Files
felhom.eu/hub/internal/store/host_delete_test.go
T
admin c484aa204e hub: R-39 core — stamp a secret GENERATION into the pbs_dr descriptor
The fleet half of R-39. An ep0 credential re-issue re-keys the SECRET of an existing
token, so token_id, fingerprint, datastore and namespace all come back byte-identical.
The agent re-applies on the descriptor's CONTENT HASH, so a re-issue was invisible to a
converged box: it short-circuited, never consumed the fresh secret, and served a revoked
credential while reporting `applied` — the N100 failure of 2026-07-18.

host_pbs_secrets gains a monotonic per-host `generation`, advanced by every fresh MINT and
by nothing else, stamped into the descriptor as `secret_generation`. That is now the only
field a re-key moves, and it is what re-arms the agent.

DEVIATION FROM SPEC, deliberate: the brief said to return "the new row's id (int64) …
no schema change". There is no row id — host_pbs_secrets is keyed by host_id and UPSERTed
last-write-wins, so a new row never exists, and created_at collides for two mints in the
same second. An additive counter column is the only monotonic source; it uses the repo's
existing idempotent ALTER-TABLE idiom.

RestageHostPBSSecret deliberately does NOT advance it: a re-stage re-arms the SAME secret,
the descriptor content genuinely has not changed, and a bump would cause a pointless agent
refetch loop (that method's own contract says so).

Also corrects a comment that asserted the re-issue refreshes the descriptor "with the NEW
token_id/fingerprint". That is false for a re-key, and believing it is why the descriptor
was never expected to be identical in the first place.

omitempty is load-bearing: a zero generation must not start emitting a new key into every
pre-existing descriptor, which would itself be a fleet-wide spurious re-apply.

Compatibility: agents below 0.91.0 drop the unknown JSON key and behave exactly as today —
inert, not breaking (Scenario C).

Tests: store-level monotonicity + per-host isolation + restage-leaves-it-alone; descriptor
byte-change, omitempty, and sibling-key round-trip; and a FLOW-level test driving
ReissuePBSDR against a fake that models a real re-key. Red-proof run at the assertion
level (not the compiler): commenting out the stamp makes the flow test fail with both
byte-identical blocks printed.
2026-07-21 09:52:04 +02:00

284 lines
11 KiB
Go

package store
// Group C (hub v0.47.0 stale host removal) — DeleteHost cascade + CountHostArtifacts.
// Effect assertions throughout: rows counted per table before/after; refusals prove the
// NON-effect (zero deletions), never just "an error came back".
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
)
// seedHostWithArtifacts creates a host plus one row in EVERY host-scoped table, and one
// CUSTOMER-scoped log bundle (the controller channel) that must survive a host delete.
func seedHostWithArtifacts(t *testing.T, s *Store, hostID, customerID string) {
t.Helper()
if err := s.UpsertHost(&Host{HostID: hostID, CustomerID: customerID, APIKey: "key-" + hostID}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, g := range []int{100, 101} {
if err := s.UpsertGuestFromReport(&Guest{GuestID: GuestID(hostID, g), CustomerID: customerID,
HostID: hostID, VMID: g, Status: "stopped"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// One host_reports row via raw insert — SaveHostReport would set hosts.last_report_at
// (→ online), and the fixture host must stay never-reported for the handler tests.
if _, err := s.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO host_reports (host_id, customer_id, report_json) VALUES (?, ?, '{}')`,
hostID, customerID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.EnqueueSignedJob(hostID, "job-1", []byte("opaque")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.SaveHostRecoveryCredential(hostID, "root@pam", "recovery-secret"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := s.SaveHostPBSSecret(hostID, "pbs-secret"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Agent-scoped log bundle (scope_id = host_id) + a pending request. Order matters:
// SaveLogBundle CONSUMES the matching pending request, so the request is re-issued
// after the bundle lands to leave one row in each table.
if _, err := s.SaveLogBundle(hostID, LogBundleComponentAgent, time.Now(), []string{"line"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.RequestLogBundle(hostID, LogBundleComponentAgent); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Customer-scoped log bundle (controller channel) — must be UNTOUCHED by a host delete.
if _, err := s.SaveLogBundle(customerID, LogBundleComponentController, time.Now(), []string{"ctl line"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Bound wg peer (raw insert — no endpoint needed for the cascade test; assigned_ip is
// TEXT with a UNIQUE constraint, so any distinct value serves).
if _, err := s.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO wg_peers (pubkey, assigned_ip, host_id, note) VALUES (?, ?, ?, '')`,
"PK-"+hostID, "ip-"+hostID, hostID); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := s.SaveHostEscrow(hostID, []byte("opaque-escrow"), "fp", "posture", "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func countRows(t *testing.T, s *Store, query string, arg string) int {
t.Helper()
var n int
if err := s.db.QueryRow(query, arg).Scan(&n); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("count %q: %v", query, err)
}
return n
}
// hostRowCounts snapshots every table the cascade touches, keyed for exact comparison.
func hostRowCounts(t *testing.T, s *Store, hostID string) map[string]int {
t.Helper()
return map[string]int{
"hosts": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hosts WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"guests": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM guests WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"host_reports": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_reports WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"signed_jobs": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM signed_jobs WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"host_recovery": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_recovery WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"host_pbs_secrets": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_pbs_secrets WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"log_bundle_requests": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM log_bundle_requests WHERE scope_id = ?`, hostID),
"log_bundles": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM log_bundles WHERE scope_id = ?`, hostID),
"wg_peers": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM wg_peers WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
"host_escrow": countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_escrow WHERE host_id = ?`, hostID),
}
}
func TestDeleteHost_CascadeAndIsolation(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "dr-drill-host", "cust-a")
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "other-host", "cust-b") // must be fully intact afterwards
before := hostRowCounts(t, s, "dr-drill-host")
for table, n := range before {
if n == 0 {
t.Fatalf("fixture gap: %s has no row for dr-drill-host", table)
}
}
otherBefore := hostRowCounts(t, s, "other-host")
if err := s.DeleteHost("dr-drill-host", true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost: %v", err)
}
// Every host-scoped row is gone.
for table, n := range hostRowCounts(t, s, "dr-drill-host") {
if n != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s: %d row(s) survived the cascade", table, n)
}
}
// The unrelated host's rows are EXACTLY intact.
otherAfter := hostRowCounts(t, s, "other-host")
for table, n := range otherBefore {
if otherAfter[table] != n {
t.Errorf("unrelated host %s: %d → %d rows (must be untouched)", table, n, otherAfter[table])
}
}
// Customer-scoped log bundles (controller channel) are UNTOUCHED — only scope_id ==
// host_id rows die. RED-PROOF 5: widening the delete to all scopes fails this.
if n := countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM log_bundles WHERE scope_id = ?`, "cust-a"); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("customer-scoped log bundle count = %d, want 1 (must survive a host delete)", n)
}
}
// Escrow refusal is fail-safe: the typed error comes back and the transaction NEVER ran —
// zero rows deleted anywhere. RED-PROOF 2 (handler-side) models on the same store guard.
func TestDeleteHost_EscrowRefusalIsNonEffect(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "escrow-host", "cust-c")
before := hostRowCounts(t, s, "escrow-host")
err := s.DeleteHost("escrow-host", false)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrHostEscrowPresent) {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost without escrow ack = %v, want ErrHostEscrowPresent", err)
}
after := hostRowCounts(t, s, "escrow-host")
for table, n := range before {
if after[table] != n {
t.Errorf("refusal deleted from %s: %d → %d (must be a non-effect)", table, n, after[table])
}
}
}
// Without an escrow row, deleteEscrow=false succeeds; with one, deleteEscrow=true removes it.
func TestDeleteHost_EscrowFlagSemantics(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
// No escrow → plain delete works without the ack.
if err := s.UpsertHost(&Host{HostID: "plain", CustomerID: "c", APIKey: "k"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.DeleteHost("plain", false); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost without escrow: %v", err)
}
if n := countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hosts WHERE host_id = ?`, "plain"); n != 0 {
t.Error("plain host not deleted")
}
// Escrow + ack → escrow row removed with the host.
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "ack-host", "cust-d")
if err := s.DeleteHost("ack-host", true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost with ack: %v", err)
}
if n := countRows(t, s, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM host_escrow WHERE host_id = ?`, "ack-host"); n != 0 {
t.Error("escrow row survived deleteEscrow=true")
}
// Empty host id → refused before touching anything.
if err := s.DeleteHost("", true); err == nil {
t.Error("DeleteHost(\"\") must be refused")
}
}
// v0.53.0 F-14 provenance — the deletion record is written IN the delete tx, with
// escrow_acked reflecting an ACTUAL acknowledged destruction (ack over a present escrow).
// RED-PROOF (Part 1): dropping the provenance INSERT from DeleteHost fails the acked case
// (LatestHostDeletion returns nil — the gate finds nothing).
func TestDeleteHost_ProvenanceRecord(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
// Escrow-ack delete → record with escrow_acked = true.
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "prov-acked", "cust-f14")
if err := s.DeleteHost("prov-acked", true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost: %v", err)
}
rec, err := s.LatestHostDeletion("cust-f14")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LatestHostDeletion: %v", err)
}
if rec == nil {
t.Fatal("no deletion record written by the escrow-ack delete")
}
if rec.HostID != "prov-acked" || rec.CustomerID != "cust-f14" || !rec.EscrowAcked {
t.Errorf("record = %+v, want host=prov-acked customer=cust-f14 escrow_acked=true", rec)
}
if rec.DeletedAt.IsZero() {
t.Error("deleted_at not populated")
}
// Delete WITHOUT escrow (none present) → record exists but escrow_acked = false, even
// though deleteEscrow=true was passed: ticking the box over NOTHING is not an
// acknowledged destruction.
if err := s.UpsertHost(&Host{HostID: "prov-noescrow", CustomerID: "cust-noesc", APIKey: "k"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.DeleteHost("prov-noescrow", true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeleteHost: %v", err)
}
rec, err = s.LatestHostDeletion("cust-noesc")
if err != nil || rec == nil {
t.Fatalf("LatestHostDeletion = %+v, %v; want a record", rec, err)
}
if rec.EscrowAcked {
t.Error("escrow_acked = true for a host with NO escrow row — vacuous ack must record false")
}
// The refused delete (escrow present, no ack) writes NOTHING — the tx never ran.
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "prov-refused", "cust-refused")
if err := s.DeleteHost("prov-refused", false); !errors.Is(err, ErrHostEscrowPresent) {
t.Fatalf("expected escrow refusal, got %v", err)
}
if rec, _ := s.LatestHostDeletion("cust-refused"); rec != nil {
t.Errorf("refused delete wrote a provenance record: %+v", rec)
}
// Customer with no deletions ever → nil, nil (the pre-v0.53.0 shape — manual path).
if rec, err := s.LatestHostDeletion("cust-never"); err != nil || rec != nil {
t.Errorf("LatestHostDeletion(no deletions) = %+v, %v; want nil, nil", rec, err)
}
}
// The gate reads the MOST RECENT record: an old acked deletion must not whitelist a newer
// un-acked one (the F-14 law is about the deletion that orphaned the CURRENT tenancy).
func TestLatestHostDeletion_NewestWins(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "gen1-host", "cust-seq")
if err := s.DeleteHost("gen1-host", true); err != nil { // acked
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.UpsertHost(&Host{HostID: "gen2-host", CustomerID: "cust-seq", APIKey: "k2"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := s.DeleteHost("gen2-host", false); err != nil { // no escrow → un-acked record
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec, err := s.LatestHostDeletion("cust-seq")
if err != nil || rec == nil {
t.Fatalf("LatestHostDeletion = %+v, %v", rec, err)
}
if rec.HostID != "gen2-host" || rec.EscrowAcked {
t.Errorf("latest record = %+v, want the NEWER un-acked gen2-host row", rec)
}
}
func TestCountHostArtifacts(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
seedHostWithArtifacts(t, s, "impact-host", "cust-e")
a, err := s.CountHostArtifacts("impact-host")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CountHostArtifacts: %v", err)
}
if a.Guests != 2 || a.Reports != 1 || a.LogBundles != 1 {
t.Errorf("counts = %+v, want guests=2 reports=1 log_bundles=1", a)
}
if !a.EscrowPresent || !a.WGPeerBound || !a.PBSSecretPresent || !a.RecoveryPresent {
t.Errorf("presence flags = %+v, want all true", a)
}
// The customer-scoped bundle must NOT be counted (host scope only).
empty, err := s.CountHostArtifacts("no-such-host")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CountHostArtifacts(empty): %v", err)
}
if empty != (HostArtifacts{}) {
t.Errorf("unknown host artifacts = %+v, want zero value", empty)
}
}