Nothing in the repo said which machines are safe to break. The host table gave access and role and stopped there, so a session needing a victim had to guess -- and the guessing inverted: the two boxes that exist to be broken were treated as sacred, and DooPlex (the recovery chain) got used because it was the only box no spec had fenced. New documentation/runbooks/target-selection.md -- one page, three tiers, and per machine what is freely permitted / needs care / forbidden, each carrying its REASON so a rule can be correctly narrowed later instead of ossifying. States the selection rule positively (start at Tier 0; a Tier 2 box only when a task says so explicitly; an absent fence is not permission) and that fences name ACTS, not machines -- demo-hp's over-subscribed local-lvm is one dangerous storage, not a dangerous box. CLAUDE.md: host table gains a Blast radius column, gains the missing demo-hp row (it was where the drill VMs ran and it was not in the table at all), and a pointer line to the new runbook. CORRECTION to the spec's problem statement: the designation was not missing. The 2026-07-25 operator ruling naming the t740 as drill+build VM host -- explicitly "moved off DooPlex" -- already existed in operations/nodes.md. It sat where no session reads at start, while the prohibitions were repeated in every task spec. The defect is reachability of the ruling, not its absence, and the R-116 drill on DooPlex contradicted a written ruling rather than filling a vacuum. CORRECTION to the R-116 record, same commit: the baseline claimed controller 0.186.0 on both demo boxes. Only felhom-pve was sampled and generalised; demo-hp re-checked directly runs 0.185.1, so the fleet is split and R-114's TargetAbsent branch is absent from demo-hp. Fixed in the audit table and REPORT-r116-diag. Docs only -- no code, no build, no deploy, no host reconfigured, no host renamed.
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Which box do I break? — target selection by blast radius
Read before picking a machine for a drill, a destructive test, or a throwaway VM. It answers one question: what is safe to lose. Reachability is in
CLAUDE.md; hardware inoperations/nodes.md. Added 2026-07-30.
The rule
Start at Tier 0 and work down only if Tier 0 genuinely cannot host the work. A Tier 2 machine is used only when a task says so explicitly — never by inference from what was not forbidden. An absent fence is not permission. If no tier fits, stop and ask.
Fences name acts, not machines. "Do not re-target demo-hp's backup target" and "do not use demo-hp to host a throwaway VM" are unrelated; only the first has ever been meant. Read a per-machine prohibition as covering the act it names and nothing more.
| Tier | Meaning | Machines |
|---|---|---|
| 0 — disposable. Reach here first. | Exists to be broken; reinstalling is a routine afternoon, not an incident. A drill that needs a victim uses one of these. | demo-hp (t740), demo-felhom (N100) |
| 1 — create and destroy freely | Throwaway VMs, guests, scratch customers — hosted on a Tier 0 machine | drill VMs, scratch guests |
| 2 — precious. Never a drill target. | Losing it costs the recovery chain or a real relationship | DooPlex, Peti's cluster, ep0 + the Hetzner Storage Boxes |
DooPlex is Tier 2 because it is the recovery chain — hub, Gitea, registry, PBS, k3s + Longhorn. Everything else rebuilds from it; it rebuilds from nothing. A bad moment in a DR drill there costs the thing under test, the source of truth for it, and the backups, at once.
Standing ruling, 2026-07-25 (operations/nodes.md): drill and build VMs live on the t740 — not
felhom-pve, and moved off DooPlex. This page exists because that ruling sat where no session reads.
Per machine — permitted / needs care / forbidden
demo-hp — HP t740 · Tier 0 · the designated drill + build VM host
- Freely: host nested drill VMs; create/destroy guests and scratch customers; reinstall the box. This is the default answer to "where do I run this".
- Care:
local-lvmis a thin pool, over-subscribed (~144 GiB allocated over ~54 GiB) backing live guest 9201 — filling it corrupts every guest. Put VM disks on a dir storage at/mnt/nvme-1tb, at its root (a subdirectory fails the agent'sexactMountcheck → storage readsdisconnectedforever). That warning is about one storage, not the box./mnt/nvme-1tbis also thefelhom-backuptarget and the enrolled user-data drive, so remove scratch storages when done. - Forbidden: do not re-target its backup configuration (below). Do not destroy or unblock
drill-r50(VM 300) — the only drift fixture (R-93). No baked SSH key; access is the hub-vaulted G1 break-glass password (R-61).
demo-felhom — N100 · Tier 0
- Freely: create/destroy guests and scratch customers; reinstall the box.
- Care: it carries the PBS-DR / offsite tier (demo-hp has none), so it is the Tier 0 box whose backup chain a test can actually disturb. Prefer demo-hp, per the 2026-07-25 ruling.
- Forbidden: do not re-target its backup configuration.
Both Tier 0 boxes, one shared prohibition and its reason: do not re-point either backup target. They are the only two correctly configured boxes, so they are the regression path new installer logic is measured against — losing that reference costs more than the box does.
DooPlex — 192.168.0.180 · Tier 2
- Freely: build, push images,
sudo kubectl, read anything. Work inside/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/. - Care: the golden-bake nested VM
drill/drill.qcow2lives here and is an accepted exception for bakes (last used 0.185.1, 2026-07-29). Using it as a drill victim is not covered by that exception and contradicts the 2026-07-25 ruling. If touched, restoreqemu-img snapshot -a virgin. - Forbidden: no global Docker cleanup; do not touch k3s data dirs, Longhorn mounts, PBS datastores
or Gitea storage; no destructive disk/guest ops; never run CC here with prompts disabled; abort large
builds if
df -h /mnt/5_hdd /shows either over 90 %. Because it is the recovery chain and a live k3s node.
Peti's cluster (peti-felhom) — Tier 2
Do not touch, at all. A real external pilot with a real person behind it; its whole-guest backup
still shares a device with its guest, so a drive failure is offsite-only recovery. Deliberately not
migrated, parked until the tester reinstalls (PETI in backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md). Currently DOWN, no
enrolled host. No access route from DooPlex, and nothing here needs one.
ep0 (felhom-hetzner, ep0.felhom.eu) + the Hetzner Storage Boxes — Tier 2
Reads are fine. It is the offsite of last resort (PBS-DR datastore, WireGuard hub, operator OOB
path) and RAM-constrained (3.8 GB, R-90) so a large restore can OOM it. Do not delete datastores, prune
jobs, tunnel config or nftables rules; never a drill target. The Storage Boxes hold the restic copy —
customer documents and photos, on a credential that can still delete (R-95).
Access: ssh root@167.233.158.164 from DooPlex — not felhom-pve → 10.77.0.1, the route that
produced a false "unreachable" verdict (standing rule 2).
Tier 1 — drill VMs, scratch guests, scratch customers
Create and destroy freely on a Tier 0 host. Two exceptions: drill-r50 is a fixture, not
scratch; and scratch customers outlive their VMs in the hub — delete those too, or they accumulate
(sess-c and sess-d are both still there).
Not established — unknown, not guessed
- Hetzner Storage Boxes (
storage-box-pool-1,PBS-storage-1/ u629193 / box 611421) — state taken frombacklog/OPEN-ITEMS.md; no direct access attempted or confirmed. Tier 2 by what they hold. felhotest(legacy,ssh -p 33022 kisfenyo@router.abonet.hu) —Connection refused2026-07-30; that was the only route tried. Untiered; assume nothing.- Peti's cluster hardware/storage layout — unverified. Tier 2 rests on the relationship, which needs no verification.
The gap this page closes
During the R-116 diagnosis session (2026-07-30) a nested-Proxmox drill ran on DooPlex, a Tier 2
machine. Not a newly provisioned VM — the standing golden-bake fixture, booted from virgin and
restored to it, so nothing was lost. But it was chosen because DooPlex was the only machine no spec had
fenced, while the ruling naming the t740 sat in operations/nodes.md with nothing pointing at it.
The designation existed and was unreachable — the same class as an absent signal read as a positive
one.