4bb2df0dc4
The operator sees the shared pool box's real state on the hub: total box fill vs
capacity, Σ(shared soft quotas) vs capacity (the oversubscription ratio), per-customer
usage/quota bars, and a box-level operator alert (fill % + oversub ratio) on the existing
dispatcher's operator channel. Per-customer fill alerts already existed; the box-level
aggregate was the gap. READ-ONLY against Hetzner (GET only).
Phase-0 probe (gate PASSED): the live pool box 611714 returns capacity via
storage_box_type.size (1 TiB / bx11) and usage via a stats object (size/size_data/
size_snapshots), all bytes; our token reads it (200).
- hetznerapi: additive StorageBoxType + StorageBoxStats on StorageBox (no existing field/
method changed); fake carries them + a GetBoxCalls counter; golden decode test.
- monitor.OffsiteBoxChecker: OffsiteChecker-sibling for the box; fetch-throttled (1 GET/
15min), cached BoxSnapshot, escalation-only + recovery re-arm. FILL (used/capacity 80/90)
+ OVERSUB (Σ shared+enabled quotas / capacity, 2.0x) — independent. Σ from the ConfigJSON
Descriptor (offsite.ReadDescriptor, new), never the report echo; dedicated+disabled
excluded. Scope "pool-box" -> operator channel only, no SaveEvent. Failed fetch keeps the
last snapshot degraded; missing data never becomes 0% and never transitions a band.
- config: Alerting.OffsiteBoxFill{Warn,Crit}Percent + OffsiteOversubWarnRatio (80/90/2.0
defaults; thresholds pending Viktor's ruling). Constructed in the HETZNER_TOKEN branch,
60s sweep, snapshot handed to the web server.
- web: Offsite-tab panel (fill bar, Σ+ratio, per-customer usage/quota rows) + a compact
dashboard tile; reads the cached snapshot only, never fetches; nil -> "not configured".
Tests: 10 new + 4 red-proofs (throttle, Σ filter, escalation-only, failed-fetch honesty),
all confirmed red then restored. go build/vet/test all pass; hub confirm gate OK.
494 lines
21 KiB
Go
494 lines
21 KiB
Go
// Package offsite orchestrates per-customer offsite-tier provisioning against the Hetzner storage-box API
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// (SLICE 1): idempotent create of a shared sub-account or a dedicated box, generation of the transient
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// one-time password, and the NON-SECRET target descriptor that rides ConfigJSON to the controller. The
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// controller-side apply-bridge (SLICE 2) and escrow auto-confirm (SLICE 3) are out of scope here.
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//
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// Fail-closed: any API/action error returns without a provisioned resource being recorded — the caller
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// must NOT mark offsite enabled/served on error. Idempotent: every create is guarded by a label lookup
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// first (box/sub-account names are not unique — SPIKE §2).
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package offsite
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"math/big"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/hetznerapi"
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"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
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)
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// sftpPort is the storage-box SSH/SFTP port (SPIKE: 23).
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const sftpPort = 23
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// Descriptor is the NON-SECRET offsite target that rides ConfigJSON to the controller. It NEVER carries
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// the password or the SSH key.
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type Descriptor struct {
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Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
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Type string `json:"type,omitempty"` // "shared" | "dedicated"
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Host string `json:"host,omitempty"` // <user>.your-storagebox.de (dedicated) / <user>-subN… (shared)
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User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
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Port int `json:"port,omitempty"` // 23
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RepoPath string `json:"repo_path,omitempty"` // /home/<repo>
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QuotaGB int `json:"quota_gb,omitempty"` // shared soft-quota (Felhom-enforced; no native lever)
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BoxType string `json:"box_type,omitempty"` // dedicated (Hetzner-hard quota via the type)
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// HostFingerprint is the box's SSH host-key fingerprint (SHA256:…), captured at provision so the
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// controller VERIFIES the box identity instead of blind-TOFU (SLICE 2). Non-secret.
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HostFingerprint string `json:"host_fingerprint,omitempty"`
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}
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// HostKeyScanner returns a box's SSH host-key fingerprint (SHA256:…). Seam'd so tests inject a fake.
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type HostKeyScanner interface {
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Fingerprint(ctx context.Context, host string, port int) (string, error)
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}
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// Input is the operator's offsite choice.
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type Input struct {
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Enabled bool
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Type string // "shared" | "dedicated"
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QuotaGB int // shared
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BoxType string // dedicated, e.g. "bx11"
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}
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// Provisioner provisions offsite resources. It depends on the CloudAPI interface (tests inject a fake).
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type Provisioner struct {
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API hetznerapi.CloudAPI
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Store *store.Store
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Scanner HostKeyScanner // captures the box host-key fingerprint (fail-closed if nil/scan-fails)
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PoolBoxID int64 // the shared-pool storage-box id (e.g. 611421)
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Location string // dedicated-box location, e.g. "fsn1"
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Logger *log.Logger
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// ScanBackoff is the retry schedule for the host-key scan (F2: a fresh sub-account's DNS name lags
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// creation by seconds-to-a-minute, so the first scan typically fails with "no such host"). nil → the
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// default ~60s ladder. Tests inject zeros. The total must fit inside applyOffsite's 3-min detached ctx.
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ScanBackoff []time.Duration
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}
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// defaultScanBackoff: 5 retries, ~60s total — sized to the observed DNS propagation lag.
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var defaultScanBackoff = []time.Duration{2 * time.Second, 4 * time.Second, 8 * time.Second, 16 * time.Second, 30 * time.Second}
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func (p *Provisioner) logf(f string, a ...any) {
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if p.Logger != nil {
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p.Logger.Printf(f, a...)
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}
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}
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// customerLabel is the idempotency/teardown key.
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func customerLabel(customerID string) map[string]string { return map[string]string{"felhom-customer": customerID} }
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func customerSelector(customerID string) string { return "felhom-customer=" + customerID }
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// repoPath is the controller-facing RepoPath — each account is chrooted, /home is writable (SPIKE).
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const repoPath = "/home/felhom-repo"
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// ProvisionOffsite ensures the customer's offsite resource exists and returns the non-secret descriptor.
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// On a fresh create it generates + stores the one-time password (Store.SaveOneTimeSecret). On an existing
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// resource (found by label) it is a no-op create → returns the descriptor without a new password. The
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// caller merges the descriptor into ConfigJSON and saves. Disable → returns {Enabled:false} (NO deprovision).
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func (p *Provisioner) ProvisionOffsite(ctx context.Context, customerID string, in Input) (*Descriptor, error) {
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if !in.Enabled {
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return &Descriptor{Enabled: false}, nil
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}
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var d *Descriptor
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var err error
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switch in.Type {
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case "shared":
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d, err = p.provisionShared(ctx, customerID, in)
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case "dedicated":
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d, err = p.provisionDedicated(ctx, customerID, in)
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: unknown type %q (want shared|dedicated)", in.Type)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Capture the box host-key fingerprint so the controller verifies (no blind TOFU). Fail-closed: don't
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// serve a descriptor the controller can't verify. Applies to both fresh and idempotent paths.
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if p.Scanner == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: no host-key scanner configured (cannot capture the pin)")
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}
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port := d.Port
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if port == 0 {
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port = sftpPort
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}
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fp, err := p.scanWithRetry(ctx, d.Host, port)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: host-key scan %s: %w", d.Host, err)
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}
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d.HostFingerprint = fp
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return d, nil
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}
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// scanWithRetry retries the host-key scan on failure (F2: fresh-resource DNS lag). Fail-closed past the
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// budget; ctx cancellation aborts between attempts.
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func (p *Provisioner) scanWithRetry(ctx context.Context, host string, port int) (string, error) {
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backoff := p.ScanBackoff
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if backoff == nil {
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backoff = defaultScanBackoff
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}
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fp, err := p.Scanner.Fingerprint(ctx, host, port)
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for i := 0; err != nil && i < len(backoff); i++ {
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p.logf("[offsite] host-key scan %s failed (attempt %d/%d, retrying in %s): %v", host, i+1, len(backoff)+1, backoff[i], err)
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return "", ctx.Err()
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case <-time.After(backoff[i]):
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}
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fp, err = p.Scanner.Fingerprint(ctx, host, port)
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}
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return fp, err
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}
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// ReissueCredentials resets the customer's offsite credential and stores a FRESH one-time password — the
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// EXPLICIT operator recovery for a consumed-password dead-end (a fresh guest at DR, or a
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// consumed-but-failed install). It is NOT implicit rotation: ProvisionOffsite never calls this. Scoped
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// hard: the reset targets ONLY the resource labelled `felhom-customer=<id>`, and refuses unless the label
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// lookup finds exactly one. The password value is never logged (the action is).
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func (p *Provisioner) ReissueCredentials(ctx context.Context, customerID, typ string) error {
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pw, err := genPassword()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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switch typ {
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case "shared":
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if p.PoolBoxID == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: no shared pool box configured")
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}
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subs, err := p.API.ListSubaccounts(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reissue lookup: %w", err)
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}
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if len(subs) != 1 {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reissue needs exactly 1 sub-account labelled for %s, found %d — refusing", customerID, len(subs))
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}
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act, err := p.API.ResetSubaccountPassword(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, subs[0].ID, pw)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reset sub-account password: %w", err)
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}
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if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, act); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reset action: %w", err)
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}
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p.logf("[offsite] re-issued shared credentials for %s (subaccount %d)", customerID, subs[0].ID)
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case "dedicated":
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boxes, err := p.API.ListStorageBoxes(ctx, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reissue lookup: %w", err)
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}
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if len(boxes) != 1 {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reissue needs exactly 1 box labelled for %s, found %d — refusing", customerID, len(boxes))
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}
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act, err := p.API.ResetBoxPassword(ctx, boxes[0].ID, pw)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reset box password: %w", err)
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}
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if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, act); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reset action: %w", err)
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}
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p.logf("[offsite] re-issued dedicated credentials for %s (box %d)", customerID, boxes[0].ID)
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: reissue: unknown type %q (want shared|dedicated)", typ)
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}
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if err := p.Store.SaveOneTimeSecret(customerID, pw); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: store re-issued one-time password: %w", err)
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}
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// v0.57.0 (2.3, the escrow-honesty fix): the restic repo password just changed, so any existing
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// key-escrow blob — which sealed the OLD password — is now STALE. A recovery code minted against
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// it would decrypt a password that no longer opens the repo. Mark the escrow stale so the hub
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// stops advertising "ceremony done" and the customer's escrow wizard is offered again; a fresh
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// ceremony seals the new password and clears the flag. Every credential change also emits a
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// visible customer event (offsite_reissued always; escrow_stale only when a blob was invalidated).
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// Best-effort: the password reset already succeeded — a bookkeeping failure here must not fail it.
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escrowStaled := false
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if host, herr := p.Store.GetHostByCustomer(customerID); herr == nil && host != nil {
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if esc, eerr := p.Store.GetHostEscrow(host.HostID); eerr == nil && esc != nil {
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if serr := p.Store.MarkEscrowStale(host.HostID); serr != nil {
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p.logf("[offsite] WARN mark-escrow-stale for %s: %v", customerID, serr)
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} else {
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escrowStaled = true
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}
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}
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}
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if _, serr := p.Store.SaveEvent(customerID, "offsite_reissued", "info",
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"Az offsite (házon kívüli) mentési hozzáférést újra kiadtuk — az új egyszeri jelszót a vezérlő a következő frissítéskor átveszi.",
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"", "hub"); serr != nil {
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p.logf("[offsite] WARN save offsite_reissued event for %s: %v", customerID, serr)
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}
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if escrowStaled {
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if _, serr := p.Store.SaveEvent(customerID, "escrow_stale", "warning",
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"A helyreállítási kulcs-letét elavult az offsite jelszó cseréje miatt — futtasd le újra a helyreállítási szertartást (Biztonsági mentés → Helyreállítás).",
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"", "hub"); serr != nil {
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p.logf("[offsite] WARN save escrow_stale event for %s: %v", customerID, serr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// OffsiteIdentifier returns the customer's provisioned offsite name (sub-account username / box name)
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// for the RESET preview inventory, "" if none is provisioned. Read-only.
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func (p *Provisioner) OffsiteIdentifier(ctx context.Context, customerID, typ string) (string, error) {
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switch typ {
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case "dedicated":
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boxes, err := p.API.ListStorageBoxes(ctx, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil || len(boxes) == 0 {
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return "", err
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}
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return boxes[0].Name, nil
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default: // shared / ""
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if p.PoolBoxID == 0 {
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return "", nil
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}
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subs, err := p.API.ListSubaccounts(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil || len(subs) == 0 {
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return "", err
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}
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return subs[0].Username, nil
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}
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}
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// Deprovision DELETES the customer's offsite storage — the RESET teardown (v0.61.0). The offsite repo
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// DATA dies with the sub-account/box; irreversible, gated by the operator RESET confirm. IDEMPOTENT:
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// zero labelled sub-accounts/boxes = already gone = success (a re-run after a partial reset does not
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// error). The id is re-derived by the customer label each time — nothing stored to go stale.
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func (p *Provisioner) Deprovision(ctx context.Context, customerID, typ string) error {
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switch typ {
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case "dedicated":
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boxes, err := p.API.ListStorageBoxes(ctx, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: deprovision lookup: %w", err)
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}
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if len(boxes) == 0 {
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p.logf("[offsite] deprovision: no box labelled for %s — already gone", customerID)
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return nil
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}
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for _, b := range boxes {
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act, err := p.API.DeleteStorageBox(ctx, b.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: delete box %d: %w", b.ID, err)
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}
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if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, act); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: delete box action: %w", err)
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}
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p.logf("[offsite] deprovisioned dedicated box %d for %s (repo data destroyed)", b.ID, customerID)
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}
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return nil
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default: // shared / ""
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if p.PoolBoxID == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: no shared pool box configured")
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}
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subs, err := p.API.ListSubaccounts(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: deprovision lookup: %w", err)
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}
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if len(subs) == 0 {
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p.logf("[offsite] deprovision: no sub-account labelled for %s — already gone", customerID)
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return nil
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}
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for _, sub := range subs {
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act, err := p.API.DeleteSubaccount(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, sub.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: delete sub-account %d: %w", sub.ID, err)
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}
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if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, act); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("offsite: delete sub-account action: %w", err)
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}
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p.logf("[offsite] deprovisioned shared sub-account %d for %s (repo data destroyed)", sub.ID, customerID)
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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func (p *Provisioner) provisionShared(ctx context.Context, customerID string, in Input) (*Descriptor, error) {
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if p.PoolBoxID == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: no shared pool box configured")
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}
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// Idempotency: an existing labelled sub-account is reused (no second create).
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existing, err := p.API.ListSubaccounts(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: list subaccounts: %w", err)
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}
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if len(existing) > 0 {
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s := existing[0]
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p.logf("[offsite] shared already provisioned for %s (subaccount %d)", customerID, s.ID)
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return &Descriptor{Enabled: true, Type: "shared", Host: s.Server, User: s.Username, Port: sftpPort, RepoPath: repoPath, QuotaGB: in.QuotaGB}, nil
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}
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// Fresh create: generate the transient password, create, wait, fetch the full object.
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pw, err := genPassword()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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id, action, err := p.API.CreateSubaccount(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, hetznerapi.CreateSubaccountRequest{
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HomeDirectory: "felhom-" + customerID,
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Password: pw,
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AccessSettings: hetznerapi.AccessSettings{SSHEnabled: true, ReachableExternally: true},
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Labels: customerLabel(customerID),
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Description: "felhom offsite " + customerID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: create subaccount: %w", err)
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}
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if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, action); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: subaccount create action: %w", err)
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}
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sub, err := p.API.GetSubaccount(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: fetch subaccount: %w", err)
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}
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if err := p.Store.SaveOneTimeSecret(customerID, pw); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: store one-time password: %w", err)
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}
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p.logf("[offsite] shared provisioned for %s (subaccount %d, user %s)", customerID, sub.ID, sub.Username)
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return &Descriptor{Enabled: true, Type: "shared", Host: sub.Server, User: sub.Username, Port: sftpPort, RepoPath: repoPath, QuotaGB: in.QuotaGB}, nil
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}
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func (p *Provisioner) provisionDedicated(ctx context.Context, customerID string, in Input) (*Descriptor, error) {
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boxType := in.BoxType
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if boxType == "" {
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boxType = "bx11"
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}
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existing, err := p.API.ListStorageBoxes(ctx, customerSelector(customerID))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: list boxes: %w", err)
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}
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if len(existing) > 0 {
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b := existing[0]
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p.logf("[offsite] dedicated already provisioned for %s (box %d)", customerID, b.ID)
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return &Descriptor{Enabled: true, Type: "dedicated", Host: b.Server, User: b.Username, Port: sftpPort, RepoPath: repoPath, BoxType: boxType}, nil
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}
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pw, err := genPassword()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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id, action, err := p.API.CreateStorageBox(ctx, hetznerapi.CreateBoxRequest{
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Name: "felhom-" + customerID,
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StorageBoxType: boxType,
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Location: p.Location,
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Password: pw,
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AccessSettings: hetznerapi.AccessSettings{SSHEnabled: true, ReachableExternally: true},
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Labels: customerLabel(customerID),
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: create box: %w", err)
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}
|
|
if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, action); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: box create action: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
box, err := p.API.GetStorageBox(ctx, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: fetch box: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := p.Store.SaveOneTimeSecret(customerID, pw); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: store one-time password: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
p.logf("[offsite] dedicated provisioned for %s (box %d, user %s)", customerID, box.ID, box.Username)
|
|
return &Descriptor{Enabled: true, Type: "dedicated", Host: box.Server, User: box.Username, Port: sftpPort, RepoPath: repoPath, BoxType: boxType}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetOffsiteFrozen freezes/unfreezes the customer's SHARED sub-account (SLICE 4: readonly access) — an
|
|
// OPERATOR lever, NEVER automatic: freezing also blocks prune/forget, which is the customer's only way
|
|
// DOWN from over-quota, so only a human weighs that trade-off. Same exactly-1 label guard as the
|
|
// re-issue. Preserves the sub-account's other access settings (SSH must stay on — only readonly flips).
|
|
// Dedicated boxes have no freeze path (Hetzner enforces their size physically; the UI hides the button).
|
|
func (p *Provisioner) SetOffsiteFrozen(ctx context.Context, customerID string, frozen bool) error {
|
|
if p.PoolBoxID == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("offsite: no shared pool box configured")
|
|
}
|
|
subs, err := p.API.ListSubaccounts(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, customerSelector(customerID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("offsite: freeze lookup: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(subs) != 1 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("offsite: freeze needs exactly 1 sub-account labelled for %s, found %d — refusing", customerID, len(subs))
|
|
}
|
|
as := subs[0].AccessSettings
|
|
as.Readonly = frozen
|
|
act, err := p.API.UpdateSubaccountAccess(ctx, p.PoolBoxID, subs[0].ID, as)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("offsite: update access: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := p.API.WaitAction(ctx, act); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("offsite: freeze action: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
p.logf("[offsite] set frozen=%v (readonly) for %s (subaccount %d)", frozen, customerID, subs[0].ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MergeDescriptor merges the offsite descriptor under the "offsite" key of a ConfigJSON object, preserving
|
|
// all other keys. Returns the new ConfigJSON string. NEVER carries a secret (Descriptor is non-secret).
|
|
// ClearProvisionedDescriptor returns config_json with the offsite descriptor reset to its
|
|
// pre-first-install shape — the customer-RESET clear (v0.61.0). The TIER CHOICE
|
|
// (enabled/type/quota_gb/box_type — customer config, SURVIVES a RESET) is kept; every PROVISIONED
|
|
// field (host/user/port/repo_path/host_fingerprint — operational state, DIES with the Hetzner
|
|
// resource) is cleared, so re-onboarding re-provisions fresh against the retained choice. No-op-safe:
|
|
// an absent/empty offsite block returns the input unchanged.
|
|
func ClearProvisionedDescriptor(configJSON string) (string, error) {
|
|
cur, err := ReadDescriptor(configJSON)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
if cur == nil {
|
|
return configJSON, nil // no offsite block — nothing to clear
|
|
}
|
|
cleared := &Descriptor{Enabled: cur.Enabled, Type: cur.Type, QuotaGB: cur.QuotaGB, BoxType: cur.BoxType}
|
|
return MergeDescriptor(configJSON, cleared)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ReadDescriptor extracts the non-secret offsite Descriptor from a customer's ConfigJSON, or (nil, nil)
|
|
// when there is no offsite block (never provisioned). This is the AUTHORITATIVE tier/quota source — the
|
|
// pool-box Σ(quota) aggregate (v0.64.0, R-5) and the RESET clear both read through it, NEVER the report
|
|
// echo (a stale/absent report would undercount the sold promises; ConfigJSON is the operator's intent).
|
|
func ReadDescriptor(configJSON string) (*Descriptor, error) {
|
|
obj := map[string]json.RawMessage{}
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(configJSON) != "" && configJSON != "{}" {
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &obj); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: parse config_json: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
raw, ok := obj["offsite"]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
var d Descriptor
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &d); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offsite: parse offsite descriptor: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return &d, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func MergeDescriptor(configJSON string, d *Descriptor) (string, error) {
|
|
obj := map[string]json.RawMessage{}
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(configJSON) != "" && configJSON != "{}" {
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &obj); err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("offsite: parse config_json: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
db, err := json.Marshal(d)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
obj["offsite"] = db
|
|
out, err := json.Marshal(obj)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return string(out), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// genPassword returns a transient password satisfying the Hetzner 4-class policy (upper+lower+digit+special).
|
|
func genPassword() (string, error) {
|
|
const alnum = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
|
|
b := make([]byte, 24)
|
|
for i := range b {
|
|
n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(alnum))))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
b[i] = alnum[n.Int64()]
|
|
}
|
|
// Guarantee all four classes (transient + single-use + reset after install).
|
|
return string(b) + "Aa9%", nil
|
|
}
|