Files
felhom.eu/hub/internal/api/mail.go
T
admin fa3c4f2657 hub v0.18.0: app-email passthrough POST /api/v1/mail → Resend SMTP
Raw-MIME passthrough (STARTTLS, AUTH LOGIN) — separate from the notify HTTP-API
alert path (which drops inline CID images). Per-customer token-bucket rate limit,
From-header allowlist backstop. Resend key stays hub-side. No new external dep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 08:45:22 +02:00

162 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/mailrelay"
)
// maxMailBytes bounds a forwarded message (raw_mime is base64 in the JSON envelope, so the
// JSON body is ~4/3 of this; 12 MiB JSON comfortably covers a 10 MiB message).
const maxMailBytes = 12 << 20
// mailRateLimiter is a per-key token bucket (key = customerID, or the envelope From when a
// global key is used). Containment: one box can't drain the shared Resend quota for the
// whole fleet. In-memory (lost on restart, acceptable — same posture as the dispatcher
// cooldowns).
type mailRateLimiter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
perMinute int
buckets map[string]*tokenBucket
now func() time.Time // injectable for tests
}
type tokenBucket struct {
tokens float64
last time.Time
}
func newMailRateLimiter(perMinute int) *mailRateLimiter {
if perMinute <= 0 {
perMinute = 30
}
return &mailRateLimiter{
perMinute: perMinute,
buckets: make(map[string]*tokenBucket),
now: time.Now,
}
}
// allow consumes one token for key, refilling at perMinute/60 tokens per second up to a
// burst capacity of perMinute. Returns false when the bucket is empty.
func (rl *mailRateLimiter) allow(key string) bool {
rl.mu.Lock()
defer rl.mu.Unlock()
now := rl.now()
cap := float64(rl.perMinute)
b, ok := rl.buckets[key]
if !ok {
rl.buckets[key] = &tokenBucket{tokens: cap - 1, last: now}
return true
}
// Refill based on elapsed time.
elapsed := now.Sub(b.last).Seconds()
b.tokens += elapsed * (cap / 60.0)
if b.tokens > cap {
b.tokens = cap
}
b.last = now
if b.tokens < 1 {
return false
}
b.tokens--
return true
}
// SetMailRelay wires the app-email passthrough: the Resend SMTP sender, the per-customer
// rate limit (messages/min), and the From-header domain allowlist. nil sender = the
// /api/v1/mail endpoint returns 503 (app mail not configured).
func (h *Handler) SetMailRelay(sender mailrelay.Sender, perMinute int, allowedDomains []string) {
h.mailSender = sender
h.mailLimiter = newMailRateLimiter(perMinute)
h.mailFromAllow = make(map[string]bool)
if len(allowedDomains) == 0 {
allowedDomains = []string{"felhom.eu"}
}
for _, d := range allowedDomains {
d = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(d))
if d != "" {
h.mailFromAllow[d] = true
}
}
}
// handleMail accepts a raw message from a customer box and passes it through to Resend
// over SMTP (raw, unchanged). Auth → From-policy → per-box rate limit → passthrough.
func (h *Handler) handleMail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
custID, _, ok := h.checkAuthCustomer(r)
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if h.mailSender == nil {
http.Error(w, "App mail not configured", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxMailBytes+1))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(body) > maxMailBytes {
http.Error(w, "Payload too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
}
var req struct {
RawMIME []byte `json:"raw_mime"`
MailFrom string `json:"mail_from"`
RcptTo []string `json:"rcpt_to"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || len(req.RawMIME) == 0 || len(req.RcptTo) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: raw_mime and rcpt_to required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// From-policy (backstop — the shim already enforced this; Resend is the final backstop).
// Reject 4xx if the From-header domain is not allowlisted.
dom, err := mailrelay.FromDomain(req.RawMIME)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Printf("[WARN] /api/v1/mail: unparseable From from %s: %v", custID, err)
http.Error(w, "Invalid message: unparseable From header", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !h.mailFromAllow[dom] {
h.logger.Printf("[WARN] /api/v1/mail: rejected From domain %q from %s", dom, custID)
http.Error(w, "Forbidden: From domain not permitted", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Per-box rate limit (key = customer; fall back to envelope From for a global-key caller).
key := custID
if key == "" {
key = strings.ToLower(req.MailFrom)
}
if h.mailLimiter != nil && !h.mailLimiter.allow(key) {
h.logger.Printf("[WARN] /api/v1/mail: rate limit hit for %q", key)
http.Error(w, "Too Many Requests", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := h.mailSender.Send(ctx, req.RawMIME, req.MailFrom, req.RcptTo); err != nil {
// A refusal/transport failure → 502; the box's shim surfaces it to the app (a 5xx
// maps to a permanent SMTP error). The upstream reason is logged, not echoed in full.
h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] /api/v1/mail: relay to Resend failed for %s (from=%s): %v", custID, req.MailFrom, err)
http.Error(w, "Upstream mail delivery failed", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
h.logger.Printf("[INFO] /api/v1/mail: relayed for %s (from=%s rcpts=%d bytes=%d)", custID, req.MailFrom, len(req.RcptTo), len(req.RawMIME))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}