Files
felhom.eu/documentation
admin e467785fd3
gates / gates (push) Successful in 5m23s
security: rotate the published secrets and de-git felhom.secret.yaml (R-925, P1)
WHY .gitignore "was not working": it was working. git never consults
.gitignore for a file it ALREADY TRACKS. The rule `*secret*` matched fine --
proved by dropping an untracked copy in and watching check-ignore name
`.gitignore:3:*secret*`. The file had been tracked since feea0606, which is
ironically the commit that de-gitted the Resend key.

WHAT THE EXPOSED VALUE ACTUALLY WAS. Not an analytics password: the GITEA
ADMIN ACCOUNT PASSWORD (is_admin true; /api/v1/admin/users answered 200), in
a repo gitea.dooplex.hu serves anonymously to the internet. That is push
access to every repo -- including the one whose website/ is git-synced live
and whose scripts/ is published by tag to every new box installer (R-110).
Re-ranked P2 -> P1 on that measurement; my first ranking had only measured
the analytics blast radius.

Every committed value was still live. Nothing had ever been rotated.

ROTATED (values never echoed; written to a 0600 file on DooPlex):
  umami-config        APP_SECRET + POSTGRES_PASSWORD. The password was
                      changed INSIDE postgres (ALTER USER) as well as in the
                      Secret -- the env var is only read at first init, so
                      patching the Secret alone would have changed nothing.
  healthchecks-config SECRET_KEY + SUPERUSER_PASSWORD (nothing consumes them,
                      there is no healthchecks Deployment).
  gitea-creds         no longer holds the admin password at all: a SCOPED
                      token (read:package + read:repository).
  gitea admin         new random password; gitea-system/gitea-admin updated.

VERIFIED, not assumed:
  - new admin password -> 200, OLD PUBLISHED PASSWORD -> 401 (the leak is dead)
  - umami: a real beacon returns 200 (so the app authenticates to postgres and
    writes) while a bogus site id still returns 400 (so the 200 means something)
  - hub: "Registry version check: latest = 0.304.0" AND "Template fetched
    (5881 bytes)", no auth failures
  - BOTH token scopes are load-bearing, and the second was found by breaking
    it: a package-only token made the hub log "Template fetch: unexpected
    status 403", because the template fetcher reads a raw file out of the
    felhom-controller repo, not the registry.

AN INCIDENT CAUSED BY THE FIX, recorded because it is the useful part: the
rollout restart needed to pick up the new umami secret put umami into
CrashLoopBackOff and took stats.felhom.eu down (503) for ~4 minutes. Not the
rotation -- at memory 512Mi that pod runs for months but CANNOT RESTART:
startup (Prisma + Next.js) peaks over the limit and is OOMKilled (exit 137).
Raised to 1Gi IN THE MANIFEST, not just live, per .claude/rules/manifests.md
("never bare kubectl set -- the next sync reverts it and the fix silently
disappears").

THE GATE: KNOWN_BACKLOG is removed from manifest_bearer_gate.py, as its own
comment instructed. Red-proofed with a decoy: exit 1 with it, exit 0 without.
An exemption kept this visible for three months and changed nothing.

WHAT REMAINS (operator, and it is bigger than what was fixed): the same
password is still the admin password in ~12 other namespaces -- nextcloud,
paperless, bookstack (a DATABASE ROOT password), tandoor, calibre,
adventurelog, gokapi, qbittorrent, servarr, homepage. Rotating Gitea does not
touch them. Also owed: a kisfenyo Gitea token sits in plaintext in the local
homelab-manifests remote URL and was printed to a session transcript during
this investigation, so it should be replaced regardless (R-580's shape).

NOT a finding: homelab-manifests is private (404 anonymously) and does not
contain the password; ArgoCD's repo credential is a separate token and was
untouched by the rotation.
2026-10-09 13:21:18 +02:00
..
…

Felhom — Documentation

Felhom is a managed home-server service for Hungarian households, built on a three-component model over Proxmox:

  • Hub — operator backend on k3s (hub.felhom.eu). Repo: felhom.eu/hub/.
  • Host agent — one per Proxmox host; operator-tier; owns all Proxmox interaction. Repo: felhom-agent/.
  • In-guest controller — one per customer LXC; Docker-only; manages the customer's apps. Repo: felhom-controller/.

This directory is the central, code-verified documentation home for all three components plus the platform and the security-audit record.

Sections

Controller (in-guest) — controller/

The Docker-only app-domain controller. Full per-area docs grounded in current source (v0.59.0). → controller/README.md: module map, deploy & stack lifecycle, backup architecture, storage/monitoring/metrics, auth/hub/sync/integrations.

Where we stand — architecture/where-felhom-stands.*

The operator's one-page picture of what is proven, built, partial and missing.

Host agent & platform — architecture/, proxmox-platform.md

The operator-tier agent and the Proxmox platform.

Hub (operator backend) — architecture/05

Security audits & remediation — audits/

Spike & test findings — tests/

Per-slice spike/validation findings (phases 0–5, slices 7–10). See tests/.

Conventions

  • Code-verified, not memory-derived. Architectural claims here are checked against the actual current source; if a claim can't be verified it is omitted and flagged, not guessed.
  • Per-repo operational working files (CLAUDE.md, CONTEXT.md, CHANGELOG.md, BUGHUNT.md, REPORT.md, TASK.md) live in their own repos — they are operational, not published docs.
  • Authoritative versions at last refresh: controller v0.59.0, agent v0.29.1, hub v0.11.0.