gates / gates (push) Successful in 12m37s
Read-only audit of whether the hacked Plex pod on DooPlex (HM-040, 2026-10-17 -> 10-23) reached Felhom's secrets. Two no-login doors existed (the Longhorn NFS export and the Longhorn API); neither was used: nfsd accepted 0 new connections in the window (positive control), no off-schedule Longhorn backup or volume. Evidence in documentation/audits/plex2shell-felhom-impact-2026-10-23/. The NFS export was narrowed from * to 10.42.0.0/16 on the operator's yes (host change, not in git). 13-threat-model.md: attacker j and one boundary row. STATUS: verdict, the P1, one do item.
21 lines
687 B
YAML
21 lines
687 B
YAML
apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata:
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name: cc-p2s-probe
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namespace: default
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labels: {purpose: plex2shell-felhom-impact-probe}
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annotations: {note: "read-only reach probe, CC 2026-10-23; removed after"}
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spec:
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automountServiceAccountToken: false
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enableServiceLinks: false
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activeDeadlineSeconds: 5400
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restartPolicy: Never
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securityContext: {runAsUser: 1000, runAsGroup: 1000, runAsNonRoot: true}
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containers:
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- name: probe
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image: docker.io/curlimages/curl:8.11.1
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imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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command: ["sleep", "5400"]
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securityContext: {allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}}
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resources: {limits: {cpu: "500m", memory: "128Mi"}}
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