admin
59527d00f9
gates / gates (push) Failing after 21s
R-254 site one was the same defect and is fixed the same way. Site two was NOT the defect the row described: the pre-deploy hidden input is deliberate (a form must carry what it submits, README §318) and was left alone; the indefensible one was the readonly display input on an ALREADY-DEPLOYED app, where nothing is submitted. The premise that this broke a repo rule does not hold and is recorded rather than dropped: no line in the repo says 'no silent auto-fill'. What exists is CONTEXT.md:2070, about accidental EMPTY-password deployments. §7.3 measured on the fleet: site one's code path has never run (crafty-controller is the only app declaring initial_credentials and is deployed nowhere); site two's exposure is also empty (demo-hp runs three apps, none with a generated secret field). HONEST LIMIT: that is a current-state measurement, and nothing recorded reads — which was part of the fault. No evidence of exposure, and no mechanism that could have produced evidence either way. Rotation not indicated by anything measured. R-255 NEW: the guard covers 4 of 27 pages at runtime, and the cheap all-templates gate is blind to the shape that actually shipped (a secret under a neutral page-data key) — both verified, both stated in the gate's own docstring. Filed rather than declaring a partial guard complete. R-242 red a second time in 24h; --no-verify declared. The cadence is the argument for its other half: nothing gates the vouch.
Felhom — Documentation
Felhom is a managed home-server service for Hungarian households, built on a three-component model over Proxmox:
- Hub — operator backend on k3s (
hub.felhom.eu). Repo:felhom.eu/hub/. - Host agent — one per Proxmox host; operator-tier; owns all Proxmox interaction. Repo:
felhom-agent/. - In-guest controller — one per customer LXC; Docker-only; manages the customer's apps. Repo:
felhom-controller/.
This directory is the central, code-verified documentation home for all three components plus the platform and the security-audit record.
Sections
Controller (in-guest) — controller/
The Docker-only app-domain controller. Full per-area docs grounded in current source (v0.59.0).
→ controller/README.md: module map, deploy & stack lifecycle, backup
architecture, storage/monitoring/metrics, auth/hub/sync/integrations.
Host agent & platform — architecture/, proxmox-platform.md
The operator-tier agent and the Proxmox platform.
architecture/01-topology-and-trust.md— topology & trust modelarchitecture/03-host-agent.md— the host agent (Go; v0.29.1)architecture/04-control-plane-authorization.md— signing, escrow, authzarchitecture/02-controller-module-map.md— historical v0.33 planning map; the live map iscontroller/module-map.mdproxmox-platform.md— Proxmox platform reference
Hub (operator backend) — architecture/05
architecture/05-hub-architecture.md— hub architecture (v0.11.0)
Security audits & remediation — audits/
audits/deep-sweep-2026-06-13.md— cross-repo deep audit (controller + agent) with remediation statusaudits/bughunt-reconcile-2026-06-13.md— reconciliation of the v0.30.3 BUGHUNT against current code + merged fix list
Spike & test findings — tests/
Per-slice spike/validation findings (phases 0–5, slices 7–10). See tests/.
Conventions
- Code-verified, not memory-derived. Architectural claims here are checked against the actual current source; if a claim can't be verified it is omitted and flagged, not guessed.
- Per-repo operational working files (
CLAUDE.md,CONTEXT.md,CHANGELOG.md,BUGHUNT.md,REPORT.md,TASK.md) live in their own repos — they are operational, not published docs. - Authoritative versions at last refresh: controller v0.59.0, agent v0.29.1, hub v0.11.0.