b6d537d86c
Four small items, each a case where the hub already knew something and said
nothing. Green: build, vet, tests all pass.
(a) Self-bind link is minted automatically at customer creation AND at RESET
completion (R-36 sub-item). The console banner tells the customer to open
"az e-mailben kapott link"; until now that email existed only once the
operator remembered the button, so the banner could point at something that
did not exist — during the 2026-07-18 rehearsal the box waited ~11.7 min on
exactly that. handleSelfBindLinkSend's body was extracted into a shared
mintAndSendSelfBindLink core so the button and the auto-mint callers cannot
drift apart on the honesty rules: F1 (no address -> mint nothing) and F2
(send failed -> delete the token, never leave it live). The wrapper NEVER
fails the operation it rides on — a create that provisioned Cloudflare,
offsite and PBS must not 500 over a courtesy email.
Gap found and closed while wiring it: PurgeCustomerResetDBState does NOT
clear selfbind_tokens, so a link minted BEFORE a reset would have stayed
live across it. A successful mint already replaces it (delete-then-insert,
single-active); the skip paths would not have, so they now clear stale
tokens too. Invariant: after auto-mint runs the only live link is one it
just issued, or none.
(b) Post-RESET staleness banner (R-37). When a RESET COMPLETED after the newest
report, every health figure on the page describes a lifecycle that no longer
exists, and the page kept showing pre-RESET warnings as current. Narrow on
purpose: an in-flight reset does not trigger it, and it clears itself when a
report arrives. Ties resolve to STALE — SQLite timestamps are second-
resolution and a same-second report almost certainly predates the reset;
erring the other way would hide the banner exactly when it matters.
(c) Unprovisioned-offsite warning (R-36 interim). enabled==true with type=="" is
a real, stable, silent state: provisioning is Save-triggered and the
re-enroll auto-re-issue deliberately skips an unprovisioned target, so
nothing self-heals it. Reuses the exact predicate the offsite re-issue
handler already refuses on.
(d) pbsdr_reissued rendered an EMPTY flash box — the key had no template branch,
so re-issuing PBS credentials showed a success box with no words (observed
live 2026-07-18). Now describes what was staged plus the R-39 caveat:
confirm `pvesm status` shows the entry active, because a converged agent can
report `applied` while the storage still 401s.
New .flash-warn (amber, --warn tokens) for the deviation tier between success
and error — exception-color principle: only on deviation, never on a healthy
page.
Tests assert each banner is ABSENT in the nominal cases as well as present in
the deviating one — a banner that always renders is worse than none. Both
red-proofed: deleting the pbsdr_reissued branch reproduces the original empty
box; neutering the staleness predicate fails the banner assertion. New
read-only store accessor CountSelfBindTokens makes the single-active invariant
assertable.
NOT in this train: the R-39 hub-side generation-bump fix the pre-travel task
made conditional. Its condition was REFUTED (SetHostDesired bumps
unconditionally; applyPBSDR is idempotent as documented) — the real mechanism is
the agent's descriptor-hash convergence and needs its own spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE
183 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
183 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"database/sql"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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)
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// selfbind.go — the customer self-bind capability-token store (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1).
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//
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// The operator mints one token per customer and the hub emails a 7-day tokenized capability link.
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// The customer opens it (public, no login — the token IS the capability), enters the box's console
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// pairing code + their retrieval passphrase, and the hub stages the bind. Only sha256(token) is
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// stored here (never the token); attempts lock at 5 (Viktor's ruling: "call support"); consumed_at
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// is the one-shot flip. There is NO appliance data on this table — the two-factor check happens at
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// bind time in web/selfbind.go, so a leaked token row reveals nothing about any box.
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//
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// Custody rules honoured here: single-active per customer (a re-mint deletes the prior row, so an old
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// link dies the moment a new one is sent), and the token hash is the only representation at rest.
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// SelfBindMaxAttempts is the lockout threshold: the 5th failed factor-check locks the token and the
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// customer is told to call support. Distinct from the controller's claim lockout — this is the
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// hub-side public-surface guard against online guessing of the pairing code + passphrase.
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const SelfBindMaxAttempts = 5
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// SelfBindToken is a minted capability link's state.
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type SelfBindToken struct {
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ID int64
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CustomerID string
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Attempts int
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Locked bool
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CreatedAt time.Time
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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EmailedAt *time.Time
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ConsumedAt *time.Time
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}
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// Expired reports whether the link is past its TTL (falls back to operator-bind, unchanged).
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func (t *SelfBindToken) Expired(now time.Time) bool { return now.After(t.ExpiresAt) }
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// Consumed reports whether the link was already used (one-shot).
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func (t *SelfBindToken) Consumed() bool { return t.ConsumedAt != nil }
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// Usable reports whether a POST may attempt a factor-check: not locked, not consumed, not expired.
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func (t *SelfBindToken) Usable(now time.Time) bool {
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return !t.Locked && !t.Consumed() && !t.Expired(now)
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}
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const selfBindCols = `id, customer_id, attempts, locked, created_at, expires_at, emailed_at, consumed_at`
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func scanSelfBindToken(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*SelfBindToken, error) {
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var t SelfBindToken
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var locked int
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var createdAt, expiresAt string
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var emailedAt, consumedAt sql.NullString
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if err := sc.Scan(&t.ID, &t.CustomerID, &t.Attempts, &locked, &createdAt, &expiresAt, &emailedAt, &consumedAt); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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t.Locked = locked != 0
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t.CreatedAt = parseSQLiteTime(createdAt)
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t.ExpiresAt = parseSQLiteTime(expiresAt)
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if emailedAt.Valid && emailedAt.String != "" {
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e := parseSQLiteTime(emailedAt.String)
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t.EmailedAt = &e
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}
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if consumedAt.Valid && consumedAt.String != "" {
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c := parseSQLiteTime(consumedAt.String)
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t.ConsumedAt = &c
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}
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return &t, nil
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}
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// MintSelfBindToken creates a fresh capability token for the customer, single-active: any prior token
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// for the same customer is DELETED in the same transaction, so an earlier link stops working the
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// instant a new one is minted (no parallel-link enumeration). tokenHash is sha256(token) — the
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// plaintext token exists only inside the email send. The token is valid for ttl from now.
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func (s *Store) MintSelfBindToken(customerID, tokenHash string, ttl time.Duration) error {
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if customerID == "" || tokenHash == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("selfbind: customer_id and token hash are required")
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}
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tx, err := s.db.Begin()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer tx.Rollback()
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if _, err := tx.Exec(`DELETE FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id = ?`, customerID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
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if _, err := tx.Exec(`INSERT INTO selfbind_tokens (customer_id, token_hash, expires_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?)`, customerID, tokenHash, expiresAt); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return tx.Commit()
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}
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// DeleteSelfBindTokens removes every self-bind token for a customer. Used on the email-failure path
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// (F2): a minted token whose delivery failed is not left silently live — the plaintext link is gone
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// from memory, so the row is unusable dead weight; deleting it keeps the operator page honest (no
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// stale "active link" with no delivery). Idempotent.
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func (s *Store) DeleteSelfBindTokens(customerID string) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id = ?`, customerID)
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return err
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}
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// CountSelfBindTokens reports how many capability tokens exist for a customer (v0.67.0). Minting is
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// single-active (delete-then-insert), so this is 0 or 1 in practice; it exists so callers can assert
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// the "after this runs, the only live link is one we just issued — or none" invariant that the
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// auto-mint at customer-create / RESET-completion depends on. Read-only, no oracle risk: it is keyed
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// by customer id, which the operator already knows.
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func (s *Store) CountSelfBindTokens(customerID string) (int, error) {
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var n int
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err := s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id = ?`, customerID).Scan(&n)
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return n, err
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}
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// SelfBindTokenByHash resolves sha256(token) to its row, or (nil, nil) when unknown — the public GET
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// maps that to the same generic "invalid link" as an expired one: no oracle for "was this ever real".
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func (s *Store) SelfBindTokenByHash(tokenHash string) (*SelfBindToken, error) {
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if tokenHash == "" {
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return nil, nil
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}
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t, err := scanSelfBindToken(s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT `+selfBindCols+` FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash))
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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return nil, nil
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}
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return t, err
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}
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// MarkSelfBindEmailed records that the capability link was delivered (operator "emailed_at" honesty
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// on the customer page). Best-effort: a failure to record does not un-send the mail.
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func (s *Store) MarkSelfBindEmailed(tokenHash string) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens SET emailed_at = datetime('now') WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash)
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return err
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}
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// RecordSelfBindAttempt increments the failed-attempt counter for a token and locks it at the 5th
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// failure. Called on EVERY failed factor-check (wrong code OR wrong passphrase — indistinguishable).
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// Returns the post-increment attempt count and whether the token is now locked. A missing/consumed
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// token is a no-op that reports locked=true (the caller already refuses those; belt-and-suspenders).
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func (s *Store) RecordSelfBindAttempt(tokenHash string) (attempts int, locked bool, err error) {
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tx, err := s.db.Begin()
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if err != nil {
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return 0, false, err
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}
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defer tx.Rollback()
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t, err := scanSelfBindToken(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+selfBindCols+` FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash))
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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return SelfBindMaxAttempts, true, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return 0, false, err
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}
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attempts = t.Attempts + 1
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locked = attempts >= SelfBindMaxAttempts
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lockedInt := 0
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if locked {
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lockedInt = 1
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}
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if _, err := tx.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens SET attempts = ?, locked = ? WHERE id = ?`, attempts, lockedInt, t.ID); err != nil {
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return 0, false, err
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
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return 0, false, err
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}
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return attempts, locked, nil
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}
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// ConsumeSelfBindToken flips consumed_at EXACTLY ONCE on a successful bind. ok=true for the single
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// winning caller; ok=false for a replay or a lost race (already consumed). The two-factor check has
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// already passed when this is called — this is the one-shot gate against a double-bind. It refuses a
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// locked or expired token defensively (WHERE guards), though the handler checks Usable() first.
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func (s *Store) ConsumeSelfBindToken(tokenHash string) (ok bool, err error) {
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res, err := s.db.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens
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SET consumed_at = datetime('now')
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WHERE token_hash = ? AND consumed_at IS NULL AND locked = 0 AND expires_at > datetime('now')`, tokenHash)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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return n == 1, nil
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}
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