- OPEN-ITEMS: R-196 CLOSED; R-204 items 1-3 CLOSED with item 4 named and its dependency stated. Header restates that R-202, the 1.2 GB ciphertext deletion and R-198's still-unit-proven retention all REMAIN OPEN. - capability map: the recovery row keeps its 'with a person present' qualifier, names which crutch remains, and cites the three now gone. - 07-backup-architecture: new 7.0 - what a customer can and cannot do ALONE, the four steps in a table with status. This is the section a future reader will use to answer that question. - CONTEXT: standing ruling S-32, superseding S-31 steps 2-5. - STATUS: rewritten to one screen per its own header; removes a corrupted half-overwritten section left from the drill session. - ROADMAP: R-196 and R-204 collapsed.
11 KiB
REPORT — R-196 / R-204 item 2 (hub v0.95.0), 2026-08-05
A re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale. One behaviour change, one register closed, and
the coverage claim proved rather than assumed. The controller's half of R-204 (items 1 and 3) is
felhom-controller v0.198.0.
1. Baselines, re-read on arrival
| Repo | Expected | Found |
|---|---|---|
felhom.eu |
2a7ac03c4726 / hub v0.94.0 (deployed felhom-hub:0.94.0) |
exact match, tree clean, HEAD == origin/main |
§3.2's landmark had DRIFTED, and the drift changed the work. The task described
offsite.go:222-231 under a known-consequence comment saying the mark was made on a false premise.
That comment had already been rewritten by the R-196 comment-correction commit, and the version on
main gave a non-false ground for the mark: "the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository
password (it does exactly that whenever <DataDir>/offbox/repo_password is absent — the
guest-rebuild shape)". So the question was no longer "delete a comment's lie" but "is the shape it
guards actually covered elsewhere?" — which is Scenario D, and §8.2 says to stop and report if it is
not. It is; §3 below is the evidence.
2. What changed
offsite.ReissueCredentials no longer calls MarkEscrowStale and no longer emits the escrow_stale
event. offsite_reissued is untouched and still fires on every re-issue. The known-consequence
comment is rewritten to record what was done, when, and why — with the disagreement below stated in
it rather than absorbed.
What the mark actually cost, established mechanically rather than asserted (this is why it was a blocker and not a nit):
stale_atset →GetEscrowStatusForCustomerwithholdsrestic_pw_sha256from the report ACK.- With no hash, the controller's SLICE-3 auto-confirm returns early and cannot flip
pending → escrowed. OffboxRunnable() = OffboxConfigured() && EscrowState == "escrowed"→ every off-site backup refused, indefinitely, on a box whose repository key was never in doubt.- The customer is told to re-run the recovery ceremony — which mints a new recovery code and supersedes the sealed blob. During a recovery that is the one act that would have destroyed the key just recovered.
3. Scenario D — the evidence that the removed marking is covered
The mark was precautionary and aimed at ONE shape: a re-issue followed by a box that mints a fresh
repository password (the guest-rebuild shape, where offbox/repo_password is absent). That shape is
measured in two independent places, and the mark was blinding one of them:
- Continuous, box-side — the real coverage.
report.EscrowAutoConfirmer.reconcileEscrowed(controller) compares the ACK's sealedrestic_pw_sha256against the box's CURRENT local repo password on every report ACK, raising the stale flag, the customer card and the „create a new recovery code" CTA on a mismatch. That is a measurement, not a guess, and it is continuous rather than edge-triggered. Pinned by the controller'sTestEscrowStale_MismatchWarnsOnceAndFlags— re-run green this session. And step 1 above was blinding it: a stale flag empties the very hash that comparison needs, so the box could only reach the hash-LESS branch and report "the hub's current blob carries NO password hash" — which is false. Removing the mark restores the true signal. - Edge-triggered, hub-side. R-197's
offsite_repo_key_changedfires fromapi.maybeEmitRepoKeyChangedon a proven hash difference across a supersession and pages the operator. Red-proved: removing themaybeEmitRepoKeyChangedcall fromhandleHostEscrowPutmadeTestEscrowPut_ChangedRepoKey_RaisesSignalfail with "the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised", while the two silence tests stayed green.
Disagreement recorded, per the R-96 standing rule. Scenario D as written asks that a real key change also "mark the escrow stale". It must not, and nothing was changed to make it. The hub learns of a real change at the instant a supersession seals the new password — i.e. when the escrow is at its freshest. Marking it stale there would ask the customer for a ceremony to fix the ceremony that just ran. The correct consequence at that instant is the operator alarm, which is exactly what R-197 already does. This is recorded in the code comment, the CHANGELOG and OPEN-ITEMS, not only here.
4. MarkEscrowStale is kept with no caller — deliberately
Per task §5 it was not to be modified, and it is not deleted either. The stale_at flag remains live
and correct — read by the ACK, the operator config card and the PBS-DR view — and the right way to
set it is a future EVIDENTIAL caller that has measured a key change rather than guessed at one.
Its doc comment now says so plainly instead of naming a caller that no longer exists, and
TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears keeps the mechanism from decaying to inert while
nothing writes it (the seam-built-but-never-wired shape, in reverse).
The schema comment and EscrowStatus.Stale's comment were corrected the same way — each of the three
previously asserted a writer that is now gone.
5. Files modified
| File | Change |
|---|---|
hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go |
the pessimistic MarkEscrowStale + escrow_stale event removed; comment rewritten to record the change, the coverage and the disagreement |
hub/internal/offsite/offsite_test.go |
TestReissue_InvalidatesEscrow replaced in place by its exact inverse TestReissue_DoesNotMarkAHealthyEscrowStale; new TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears |
hub/internal/store/store.go |
three comments corrected (MarkEscrowStale, the stale_at schema note, EscrowStatus.Stale) — each had named a writer that no longer exists |
manifests/hub.yaml |
image tag 0.94.0 → 0.95.0 |
hub/CHANGELOG.md, CONTEXT.md, STATUS.md, documentation/… |
v0.95.0 entry; ruling S-32; the register and architecture updates below |
Commits on main: d1a8edb (behaviour + tests + comments) · 5c7d671 (CHANGELOG) ·
975a690 (manifest bump).
Deploy: built + pushed felhom-hub:0.95.0, bumped manifests/hub.yaml, pushed, then a
deliberate ArgoCD hard-refresh + sync (auto-sync stays off; no kubectl set image anywhere).
Result: app felhom Synced / Healthy, deploy/hub rolled out, running image
gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.95.0, startup log clean (offsite provisioning, pool-box checker,
PBS-DR reconciler and all six host checkers initialised; Listening on :8080).
6. Tests and red-proofs
Green gate: cd hub && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... — rc=0.
python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast — all five gates OK.
| Test | Result | Red-proof — what was mutated | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
TestReissue_DoesNotMarkAHealthyEscrowStale (C) |
PASS | restored the pessimistic MarkEscrowStale block in ReissueCredentials, exactly as it was |
FAILED — "a re-issue marked a HEALTHY escrow stale…" |
TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears |
PASS | same mutation | stayed GREEN — correctly: the mutation restores a caller, not a break in the mechanism. That split is the evidence Scenario C's assertion is about the caller and not the flag. |
TestEscrowPut_ChangedRepoKey_RaisesSignal (D) |
PASS | removed the maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged call from handleHostEscrowPut |
FAILED — "the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised" |
TestEscrowPut_UnchangedRepoKey_Silent, TestEscrowPut_HashlessSupersession_NoSignal |
PASS | same | stayed green — the detector's silence branches are independent |
controller TestEscrowStale_MismatchWarnsOnceAndFlags |
PASS | — (cited as the continuous-coverage pin) | — |
Scenario C asserts the consequence (the ACK still carries the hash, so auto-confirm can proceed)
rather than the mechanism (that a function was not called), because the hash is what the drill's
blockage actually turned on. It also asserts that offsite_reissued still fires — removing a false
alarm must not remove the true notice.
7. Live validation
Per task §12 point 5, a live re-issue was NOT run, and must not have been on demo-hp — it would
have been a credential rotation on the box holding the drill's evidence. Part 2 is proved by test and
by the deployment being live and healthy. The controller-side halves of R-204 were validated live and
are reported in felhom-controller/REPORT.md.
8. Register and documentation
OPEN-ITEMS.md— R-196 → CLOSED (hub v0.95.0); R-204 → items 1–3 CLOSED, item 4 OPEN (→ R-193) with its dependency named. The header block is updated and states explicitly that R-202, the ~1.2 GB orphaned-ciphertext deletion and R-198's retention (still UNIT-PROVEN ONLY — the second deliberate wipe is the next item) all remain open, so nothing is presumed closed by association. R-201 is recorded as PASSED. R-204 is still the highest ID; nothing new was minted.architecture/00-capability-map.md— the recovery row now says three of the four crutches are gone, names the fixes and their evidence, and states that item 4 (R-193) is the one that remains and is why the row keeps its "with a person present" qualifier. The R-199 back-pointer was already present on the adjacent key-recovery row (added when that row was last corrected), so it needed no further action — verified, not assumed.architecture/07-backup-architecture.md— new §7.0, "What a customer can and cannot do ALONE": the four steps in a table with what each cost and its status, plus the honest current answer. This is the section a future reader will use to answer the question.documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md— R-196 and R-204 collapsed per the coupling rule.CONTEXT.md— new standing ruling S-32, which supersedes S-31's steps 2–5 and carries the blinding mechanism, the fail-closed rule and the "no TTL" reasoning forward.STATUS.md— rewritten to one screen (191 → ~90 lines) per its own header. It also had a corrupted, half-overwritten "What we're working on" section left from the drill session, which is now gone. Next item stated as the retention drill.
CI: felhom.eu runs 154 (5c7d671, code) and 155 (975a690, manifest) — both success.
--no-verify was not used; the pre-push gate ran and passed on every push.
9. Observations — noticed, NOT acted on
allowedEventTypesstill listsescrow_stale, which after this change has no producer in either repo. It is inert rather than harmful; removing an allowlist entry is a behaviour change and is out of this session's scope.MarkEscrowStaleis now dead code by call-graph. Kept on purpose (§4 above) — but if a future session's linter or cleanup pass proposes deleting it, the reason it exists is in its doc comment and in the test that exercises it./on DooPlex is at 86% used — under the 90% abort line, but worth watching before large builds.