felhom.eu/STATUS.md

STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next

Updated 2026-08-05.

A view, not a source. documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md is the authority on open work; this page restates part of it in plain words, and nothing may exist only here. Not CONTEXT.md, which is technical state written for Claude Code — keep the two separate. Maintenance: update at the end of every session in which something shipped, broke, or was decided. One screen; cut items rather than extend it.

What works right now

A blank machine boots the Felhom disc, installs itself unattended, and is claimed by the customer, who sets their own password. They install apps from a catalogue of fifty-three, share files over the home network, and open apps from a launcher or a shared link. Backups run on their own to three places — the machine's drive, a second drive, and an encrypted off-site copy.

The backup promise is proved. The recovery JOURNEY is not. On 5 August we built a brand-new machine from the published disc, gave it three marked files, destroyed it, and tried to get them back the way a household would — no shortcuts, no command line. The files came back byte for byte identical, all three, including one with Hungarian accents in its name. But the journey needed us four times, and the very first thing the machine did was tell the customer their correct recovery code was wrong. (CAMPAIGN 11)

What's broken

• A machine installed today would tell its owner their correct recovery code is wrong. The recovery screen needs a newer in-house service than a new machine is given; when it asked and got nothing, it blamed the customer's typing. We fixed the lie today — it now says plainly that the machine cannot do this yet, and never accuses anyone. It still needs one click from you to actually work on new machines (below). (R-216, R-223)
• Three things a rebuilt machine still cannot do by itself. Its owner cannot re-attach their own drives, so no app can be put back on its data; it cannot create a new recovery code at all; and the screen at the machine itself never stops showing a stale pairing code. Each is understood, measured and written down — none is fixed yet. (R-220, R-221, R-214)
• Rebuilding a machine still throws away its off-site backup HISTORY. The machine invents the key that encrypts its own off-site backups, and a rebuilt machine invents a new one. The good news: the old key really is kept now — we proved it on a real machine today, for the first time, and a changed key raises an alarm the same day. (R-193, R-198)
• The kept older backups cannot be opened yet. We keep the previous sealed package, and there is no way to open it. A customer holding exactly the right code for it used to be told they had mistyped; today the screen names the situation honestly instead — but it still cannot open it, and it does not pretend otherwise. (R-222, R-202)
• The off-site copy can be erased by the machine that made it. A daily snapshot is armed as a stopgap. (R-95, R-87)

What shipped recently

• 2026-08-05 (late) — New machines now get current software again — and the disc image had been quietly un-updatable for days. Approving the newer in-house service turned out to be impossible on its own: the system correctly refuses to publish a set where the pre-built machine image is older than the software the fleet already runs, and that image had been behind since late July. So the image was rebuilt and both were published together. A machine installed from now on lands on current software and can open a recovery package on day one. (R-223)

• 2026-08-05 (evening) — Four sentences where there was one, and none of them blames you. "We did not accept your recovery code" used to appear when the code was wrong, when the machine could not ask, when the store could not be read, and when the customer held the code for an older backup we still keep. Only the first is the customer's doing. Also today: succeeding at recovery no longer switches off the machine's own request for the thing it still needs; the screen now finishes the job and shows what is in the backups instead of promising a list it could never produce; and the recovery page can no longer be reached on a machine that never had backups. (R-216, R-217, R-218, R-219, R-222, R-215)

• 2026-08-05 — The recovery screen: a customer whose machine was rebuilt is now told, and shown how. Until today they had everything needed to get their data back and no way to find out — the only route was a command line. The screen unlocks the backups and lists what is in them; it does not restore anything, because unlocking and restoring are two different decisions and mixing them would turn one clear moment into a wizard. Three ways out, none of them a dismiss button — and the „most nem" option keeps the route to the data permanently visible in the backups area, because a notice someone clicks past once is a notice that never happened. (R-193)

• 2026-08-05 — The orphaned backups are deleted — and the list you were given was wrong, which is why you were asked again. You had approved "about 1.2 GB in two set-aside stores". Measured before touching anything: there were three set-aside stores totalling ~1.45 GB — and the thing that was exactly 1.2 GB was demo-felhom's live store. Matching on the size would have deleted a working backup. With the corrected list confirmed, all three were removed and both live stores left alone; a real off-site backup ran successfully straight afterwards to prove nothing working had been caught. (R-212)

• 2026-08-05 — A rebuilt machine now asks for its storage credential, and the hub gives it back. The machine says plainly what it needs — it can tell it has been rebuilt, because its data area is empty and the hub is holding a sealed recovery package for it — instead of leaving the hub to guess from a silence that has four possible meanings. The hub waits long enough to be sure it is not a restart, then re-uses the credential it already holds before creating a new one at the storage provider. The recovery ceremony stays manual, deliberately: a credential can be replaced, your recovery code cannot. (R-204 item 4, R-193)

• 2026-08-05 — The DooPlex server's disk is out of danger: 86% full → 54%, and the storage layer is unstuck. The cause was leftover working data from building our own software — 157 GB of it, growing about 5 GB a day, which nothing was allowed to delete. 148 GB came back in 86 seconds. The storage layer had already stopped accepting new copies of any volume onto that disk; that is fixed the same day. A 30 GB ceiling is now in place and was proved to work by deliberately overfilling it and watching it evict — not by assuming the setting took. Two things that failed quietly around it: the warning meant to catch exactly this could never fire (fixed and proved), and the weekly cleanup is still forbidden from touching the thing that grows (next session). (R-205 … R-211)

• 2026-08-05 — The build data now lives on the second SSD, moved with nothing lost. All 345 images, every saved volume and both development databases came through identical — checked before the original was touched and again afterwards, and confirmed by running a real build on the moved copy. The server's own services never went down: Gitea, the registry, the hub and the backup system run on a separate system and stayed up throughout. The second SSD now also reserves 80 GB for this, so the storage layer can no longer quietly claim the space and repeat what happened to the first disk. The old copy is kept as the way back until the machine next restarts. (R-209)

• 2026-08-05 — Three of the four recovery crutches removed. The reset code works first time; a credential re-issue no longer blocks off-site backups on a healthy machine; and the default restore no longer quietly returns the wrong thing. (R-204 items 1–3, R-196)

• 2026-08-04 (night) — The drill PASSED, end to end, on real hardware. (R-201)

• 2026-08-04 — The folder-left-out-of-the-backup problem fixed both halves: the app and its backup look in the same directory, and a backup that misses a folder marked essential reports incomplete instead of success. (R-203)

• 2026-08-04 — The hub now keeps the off-site backup key when a machine re-seals, instead of only the whole-machine one, and a machine can fetch its own sealed package back. (R-198, R-199)

• 2026-08-04 — The daily false alarm about David is gone; a vanished permission now repairs itself and says it had to; the weekly off-site backup stopped reporting failure after a successful upload. (R-195, R-190, R-191)

What we're working on

• Next: the retention proof. The hub keeping the old sealed key when a machine re-seals is the one remaining link that has never run outside a test. Proving it needs a second deliberate wipe on the spare demo machine, and it is its own procedure. (R-198)
• Then: the orphaned-backup deletion you asked for (below), and the off-site copy the machine can still erase. (R-193, R-95)

Waiting on you

• One thing to read after the machine next restarts — and nothing to do until then. You told me not to restart DooPlex, so I did not, and the move to the second SSD has therefore never been through a restart. It works right now and nothing was lost, but a restart is the one test that matters for this kind of change, and it has not happened. I made it check itself: whenever the machine next starts, for any reason, it writes a plain PASS or FAIL line to /var/log/felhom-store-postboot-check.log. If it says PASS, the old copy can be deleted and 34 GB comes back. Until then I have deliberately kept that old copy, which is the only quick way back — it is why the disk sits at 54% rather than lower. (R-209a)
• One list to rule on: 193 old images that exist only on this machine. 131 controller versions and 62 hub versions are not in the registry, so they cannot be re-downloaded — all of them old (controller up to 0.135.0, hub up to 0.57.0; everything newer is safely in the registry). Nothing was deleted. Worth knowing before you spend time on it: they only account for about 27 GB against 199 GB now free, so this is about clutter, not space. (R-210)
• Nothing.
• The recovery screen you described has been priced, and it can be built. A freshly installed machine that finds a sealed package waiting should say so, offer a box for the recovery code, and show what would come back before doing anything. One thing to weigh, deliberately not decided: that screen is reachable by anyone with the household's dashboard password, and the preview reveals backup dates and app names. (R-193)
• The orphaned backups on the storage box — you said delete, and it is still owed. About 1.2 GB across the two demo machines, in set-aside stores nobody can open and nothing prunes. It wants its own session rather than riding along with other work. (R-193)
• (decided 4 Aug) You chose not to keep a copy of the backup key on the Proxmox host, which makes the customer's own recovery code the only route back from a rebuild. (R-193)
• A job, not a decision: the hub password needs changing. A diagnostic command printed it into a session log; nothing suggests anyone else saw it. (R-132)
• One small question, not urgent. The automatic version check cannot see which version you have told machines to install, only which ones exist. (R-184)