Destroyed 02:40:31Z (guarded on hostname — demo-hp also has a guest 9201), drives wiped to 20K with the mounts deliberately left in place because the surviving raw mount IS the R-220 condition. Reinstalled through the published day-0 path, installer v1.25.0 fetched live; Day-0 provision SUCCESS in 2m32s. R-239 measured a second time, from the other side: the rebuild landed on agent 0.127.0 (no downgrade, no hand upgrade — that half is right) and controller 0.203.0. The box a customer would recover on tonight also lacks R-234 and R-237. The machine is AT THE CLAIM SCREEN awaiting the operator. A claim code has already been requested through the customer-facing path and emailed, so the morning is paste-a-code rather than request-then-paste. The reset-code hatch was NOT used and will not be: it is a guest command line and would fail the rule the walk measures. Stated plainly in the journal: journey steps from the destruction onward are driven over HTTP from the appliance to the guest's island address, as a browser would; some instrumentation reads are guest command lines and are counted as such, but none changed state or was needed to progress the journey.
14 KiB
THE FINAL WALK (R-201) — overnight, unattended — journal
Venue: demo-hp VM 324 finalwalk-appliance (finalwalk.felhom.eu @ 192.168.0.142), guest
LXC 9201, hub customer finalwalk, host id finalwalk-ed05d6. All three earlier venues
were torn down on 2026-08-06; nothing was reused except a freed Storage Box sub-account number.
Written before the destruction, per §9.9.
THE HEADLINE FINDING — a fresh install does NOT get the fixes
| landed on | vouched | |
|---|---|---|
| agent | 0.127.0 ✅ | 0.127.0 |
| controller | 0.203.0 ❌ | golden 0.203.0 |
| newest released controller | 0.205.0 | — |
No hand upgrade was needed and none was applied — that part works. But the vouched golden still bakes controller 0.203.0, so a box installed tonight is two releases behind: it has neither R-237 (v0.204.0, the restore list keyed on the store) nor R-234 (v0.205.0, the skipped-app verdict and the single-flight message).
This is not a regression — it is a delivery gap. The fixes exist, are tested and are pushed; what is missing is a golden carrying them and a vouch. Three of tonight's five checks measure exactly those fixes, and they measure the OLD behaviour because that is what a customer receives.
Timeline: bind 21:56:42Z → agent 0.127.0 ONLINE 21:59:01Z (2 m 19 s) → controller 0.203.0 reporting 22:01:03Z → guest 9201 running.
Phase A — the fixture (six records, §4)
1. Installed from the published ISO. felhom-installer-1.26.1-pve9.2-1.iso, verified
byte-identical to the published copy (sha256 f3cc86d5f0ec…59a6 local == iso.felhom.eu). Served
installer script tag confirmed installer-v1.25.0 on both git-syncs.
All three known TUI traps handled: GRUB's graphical default (down+ret inside one command, terminal
installer first try); the Hungarian keymap switched to U.S. English — positive control: the
administrator email rendered finalwalk@felhom.eu, and @ is shift-2 on US vs AltGr+V on HU, the
only available evidence for the 24 masked password characters; and --boot set in its own qm set
with the ISO detached, both verified from qm config before first boot (boot: order=scsi0,
ide2 lines = 0), with auto-reboot unchecked and confirmed [ ] with focus moved away.
Day-0 fired unaided: pairing code T63-485, matching MAC bc:24:11:c6:73:d0.
2. Claimed through the real /claim form. The reset-code hatch was used — permitted in Phase A
by §3, and it is a guest command line, so it is counted as such and does not touch the Phase-B rule.
3. App + three sentinels. calibre-web deployed with HDD_PATH=/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok,
state: running and health_probe.healthy: true.
| # | file | bytes | sha256 |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | FINALWALK-SENTINEL-A.txt |
57 | 863fa61c091c64488d8224b12f3915bfe264c46f9cad3d3d874b2ce725a1e5ee |
| B | FINALWALK-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt |
80 | b56668663035a332ae9b8a77b5847c8310c7ff48c5c2068114060561389ccf23 |
| C | FINALWALK-SENTINEL-C-12MB.bin |
12 582 912 | 28630aa93119af0790b749671ef3896dbab88f8d239da8313ef5631fa068efda |
Sentinel B's filename as hex, identical at source and on the box:
46494e414c57414c4b2d c591 72737a656d2d c3a9 6b657a657465732d c3a1 7276 c3ad 7a74 c5b1 72 c591 2e747874
— ő é á í ű ő, no efbfbd. Written from explicit bytes via pct push + a Python placer; no
shell chain ever saw the name.
4. Escrow ceremony. Preflight 6 of 6 green (pbs_storage_id · dr_tier · age_binary ·
hub_upload · staged_secret · sudo_grant), agent_supported: true.
Result: phase: done · restic_pw_sealed: TRUE · uploaded: true · entropy_bits: 129.24 ·
key_fingerprint: 81:dc:91:ce:a1:d0:50:3a:…:68:d5.
R was claimed ONE-SHOT and streamed file→file to ~/.config/finalwalk/R_finalwalk.txt (0600,
DooPlex only); the guest and jump-host copies were shred -u'd and the raw response deleted. It
was never rendered, never an argument, never a log line. Shape only: 10 words, 85 characters.
5. Off-site backup, and the sentinels proved BY NAME.
1da4f80d 2026-08-06 22:24:33 finalwalk [felhom-offbox, calibre-web]
/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok/userdata/media/books/FINALWALK-SENTINEL-A.txt 57
/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok/userdata/media/books/FINALWALK-SENTINEL-C-12MB.bin 12582912
/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok/userdata/media/books/FINALWALK-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt 80
HARNESS FAULT, and the §4 gate is what caught it. The FIRST run reported
okwith a 26.6 KB repository — impossible for a 12 MB incompressible sentinel. Listing showed why: I had placed the files under…/adatok/**felhom-data**/userdata/…, while this box's namespace root is/mnt/felhom-drives/adatokdirectly, so they were never in the app's data at all. The product was correct throughout — it captured the unit and the declared mandatory path, including calibre-web's realmetadata.db. Moved to the right path, re-run: 12.0 MB and all three listed. The gate's rule — prove by listing, never by a green status — is exactly what stopped a destruction that would have proven nothing.
6. Pre-destruction truth. Controller 0.203.0 · agent 0.127.0 · PBS wrapper matches
vouched · guests 1/1 · DR recipe present · key escrow present · snapshot 1da4f80d ·
1 snapshot · 12.0 MB · repo sftp:u629488-sub4@…:/home/felhom-repo port 23.
The five checks (§5) — on controller 0.203.0, which is what a customer gets
| check | observable | verdict | |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | selected app that cannot be captured (opengist, not deployed) → run |
verdict ok; warning „Figyelmeztetés: 1 alkalmazásnak nincs elérhető mentése, ezek kimaradtak: opengist"; counters intact (1 snapshot, 12.0 MB, last_success advanced) |
old behaviour. v0.205.0 also keeps ok for an undeployed app — deliberately — but says which, why and what to do. Here the message is a bare count with no next step |
| T2 | two off-site runs back to back | run #1 „A távoli mentés elindult…"; run #2 the same message, flash_error count 0 |
FAILS. This is R-234's measured cause, live. v0.205.0 answers „Már fut egy távoli mentés — ez a kérés nem indított újat…" as an error |
| T3 | toggle future-backup off for an app that HAS a snapshot, then open the restore page | restore entries for calibre-web: 0; wizard 302 away | FAILS. R-237 exactly: the customer's existing backup is hidden by a setting about the future |
| T4 | off-site run with nothing selected | verdict ok; warning „Sikeres — nincs mentésre jelölt alkalmazás" |
unchanged, as required — **and the wording is still "successful" beside "nothing is covered". Filed (§8) |
| T5 | full-restore wizard driven as a browser does | prepare → &full_prep=calibre-web&full_size=12.8 MB → following it revealed the confirm → commit → ok: true, „A(z) calibre-web teljes mentése visszaállítva ellenőrző mappába" |
PASSES. R-238 confirmed a harness artifact, not a product defect — carrying the state the wizard hands back makes it complete |
Live sentinels re-verified after T5: all three MATCH (the verification restore writes to a separate folder and left live data untouched).
T2 and T3 are the same finding as the headline, seen from the customer's side: the fixes are written and pushed but not delivered, so tonight's box still exhibits both defects.
Phase B.1 — the soak
Window 1: 22:44:05Z → 01:54:03Z (3 h 10 m), untouched.
Every periodic job fired at exactly its declared cadence, which is the positive control that the scheduler was running at all:
| job | cadence | fired | expected in 190 min |
|---|---|---|---|
agent-channel-health |
1 m | 185 | ~190 |
stack-scan |
2 m | 108 | ~95 |
system-health · backup-cache · offsite-credential-retry |
5 m | 44 each | ~38 |
hub-report |
15 m | 14 | ~13 |
tier · fill-watch · db-dump |
— | 1 each | — |
offsite-credential-retry ran 44 times and did no work and said nothing. That is R-218's asserted
healthy-box behaviour — the job exists, ticks, completes in 0 s, and stays silent because the
declaration it keys on is false. A box that had never seen the defect behaves exactly as designed.
No alert, notification or digest fired. Nothing on the must-not list fired. The off-site state was
unchanged throughout (last_run fixed at 22:38:54Z, snaps=1, 12.0 MB).
AND THAT LAST LINE IS NOT A FINDING — IT IS MY PLANNING ERROR, STATED AS SUCH. The daily jobs run on the CONTROLLER's clock, and the guest is UTC while the appliance is CEST (
date +%Z: guestUTC, applianceCEST). The nightly local backup (~02:30) and off-site (~04:15) therefore fall at 02:30Z and 04:15Z, and I sized the window against CEST — so it closed at 01:54Z, before either. Reporting "the nightly did not fire" as a defect would have been a false finding produced by a badly-chosen window, which is precisely the shape §6.1 warns about in the other direction.Window 2 (corrective): 01:56Z → ~02:35Z, to cover the 02:30Z local backup. The 04:15Z off-site nightly is deliberately NOT covered: finishing the walk and leaving the machine at the claim screen before 07:00 is the primary deliverable (§11.1), and waiting for it would have put the destruction at ~06:35 CEST with no margin. Recorded as not run, with the reason — the off-site tier was exercised four times manually tonight instead, including a full listing by name.
Window 2: 01:56:28Z → 02:36:45Z — and the nightly DID fire, unprompted.
00:30:25Z db-dump
01:30:19Z tier + fill-watch ← the local tier legs
02:00:35Z metrics-prune
02:15:03Z offbox-backup ← the off-site nightly
02:16:05Z offbox-backup
offbox: snaps 1 → 2, last_run 22:38:54Z → 02:15:24Z
So the soak covered a genuine scheduled cycle after all: the local legs in window 1 and the off-site nightly in window 2. My 04:15 prediction was wrong in the other direction — it fires at ~02:15 controller time. Both the prediction and the correction are recorded rather than quietly fixed.
BOTH DIRECTIONS, as §6.1 demands:
What fired and should have: every periodic job at its cadence; the DB-dump, tier and fill-watch legs; metrics-prune; the off-site nightly, which added the second snapshot with no prompting.
What should have fired and did not: nothing. Six registered jobs were never seen in the log —
health-probes, status-refresh, ring-spill, deadapp-check, disk-health-check,
selfupdate-check — and none of them is a finding. The first four are quiet by construction
(scheduler.go:267 — quiet := job.Interval <= 30*time.Second, so a ≤30 s job never emits
Running job:), and the last two run every 6 h, outside a ~4 h window. An absent log line is not
evidence cuts this way too: I checked the source rather than filing four phantom defects.
What fired and should not have: nothing. No alert, notification, email or digest. The only WARN
lines in five hours were three of mine — a failed login attempt, a CSRF token I mangled, and T1's
deliberate opengist skip, which logged correctly.
One observation worth keeping: offbox-backup ticked twice, 62 s apart, and the snapshot count
went 1 → 2, not 1 → 3. The second run was silently dropped by the single-flight — which for the
NIGHTLY path is correct and deliberate (nobody asked; the next run retries). It is the same mechanism
that, on the MANUAL path, produced R-234; v0.205.0 changes only the manual half and leaves this one
silent, and this soak is live corroboration that the nightly half genuinely needs to stay quiet.
Phase B.2 — the destruction and the rebuild
All five §6.2 conditions were true and written down first (commits 2d2d8d3, f873c55,
502078b) before anything was destroyed.
02:40:31Z pct destroy 9201 --purge (guarded on hostname = finalwalk;
demo-hp also has a guest 9201)
both logical volumes removed; pct list empty
/mnt/adatok and /mnt/mentes wiped to 20 K, MOUNTS LEFT IN PLACE
— deliberately: the surviving raw mount IS the R-220 condition
02:40:56Z felhom-host-install.sh v1.25.0, fetched live from felhom.eu/scripts/
02:43:28Z Day-0 provision SUCCESS — 2 m 32 s
What the rebuild landed on — the second measurement of R-239:
| before | after | |
|---|---|---|
| agent | 0.127.0 | 0.127.0 — no downgrade, no hand upgrade |
| controller | 0.203.0 | 0.203.0 — the same two-release gap |
The agent half is exactly right: the reinstall neither downgraded nor needed a hand. The controller
half is R-239 again, from the other side — the rebuilt box a customer would recover on tonight also
lacks R-234 and R-237. Golden used: vzdump-lxc-9100-2026_08_06-23_58_32.tar.zst.
Raw mounts survived the rebuild (/dev/sdb /mnt/adatok, /dev/sdc /mnt/mentes), so the R-220
precondition is present for the morning.
Phase B.3 — THE HALT (§7)
The machine is at the claim screen and is waiting for the operator. Verified over HTTP from the appliance, with no guest shell:
GET / -> 200, <title>A szerver beállítása — Felhom
forms: POST /claim · POST /claim/request-new-code
claimed: null · offbox config: absent (pristine rebuilt state)
A claim code has already been requested and emailed, through the customer-facing „Új kód kérése"
path (POST /claim/request-new-code → 200, „Ha az e-mail cím regisztrálva van, elküldtük a kódot"),
so the morning is paste a code, not request one and then paste it.
The reset-code hatch was NOT used here and will not be — it is a guest command line and would fail the rule this walk exists to measure. It was used once, in Phase A, where §3 permits it.
Honesty about the no-guest-command-line rule
The customer-journey steps from the destruction onward are driven over HTTP from the appliance to
the guest's island address, which is what a browser would do. Some instrumentation reads —
pct exec … python3 against settings.json, pct list, the restic listing — are guest command lines
and are counted as such. They are not steps of the journey: none of them changed state, and none was
needed to progress it. The distinction matters because conflating the two is how a walk claims a
property it does not have.