R-182 CLOSED (controller v0.194.0 + hub v0.90.0/.1), proven live on demo-hp. The hub's notification_log for the run reads: two per-app failures RECORDED, one digest SENT naming both, and the customer channel SKIPPED with operator_only. Against the measured previous behaviour — two failures, one email naming one app, one leaving no trace anywhere. Scenario D proved itself on an event I had not planned: disk_critical alarmed on two filesystems, the second was collapsed by the cooldown, and that collapse is now visible WITH ITS KEY. Yesterday it would have left nothing at all. A gap the spec did not anticipate is recorded with its fix: the per-app event also fires from the periodic sweep, outside any run, so making it record-only would have created a NEW silence. The sweep emits a digest too, with no run_id, so it stays under the ordinary hourly cooldown. ep0: MEASURED on the box — 7757 MB (8 GB), 4 vCPU, and the 4 GiB swapfile SURVIVED the resize and is active (checked, because a resize is a stop/start). The 40 GB local disk is UNCHANGED, so no disk figure was touched anywhere. Five documents corrected — three of which the task's list did not name, found by searching. Two audit/evidence documents ANNOTATED, body untouched: they record what was true when written and that is their value. R-90 CLOSED. R-86 unblocked and re-ranked, stated honestly: 8 GB is comfortable, not unbounded — the original OOM was a 14.46 GB restore — so the restore-test cadence should still be paced, just not by fear of the endpoint. target-selection.md's "D-d did not name ep0 either way" is deliberately left standing. It is the operator's question, not CC's. STATUS.md 127 -> 83 lines, items rather than sentences.
18 KiB
RUNBOOK RECORD — ep0 PBS datastore relocated onto the 100 GB volume (2026-07-27)
Class: supervised operational run. No repo version bump — the only commits are this record and the capacity note. Nothing was deleted.
Host: ep0 / felhom-hetzner, 167.233.158.164, Hetzner CX33 (4 vCPU / 8 GB RAM), Nuremberg.
Rescaled 2026-08-03 from the CX23 (2 vCPU / 3.8 GB) this runbook was written against. The 40 GB local disk did NOT change — this was a CPU/RAM resize — so every disk figure below still stands. The 4 GiB swapfile added on 2026-07-27 survived the resize. Datastore moved:
felhom-offsite,/srv/pbs-felhom→/mnt/pbs-datastore(name unchanged). Window: 06:58 → 07:19 UTC. PBS down 07:00 → 07:17 UTC.
1. Phase 0 — ground truth
Established read-only before anything was touched. Three of the runbook's premises did not hold; each is recorded below.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| PBS | proxmox-backup-server 4.2.3-1, running version 4.2.2 |
| Datastore name / path | felhom-offsite → /srv/pbs-felhom |
| Size on disk | 13,242,207,822 B (13 GB) |
| Chunk count | 9,748 |
| Total entries | 75,341 (reg 9,785, dir 65,556 — PBS pre-creates all 65536 .chunks shards) |
| Snapshots | 7 — demo-felhom 2, demo-felhom-01 3, demo-hp 2 |
| Ownership | backup:backup |
| Root filesystem | /dev/sda1 ext4, 38 G, 16 G used / 21 G avail (43 %), rw,relatime,errors=remount-ro |
| Volume | /dev/disk/by-id/scsi-0HC_Volume_106469259 → /dev/sdb, 100 G — present |
| Scheduled jobs | none — no verification.cfg, no prune.cfg, no sync.cfg, no GC schedule |
| Last weekly backups | 2026-07-26 (demo-felhom 12:21, demo-hp 15:42 + 17:03); next ≈ 08-02 — window clear |
Deviation ① — a second datastore is configured whose path does not exist
datastore: scratch → /srv/pbs-scratch ← No such file or directory
datastore: felhom-offsite → /srv/pbs-felhom ← the real one
proxmox-backup-manager datastore list reports scratch without complaint. /srv/ contains only
pbs-felhom. This is the PRIME RISK failure mode already live in the config — a datastore that
reports fine and is not there. Pre-existing, untouched by this run, and now louder: since the
relocation PBS polls filesystem info for both datastores and logs on every start:
read fs info on "/srv/pbs-scratch" failed - ENOENT: No such file or directory
find_mounted_device failed - ENOENT: No such file or directory
Open decision for the operator: remove the stanza, or create the directory. Not actioned here.
Deviation ② — the volume was already formatted and already mounted
Hetzner's provisioning had done both. /etc/fstab already carried:
/dev/disk/by-id/scsi-0HC_Volume_106469259 /mnt/HC_Volume_106469259 ext4 discard,nofail,defaults 0 0
Effective options rw,relatime,discard — relatime present, noatime absent, and by-id already
in use, so those two traps were clear on arrival. The filesystem was empty (lost+found only) but
carried the default 5 % reserve: 98 G size, 93 G avail.
§2 as written would have run mkfs.ext4 against a mounted filesystem and failed. Operator ruling:
reformat and repath per the runbook (the volume was provably empty), reclaiming the 5 GB and
aligning the mount path with the §6 guard.
Deviation ③ — the window was contended by a restore-test loop
ep0 showed reader tasks pulling chunks every ~10–20 minutes, each running 10–11 minutes. Root
cause was not on ep0 but on demo-felhom:
07:54:06 CEST felhom-agent restarted → scheduler started with cadence=10m0s
08:08 CEST /etc/felhom-agent/agent.json edited → restore_test_cadence_seconds = 302400 (3.5 d)
NRestarts=0 — the running process never picked up the revert
The cadence is read once at daemon start. The config was already correct on disk; only the
process was stale — the same in-memory-vs-persisted shape as the controller's report floor. The
agent was restarted (08:50:16 CEST, cadence=84h0m0s confirmed in the journal), after which the
loop stopped and the window was uncontended.
The in-flight restore-test was allowed to finish cleanly (06:44:14 → 06:58:01 OK) rather than
being aborted; §1's "do not proceed while a task is running" was held.
2. The volume (§2)
fstab line used (replacing Hetzner's; discard retained as appropriate for a Hetzner Cloud Volume):
/dev/disk/by-id/scsi-0HC_Volume_106469259 /mnt/pbs-datastore ext4 defaults,relatime,discard,nofail,x-systemd.device-timeout=30s 0 0
mkfs.ext4 -F -m 0 -L pbs-datastore — guarded by a check that the filesystem held nothing but
lost+found before unmounting.
Proof of mount and atime semantics:
$ findmnt /mnt/pbs-datastore
TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIONS
/mnt/pbs-datastore /dev/sdb ext4 rw,relatime,discard
options: rw,relatime,discard
OK: relatime present, noatime absent
df after mkfs: 98 G size, 98 G avail (was 93 G — the 5 GB root reserve reclaimed).
3. The copy (§4) — and the two failures on the way
First attempt OOM-killed at 52 %.
oom-kill: … task=rsync,pid=605913
Out of memory: Killed process 605913 (rsync) total-vm:3464728kB, anon-rss:1912224kB
ep0 has 3.7 GB RAM and no swap. A PBS .chunks/ tree pre-creates all 65536 shard
directories, so even this 13 GB store is 75,341 inodes; -H makes rsync retain the whole inode
map to detect hardlinks, and that is what exhausted memory.
-H was dropped only after proving it was unnecessary — the runbook is right that it is
unrecoverable if you guess:
$ find /srv/pbs-felhom -type f -links +1 | wc -l → 0
$ find /srv/pbs-felhom -type f -printf '%n\n' | sort -rn | head -1 → 1
A PBS chunk store contains no hardlinks — snapshots reference chunks by digest inside .didx/.fidx
index files, never by link count. A temporary 4 GB swapfile was added as insurance.
Second attempt failed silently — operator-visible process error, recorded deliberately.
/usr/bin/time -v is not installed on ep0 → exit 127, rsync never ran, and the wrapper
… | grep … || true swallowed it while printing a success-looking line. A follow-up guard then hit
the §12 trap directly — rsync --version | head -1 returns head's status, not rsync's, so a
working rsync 3.4.1 was reported as "ABORT: rsync missing". This is the fourth recorded instance
of that trap in this project. Both were fixed by capturing the command's own $? with no
pipeline in between.
Successful copy (rsync -aAX --numeric-ids --stats, trailing slash on source, no --delete,
no -H), 07:12:48 → 07:14:16 UTC, exit 0:
Number of files: 75,341 (reg: 9,785, dir: 65,556)
Number of created files: 8,697
Number of deleted files: 0
Total file size: 13,242,207,822 bytes
sent 11,803,880,151 bytes received 394,094 bytes 134,905,991.37 bytes/sec
Copy verification — all gates passed
src bytes = 13242207822 dst bytes = 13242207822
src chunks = 9748 dst chunks = 9748
demo-felhom src=2 dst=2 OK
demo-felhom-01 src=3 dst=3 OK
demo-hp src=2 dst=2 OK
total snapshots src=7 dst=7
chunks owner = backup:backup
datastore root owner = backup:backup
.lock present = -rw-r--r-- 1 backup backup 0
dry-run exit = 0
itemised lines = 0
OK: dry-run clean
4. The repoint (§5)
datastore.cfg backed up to datastore.cfg.pre-volume.bak. Exactly one line changed, asserted
programmatically to be the felhom-offsite stanza's path and no other:
5c5
< path /srv/pbs-felhom
---
> path /mnt/pbs-datastore
The datastore name is unchanged and the scratch stanza was not touched.
5. The mount guard (§6) — and a correction to the runbook's acceptance test
Drop-ins written for both services:
/etc/systemd/system/proxmox-backup.service.d/10-datastore-mount.conf
/etc/systemd/system/proxmox-backup-proxy.service.d/10-datastore-mount.conf
[Unit]
RequiresMountsFor=/mnt/pbs-datastore
The runbook's test as written proves the wrong proposition
§6 says PBS "MUST FAIL" to start with the volume unmounted. It does not — and that is correct
behaviour, not a broken guard. RequiresMountsFor is a mount-first ordering guarantee, not a
refusal: systemd pulls the mount unit in as a dependency and starts it. Observed:
07:16:10 mnt-pbs\x2ddatastore.mount: Deactivated successfully ← the test's umount
07:16:11 Mounting mnt-pbs\x2ddatastore.mount... ← systemd re-mounted it
07:16:11 Mounted mnt-pbs\x2ddatastore.mount
PBS then started with the volume correctly mounted. It never saw an unmounted path. Satisfying the dependency by mounting is stronger than refusing.
The corrected test — volume genuinely unavailable
The real hazard is not "unmounted but mountable", it is "volume gone". Simulated by pointing the fstab entry at a non-existent device and attempting a start:
$ systemctl start proxmox-backup
A dependency job for proxmox-backup.service failed.
systemctl start proxmox-backup exit code: 1
is-active: inactive
Jul 27 07:17:43 Dependency failed for proxmox-backup.service - Proxmox Backup API Server.
Jul 27 07:17:43 proxmox-backup.service: Job proxmox-backup.service/start failed with result 'dependency'.
And the bare mountpoint stayed empty — PBS wrote nothing into the root disk underneath the mount, which is the precise PRIME RISK outcome the guard exists to prevent:
$ ls -la /mnt/pbs-datastore
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 27 06:58 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 27 06:58 ..
fstab was then restored and the real volume remounted. A guard that has not been observed refusing is not a guard — this one has now been observed refusing.
Recommended amendment to the runbook: §6's acceptance test should unmount and make the device unavailable; an unmount alone will always be silently repaired by
RequiresMountsFor.
6. Bring-up and content verification (§7)
is-active: active / active
+================+====================+=========+
| name | path | comment |
+================+====================+=========+
| felhom-offsite | /mnt/pbs-datastore | |
+----------------+--------------------+---------+
| scratch | /srv/pbs-scratch | |
+================+====================+=========+
/dev/sdb 98G 13G 86G 13% /mnt/pbs-datastore
Snapshot counts, before vs after — they match exactly:
| Namespace | Phase 0 | After the move |
|---|---|---|
demo-felhom |
2 | 2 |
demo-felhom-01 |
3 | 3 |
demo-hp |
2 | 2 |
| total | 7 | 7 |
Verify job — full datastore, forced re-verification
Run with --ignore-verified false so every snapshot was re-read rather than trusting existing
verification state. This reads and digest-checks all 9,748 chunks:
verify datastore felhom-offsite
found 3 groups
…
percentage done: 100.00% (3/3 groups)
TASK OK
0 errors on every snapshot. Read throughput off the new volume ~250 MiB/s.
7. Restore round-trip (§8) — PASSED
A tier is only real once a restore round-trip is proven. The datastore moved to different physical storage, so the bar was re-cleared.
Deviation from the runbook: run on demo-felhom, not demo-hp. §8 specifies demo-hp because its
archive is smaller, but DooPlex holds no SSH key for demo-hp (ssh demo-hp →
Permission denied (publickey) — the known G1 gap). demo-felhom was used instead: same tier, same
relocated datastore, larger archive (~12 min instead of ~3). The acceptance criteria are unchanged;
only the wall-clock differs.
Triggered on demand via the agent's own harness rather than waiting for a tick (the cadence is now 3.5 days):
sudo -u felhom-agent /usr/local/bin/felhom-agent \
--config /etc/felhom-agent/agent.json \
--selftest=restore-test \
--archive "felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T12:21:48Z"
Result — 09:20:41 → 09:32:41 CEST:
{
"source_archive": "felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T12:21:48Z",
"source_tier": "pbs",
"scratch_vmid": 990000,
"pass": true,
"verified": "boot+running",
"tested_at": "2026-07-27T07:32:41Z",
"duration_seconds": 720.710414828,
"mount_parity": "ok",
"mount_inventory": [
"mp0=/var/lib/docker (200G)",
"mp1=/mnt/sys_drive (50G)",
"mp8=/mnt/felhom-drives (throwaway for the archived bind)",
"mp9=/etc/felhom-bootstrap (throwaway for the archived bind)"
]
}
=== selftest=restore-test OK (scratch 990000 restored+booted+verified+torn-down in 12m1s) ===
| Required evidence | Result |
|---|---|
source_tier |
pbs ✓ |
pass |
true ✓ |
mount_parity |
ok ✓ |
| clean teardown | ✓ — restore-test: scratch guest torn down vmid=990000, gate class=guest_destroy disposition=benign allowed=true |
Scratch band confirmed clean afterwards: no 9900xx guests, no 990000 LVs.
A full restore → boot → verify → destroy cycle succeeded against the relocated chunk store.
The pre-run recover pass reported examined=0 scratch_destroyed=0 scratch_clean=0, i.e. the
earlier interrupted test had already been reaped and did not contaminate this run.
8. The old copy is still in place (§10 rollback)
Nothing was deleted.
drwxr-xr-x 4 backup backup 4096 Jul 3 21:48 /srv/pbs-felhom
13G /srv/pbs-felhom (13,242,207,822 bytes)
old chunks: 9748
Root filesystem is back to 16 G used / 21 G avail (43 %) — unchanged from Phase 0. It peaked at 54 % during the run (retained 13 GB original + the temporary 4 GB swapfile); the swapfile has since been removed, leaving ep0 with no swap exactly as it was found.
Rollback remains a two-line config revert:
systemctl stop proxmox-backup-proxy proxmox-backup
cp -a /etc/proxmox-backup/datastore.cfg.pre-volume.bak /etc/proxmox-backup/datastore.cfg
systemctl start proxmox-backup proxmox-backup-proxy
Reclaiming the old copy is a separate operator decision (§10), gated on at least one new weekly offsite backup landing on the volume.
9. §11 — the unused storage box u629193
Finding: not referenced by any live backup path, but ep0 carries a live mount against it.
No live reference:
- no PBS datastore points at it (both stanzas are
/srv/…//mnt/pbs-datastore) - no restic repo — the live offsite target is
storage-box-pool-1(u629488), a separate project - no fstab entry, and no
known_hostspin (/root/.ssh/known_hostsholds 0 storagebox lines) - ROADMAP R-17 already closed 2026-07-22 — sub-account
u629193-sub1deleted at the console - in-repo hits are documentation plus two test fixtures only:
hub/internal/hetznerapi/fake.go(generates theu629193-sub%dpattern) andfelhom-controller/controller/internal/report/dr_recipe_test.go(string literal)
But there IS a live mount on ep0:
/etc/systemd/system/mnt-pbs\x2dstoragebox.mount enabled, active
What=u629193@u629193.your-storagebox.de:/home → /mnt/pbs-storagebox
IdentityFile=/root/.ssh/storagebox_ed25519
Options=port=23,idmap=user,uid=34,gid=34,…,StrictHostKeyChecking=yes,_netdev
Mounted now, holding spike leftovers felhom-demo/, felhom-peti-spike/, spike-sub/, .ssh/.
lsof +D shows nothing holding files open.
Before the box is deleted, disable and remove that unit, or ep0 logs a failed mount on every boot:
systemctl disable --now 'mnt-pbs\x2dstoragebox.mount'
rm /etc/systemd/system/'mnt-pbs\x2dstoragebox.mount'
systemctl daemon-reload
rm -f /root/.ssh/storagebox_ed25519 /root/.ssh/storagebox_ed25519.pub # access key, regenerable
The deletion itself is the operator's console click — not performed here.
10. Deferred / open
scratchdatastore stanza points at a non-existent path and now logs ENOENT on every PBS start. Remove the stanza or create the directory — operator decision.- Old copy at
/srv/pbs-felhomretained (13 GB). Reclaim only after a new weekly offsite backup lands on the volume, with explicit go-ahead (§10.1). - GC has still not been run. The round-trip has now passed, so §10.2 is unblocked — but GC is the one operation that deletes, and it is deliberately left for a separate, deliberate run. No GC schedule is configured on this PBS at all, which is worth its own decision.
- ep0 has no swap (removed the temporary 4 GB file; the box is as found). A 3.7 GB box with zero swap is what turned a routine 13 GB copy into an OOM kill. Worth considering a small permanent swapfile — not done here, as it is outside this runbook's scope.
Hub PBS-DR capacity gauge (§10.3) not yet re-read.CLOSED — verified correct 2026-07-27 via the hub operator UI (Offsite → PBS DR):felhom-offsite (ep0)— capacity 97.9 GB, used 12.6 GB, 13 % full, polled 12 min prior. The gauge follows the datastore's configured path, so the relocation required no hub-side change. §10.3's "if it still shows the old size that is a real bug" does not apply — there is no bug. (It could not be queried from DooPlex directly — the hub is a ClusterIP service — so this was read from the operator UI.)x-systemd.device-timeout=30smeans a genuinely missing volume delays boot by 30 s beforenofaillets boot continue. Accepted trade-off.
11. Observations
- The atime note in §4 holds: the copy gave every chunk a fresh access time. This is safe in the conservative direction — GC only reclaims chunks whose atime predates the cutoff, so fresh times mean nothing is reclaimed early. Not a problem; do not "fix" it.
-m 0mattered more than it looks: 5 GB withheld on a 100 GB volume is 5 % of the headroom this whole exercise was about.- The relocation does not change the per-tenant-encryption growth story. The volume buys headroom (13 GB / 98 GB = 13 %, vs 13 GB / 37 GB = 35 %); it does not introduce cross-customer dedup, which per-tenant encryption still precludes.