Files
felhom.eu/scripts
admin 01a8155c5a iso v1.26.0: the PUBLIC release image — no answer file, interactive install, day-0 by .deb
Design inputs: SPIKE-universal-iso-{1,2,3,4}-2026-07-31.md. Every choice below is a measurement.

NEW: scripts/iso/pkg/ — the felhom-bootstrap .deb, built from committed source.
  Two files only (script + unit), NOT three: felhom-bootstrap.sh:91 reads /etc/felhom/bootstrap.env
  only 'if [[ -r ]]', and its defaults at :95-96 are EXACTLY what the pairing env set
  (build-felhom-iso.sh:257-258) — so shipping it would add a 0600 file to a public package to express
  values the script already defaults to. NO dependencies: the binaries it calls run at FIRST BOOT,
  not at postinst time, so SPIKE 4's open 'dpkg --configure -a' ordering question does not arise.
  The postinst is structurally incapable of failing (no 'set -e', every statement guarded, ends
  'exit 0'); build-deb.sh self-asserts G8/G9 and REFUSES to emit a package that violates them.

iso-repack.sh — two changes, both narrowing rather than deleting:
  - R-155 guard: now applies to FELHOM_MENU=single ONLY. It protected the single-entry mode's promise
    (one button labelled 'install' must not drop into a disk-picker); a release image carries no
    auto-installer-mode.toml BY DESIGN (gate G1), so refusing it would be the guard firing on the
    shape it describes rather than the one it prevents.
  - the menu collapse now has a release mode: two INTERACTIVE entries, Graphical default, timeout 15.
    Entry-count and banned-token gates are per-mode; the six-token list is UNCHANGED for single mode.
  - .deb injection into /proxmox/packages/, with a skip-list collision check (a colliding name would
    be dropped silently — the inert-payload class) and a post-remaster assertion that it landed in
    final.iso, not merely in the extract tree.

build-felhom-iso.sh — --release: no profile, no root hash, no answer.toml, no prepare-iso at all.
  Skipping prepare-iso is what removes the Automated entry by construction, since the stock grub.cfg
  emits it only inside 'if [ -f auto-installer-mode.toml ]'.

R-128 RULING — FIXED, by correcting the claim rather than inventing an assertion for it. The comment
  said ISO_VERSION 'aligns with SCRIPT_VERSION'; nothing evaluated it and the two had drifted. The
  coupling does not exist: the ISO is frozen, felhom-host-install.sh is fetched at run time from main
  (R-94/R-110), so an assertion would invent a constraint. Comment corrected, ISO_VERSION -> 1.26.0.

Release gate G6 AMENDED before the build, with its reasoning recorded in the runbook: the six-token
  ban existed to keep users away from the manual installer, which the ruling makes the product.
  'proxtui' (the TUI installer we ship) and 'nomodeset' (its graphics fallback) are dropped for
  release images; proxdebug/Rescue Boot/memtest/fwsetup stay banned in both modes.
2026-07-31 16:39:47 +02:00
..

Felhom host scripts

Operator-side scripts for standing up a Felhom Proxmox host.

felhom-host-install.sh — Day-0 host bootstrap (operator-deploy)

Run on a freshly-PVE-installed box to fully automate Day-0: Proxmox API token → hub host enrollment (single secret) → agent install (fetch + verify + install) → agent config → golden → guest provision → verify. It composes already-proven mechanisms (the pveum role/token sequence, the hub POST /host-enroll enrollment from option C, and felhom-agent --selftest=provision). The agent renders bootstrap.json into the guest and the controller pulls its own controller.yaml in-guest — the script never fetches that.

Since v1.1.0 (BUNDLE slice) the script also installs the agent itself: it fetches the agent binary + golden from Gitea generic packages and verifies each artifact's sha256 against the hub-vouched manifest (GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id}) before installing/using it. The fetch credential is the git token already inside the customer's controller.yaml (config-retrieve) — no new credential, and the checksum trust root is the hub, not Gitea.

Grounding: documentation/audits/SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26.md.

Prerequisites (manual, before running)

  1. Install Proxmox VE 9.x on the box. During the installer, use Advanced → LVM sizing so local-lvm (the pve/data thin pool) has enough room for the appliance volumes — a useful box wants ≥ ~120 GiB free on local-lvm (rootfs 32G + Docker-data ~200G + user-data ~50G after grows). The script refuses below the hard minimum.
  2. SSH into the box as root.
  3. Create the customer in the hub first (hub UI → new customer). The customer's retrieval passphrase (a 5-word Hungarian phrase) is the only secret you carry to the box.

That's it. The agent binary + golden are fetched + verified + installed by the script (provided the operator has recorded the current artifact set in the hub UI → Configs → Day-0 artifacts, and published them via felhom-agent/scripts/publish-agent.sh + configs/build-golden.sh). A local golden, if present, is still used as a fallback.

Usage

curl -fsSL https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh -o felhom-host-install.sh
chmod +x felhom-host-install.sh

# secure no-echo passphrase prompt:
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer>

# or from a 0600 file (no prompt):
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --passphrase-file /root/.pass

# preview every mutating command without executing:
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --dry-run

# resume after a fixed mid-way failure (skips completed steps):
sudo ./felhom-host-install.sh --customer-id <customer> --resume

The passphrase is read no-echo or from a 0600 file — never a CLI argument, never echoed, never written to the state file or logs. The minted Proxmox-token secret and the per-host hub api_key live only in the agent config (0600, root).

Key options

Option Default Purpose
--customer-id ID (required) customer (must already exist in the hub)
--vmid N 9201 guest VMID to provision
--golden VOLID newest vzdump-lxc-<golden-vmid> golden archive
--rootfs/--datavol/--sysdata-grow N auto-compute volume grows (GiB over the golden base 32/16/8)
--passphrase-file PATH no-echo prompt read passphrase from a 0600 file
--preserve-from PATH merge non-Day-0 sections (PBS/local_api/privileged/authz) from an existing config
--dry-run / --resume / --force off preview / resume / clobber an existing vmid
--mode provision|dr provision dr is a documented 10D stub (not implemented)

Behaviour notes

  • Idempotent + resumable. A step-state file (/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json) records completed steps; --resume skips them. A plain re-run refuses to clobber an existing --vmid (pass --force to override).
  • Single-secret enrollment. POST /host-enroll mints on first call (201) and reuses the credential on later calls (200) — re-running never orphans a running agent's key. The global operator key is never used.
  • Token automation. Creates/normalises the 16-priv FelhomAgent role, the felhom-agent@pve user + privsep token, and both ACL grants (user and token — the ACL is applied after the token exists, because pveum user token remove purges it).
  • Agent install (v1.1.0). Fetches the binary from Gitea (/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/<ver>/felhom-agent), verifies its sha256 against the hub manifest, then installs the non-root felhom-agent service user + binary + sudoers (0440, visudo -cf-validated) + the canonical systemd unit. Idempotent: same version already installed + service active → skips. A sha256 mismatch aborts the install (verify-before-use). The agent runs non-root (privileged.mode: "sudo" + the sudoers allowlist), never as root.
  • Golden (v1.1.0). Uses a local golden when present; otherwise fetches it from Gitea (/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/<ver>/golden.tar.zst), verifies its sha256, and imports it into the archive storage's dump dir for the restore. --force-gitea-golden forces the Gitea path even when a local golden exists.
  • DR mode (--mode dr) is a documented seam only — it restores the customer's own PBS whole-CT snapshot instead of the golden. Not implemented (10D).

Productionization hooks (not done here)

  • Serving: place this file where the felhom.eu site serves it at https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh (a static route; verify on deploy).
  • Per-customer artifact pinning: the hub manifest currently returns the global current artifact set for every customer; per-customer pinning is a future hook (GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id} already takes the customer id).
  • Unit/sudoers integrity: the binary + golden are sha256-verified against the hub; the unit + sudoers are fetched from the agent repo main (canonical text) and the sudoers is visudo -cf-validated.