with the image line, as the catalog rule requires; the revert restores 2026-07-18.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The rule (CLAUDE.md, operator ruling 2026-09-13): until the Update button takes a verified backup
as its precondition, no template may move a mariadb:/postgres: image across a major version. Four
MariaDB and eleven PostgreSQL services; the gate finds them by image name, not by a list.
scripts/check-engine-major.py — fast (git reads only), diffs each changed template's per-service
image: line between the two ends of the push range, refuses a major move naming the rule and its
expiry (R-448). Fourth row of catalog_gates.py; .githooks/pre-push now hands the push range
through as --range=<remote sha>..<local sha>.
HONEST LIMIT: it needs a parent commit and CI fetches at --depth 1 (the R-452 gap, not re-filed),
so on a shallow clone the runner SKIPS it out loud instead of reddening every CI push. The hook,
which has the full clone, is where it bites.
Red-proof (scripts/test_gate_decoys.py, 7 cases, all seen to judge correctly): mariadb 11.6->12.3
REFUSED, postgres 16->17 REFUSED, mariadb:lts INCONCLUSIVE; 11.6->11.8 PASSES; the major moving
only in a comment / kimai's serverVersion env / README / the app's own image PASSES. COVERS literal
registered for felhom.eu's decoy_coverage_gate (which now reads 1 covered, 3 exempt, 0 unaccounted).
test_catalog_gates.py pins the four-gate table and the announced shallow-clone skip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
bookstack-db, kimai-db, nextcloud-db, romm-db each gain `MARIADB_AUTO_UPGRADE=1` in the db
service's environment list. Operator ruling 2026-09-13 on the measurement in
felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-r459-mariadb-upgrade-2026-09-06.md: an unconverted datadir
is stable but never heals; the conversion costs ~7 s and the engine backs its system tables up
first. MARIADB_DISABLE_UPGRADE_BACKUP is deliberately left UNSET — that backup is the precaution.
NO `image:` line changed, so `catalog_since` does NOT move — the CLAUDE.md rule ties it to an
image change and this is not one. Do not "fix" that.
The setting is inert until an engine major actually moves, and none may until Slice 4 (R-448)
ships — see the engine-major rule in CLAUDE.md and scripts/check-engine-major.py (next commit).
The eleven PostgreSQL templates are untouched: R-463 is a different engine and a different
measurement.
REUSE.md: one convention row for the MariaDB sidecar env, same commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
R-459. The harness returned proven for E3b while MariaDB was logging that the
conversion it requires had been skipped. The verdict was right - the app's data
survived, which is what it asked - but the harness watched the app and the
migration log, and neither looks at engine state.
engine_state_after now carries each database service's own answer: MariaDB's
datadir version plus 'mariadb-upgrade --check-if-upgrade-is-needed', and
PostgreSQL's PG_VERSION.
It sits BESIDE the verdict and is never folded into it. An unconverted datadir is
not known to be a failure - 5 of 5 restarts showed no degradation - so a verdict
that called it failed would encode an unproven judgement, which is worse than
reporting a fact and letting a person read both.
No template changed. Nothing with MARIADB_ in it is committed by this work: that
is a fleet-wide decision the operator owns, and it affects four apps.
R-449. Until today one upgrade out of 53 had ever been measured - Nextcloud, by
hand, in a spike - and the whole update arc was designed against that single data
point.
Per edge: deploy at FROM, seed through the app's OWN interface, prove the seed
reads back, swap to TO, ask the app for the data again, then put the FROM images
back and record what happens - verbatim, and never called a rollback.
Success is an application-level readback, not file identity: survive2.py's
sha256+inode rule is right for a redeploy and wrong for an upgrade, because a
migration is supposed to rewrite files. And nothing is ever seeded by hand (R-156)
- an app with no non-browser route is recorded inconclusive, never faked.
C3 is a negative control whose TO image exits immediately, and it must be run
first: it came back failed, which is what makes the greens mean anything.
The bookstack fixture uses artisan for both halves and carries its own negative
control on every call, because the obvious HTTP-login readback cannot work: the
template's https APP_URL makes the session cookies secure, so curl over http gets
419 on every login and it looks exactly like a wrong password.
An IMAGE change, pushed to prove that a pinned app does NOT receive it — the whole
point of slice 3. bentopdf is deployed on demo-hp only and is file-based with no
database and no volume, so no data anywhere can be touched. The revert follows in
the same session.
A NON-image template change, pushed to prove that a pinned app still receives
template fixes on the normal 15-minute cycle. No image pin is touched. The revert
commit follows in the same session.
Backfilled from this repo's own git history (newest commit whose image: set differs
from its parent's), excluding the two bentopdf SPIKE commits by hash — they moved a
pin and reverted it in the same hour and are a measurement, not a release.
Four anchors confirmed (nextcloud 5e2c1ae, grafana b789acc, calcom 147cee7,
vikunja 3fa63cd, all 2026-07-18); six apps re-checked against git log by hand.
Consumed by felhom-controller v0.233.0 to render 'Frissitesi elerheto - N napja'.
No version number is ever shown to the customer, so there is no version: key.
Rule added to CLAUDE.md; the missing drift gate is filed as a register row (the
gates runner fetches at --depth 1 and has no parent to diff an image: line against).
Phase 2 of SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01: measure live whether the 15-minute
catalog sync rewrites a DEPLOYED app's docker-compose.yml on demo-hp while its
running container keeps the old image (R-438).
bentopdf is deployed on demo-hp ONLY (demo-felhom runs opengist alone; Peti's
box is down with no access route), it is file-based with no database and no
volume, so the change cannot touch customer data anywhere.
This commit is reverted as soon as the measurement is taken.
All 29 gate scripts across the four repos were read and DECOYED - the label constructed without the
fact, the gate run, the verdict recorded. 16 were fooled. None of them were in this repo.
A decoy that nobody would write proves nothing, so the attempts that turned out illegitimate were
WITHDRAWN rather than counted. Both of this repo were withdrawn, and both are named in the audit.
The gates here that could not be given a plausible decoy are listed BY NAME in
felhom.eu/scripts/decoy_coverage_gate.py EXEMPT (R-426) as UNTESTED - not as sound. A gate nobody
tried to fool is UNKNOWN, and calling it sound would be the same confident guess this sweep exists
to find.
Survey table: felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-gate-decoys-2026-09-01.md
Corrected in all four instruction files across all four repos. Found while confirming this
session own push by run ID, which is precisely the check that catches it.
In felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md the sentence contradicted the same file release section, which
already said R-168 mails the failure -- a contradiction inside one instruction file, the exact
class the R-229 work exists to find.
REPORT.md deliberately NOT overwritten in the sibling repos: a one-line docs correction must not
destroy the record of their last real implementation.
The workspace root is already documented (workspace-CLAUDE.md, the workspace-root
CLAUDE.md 'stay inside it') and work drifted into a home directory anyway. A rule
that has failed once as a reminder is not fixed by writing it down again, so it is
now asserted where it can bite.
A push is the right trigger: throwaway clones under /tmp for probes and red-proofs
never push, so nothing legitimate breaks. Symlinks are resolved on both sides; an
absent workspace root SKIPS the check rather than failing it, so this cannot brick
a legitimate clone on another machine. The only bypass is the documented
--no-verify, whose use is already reportable.
Identical in all four repos.
papra mounted papra_data:/app/data while the application writes to
/app/app-data, so its database sat in the container's writable layer: lost on
redeploy, and tarred nightly as an empty directory while the healthcheck stayed
green. Last of the three apps R-156 convicted.
Decided from the IMAGE, not the README. docker inspect of
ghcr.io/papra-hq/papra:26.6.1-rootless gives WORKDIR=/app and all three data
paths under ./app-data (DATABASE_URL, DOCUMENT_STORAGE_FILESYSTEM_ROOT,
PAPRA_CONFIG_DIR) — and /app/data does not exist in the image at all.
Reconfiguring the app to write to /app/data was available and deliberately not
taken: it enumerates data paths, so a fourth added upstream would escape to the
writable layer again, silently — this defect re-armed. Mounting the app's own
data ROOT captures every current and future path by construction.
Precondition checked rather than inherited: docker ps -a (including stopped) on
BOTH demo guests, plus the hub fleet view (two enrolled hosts, zero papra) —
both boxes were wiped and rebuilt today, so the 2 August evidence was re-measured.
Proven by the runtime gate in both directions: CLEAN with the self-test passing,
and BROKEN when the mount is reverted, with the exact R-156 evidence. Full
catalog_gates.py papra: all three gates OK.
--fast only: check-image-pins runs; the network and container-runtime gates do NOT. CI that
pulls 53 images on every push gets disabled, and they remain deliberate periodic runs.
No sibling clone needed here — unlike the controller and the agent, catalog_gates --fast
does not invoke the shared reuse checker. No uses: step, no version bump.
--fast selects only gates that touch no network and no container runtime: gate 1
(check-image-pins) runs, image-resolvable and volume-persistence do NOT. Default behaviour with
no flag is unchanged. The skip is ANNOUNCED with the reason and with what still owes a periodic
run — a silently narrowed run reads as 'covered everything' when it did not.
Why the runtime gates are never in a hook: a push that pulls images and starts containers gets
bypassed within a week, and the bypass becomes the habit. They stay deliberate periodic runs at
the start of a catalog campaign, before a publish train, and when a template's volumes: block or
image tag changes — on a scratch host, never a customer box.
.githooks/pre-push runs catalog_gates.py --fast and refuses the push. Per-clone and
--no-verify-able, both stated in the hook itself.
test_catalog_gates.py pins --fast's CONTENT, not just its exit code: the runtime gates must not
run, the skip must be announced, and the no-flag path must still select all three. Red-proofed:
an inert run_gate turns it red.
scripts/catalog_gates.py runs all three gates - image-pins, image-resolvable,
volume-persistence - and exits non-zero if any fails. Mandated in CLAUDE.md the way
felhom.eu/scripts/site_gates.py is: run it after any template change, naming the
app(s) you touched.
Operator ruling, recorded because both alternatives were rejected for measured
reasons. Controller-side enforcement at template load was rejected because such a
check can only read the file, and a static audit of all 53 templates reports the
catalog clean INCLUDING papra - it would pass on the exact defect it exists to
catch; the property is decidable only at runtime. CI was rejected for now: neither
repo has any, and there are no users yet. What was chosen copies the shape that
demonstrably works here - of this project's gates, the only ones that ever get run
are the ones with a single entry point named in a CLAUDE.md; site_gates.py is run,
and R-29's three orphans are named nowhere and have stopped nothing.
Behaviour: 0 all clean / 1 convicted / 2 UNDETERMINED, never a pass; a conviction
outranks an undetermined result so the reader knows which they have. Gate output is
streamed, not captured. App names scope the two gates that accept scoping; with no
names the runtime gate deploys every template and belongs on a scratch host.
Adding a fourth gate means one line in GATES.
R-161 stays OPEN at reduced scope: this is convention, run by a person. Real
automatic enforcement is owed when a second person touches templates.
Verified: image-pins passes standalone (53 templates, 0 unpinned), the
unknown-option path exits 2, and the aggregation was unit-checked over five
gate-code combinations. The runtime leg was deliberately NOT executed - it deploys
templates via docker compose and DooPlex is the recovery chain - so the runner's
end-to-end invocation of that third gate is inferred, not measured, and is flagged
in REPORT.md to be closed on a scratch host at the next campaign.
REPORT.md overwritten per convention; the persistence sweep's report is preserved
at audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/ and pointed to from the new one.
The register grep that put these at R-158..R-161 was true when run and stale within hours: the
parallel session pushed SPIKE-recovery-unit-space-2026-08-02.md and CAMPAIGN-10-closeout-2026-08-02.md
mid-run, both using R-158 for an unrelated finding, and neither files it — ROADMAP.md and
OPEN-ITEMS.md still stop at R-155.
So two sessions minted the same number for different findings on the same day, which is the exact
failure §8.0 was already documenting about R-154/R-155 and R-156/R-157. Now recorded with itself as
the third instance. R-156, R-157 and R-158 are all live in audit documents and none is filed.
admin