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felhom.eu/documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-3-2026-07-11.md
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admin f97f7803c7 CAMPAIGN-3: morning RCA — host loss = F12 CRITICAL automount ordering cycle (hardware exonerated); box recovered to defined state
journalctl proved boot -1 came up at 23:31 WITHOUT networking: the agent automount
template's After/Wants=network-online.target cycles with local-fs.target and systemd
deleted networking.service to break it; the 06:45 power-cycle boot hit the same cycle
and deleted the automount instead. Every boot with an enrolled share is a coin flip
until the template drops that ordering. Recovery executed: automount started, apps
healed, privatebin removed via real flow, verification backup green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CDMFpFx84pfviCTVuGGhf
2026-07-12 06:55:40 +02:00

14 KiB
Raw Blame History

CAMPAIGN-3 — unattended "no mercy" night run (NAS · deploy · backup · chaos · observability)

  • When: 2026-07-11 22:09 → 2026-07-12 HH:MM CEST (launch seed 2868120970, 8h budget, wrap early — see host incident)
  • Stack under fire: controller v0.117.0 · agent v0.84.0 · demo guest 9201 on felhom-pve · DooPlex NAS (exports only) · hub untouched
  • Contract honored: zero operator questions; continue-on-failure; no hub/PBS/Gitea mutations; DooPlex services never stopped (exportfs on felhom paths + campaign temps only); no code fixes — findings only.
  • Run architecture (recorded judgment): campaign driven by the CC session with harness/ledger/evidence at 180:~/campaign3/ (180 has no root SSH to pve; evidence spans 180-API + pve-host + guest vantage points). Phase 5 sampler + Phase 6 endurance ran detached on 180.

Verdict

The data plane is solid; the reboot/recovery plane is not. Refusal categories, verify-before-commit, rollback, single-flight, orphan handling, deploy-view truth, backup/restore round-trips and EIO-fast-fail all behaved. What failed is everything around NFS automount units and their re-arming: four independent CRITICAL/HIGH findings (F12/F10/F11/F9) mean a host reboot is a coin flip between losing networking and losing the NAS (F12), and any NAS hiccup or guest reboot with an idle share strands all NAS apps until a human intervenes — the exact gap the v0.84.0 ReassertNetworkMounts feature was meant to close. Plus one HIGH backup-integrity finding (F7). The overnight host loss was F12 in action — hardware exonerated by RCA.

Ledger (final): 31 PASS · 17 FAIL · 12 FINDING · 1 DISCREPANCY · 11 INFO (FAILs include endurance-loop iterations that honestly fired during reboot/outage/host-down windows).

Top findings (ranked — these become the next specs)

# Sev Finding Exact repro
F12 CRITICAL Agent network-storage automount unit orders After=+Wants=network-online.target → boot ordering cycle with local-fs.target; systemd deletes an arbitrary job to break it — one boot lost networking entirely (host dark 7 h), the next boot lost the automount (NAS dead). Every boot with an enrolled share is a coin flip. Fix: remove network-online ordering from the automount (_netdev on the .mount suffices). reboot a host with any enrolled network share; journalctl -b | grep "ordering cycle"
F10 CRITICAL mount-start-limit-hit on a NAS automount is never re-armed by any platform path: agent-restart sweep no-op (F9), guest-reboot hook no-op, and the pre-start hook once blocked guest start entirely (rc255 while the limit was live → guest DOWN). All 4 NAS apps dead until manual systemctl reset-failed. unexport share on NAS; wait 60s idle-timeout; access path 5×; pct reboot within the limit window
F11 HIGH Guest reboot with an idle (armed-not-mounted) share: the autofs trigger does not propagate into the new container namespace. The post-start reassert detects it and logs a WARNING ("share NOT visible in guest after reassert (skip-active)") but does not remediate — the skip-active branch is the bug. Manual systemctl restart <automount> heals instantly. Every reboot with idle share = 4 NAS apps dead-at-boot (couples with fix-3: no alerting). Reproduced on reboots #2, #3, #4. pct reboot 9201 while nas-media idle; watch hook WARNING + docker ps
F7 HIGH Volume dumps are written in place, no tmp+rename: a mid-backup NAS cut left a 0-byte calibre tar replacing the last good 247M dump. Until the next successful run, the only "restore point" restores an empty volume (tier-1 restore is replace-semantics). Run-level success:false is the only signal; the artifact damage itself is silent. Next run self-heals. POST /api/backup/run; exportfs -u the backup-target share at T+6s; inspect volume-dumps/*.tar
F9 HIGH Agent-restart startup sweep produced zero reassert log lines and left the automount failed/disarmed — likely checks unit enablement, not runtime state. get F10 state; systemctl restart felhom-agent; grep journal
F8 MED Storage health stays idle + reachable:true through an export outage (probe is server-level, not export-level) — even across a reboot with NFS down the share badge shows benign "Készenlét" while stacks/dashboard show stub warnings. Spec expected unreachable; got neither silent nor correct: contradictory UI. exportfs -u while idle; poll /api/storage/netstorage 5 min
F6 LOW Volume-only apps (no HDD_PATH) back up to sys_drive with drive_label:"" (blank in UI) and get no tier-2 secondary — single-copy exposure. GET /api/backup/snapshots?stack=actualbudget
F4 LOW mapped_uid out of range (101000) passes controller validation, fails only at agent → generic agent_error with raw detail instead of a friendly 400. add with mapped_uid:101000
F5 LOW backups/primary/ retains stale dirs for apps since redeployed to another drive (invisible in snapshot list, disk residue). redeploy app to other drive; inspect old drive
F2 LOW Failed-add rollback removes unit files but leaves systemd runtime units in failed state (no reset-failed) + leftover mountpoint dirs. any refused add past reachability
F1 LOW netstorage/remove leaves the empty mountpoint dir on host+guest (stub-shaped residue; 10 accumulated during P1). add+remove any share
F3 DISCREPANCY Spec expected not_network_fs for a no-all_squash export; actual = not_writable (×2, deterministic, message even hints all_squash). Correct-by-design: not_network_fs is the deploy/stub-time branch — which WAS live-validated via the organic stub (below).

Host incident — RCA CLOSED 2026-07-12 06:48 (= finding F12, CRITICAL). felhom-pve was unreachable from the 4e reboot (23:30) until the operator power-cycled it at 06:45. journalctl --list-boots proved the box booted fine at 23:31:04 and ran all night — with no network: the agent's automount unit template (After= + Wants=network-online.target on the automount unit, which is implicitly Before=local-fs.target) creates the boot ordering cycle networking → local-fs → nas-media.automount → network-online → networking. systemd breaks such a cycle by deleting an arbitrary job in it: boot -1 deleted networking.service (host up, no network, 7 h); boot 0 after the power cycle hit the same cycle and deleted the automount instead (network up, NAS dead — recovered manually). Every boot of a host with an enrolled network share is a coin flip. Hardware exonerated; the power cycle fixed nothing but the dice. Fix for the spec: drop the network-online ordering from the automount unit — _netdev on the .mount already delays the actual mount until the network is up; the trigger needs nothing. (Interim host-side mitigation if needed before the agent fix: a systemd drop-in removing the ordering on the installed automount units.) The 4e boot-ordering proof therefore ran and caught exactly what it was designed to catch.

What passed (the good news)

  • NAS add/remove lifecycle (~19 ops): happy NFS routeA-style 2.6s / prod-style 2.5s / SMB 2.5s; all 5 refusal categories ×2 with correct category + Hungarian copy in 25s (retry=0 holds everywhere); single-flight = exactly one 409; SMB password lands in a root-only credentials= file and is gone after remove; registry consistent after every cycle.
  • Ring reconstruction (S7): every add fully reconstructable — phase transitions, capability gate: netstorage_verify=yes (source=version), probe verdict, timings.
  • Orphan flow: controller restart mid-add → Árva megosztás row surfaced → removed via the real action → clean.
  • Deploy wave: radarr/jellyfin/navidrome onto nas-media + seerr/actualbudget (volume-only) + privatebin; all running; deploy-view truth holds for HDD apps (selected option == stored path; volume-only apps have no HDD_PATH field — N/A recorded, not a bug).
  • *Hardlink (arr pattern) works on NFSv4.1 (links=2, correct uid mapping) — the Synology-era caveat does not apply to the DooPlex export.
  • Backup/restore: tier-1 31s / tier-2 5s / offsite restic cycle ~30s clean (quota 129.7MB/50GB); restore round-trips byte-identical on calibre-web (53 files, deleted+corrupted recovered, 25s) and actualbudget; tier-1 restore = replace-semantics (defined; tier-2 is the additive path).
  • EIO behavior under outage: active read fails same-second (soft,timeo=50,retrans=2), D-count=0, containers survive, re-export recovers without remount; mid-backup cut fails clean in 14s, no hang.
  • Stub machinery: the organic stub (outage→idle-timeout→access) fires the distinct stub badge (4 apps) AND the deploy-time 409 with the exact Hungarian refusal. The branch is now live-validated.
  • Concurrency spice: deploy-during-add, backup race (200/409), rapid add/remove ×5, remove-during-backup — all clean.

Backup-vs-NAS policy discovery (docs finding, not pass/fail)

  1. Tier-1 backs up volumes + config only; NAS-hosted HDD userdata (the 2.8G media tree) is excluded by design (jellyfin backup = 560K).
  2. NAS apps' tier-1 artifacts land on the NAS itself (nas-media/backups/primary/) — tier-2 then copies them cross-drive to felhom-usb, which is what gets them off-NAS. During a NAS outage both tier-1 (target) and the app data are on the dead device.
  3. Volume-only apps → sys_drive/felhom-data/backups/primary/, blank drive label, no tier-2 copy (F6).
  4. Outage during backup: clean failure, plus F7's truncation window.

Fix-6 ring numbers (wrap horizon, measured)

  • Idle: controller ring at 1000-cap with ~55 min horizon (21:20→22:15).
  • Under campaign load: ~2.6 entries/s → cap horizon ≈ 6.5 min (23:04→23:08 = 618 entries). A refused flow older than ~6 min under load is already unreconstructable.
  • Restart/reboot loss: controller restart at 22:26 wiped the ring (the interrupted orphan-add's trace was gone); both rings died on every reboot (in-memory, expected) — post-incident operators lose exactly the window that matters. The viewer's total field tracked entries correctly in all samples (no 1067/1000-style overshoot reproduced; the counter reads clean).
  • Verdict for fix-6: the 1000-entry cap is too small under load and ring persistence across restart is the real gap.

Timings table

Operation Measured
happy add (NFS/SMB) 2.52.6 s
refusals (all categories) 25 s
EIO after unexport (active read) same second
backup fail-clean after cut 14 s
deploy → running 2560 s
tier-1 / tier-2 / offsite run 31 s / 5 s / 30 s
restore round-trip 25 s
boot→all-healthy never zero-touch with idle NAS share (F11); manual heal ~1 min

Deviations & judgment calls (all ledgered)

  • Reboots #2/#3 spaced 56 min instead of 15 (fast phase pace; state verified settled between). #4 and host reboot properly spaced.
  • Endurance-loop injections limited to campaign exports (not felhom-data) to keep the unattended loop from re-tripping F10 with no pve-side healer.
  • App-level API records skipped for seerr/actualbudget (interactive auth setup — not trivial per spec).
  • ?raw=1 on the debug ring does not exist (it belongs to per-app container logs); JSON /api/debug/logs used instead.
  • One offsite cycle run (of ≤2 allowed); second budget unused.
  • No midnight operator push about the host (expendable demo box, Peti unaffected); this report is the notification.

Box state at wrap (final, 2026-07-12 06:53)

  • felhom-pve: RECOVERED — operator power-cycled 06:45; RCA = F12 ordering cycle (above), hardware exonerated. Automount manually started (boot 0's cycle-break had deleted its job), all apps healed.
  • Guest 9201: defined state reached — 6 wave apps (radarr/jellyfin/navidrome on nas-media, seerr/actualbudget volumes, calibre-web) deployed + healthy with their data; privatebin (campaign temp) stop+removed via the real flow; verification backup run success:true (25 s); nas-media ok+mounted; stub badge 0; deployed-not-running: none.
  • Until F12 is fixed, every reboot of this host is the coin flip — next boot may come up without network again (interim: systemd drop-in, or fix the agent template).
  • DooPlex/NAS: fully restored — /etc/exports and smb.conf restored from .bak-campaign3, md5 == baseline (3 exports); campaign SMB user/share/creds/dirs removed; felhom-data export live; all customer/homelab services untouched throughout (exportfs-only rail held).
  • Guest 9201 (as last seen, 23:33, pre-host-reboot): 11 containers healthy — controller 0.117.0, calibre-web/radarr/jellyfin/navidrome (nas-media), seerr/actualbudget (volumes), privatebin (campaign temp — removal via the real flow was pre-empted by the host loss; remove after recovery), filebrowser + infra. Dummy media data (2.8G) + backups intact on the NAS.
  • Hub: untouched all night (reports were flowing until host loss; row will show the host offline — correct).

Morning recovery (EXECUTED 06:4806:53)

  1. ✔ Operator power-cycled; RCA established from journalctl -b -1 (F12 ordering cycle; boot -1 sacrificed networking.service, boot 0 sacrificed the automount).
  2. ✔ Automount started, NAS apps + all others healthy (11 containers).
  3. ✔ privatebin stopped + removed via the real flow (remove_hdd_data + remove_backups).
  4. ✔ Verified: stub 0, nas-media ok, deployed-not-running none, verification backup success:true.

Evidence

180:~/campaign3/ledger.tsv (66+ entries), master.log (every API call), evidence/ (per-scenario ring+shares+stacks snapshots), ring-samples.log. Guest-side manifests at 9201:/root/c3/. No secrets in any committed artifact; campaign SMB cred stored only on 180 and deleted at wrap.