admin
b080ecf411
oobDegraded tested five things and the sixth never arrived. The agent has emitted `operator_key_configured` on every heartbeat since v0.72.0 — the SAME version that introduced the `oob` stanza carrying it — and store.HostOOBRow mirrored five of the agent's eight OOB fields. With no field for it, encoding/json discarded the fact on arrival, so a box with felhom-sshd active, reachable, a valid config and a configured peer reported `ok` with NO OPERATOR KEY INSTALLED AT ALL. Not a wrong answer: an answer to a question nobody was asking. `operator_peer_configured`, which the hub did read, only says the peer IP is in desired-state — that OOB is MEANT to work, not that entry is possible. Now decoded: operator_key_configured, plus wg_handshake_age_s and healed_at. The last two ride the ALERT TEXT and are deliberately NOT in the predicate — widening a check beyond the fact that is now arriving is how a check stops being read. SCENARIO F, decided on a measurement rather than a preference. operator_key_configured decodes as a POINTER: nil = the agent never said, reported distinctly and never as ok. The version gate was rejected because the field and its stanza shipped in the SAME agent version (v0.72.0), so a stanza without the field cannot come from any released agent; the fleet is 0.113.0/0.127.0 and the vouched floor is 0.127.0. Handled explicitly anyway and pinned, because "cannot happen" is a claim this project has been burned by. THE MESSAGE NAMES THE FAULT. oobDegradedReason is the single source for both predicate and text, so the alert can never name a different fault from the one that fired. The old form derived it separately and had a vocabulary of two — unreachable, or config invalid — with no way to say the key is missing. The operator reads this at 07:00. TESTS DRIVE THE DECODE BOUNDARY. Every hub OOB test before this built a HostOOBRow by hand, and a test written that way CANNOT SEE A FIELD THAT NEVER DECODES — which is how this held a green suite for five weeks. The pre-existing fixture oobReport() also omitted the field, so those scenarios ran against a report shape no released agent produces (same family as R-262). Both fixed. Red-proofs, 8 expected outcomes and 0 wrong, each with the mutation asserted applied: dropping the field returns the false ok; an unconditional check alerts a healthy box; unknown-as-ok restores the silent pass. G-1 CLOSED — scripts/wire_contract_gate.py shipped as ranked, built BEFORE the fixes and seen failing on 40 fields (documentation/tests/wire-contract-gate-2026-08-08/BEFORE.md). Two instrument defects the control caught first: a substring false negative (grep -F healed_at matched privsep_healed_at) and treating dr_recipe as wholly opaque when its top-level sections ARE decoded through an allow-list that already cost offsite_restic (R-122). The prompt for this session said "465 emitted tags, eight unreachable". Checked against the repo: R-260 said "at least eight DECISION-BEARING facts", never eight tags. The real count is 40. R-260 CLOSED (class gated, sharpest instance fixed). R-247 CLOSED (controller v0.209.0). R-264 MINTED and OPEN — the 21 facts with no consumer, allowlisted with reasons so that gating the class could not be mistaken for deciding them. Still open and named: R-246, R-255..R-259, R-261..R-263, and C7's test-comment half. Capability map checked: it claims OOB access is implemented, never monitored, so no row was untrue; what was untrue sat one layer down and the row now records it. repo_gates --fast: all 8 OK. go build/vet/test green in hub, run separately from this commit.
Felhom — Documentation
Felhom is a managed home-server service for Hungarian households, built on a three-component model over Proxmox:
- Hub — operator backend on k3s (
hub.felhom.eu). Repo:felhom.eu/hub/. - Host agent — one per Proxmox host; operator-tier; owns all Proxmox interaction. Repo:
felhom-agent/. - In-guest controller — one per customer LXC; Docker-only; manages the customer's apps. Repo:
felhom-controller/.
This directory is the central, code-verified documentation home for all three components plus the platform and the security-audit record.
Sections
Controller (in-guest) — controller/
The Docker-only app-domain controller. Full per-area docs grounded in current source (v0.59.0).
→ controller/README.md: module map, deploy & stack lifecycle, backup
architecture, storage/monitoring/metrics, auth/hub/sync/integrations.
Host agent & platform — architecture/, proxmox-platform.md
The operator-tier agent and the Proxmox platform.
architecture/01-topology-and-trust.md— topology & trust modelarchitecture/03-host-agent.md— the host agent (Go; v0.29.1)architecture/04-control-plane-authorization.md— signing, escrow, authzarchitecture/02-controller-module-map.md— historical v0.33 planning map; the live map iscontroller/module-map.mdproxmox-platform.md— Proxmox platform reference
Hub (operator backend) — architecture/05
architecture/05-hub-architecture.md— hub architecture (v0.11.0)
Security audits & remediation — audits/
audits/deep-sweep-2026-06-13.md— cross-repo deep audit (controller + agent) with remediation statusaudits/bughunt-reconcile-2026-06-13.md— reconciliation of the v0.30.3 BUGHUNT against current code + merged fix list
Spike & test findings — tests/
Per-slice spike/validation findings (phases 0–5, slices 7–10). See tests/.
Conventions
- Code-verified, not memory-derived. Architectural claims here are checked against the actual current source; if a claim can't be verified it is omitted and flagged, not guessed.
- Per-repo operational working files (
CLAUDE.md,CONTEXT.md,CHANGELOG.md,BUGHUNT.md,REPORT.md,TASK.md) live in their own repos — they are operational, not published docs. - Authoritative versions at last refresh: controller v0.59.0, agent v0.29.1, hub v0.11.0.