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- DeleteHost(deleteEscrow) demotes current host_escrow into host_escrow_superseded (copy-before-delete, same tx), spares existing; one shared demoteCurrentEscrowTx (reused by SaveHostEscrow). F-14 provenance/gate unchanged. - DeleteCustomerConfig now purges both escrow tables for all the customer's hosts incl. already-deleted (F-14 provenance UNION) — the one true purge point. - Wording: checkbox/refusal/Danger-zone → demotion. S6b OBSOLETE. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_Demotes + TestDeleteCustomer_Purges + wording guard.
23 KiB
23 KiB
00 — Felhom Capability Map
What this is: the single cross-component truth table of what the Felhom platform can do today, at what confidence level, with verifiable evidence. Rows are scenarios (user- or operator-visible outcomes), not modules — a scenario spans agent + controller + hub + catalog, and this is the only doc that shows that view.
What this is NOT: a roadmap. Planned work lives in
documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.mdand is referenced from gap rows by ID (→ R-n). A row here never claims future behavior.Status enum (strict):
Status Meaning PROVEN-LIVE Exercised end-to-end on real infrastructure; MUST cite a campaign/drill/validation doc in documentation/audits/ordocumentation/tests/. No citation → not PROVEN-LIVE.IMPLEMENTED Shipped + unit/red-proof tested, but the real flow has not been exercised live (or not on the surface that matters — noted per row). PARTIAL Some legs live, some missing/unvalidated — the note says which. MISSING Does not exist. Present-tense fact; if planned, the row points at a roadmap ID. Update rule (end-of-session checklist item): if a task changed any capability's status, update the row in the same session — with the new evidence citation. A PROVEN-LIVE claim is subject to the cardinal rule like any other claim.
Verified 2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip
4b18cc5by CC (capability-map audit); see REPORT.md for the per-row verdict table.
A. Provisioning & day-0
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Appliance day-0 install: golden image → first boot → auto-confirm (zero clicks) → claimable box | installer, agent, hub, golden | PROVEN-LIVE (nested VM) | DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12, DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12 |
First firing on real customer hardware pending → R-1 |
BYO install: --mode byo, mandatory caps, host-mutation disclosure, coexistence guards |
installer v1.15+, agent | PARTIAL | DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08 (demo box); GL-8 coexistence fixes |
Peti clean-slate reinstall on proxmox2 is the first real BYO run of the current path → R-1 |
| Customer claim: one-time emailed code → customer sets own password (bcrypt, operator never sees it) | controller v0.122, hub v0.50 | PROVEN-LIVE (drill VM) | DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12 §10/F-4 (gate ON via real edge; claimed, code consumed) |
Never executed by a non-Viktor human → R-3. (Dropped mis-cited CAMPAIGN-4 F-C — that is the escrow-claim 502, not password claim) |
| Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | PROVEN-LIVE (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13 |
Endpoints driven on the drill VM; customer-facing browser wizard leg not yet live-validated. First supervised ceremony with a real customer pending → R-1. agent v0.89.0: /escrow/preflight pbs_storage_id row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart. hub v0.60.0 (data-first retention): a re-escrow with a DIFFERENT sealed passphrase no longer destroys the old blob — the hub RETAINS it (host_escrow_superseded), so a previous passphrase stays recoverable with its recovery code (turns the reinstall-orphan incident from "history destroyed" into "history recoverable"). Guided-recovery flow = R-26. Red-proof TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded. hub v0.60.1 — custody survives the host lifecycle: host deletion (with the escrow ack) DEMOTES the current blob to retained custody (moved into host_escrow_superseded, never destroyed; existing superseded rows spared); the customer Danger-zone Delete is the one true purge point (cascades both escrow tables incl. already-deleted hosts). No operator path through host lifecycle can lose a blob. Red-proofs TestDeleteHost_DemotesEscrowNeverDestroys + TestDeleteCustomer_PurgesEscrowCustody |
| DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | IMPLEMENTED | DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12 §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 |
Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected. Candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE — see REPORT.) agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17: the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22) → converged state=adopted in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, pvesm status felhom-offsite=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot pveum grant |
| Uninstall: KEPT-vs-WIPED statement, secret purge, enrolled-drive handling | installer | PARTIAL | DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08 Phase 1/5 (KEPT-vs-WIPED printed verbatim; drive data intact ×3); GL-4 code |
Secret purge (GL6-F1 .bak residue) fixed v1.12.0; enrolled-drive mnt-*.mount units survive (GL6-F2, open); cluster-aware felhom_guests guard + saferemove cost warning missing → R-9 |
B. Apps & catalog
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deploy an app from the catalog (env config, memory guard, health-aware progress) | controller, catalog (~52 apps, images pinned) | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-DEPLOY-SET (7 apps, env config, health-aware); RERUN-p1p3 (×4 PASS) |
Memory-guard FIRING is not live-shown (T-RES-MEMGUARD never fired: ample RAM / auth-walled) — implemented + unit-level only |
| App lifecycle: start/stop/restart/update/logs/remove/redeploy | controller | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-LIFECYCLE (stop/start/restart/update/logs); remove live in CAMPAIGN-3 |
Redeploy-after-remove edge remains open (T-REMOVE-REDEPLOY never cleanly passed — stale dryrun journal); non-pilot-critical |
| Protected infra stacks can't be stopped/removed from UI | controller | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-nomercy + RERUN-p1p3 T-SEC-PROTECTED (refuse stop/remove, stay Up) |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-SEC-PROTECTED was a stale-dryrun FAIL — corrected to the runs with a real server-side refusal) |
Catalog sync (git, 15 min) + orphan lifecycle + validation choke point (bad backup: block degrades to legacy, loudly) |
controller v0.132, catalog | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-SYNC-IDEMPOTENT; v0.132 LoadMetadata red-proofs |
|
| App crashes → customer notified (one event per transition, no flapping spam) | controller v0.120, hub v0.48 | IMPLEMENTED | controller v0.120.0 (dead-app alerting, app_start_failed, one-event-per-transition red-proofs); CAMPAIGN-3 F11 surfaced the gap |
End-to-end crash→customer-email delivery never live-confirmed (6B deferred / 6C inconclusive: clean stop ≠ crash); anti-spam unit-proven |
| Post-deploy optional config (API keys etc.) with restart | controller, catalog .felhom.yml |
IMPLEMENTED | feature long-standing; config page renders (CAMPAIGN-2 T-PAGE-ALL is GET-only) |
The config-save+restart flow is exercised in no campaign (CAMPAIGN-3 explicitly skipped interactive app config). Demoted: T-PAGE-ALL is a page-render smoke test, not this flow |
| Backup classification: 13 bind-bearing apps carry mandatory/optional/excluded classes | catalog, controller v0.132–133 | PROVEN-LIVE | SPIKE-backup-classification-2026-07-14, CAMPAIGN-6D/6E |
Remaining ~39 apps are legacy-class by design (unit-only offsite) |
C. Protection & recovery (the product promise)
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nightly DB dumps (postgres/mariadb autodiscovery), atomic writes | controller v0.118 | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-BAK-FULL (pg+mariadb autodiscovered); atomicity CAMPAIGN-6B P4 + CAMPAIGN-6E B1/B2 (SIGKILL mid-write → only .tar.tmp touched, last-good byte-unchanged); DB restore CAMPAIGN-6D P-FAB |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-3 F7 is the finding of non-atomic writes, and T-RST-DB was auth-hollow — corrected to the 6B/6E fix-proofs.) T-6E-1 dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW) → R-10 |
| Tier-2 secondary-drive copy: class-driven legs, v2 relpath layout, NAS-target exclusion, safe-remove boundary | controller v0.135 | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6E-2026-07-15 (P-TIER2 deep-4 PASS), CAMPAIGN-6C |
|
| Offsite (restic → Hetzner Storage Box): mandatory class only, raw-data quota, enlargement gate, retention regrouping | controller v0.134, agent, hub | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6D-2026-07-15 (mandatory-only P-IMMICH; enlargement gate fired at real 50GiB quota P3-DELIVERY); VALIDATION-offbox-storagebox-2026-07-09 (byte-perfect round-trip) |
Raw-data quota (SP-1) + retention regrouping (SP-2) are SPIKE-restic-snapshot-shape dry-run verdicts — mechanism validated, not fired in a live product run; only the enlargement gate is live-fired. Reinstall-continuity (controller v0.142.0, 2026-07-17): a recreated data volume that orphaned the repo (new passphrase can't open the old keys) is now CLASSIFIED (wrong password or no key found) → explicit ORPHANED card + event (not nightly-spam) + a move-aside (never-delete) reset (unclaimed auto / claimed confirm), instead of a raw nightly restic error. Fake-based scenarios + red-proofs; live leg staged for the delete/re-create rehearsal (a scratch-target swap disturbs the live escrow state). DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17 |
| Offsite restore: local-preferred scratch, unit-only default, full two-step, missing-only place-to-live | controller v0.134/134.1/135 | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6D accept legs (immich end-to-end from offsite alone) |
|
Manual .fab export/import: class-scoped capture, browser up/download, tunnel-proof chunking |
controller v0.125/128/130/136 | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6D P-FAB / Accept #1 (1.7 GB full circle, byte-identical, app boots); chunking CAMPAIGN-6B P2 (100 MiB via real CF edge, 120 MiB→413) |
Chunking proven at the real CF edge via curl --resolve; the rendered browser file-picker upload leg is still Viktor's open full-circle test (6C ran it NOT-RUN). C6B-F1 was the 6B finding; fix verified in 6D |
| Guest-loss DR: PBS restore with full-fidelity layout from archive, restore-test verification | agent v0.75/0.76, PBS | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-P9-DESTROY-RESTORE (whole-guest pct restore of 9201 → running+healthy) + T-PBS-VERIFY (verify_state: ok, 13 snapshots); DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08 Phase 0d (restore-test mount_parity: ok) |
(Cited VALIDATION-newbox-restore is offbox restic file-restore, wrong tier — corrected.) Real offsite guest-loss round-trip still R1-blocked → S5 DR drill |
| PBS-DR secret self-heal on reused-peer re-provision | hub v0.56 | IMPLEMENTED | hub v0.56.0 (pbsdrheal/reconciler.go, RestageHostPBSSecret, all §10 red-proofs); SPIKE-pbsdr-selfheal-2026-07-15 (root cause) |
Reconciler is scoped to one host (PBSDRHEAL_ONLY_HOST), not fleet-wide; already fired live hands-free on drill qm300 (07-15) — real-customer firing + fleet-wide widening pending |
| Crash/power-loss mid-backup/mid-migration → self-heal on next run | controller, agent | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6D P5-REST (SIGKILL mid-offbox → auto-restart ~15s, run marked failed not false-success, no stale lock); CAMPAIGN-6E B1-B3 |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-RBT-* legs were empty / auth-hollow — corrected.) Live mid-migration crash→self-heal is the weakest sub-claim (P5-REST is mid-backup) |
| Soft-quota: usage bar, pre-push enlargement block, customer notification | controller v0.109/134, hub v0.41/55 | PROVEN-LIVE | 6D/6E; hub OffsiteChecker | |
| A customer (not the operator) performs a restore via UI alone | all | MISSING (as evidence) | — | Alpha will produce this; script it into R-3 |
D. Storage & devices
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Drive wizard: scan/format/mount/enroll, incl. legacy-boot LVM-root hosts | controller, agent v0.87 | PROVEN-LIVE | DISPOSITION-ia-finding2-systemdisks-2026-07-13 (legacy EFI+LVM host, root not offered, byte-identical); enroll/format live in storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15 (E10 re-enroll, data intact); agent fence self-test refuses /dev/sda |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-STG-ENROLL/SEC-FORMAT were auth-hollow CSRF-403.) Fresh-USB wizard enroll+format through the customer UI PROVEN-LIVE (controller v0.141.0, 2026-07-17): a 64 GB scratch USB driven through the real /api/storage/init endpoints (login+CSRF) → confirm → detached format (~27 s mkfs) → mount → register → mounted+registered at /mnt/felhom-drives/scratch1. F6 (initialize-to-usable) now covered: the wizard runs the chain as a detached, disconnect-safe, pollable job (3-step progress) with an agent format-status poll for a slow mkfs |
| Data migration between drives (all / per-app), crash-safe | controller | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6C 4P-5 (scope=app round-trip, byte-identical); storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15 (two migrate-all runs via dashboard UI, sha256 byte-identical) |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-STG-MIGRATE-* were auth-hollow.) "crash-safe" is design-level (copy→verify→remove) — no clean live crash-during-migration PASS |
| NAS (NFS/SMB-client) verify-before-commit, uid-1000 probe, categorized Hungarian errors, DSM-validated | controller v0.113–117, agent v0.81/84/85 | PROVEN-LIVE | SPIKE-nas-verify-2026-07-11, SPIKE-nas-dsm-2026-07-11, CAMPAIGN-3-2026-07-11 (boot/reassert fixes) |
|
| USB drive enrollment + unplug detection + recommission | controller, agent | PROVEN-LIVE | storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15 E4 (yanked-while-running → agent auto-rebind) + E10 (re-enroll, data intact); CAMPAIGN-4/6A (3 USB re-establish across device-letter reshuffle) |
(Cited RUNBOOK-usb could NOT complete a wizard enrollment; CAMPAIGN-2 legs were auth-hollow.) Fresh-USB wizard enrollment specifically still unproven |
| Decommission (migrate-first and anyway-paths), eject | agent, controller | PROVEN-LIVE | storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15 E9 (decommission-anyway → bind detached, parent mp untouched, reboot-safe) + E12 (eject drive holding all apps) |
(Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-STG-DECOM-* were auth-hollow; SPIKE-decommission was report-only, button still vestigial.) |
| Boot ordering: automount + networking survive reboot; appliance self-heal watchdog | agent v0.85 | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-4-2026-07-13 (F12 fix HOLDS: demo-host reboot + 5-boot storm, 0 ordering cycles, caps 63/63, WG re-handshake) + CAMPAIGN-6A-2026-07-14 1D (re-arm reboot-survival across 9 guest + 1 host reboots) |
(CAMPAIGN-3 F10/F11/F12 were the CRITICAL/HIGH failures; fixes shipped in agent v0.85 and were re-validated live in 4/6A — cite the validation, not the finding.) Residual: skip-active on pct reboot carried by the heal path; a NAS outage spanning a guest reboot can strand the share until agent restart (6A) |
E. Access, networking & household use
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remote access via Cloudflare Tunnel + Traefik (per-app subdomains) | cloudflared, traefik | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-2 T-FLT-CF |
Per-customer zone-scoped CF tokens (blast-radius ruling) |
| LAN access when internet is down (lan_resolver) | agent | IMPLEMENTED | — | Never drilled as a customer experience ("net down — can I reach my photos?") → R-19 |
| Phone photo backup | immich (classified) | PROVEN-LIVE | 6D end-to-end restore proof | |
| Documents/OCR | paperless-ngx (classified) | PROVEN-LIVE | CAMPAIGN-6C 4P-1 (deploy paperless-ngx, ingest 3 docs via consume flow, OCR + PDF/A ~90s) + 4P-2/3/5 |
Consume-folder ingestion awkward without SMB → R-7 |
| Files from Windows Explorer / Mac Finder (SMB server) | — | MISSING | — | → R-6 (spike), R-7 (feature) |
| Media to TV via DLNA | — | MISSING | — | Jellyfin app exists; DLNA/SSDP unvalidated → R-6, R-8 |
| File access via browser | FileBrowser (infra app, auto-mount sync) | IMPLEMENTED | FileBrowser runs healthy + userdata-bound (storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15, CAMPAIGN-3) |
Actual browse/download through FileBrowser is exercised in no doc. (Cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-PAGE-ALL renders only the controller dashboard pages, not FileBrowser.) Demoted |
| Forgot dashboard password → instant reset code | controller v0.123, hub | PROVEN-LIVE | DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12 F-15 (live re-run of the exact failure path: hash applied 1s after request, code accepted first try) |
|
| Multiple household users / per-person accounts | — | MISSING | — | Single dashboard password; acceptable for alpha → R-15 |
| WireGuard base infra always-on; OOB operator access (felhom-sshd, /32 peer) | agent v0.72, hub v0.35 | IMPLEMENTED | SPIKE-oob-wg-operator-peer-2026-07-05, SPIKE-felhom-sshd-2026-07-05 |
Mutual-repair desired-state arc not built → R-13 |
| Break-glass management-plane recovery | agent v0.71, hub v0.34 | IMPLEMENTED | runbooks/break-glass.md |
F. Notifications & monitoring
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health-degradation email (edge-triggered, cooldowns, Hungarian) via hub → Resend | controller, hub | IMPLEMENTED | delivery pipeline live-proven for the enlarge-block trigger (CAMPAIGN-6D P3-DELIVERY, op+customer "Kedves Ügyfél!"); NotifyHealthChange ok→warn/fail edge-trigger implemented |
The health-degradation trigger specifically has never fired an email live in any doc. Demoted (pipeline proven for a different event). Deliverability to HU freemail → R-4 |
| Event catalog: app_start_failed, dead-app, offbox_enlarge_blocked, claim/reset codes, critical severity | controller, hub v0.31/48/50/55 | PROVEN-LIVE | live-delivered: CAMPAIGN-6D P3-DELIVERY (enlarge-block, op+customer); DRILL-day0-vm F-4 (claim code); DRILL-day0-take2 F-15 (reset code) |
app_start_failed/dead-app delivery is unit-only (6C inconclusive) — the pipeline + 3 event families are live, those two are not |
| Prefs safety: empty-email wipe guard | controller v0.137 | IMPLEMENTED | red-proofed 07-15 | Born from a live incident; guard itself unit-proven |
| System + container metrics (SQLite, Chart.js, 30-day downsampling) | controller | IMPLEMENTED | metrics collection + /monitoring render present (page 200) |
The cited CAMPAIGN-2 T-RES-CPU/T-SOAK-LOOP are H1/H2 harness artifacts (auth-302), not metrics tests; SQLite/Chart.js/30-day downsampling validated in no campaign. Demoted |
| Always-on debug rings + on-demand log-bundle pulls with TTL/custody | controller v0.116, agent v0.83, hub v0.46 | PROVEN-LIVE | debug rings live-exercised CAMPAIGN-3 fix-6 (1000-cap ring, ~55min horizon under load) |
The log-bundle-pull TTL/custody half is changelog-only (no dedicated observability audit doc); ring persistence across restart is a known gap |
| Operator alerting (Healthchecks → monitoring@felhom.eu) | k3s, Resend | IMPLEMENTED | operator infra, stated in production since 02-04; no corpus validation doc | Per the status enum, no citation → not PROVEN-LIVE. Demoted pending an operator-cited live alert (candidate re-upgrade — see REPORT) |
G. Fleet & operator (hub)
| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer/host management: 8-tab detail, scoped auto-refresh, safe stale-host deletion, capability chips | hub v0.47–0.53 | PROVEN-LIVE | hub v0.53.0 dead-host roll-up live on the Peti cluster (proxmox1 down 23h); CAMPAIGN-4-2026-07-13 (operator UI driven live); DRILL-day0-take2 F-16 (offsite/freeze buttons live) |
8-tab render + capability chips are render-test-validated (hub UI is password-gated; CC cannot log in). (Cited "daily operator use" was a no-doc citation; AUDIT-hub-gui-2026-06-30 predates these features at hub v0.25) |
Config/state change round-trips in seconds (hub↔box immediacy; 15-min cycle stays the backbone): box→hub out-of-cycle report (Dir 1) + hub→box GET /api/v1/wait long-poll wake (Dir 2) |
controller v0.139/140, hub v0.58 | PARTIAL | Transport proven live through the real DNS-only ingress: SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16 + hub v0.58.0 / controller v0.140.0 REPORTs — 240 s no-annotation hold (25 s heartbeat defeats nginx's 60 s proxy_read_timeout, no ingress change), 0.047 s wake-on-change, hub rollout restart = 1 WARN + 0-storm reconnect; Dir-1 2 s box→hub round-trip live in controller v0.139.0 |
The operator-UI save→apply round-trip is not fired end-to-end live (hub UI password-gated; CC can't log in) → R-23; the wake transport and the ACK→config_version→ConfigRefresher delivery chain are each proven, only the UI-triggered bump leg is unexercised. Agent-plane (host-domain desired-state) poke first slice PROVEN-LIVE (Direction-2a, agent v0.89.0 + hub v0.59.0, 2026-07-17): contentless ep0-relayed UDP poke → agent immediate desired-state cycle, per SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16 P4. Full path live-proven: a real operator manifest save fired poke: sync-poke delivered to 10.77.0.2; the box (0.89.0) received it and logged poke received → triggering an immediate desired-state cycle → out-of-band report triggered — ~31 ms ep0→box, sub-ms to the report cycle (WG-confined, from 10.77.0.1 to the 10.77.0.2-bound socket); save→tick ≈ ~0.45 s (SSH-dominated), well under ≤2–3 s. R-13 first slice (listener+sender only; the rest of the mutual-repair arc stays open) |
| Publish train: MinAgent floors, gated auto-Reissue, version channels, floor-field-LAST rules | hub v0.45/0.53, agent | PARTIAL | runbooks/publish-train-rules.md; demo-fleet updates proven |
Never proven on a real remote customer — parked trains RUNBOOK-publish-0.79/0.81/0.85-* await Peti → R-1 |
| Agent self-update: A/B slots, crash-loop auto-rollback, operator-signed | agent v0.70+ | PROVEN-LIVE (demo) | SPIKE-agent-selfupdate-2026-07-05 |
Remote-customer proof pending → R-1 |
| Controller self-update: anonymous registry, no credentials in guest | controller v0.112 | PROVEN-LIVE (demo) | 07-10 arc | |
| Offsite provisioning: Hetzner API, sub-account per customer, host-key pinning, credential re-issue | hub v0.37–0.39 | PROVEN-LIVE | VALIDATION-offsite-provisioning-e2e-2026-07-09, SPIKE-hetzner-api-provisioning-2026-07-09 |
|
| Per-customer offsite fill + staleness + freeze lever | hub v0.41 | IMPLEMENTED | OffsiteChecker (hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go): fill 90/95% vs soft quota, staleness >48h |
No live-fired leg: CAMPAIGN-offsite-overnight-2026-07-10 recorded no quota/fill/staleness emails, and the freeze write-block was inconclusive (only the Hetzner readonly:true API op succeeded). Demoted |
| Box-level Storage Box aggregate (total fill, Σ quotas, oversubscription alert) | — | MISSING | — | → R-5 |
| Secrets hygiene: bearer in k8s Secret, no secrets in git, single-quote credential store | hub v0.53, conventions | IMPLEMENTED | 07-13 closing bundle | |
| Operator login password changeable from UI | hub v0.54 | IMPLEMENTED | 07-13 |