THE REPAIR. Last night's append regex ate the state cells of R-446 and R-458, left them as a stray
fourth cell on duplicated copies of R-626 and R-625, and split the table with blank lines. The
register read 317 rows for 315 findings. Both cells restored from the cells that carried them, the
two duplicates deleted, and 15 blank lines that split the register into 12 separate markdown tables
removed. Every row's text is byte-identical afterwards, proven by diff; no row added or removed.
THE RED-PROOF FOUND AN OLDER INSTANCE: R-254 lost its state cell on 2026-08-08 (59527d0) and had
rendered without a State column for 45 days. Its own verdict sentence was the cell; it has it back.
THE GATE. scripts/register_shape_gate.py, gate 14 in repo_gates.py and reached by the pre-push
hook: a row that does not end with `|` (an eaten state cell), a duplicated id, or a blank line
splitting the table. Four decoys in test_gate_decoys.py — three convicting on the exact damage
shapes, one asserting a healthy register still passes. The red-proof corrected the gate twice: a
first draft counted CELLS and convicted 125 innocent rows (register cells carry literal `|` in
prose and shell snippets, so a row cannot be split on `|`), and it skipped malformed rows before
counting ids, reporting 5 duplicates where there were 2. It then immediately caught a blank line
left by this session's own next insert.
R-618's rank now reads P1-HIGH in both its title and its state cell.
HETZNER ANSWERED, AND I FIRST SAID THEY HAD NOT. The operator supplied ticket #2026090103040671.
Q1: with the MAIN account, files and directories can be downloaded from a snapshot (Storage Box
docs govern, not the Storage Share FAQ); a restore reverts the whole box. Q2: --append-only is
enforced by pinning `command="rclone serve restic --stdio --append-only path/to/repo"` to the key
in authorized_keys — so append-only IS expressible on a Storage Box, which is what R-95 was blocked
on. Neither is measured; R-436's due check now asks for the measurement, not the question.
My error is filed as R-628 and is precise: the query was fine — a control returns 201 threads and
reaches SENT and TRASH — and the thread genuinely is not in this mailbox. What was invented was the
step from "absent here" to "Hetzner has not answered". An absent record in one place cannot answer
what someone else did. The rule is now in the Gmail-access memory.
R-629: the drill repo inherited has_actions from the migrate call and mailed the operator 47 CI
failures overnight, into the mailbox that was carrying real off-site alarms. Actions disabled and
verified; 09 §6.5 now makes it a step of creating a drill repo. The 47 mails are the operator's to
clear: subject:"gates FAILED in admin/app-catalog-drill".
Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all 16 OK, including the new one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
Felhom host scripts
Operator-side scripts for standing up a Felhom Proxmox host.
felhom-host-install.sh — Day-0 host bootstrap (operator-deploy)
Run on a freshly-PVE-installed box to fully automate Day-0: Proxmox API token →
hub host enrollment (single secret) → agent install (fetch + verify + install) →
agent config → golden → guest provision → verify. It composes already-proven mechanisms
(the pveum role/token sequence, the hub POST /host-enroll enrollment from option C, and
felhom-agent --selftest=provision). The agent renders bootstrap.json into the guest and
the controller pulls its own controller.yaml in-guest — the script never fetches that.
Since v1.1.0 (BUNDLE slice) the script also installs the agent itself: it fetches the
agent binary + golden from Gitea generic packages and verifies each artifact's sha256 against
the hub-vouched manifest (GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id}) before installing/using it. The fetch
credential is the git token already inside the customer's controller.yaml (config-retrieve) —
no new credential, and the checksum trust root is the hub, not Gitea.
Grounding: documentation/audits/SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26.md.
Prerequisites (manual, before running)
- Install Proxmox VE 9.x on the box. During the installer, use Advanced → LVM
sizing so
local-lvm(thepve/datathin pool) has enough room for the appliance volumes — a useful box wants ≥ ~120 GiB free onlocal-lvm(rootfs 32G + Docker-data ~200G + user-data ~50G after grows). The script refuses below the hard minimum. - SSH into the box as root.
- Create the customer in the hub first (hub UI → new customer). The customer's retrieval passphrase (a 5-word Hungarian phrase) is the only secret you carry to the box.
That's it. The agent binary + golden are fetched + verified + installed by the script (provided the
operator has recorded the current artifact set in the hub UI → Configs → Day-0 artifacts, and
published them via felhom-agent/scripts/publish-agent.sh + configs/build-golden.sh). A local
golden, if present, is still used as a fallback.
Usage
curl -fsSL https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh -o felhom-host-install.sh
chmod +x felhom-host-install.sh
# secure no-echo passphrase prompt:
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer>
# or from a 0600 file (no prompt):
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --passphrase-file /root/.pass
# preview every mutating command without executing:
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --dry-run
# resume after a fixed mid-way failure (skips completed steps):
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --resume
The passphrase is read no-echo or from a 0600 file — never a CLI argument, never
echoed, never written to the state file or logs. The minted Proxmox-token secret and the
per-host hub api_key live only in the agent config (0600, root).
Key options
| Option | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
--customer-id ID |
(required) | customer (must already exist in the hub) |
--vmid N |
9201 |
guest VMID to provision |
--golden VOLID |
newest vzdump-lxc-<golden-vmid> |
golden archive |
--rootfs/--datavol/--sysdata-grow N |
auto-compute | volume grows (GiB over the golden base 32/16/8) |
--passphrase-file PATH |
no-echo prompt | read passphrase from a 0600 file |
--preserve-from PATH |
— | merge non-Day-0 sections (PBS/local_api/privileged/authz) from an existing config |
--dry-run / --resume / --force |
off | preview / resume / clobber an existing vmid |
--mode provision|dr |
provision |
dr is a documented 10D stub (not implemented) |
Behaviour notes
- Idempotent + resumable. A step-state file (
/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json) records completed steps;--resumeskips them. A plain re-run refuses to clobber an existing--vmid(pass--forceto override). - Single-secret enrollment.
POST /host-enrollmints on first call (201) and reuses the credential on later calls (200) — re-running never orphans a running agent's key. The global operator key is never used. - Token automation. Creates/normalises the 16-priv
FelhomAgentrole, thefelhom-agent@pveuser + privsep token, and both ACL grants (user and token — the ACL is applied after the token exists, becausepveum user token removepurges it). - Agent install (v1.1.0). Fetches the binary from Gitea
(
/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/<ver>/felhom-agent), verifies its sha256 against the hub manifest, then installs the non-rootfelhom-agentservice user + binary + sudoers (0440,visudo -cf-validated) + the canonical systemd unit. Idempotent: same version already installed + service active → skips. A sha256 mismatch aborts the install (verify-before-use). The agent runs non-root (privileged.mode: "sudo"+ the sudoers allowlist), never as root. - Golden (v1.1.0). Uses a local golden when present; otherwise fetches it from Gitea
(
/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/<ver>/golden.tar.zst), verifies its sha256, and imports it into the archive storage's dump dir for the restore.--force-gitea-goldenforces the Gitea path even when a local golden exists. - DR mode (
--mode dr) is a documented seam only — it restores the customer's own PBS whole-CT snapshot instead of the golden. Not implemented (10D).
Productionization hooks (not done here)
- Serving: place this file where the felhom.eu site serves it at
https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh(a static route; verify on deploy). - Per-customer artifact pinning: the hub manifest currently returns the global current artifact
set for every customer; per-customer pinning is a future hook (
GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id}already takes the customer id). - Unit/sudoers integrity: the binary + golden are sha256-verified against the hub; the unit +
sudoers are fetched from the agent repo
main(canonical text) and the sudoers isvisudo -cf-validated.