# Felhom scripts — Changelog

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.8.0 — install the guarded-mkfs wrapper (Impl-1 Part B) (2026-07-01)

Companion to felhom-agent v0.54.0 (format-safety foundation). During agent install, fetch + install the
guarded-mkfs wrapper so the agent's format path is safe on any box.

- **New step in `step_agent_install`:** fetch `configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh` from Gitea, `bash -n`
  validate, `install -m0755 -o root -g root` → `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded`. Installed BEFORE
  the sudoers (which now allowlists ONLY the wrapper, not raw `mkfs.*`), so the ordering is gap-free.
- The agent v0.54.0 sudoers (fetched by the same step) drops the raw `mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/* / mkfs.xfs -f
  /dev/*` allowlist and permits only `felhom-mkfs-guarded /dev/* *`, plus read-only `pvs`/`zpool` for
  the agent's unclaimed-disk guard. No other host-install change.
- `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings). Live-validated on felhom-pve (agent v0.54.0 deploy):
  wrapper refuses the OS disk + an LVM-PV partition, raw mkfs is sudo-denied, an unclaimed throwaway
  disk formats; the agent guard's sudo reads (pvs/lsblk/zpool) all work as the felhom-agent user.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.7.0 — 3b-fix: `Datastore.Audit` box-wide (restore drive visibility) (2026-07-01)

Fixes a regression the v1.6.0 pool-scoped ACL introduced: `Datastore.Audit` was placed in the
per-storage `Store` role (granted only on `local`/`local-lvm`/`felhom-pbs`), which **excluded the
enrolled removable drives** `felhom-usb`/`felhom-flash`. The agent enumerates storage via
`ListStorage`/`NodeStorage` (both gated by `Datastore.Audit` — `internal/storage/observe.go`), so it
could no longer SEE the drives → false "Meghajtó leválasztva" (drive detached) alerts + drives absent
from the agent-view. (The v1.6.0 swap's "felhom-usb → 403" was mis-read as blast-radius success;
felhom-usb is Felhom's OWN customer drive, not an out-of-scope object.)

- **`Datastore.Audit` moved from Store → Base** (`PVE_PRIVS_BASE` now `"Sys.Audit SDN.Use
  Datastore.Audit"`; `PVE_PRIVS_STORE` now `"Datastore.Allocate Datastore.AllocateSpace"`). Audit is
  read-only metadata, so box-wide Audit restores visibility of ALL storages (incl. dynamically-enrolled
  drives — no per-drive grant ever needed) while the **write** privs (`Allocate`/`AllocateSpace`) stay
  per-storage → write/allocate blast-radius containment is UNCHANGED. Confirmed at source: the agent
  creates no PVE storage (no `POST /storage`/`pvesm add`); drives are dir-storages it observes + mounts
  via host ops, so they need only Audit, never Allocate.
- **`apply_scoped_acl` reordered** Base-before-Store (role + grant) so a RE-APPLY on a live box adds
  `Audit@/` before Store drops its per-storage Audit → gap-free (the agent never loses enumeration).
- `remove_scoped_acl` / `--uninstall` / `--rescope-acl` operate by role NAME and inherit the corrected
  privs automatically (no other change).
- **Live-repaired felhom-pve** (two `pveum role modify`, Base first — no agent stop/restart): drives
  reappeared (agent-view 3→5 storages), detach alerts cleared. Re-tested under the scoped token: drives
  readable (was 403), write-containment intact (vzdump→felhom-usb still 403; out-of-pool guest 403),
  PBS Store grant unchanged. `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings).
- **NOT physically run** (source-confirmed, no `Datastore.Allocate` in the path): a brand-new-drive UI
  enrollment (needs a spare USB) — the host-ops/Audit path is unchanged from pre-3b.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.6.0 — pool-scoped token ACL (3-role) + `--rescope-acl` retrofit (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #4 phase b (script half; agent half = v0.53.0). Moves the agent token's dangerous
privileges off `/` (which spanned every guest + storage) to `/pool/felhom` + `/storage/<targets>`, so on
a shared box the token can only touch Felhom's own guests + storages. Validated by
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-pool-scoped-acl-2026-07-01.md` (PASS) — implemented here.

- **3-role scoped ACL (`step_token` rewrite).** Replaces the single `FelhomAgent` role granted at `/`
  with three roles, each granted to BOTH the user AND the token (privsep intersection): `FelhomAgentGuest`
  (`VM.*` + `Pool.Allocate`) @ `/pool/felhom`; `FelhomAgentStore` (`Datastore.*`) @ each of
  `PVE_STORAGES` (default `local local-lvm felhom-pbs` — the offsite PBS MUST be included, SPIKE
  residual #1; `--acl-storages` overrides); `FelhomAgentBase` (`Sys.Audit SDN.Use`) @ `/`. Helpers
  `apply_scoped_acl`/`remove_scoped_acl`/`_grant`/`_ensure_role`.
- **Pool before token.** `ensure_felhom_pool` runs at the top of `step_token` (always, incl.
  `--skip-provision`) so `/pool/felhom` exists before it's granted on.
- **Re-install safety.** `step_token` also removes the pre-3b broad `/` grant + `FelhomAgent` role if
  present (`remove_old_broad_acl`, tolerate-absent), so a re-install can't leave the old grant unioned
  with the scoped one. The post-provision `pool_add_guest` is gone (the agent's `restore --pool` makes
  the guest a member atomically — v0.53.0).
- **`--rescope-acl` retrofit** (new mode, mirrors `--adopt-pool`): migrate an existing install — ensure
  the pool + guest membership, apply the scoped grants, THEN remove the old broad grant (add-before-
  remove: the token is never grant-less mid-migration). Prints the "now deploy agent ≥ v0.53.0"
  ordering reminder. Idempotent + dry-run-aware. **SUPERVISED** (run with the agent stopped — the scoped
  ACL and the pool-param agent are mutually dependent; §13 of the task).
- **`--uninstall`** now removes the scoped grants + 3 roles AND the pre-3b broad grant/role (both
  tolerate-absent → works on either shape), keeping the pool delete-if-empty (v1.5.0).
- **Validated on felhom-pve** (dry-run): T-A fresh install (pool-before-token, 3 roles once, scoped
  grants incl. `/storage/felhom-pbs`), `--rescope-acl` (add scoped → remove old `FelhomAgent`), T-F
  uninstall (old-shape cleanup + pool not-empty skip). `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings).
  **The live rescope + agent swap is the supervised STOP** — not run here.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.5.0 — `felhom` pool by default + `--adopt-pool` retrofit + uninstall teardown (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #4 phase a. Every Felhom-managed guest now joins a dedicated **`felhom` pool**
for fleet uniformity (and as the environment the later pool-scoped ACL — 3b — will spike against). All
pool ops run as `root@pam` from the installer, so there is **NO agent/token/ACL change** and zero
permission-model risk (`PVE_PRIVS` untouched; the `FelhomAgent` token stays scoped at `/`).

- **New `felhom` pool default.** `step_provision` calls `ensure_felhom_pool` (create if absent,
  idempotent) and, after a successful provision, adds the guest via `pveum pool modify felhom -vms
  <vmid>` (skip-if-already-member). New helpers `pool_exists` / `pool_members` / `ensure_felhom_pool` /
  `pool_add_guest`; const `PVE_POOL="felhom"`. PVE 9 syntax + `/pools` JSON shape confirmed live before
  wiring (`pveum pool add|delete|modify`; `pvesh get /pools` → `[{poolid,comment}]`, `/pools/<id>` →
  `{members:[{vmid,…}]}`).
- **`--adopt-pool` retrofit mode.** Non-destructive: adds an EXISTING Felhom guest to the pool (creating
  it if needed), resolving the guest from `--vmid` else the recorded `provisioned_vmid`. Reuses the
  ours-check (`/etc/felhom-bootstrap` mount) — refuses a non-Felhom guest unless `--force`. Touches ONLY
  pool membership: never reconfigures/restarts the guest, never contacts the hub. Idempotent
  (skip-if-member).
- **`--uninstall` pool teardown (step 5b).** After the pveum removal, deletes the `felhom` pool **only
  if empty** (a destroyed guest is auto-removed from its pool); a pool that still has members is left
  with a `log_skip` naming them. Not reached on the Spec-1 safe-skip path (other Felhom guests remain).
- **Validated on felhom-pve** (dry-run + SAFE live): T-A fresh-install dry-run shows the pool create +
  membership lines; T-B **live adopt of guest 9201** → `pvesh get /pools/felhom` lists 9201, guest still
  running, config unchanged (the demo node is now pool-uniform); re-run = no-op; T-B' non-Felhom vmid →
  refusal; T-C uninstall dry-run → "pool felhom not empty (members: 9201) — leaving it". `bash -n` +
  `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings; the 2 pre-existing SC2015 in `step_verify` unchanged).
- **NOT changed:** `PVE_PRIVS`, the ACL grants, the agent, the provision-call args. 3b (pool-scoped ACL
  + agent restore-into-pool under a scoped token) is the separate spike-gated task.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.4.0 — appliance CPU/RAM cap passthrough (`--cores` / `--memory`) (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #3 (host-install half; the mechanism is agent v0.52.0). Lets an operator cap the
provisioned guest so a trial appliance on a SHARED production Proxmox doesn't pressure the colleague's
existing guests.

- **`--cores N` / `--memory M` (MiB)** — optional; passed through to the agent's `--selftest=provision`
  as `-cores`/`-memory`. `0`/unset = keep the golden's baked sizes (unchanged behaviour). New vars
  `CPU_CORES`/`MEM_MIB`; `usage()` header gains an "Appliance cap (optional)" group.
- **Conditional passthrough** — `step_provision` builds a `cap_args` array and appends the flags to BOTH
  the dry-run log and the real agent call **only when set**. An agent < v0.52.0 would reject an unknown
  flag, so the flags are never sent unless the operator opts in (see the deploy dependency below).
- **Pre-flight sanity WARN (soft, provision only)** — if `--cores` > host `nproc` or `--memory` > host
  `MemTotal`, `log_warn` "the cap won't protect other guests"; never `die` (the operator may know better).
- **Deploy dependency:** a fresh install using `--cores`/`--memory` needs the hub artifact manifest to
  serve **agent ≥ v0.52.0**.
- **Validated dry-run on felhom-pve:** `--cores 2 --memory 4096 --dry-run` → provision command shows
  `-cores 2 -memory 4096`; without the flags → neither present; `--cores 64 --memory 65536` → both WARN
  lines (host 4 cores / ~15771 MiB). `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings; the 2 pre-existing
  SC2015 in `step_verify` unchanged).

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.3.0 — `--uninstall` (clean revert) + pre-flight guards (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #1+#2. Adds a first-class, guarded **`--uninstall`** teardown so an operator can
cleanly back out of a trial install, plus three provision pre-flight guards that stop common footguns.
Script-only; no agent/hub/controller change.

- **`--uninstall` (local host teardown — no hub contact, no passphrase).** Reverses an install in the
  install-order's reverse: **guest → agent(unit/sudoers/binary/state/user) → pveum(ACL,token,user,role)
  → golden(opt-in) → state file.** Every mutation goes through `run()` so `--dry-run` prints the full
  plan and executes nothing. Safety:
  - **Ours-check:** refuses to destroy a guest that lacks the `/etc/felhom-bootstrap` bind mount (matched
    by the constant guest *path*, not a hardcoded `mpN` slot — on the demo host it's `mp9`), unless
    `--force`.
  - **Typed confirmation:** must type the vmid to confirm PERMANENT destruction (read from `/dev/tty`;
    skipped only under `--dry-run`, where nothing is destroyed).
  - **Other-guests guard:** if any OTHER Felhom guest remains, destroys only the target and **leaves the
    agent + PVE token + state in place** (re-run with `--force` to remove host-level anyway — orphans the
    others).
  - **Never removes the `sudo` package**; never contacts the hub (the host record intentionally persists).
  - Presence-checked + idempotent: an already-absent guest/unit/sudoers/binary/user/ACL/token/role is a
    tolerated skip, not an error. The `pveum role delete` runs only after its ACL grants are gone (PVE
    refuses to delete a referenced role). Confirmed PVE 9 ACL-delete form:
    `pveum acl delete / --users|--tokens <x> --roles FelhomAgent`.
  - Target vmid resolves from `--vmid`, else the recorded `provisioned_vmid` (else dies). A `--vmid` that
    disagrees with the recorded one needs `--force`.
  - **`--remove-golden`:** with `--uninstall`, also delete the golden vzdump from the archive storage
    (`pvesm free`); otherwise it is left in place.
- **Install state now records `customer_id` + `provisioned_vmid`** (new `_state_put`/`_state_get` helpers,
  dry-run-guarded like `_state_mark`; the `completed[]` shape is untouched) so a later `--uninstall`
  resolves its target automatically and safely.
- **Pre-flight guards (provision mode):**
  - **Multi-node guard** — on a 2+-node cluster, `die` (naming the nodes) unless `--node` is explicit
    (new `NODE_EXPLICIT`); single-node keeps the current auto-pick. No-op under `--skip-provision`.
  - **Archive-storage-exists guard** — verify `--archive-storage` appears in `pvesm status` (else `die`);
    no-op under `--skip-provision`.
  - **RAM floor (WARN, never fatal)** — warn when `MemAvailable < 2048 MiB`.
  All three run inside `step_preflight` (before any mutation) so they also fire under `--dry-run`.
- **Validated dry-run-only on felhom-pve** (single-node, live guest 9201): T-A full uninstall plan, T-C
  not-ours refusal (red-proof), archive-missing `die`, RAM line, other-guests detector, state round-trip;
  confirmed 9201 + agent + pveum + state untouched after all dry-runs. `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean
  (0 new warnings vs. baseline; the 2 pre-existing SC2015 in `step_verify` are unchanged). **NOT yet
  live-validated (awaiting a supervised run):** a real live `--uninstall` (guest destroy + pveum removal)
  and the multi-node guard on an actual cluster.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.2.0 — /dev/tty passphrase read + vmid auto-detect (2026-07-01)

Two operator-experience fixes so a colleague can install online (via the hub's new "Option 1: Online
install" one-liner) and onto a host that already runs a guest at 9201.

- **Passphrase prompt reads from `/dev/tty`, not stdin** (`read_passphrase`). `read -rsp … < /dev/tty`
  makes the no-echo prompt work regardless of how stdin is wired — both download-then-run **and**
  `curl … | sudo bash` (where stdin is the pipe). Strictly more correct; the `--passphrase-file` path is
  unchanged. The passphrase is still never on argv / in logs / in the state file.
- **VMID auto-detect (`--vmid` now optional-smart).** New `VMID_EXPLICIT` flag (set by `--vmid`). The
  pre-flight vmid guard now determines "in use" against the **`pct list` + `qm list`** id-set (LXC and
  VMs share the id space — more complete than the old `pct status`, which only knew LXC):
  - **explicit `--vmid`** → unchanged deterministic behavior: die if the id is in use unless `--force`
    (destructive over-provision).
  - **default 9201, in use, no `--force`** → **auto-pick the next free id** (scan upward from 9201 over
    the used-set) and **ask to confirm** from the terminal (`read … < /dev/tty`, `[y/N]`); proceed on
    yes, `die "no free vmid confirmed"` otherwise. Never a silent auto-pick.
  - **default 9201 + `--force`** → over-provision 9201 (destructive) without prompting, as before.
  - New helpers `used_vmids` / `_vmid_in_use` / `next_free_vmid`. `--vmid` help text + `usage()` updated.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.1.0 — self-install the agent + fetch the golden from Gitea (2026-06-28)

The script now **installs the agent itself** (the last big manual Day-0 prerequisite is gone). It
fetches the agent binary + golden from Gitea generic packages and **verifies each against the
hub-vouched artifact manifest** before installing/using it. BUNDLE slice; pairs with hub v0.16.0
(artifact manifest endpoint + operator UI) and felhom-agent v0.43.0 (canonical unit + publish).

- **New step `5/8 agent install`** (before agent-config): resolves the manifest
  (`GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id}`, passphrase) + the git fetch token (from the customer's
  `controller.yaml` via config-retrieve — **NO new credential**); fetches
  `/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/<ver>/felhom-agent`, **verifies sha256 vs the hub
  manifest** (aborts on mismatch — verify-before-use), backs up any existing binary, installs
  `0755 /usr/local/bin/felhom-agent`; ensures the non-root `felhom-agent` system user; installs the
  canonical sudoers (`0440`, `visudo -cf`-validated) + systemd unit; `daemon-reload` + enable. Idempotent:
  same version already installed + service active → skip.
- **`--skip-provision`:** install + configure + verify the agent (incl. golden fetch+verify) but do NOT
  provision a guest — the agent-only path for re-installing/upgrading the agent on a host that already
  has live guests. Adds an agent-only `step_verify_agent` (binary + non-root service active + a
  `--selftest=hub` collect-report).
- **New step `7/8 golden`:** local auto-discovery stays the default/fallback; otherwise fetches
  `/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/<ver>/golden.tar.zst`, **verifies sha256**, and imports it
  into the archive storage's dump dir for the restore. `--force-gitea-golden` forces the Gitea path.
- **Non-root agent model:** the agent now runs as `felhom-agent` with `privileged.mode: "sudo"` (was the
  dev/CI `direct`+root shortcut). The config is `chown`ed to the service user (0600) so the daemon can
  read it; `systemctl is-active` after restart is the real proof the non-root user can read the config.
- **Pre-flight relaxed:** a missing agent binary is no longer fatal (step 5 installs it); the local
  golden requirement is deferred to step 7.
- **Trust model:** checksum **trust root = the hub** (manifest), not Gitea; the fetch credential is the
  existing config-retrieve git token; artifacts are pinned to a version (never `:latest`).
- **Secrets:** the git token is a never-logged runtime carrier (cleared on EXIT alongside the passphrase
  / pve-token / hub api_key); the sudoers is `0440` and `visudo -cf`-validated before install.
- `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.0.0 — Day-0 host bootstrap (provision mode) (2026-06-26)

First release. A single operator-run script that automates Day-0 on a freshly-PVE-installed
host: Proxmox API token → hub host enrollment (option C, single secret) → agent config →
guest provision → verify. Composes proven mechanisms (the `pveum` role/token sequence, hub
`POST /host-enroll`, `felhom-agent --selftest=provision`); grounded by
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26.md`.

- **7 steps, idempotent + resumable** via `/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json`: pre-flight →
  Proxmox token → compute grows → host-enroll → agent config → provision → verify.
- **Single-secret** (the retrieval passphrase): read no-echo or from a 0600 file, never on
  argv/logs/state. The global operator key never touches the box.
- **pveum automation:** 16-priv `FelhomAgent` role (create-or-modify), `felhom-agent@pve` user,
  privsep token (reuse-if-working else rotate), and **both** ACL grants applied **after** the
  token exists (token-remove purges the token ACL).
- **Auto-discovery:** golden archive (newest `vzdump-lxc-<golden-vmid>`), PVE node name, vmbr0
  bridge IP for the local-api, and the served-leaf TLS fingerprint pin.
- **Safety:** pre-flight fails fast (root, PVE 9.x, local-lvm headroom, hub reachable,
  customer+passphrase valid via read-only `GET /config/{id}`, golden resolvable); refuses to
  clobber an existing `--vmid` without `--force`; `--dry-run` previews every mutation;
  `--preserve-from` keeps operator infra (PBS/local_api/privileged/authz) on re-deploys.
- **`--mode dr`:** documented 10D stub (restore customer PBS snapshot instead of golden) — not
  implemented.
- **Live-validated** end-to-end on `felhom-pve`: authorized wipe of demo guest 9201 →
  re-provision from the golden → controller config-pull + public tunnel `HTTP 200` →
  host-report of guest 9201 → idempotent `--resume` no-op. (One ordering bug — token ACL
  applied before rotation — was found and fixed during the live run.)