felhom.eu/STATUS.md

STATUS — what works, what's broken, what's next

Updated 2026-08-31 — the weekly off-site check now re-reads your actual data, not just the list of it. A third of the debug page did nothing and no longer exists. 0.228.0 is baked, vouched and delivered; both demo machines are on it and nothing is waiting on you about this release.

A view, not a source. documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md is the authority; this page restates part of it in plain words, and nothing may exist only here. Items, not paragraphs. One screen. If it does not fit, it belongs in the register instead.

Waiting on you

This section is allowed to be longer than one screen, and each item says what happens if you do nothing.

1. Nothing about delivery — the golden train is current. Golden 0.229.0 was baked, published, round-trip verified, vouched, and the fleet floor raised to 0.229.0 on 2026-08-31 (the second bake that day; 0.228.0 was the first). Both demo machines run it; demo-felhom got there by itself and re-registered its jobs without anyone touching it. A machine installed today receives 0.229.0 and everything shipped today, including the restore from the second drive. Evidence: documentation/tests/golden-0.229.0-2026-08-31/.

2. Nothing else about this release. Everything in 0.229.0 is a fix to code that ships in the controller image; no customer action, no data migration, no credential change.

3. Whether to change the hub password (R-350). I printed it into my own session log on 20 August. Not in git, not in any saved file — in the log on this machine. If you do nothing: it stays as it is, at the risk you accept by leaving it. I can change it without ever showing you the new one.

4. demo-hp's network setup does not match our own notes (R-338) — the machine works, the page is wrong, or the other way round. If you do nothing: the page keeps misleading the next session, as it misled one by an hour.

Decided — and what would reopen each

• Getting old backups back yourself: NOT BUILT, deliberately. Reopens if: a real customer asks. (R-312)
• The unopenable old copy on demo-felhom: KEPT as a test fixture — the only state in existence where a set-aside store is present and cannot be opened. Delete when: that work ships or is abandoned. (R-313)
• A machine in two kinds of trouble says both things: LEFT AS IT IS. Reopens if: observed outside a constructed test. (R-303)

What works

Both demo machines are home, healthy and reporting — agent 0.130.0 published and running on both. Which controller each box runs, and where the floor sits, is item 1 above and is not restated here — R-395: this paragraph carried a second copy of those numbers, it went stale by seven releases, and the page then disagreed with itself about the thing an operator checks first. Ask the hub (/hosts, /configs) or the box for what is live; a doc is never the authority on a version. Off-site is credentialed on demo-hp and its store opens with the machine's own key.

The fleet, because two summaries have been misread: five customer records, three machines. demo-felhom and demo-hp are ours and disposable; drill-r50 is a nested drill VM, reverted and off. peti-felhom is a real machine we have not heard from since 15 July and has no host record. tester-1 is a record with no machine.

Shipped

• Something finally checks that the off-site copies are still there and readable (R-359 + R-397, controller 0.227.1, proven on demo-hp). Until today nothing did — not the box, not the agent. The whole-machine backups had their own checks; the copies holding your customers' documents and photos had none, so we would have found a problem at restore time, with a customer waiting. Now the box checks its own off-site store about once a week and tells you only if something is wrong. A pass sends no e-mail, on purpose — a weekly "everything is fine" is how people stop reading their alerts. It also catches itself up: it asks „has it been more than seven days?", not „is it Sunday?", so a machine that was switched off on its check day is checked the next day. And it never gets in the backup's way — if a backup or restore is running, the check steps aside and tries again tomorrow. That is not politeness: the tool would otherwise clear a lock that a live backup was holding. Proven live, twice over — a real check against your real store (35 seconds), and a second check fired during the first, which correctly stepped aside without doing anything. Read item 2 under „Waiting on you" for what this check does NOT see.

• The product stopped claiming a check it never ran. The monitoring page said an integrity check ran every Sunday. It did not exist. The e-mail text, the settings checkbox, the hub's side of it and a debug button were all built and wired to nothing (R-397). They now have the missing piece.

• Taking the safety copy no longer destroys the app's own backup (R-361, controller 0.221.1, proven on demo-hp). Before every restore the machine saves a copy of your live database. To do that it called the ordinary backup routine — which always writes to the app's normal backup filename first — so the app's real backup was overwritten and then renamed away. Until the next nightly run the app had no database backup of its own, and a local recovery in that window would have told you the app never had a database. A comment in the code said this could not happen; it could, and had been happening for four months. Proven fixed the only way it can be: the app's own backup file is now byte-identical before and after a restore, on both database types.

• A failed database restore now puts your data back by itself (R-379/R-380, controller 0.220.2, proven on demo-hp). Until today, if a restore of an app's database went wrong, the machine had already taken a copy of your live database — a good copy — and nothing in the product could put it back. You were shown a filename. On one of the two database types it was worse: part of the restore applied, part did not, and the dashboard said the app was healthy. Now the machine puts your own copy back automatically and says plainly: the restore failed, your data is as it was, the app is running. Proven on both database types, byte-identical both times. If even that fails, the app is deliberately stopped and held rather than started — a running app on a half-written database lets you type into it and makes the damage permanent — and you are told to contact us. That was your ruling this morning. Two things also stopped: the error no longer pastes raw database text at you (it was 615 bytes once, including rows out of your own database), and the undo copies no longer pile up forever — three per app, and they were being copied off-site permanently.

• The copy on the second drive can now bring an app back (R-102 + R-103, controller 0.229.0, proven on demo-hp, and delivered — golden 0.229.0 is vouched and the fleet floor is raised, so a machine installed today has it). Every night the box copied each app's whole recovery package onto the second drive — its settings, its database and its data. It did that for months. Nothing could open those copies. No button, no screen, no command. That mattered most in the one fault the second drive exists for: if the first drive dies, the package on it dies too, and the copy that survived could not be read. For 45 of the 53 apps that is everything they own. Now the same restore that always worked from the first drive can read the copy on the second one, and the button is on the app's own backup row. Proved with the first drive's package taken away: Docmost came back in 29 seconds — its database, all three data volumes, a file with a Hungarian accented name back byte for byte, and the app then read its own rows with its own password. Done again with the app's password file also taken away: the copy carried the passwords too (2 of 2). The screen that used to say „press that other button on another page" now offers the action itself. It says plainly that this one overwrites what is there — the gentle „Fájlok visszaállítása" beside it still only adds back missing files — and it names the date of the copy, so nobody puts last week over today by accident.

• We counted the apps this affects, and settled it. Two of our own notes disagreed — 43 or 45. The answer is 45, counted with the product's own rule against the live catalogue. The older count missed radarr and sonarr.

• The off-site restore now works for the other 40 apps (R-356, controller 0.219.0, proven on demo-hp). It used to refuse before starting, tell the customer a running app „nincs telepítve", and send them to reinstall it "to the same place" — a place those 40 apps never offer, because they were never given a drive to choose. It was asking one question to answer two. Proven today on privatebin: data planted through the app itself, backed up, deleted, restored — all 15 files back byte for byte, Hungarian accented names included, message „0 fájl és 1 adatkötet visszaállítva". The 13 apps that do have a drive are unchanged, checked the same way.

• The off-site restore gives an app's data back at all (R-354, controller 0.218.0). It used to say „0 fájl visszaállítva", report success, and the folder was simply not there. It now names what came back, because a restore that mentions only its file count is how a silent loss reads as a success.

• Paperless's database is in the backup, and restoring it takes an undo copy first (R-355, controller 0.218.0). The dump was landing in a folder named after an app that does not exist. One app of 53 was affected, established with a check first proved able to catch a planted second case.

• The system tells you when it cannot see the off-site copies (R-339) — a mail after ~30 minutes, hourly while it lasts, one all-clear. Caveat: it watches whether the machine answers, so it would not have caught the 18 August fault, where one service was wedged and the machine stayed healthy.

• The connection leak was ours and is fixed (R-344). Our agent opened a connection to the off-site box every 15 minutes and never closed it; the idle timer was switched off. Proved by fixing one machine and leaving the other: same work, 4 more leaked on the untouched one, none on the fixed one. The off-site box is back to 17 open connections from 415.

• A dated check can no longer be quietly missed (R-341) — but it speaks on the next push, not on the day. A machine we tell to be quiet is no longer reported as dead (R-321). One name per secret (R-295, R-323). The hub's own words are under a guard (R-324). Removal reverses the installation (R-316). A correct recovery code is no longer called wrong (R-311). The drive can be re-attached after a reinstall (R-280).

Broken, or knowingly incomplete

• We do not know what the deep check costs on a BIG store (R-401). Since 0.228.0 the weekly check re-reads all your stored data, not just the list of it. We had to: a copy was damaged in a way that left its size unchanged, and the old shallow check said „no errors were found". Only the deep check caught it. The cost we measured was four seconds — 35.0 s before, 39.2 s after — but that was on a 134 MB store, and it will not stay four seconds. So the box now tells us: any check that takes longer than five minutes writes a warning naming this item. If you do nothing: every machine re-reads its whole store every week, however large it grows, and the first person to notice would be a customer whose upload is busy. The warning is there so that does not happen.
• After a restore from the second drive, the first drive's package is rewritten EMPTY (R-403, found during the 0.229.0 drill, not fixed). Two seconds after the restore finished, the box's five-minute housekeeping rebuilt the first drive's package from a drive that had no data files on it, and wrote a package that lists nothing. The ordinary „Visszaállítás indítása" then read it and said, correctly and uselessly, that the backup held only settings. What we did not test: the nightly copy mirrors the first drive over the second one and deletes what is not there, so the next night could plausibly overwrite the good copy with the empty one. That is a reading of the code, not a measurement, and it is written down as unmeasured on purpose. If you do nothing: a customer who recovers from their second drive may find, the next morning, that the copy they recovered from has been replaced by an empty one. Settling it costs one test on a spare machine.
• We ask the off-site box a question about once a second (R-336) — ~85,000 a day for a box we write to weekly. The leak that made this dangerous is fixed (R-344); the volume is not. The ceiling is under a year away on the corrected measurement, not two.
• Peti's machine has no recovery route at all. A real machine belonging to a real person, silent since 15 July, no key, no off-site copy, no local backup. If that drive fails, everything on it is lost. First act of any visit: copy the ~3.6 GB off before anything is reinstalled.
• The agent picks dnsmasq by looking at a file another package owns (R-317) — one line; LAN name resolution goes missing quietly.
• Three facts the machines send still have no reader (R-264); the storage page has its own reason for an empty list (R-298); two thirds of the standing picture is unproven (R-326: 23 of 55 claims walked — python3 scripts/unproven.py); the picture still describes one defect we fixed twice (R-327).

Working on next

The 2026-08-09 batch (R-279 … R-292), still untriaged; the three remaining R-264 readers; R-317 (one line in the agent); R-327 (decide the naming claim's status); R-359 (nothing reads the off-site store).