# Runbook — out-of-band secrets (felhom-system) **Model:** out-of-band `kubectl` + this runbook (DECISION model **A**). Secret *values* are **never** committed to git. The manifests in `manifests/` carry only **placeholders + comments** that point here. The live values live in the operator's out-of-band store (password manager / escrow) and in the cluster as Secrets created imperatively with the commands below. > The `felhom` ArgoCD app syncs the **entire** `manifests/` dir, so any Secret committed there is > re-applied on every sync. Secrets that must stay out of git are therefore created as objects that are > **not present in `manifests/`** (ArgoCD does not manage them), e.g. `Secret/resend-api` below. --- ## Resend API key — `Secret/resend-api` **What uses it (live consumers):** | Consumer | How it reads the key | |----------|----------------------| | `hub` (`Deployment/hub`) | env `RESEND_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`; the hub binary's `RESEND_API_KEY` env override fills `notifications.resend_api_key` (the committed ConfigMap field is an empty placeholder). | | `contact-mailer` (`Deployment/contact-mailer`) | env `RESEND_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`. | | `healthchecks` (**not currently deployed**) | when deployed, wire `EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD` to `secretKeyRef: resend-api/RESEND_API_KEY`; do **not** inline the value into `felhom.secret.yaml`. | | Gmail "Send mail as" (`info@` / `admin@felhom.eu`) | external — the key is the SMTP password; updated manually in Gmail settings, **not** in the cluster. | **Where the value lives out-of-band:** the operator's password manager, entry "Felhom Resend API key (app-relay + alerts)". Send-scoped. **Never** written to a file on a host, the guest, or any commit. ### Create / rotate the Secret The key is available as the `RESEND_API` env var in `kisfenyo`'s shell on the build host (192.168.0.180). It is exported from `~/.bashrc`, so it is present in an **interactive** shell (`bash -ic`) but **not** in a plain non-interactive `ssh host 'cmd'`. Create (or update) the Secret without ever echoing the value — render the Secret YAML in the (non-sudo) interactive shell where `$RESEND_API` is set, and pipe it into `sudo kubectl apply`: ```bash # on 192.168.0.180, as kisfenyo: bash -ic 'kubectl create secret generic resend-api -n felhom-system \ --from-literal=RESEND_API_KEY="$RESEND_API" \ --dry-run=client -o yaml' | sudo kubectl apply -f - ``` Then roll the consumers so they pick up the new value: ```bash sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout restart deploy/hub deploy/contact-mailer sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout status deploy/hub deploy/contact-mailer --timeout=120s ``` ### Verify a consumer can send - **contact-mailer:** submit the website contact form at (or, if `DEBUG=true`, `curl -X POST https://felhom.eu/api/debug/test`) → mail arrives at `info@felhom.eu`. - **hub:** trigger a notification (or the dispatcher test path) → mail arrives. - **Gmail:** send a test from `info@felhom.eu` → delivers. ### Rotating away from a compromised key (ordered — load-bearing) 1. Create the **new** send-scoped key in Resend; store it out-of-band; set `RESEND_API` on host 180. 2. Run the create-Secret + rollout above with the new value. 3. Update Gmail "Send mail as" SMTP password to the new key. 4. **Verify every consumer sends on the new key** (above) — do this **before** step 5. 5. Only then: **delete the old key** in Resend. Re-verify one consumer still sends afterwards. > Never delete the old key before step 4 passes — a premature delete breaks live mail. --- ## Operator/global bearer key — `Secret/report-api` The hub API's global bearer (`api.report_api_key`) — the operator's own key (e.g. `felhom-ops … -hub-key`), distinct from the per-customer/per-host keys the hub generates itself. It was COMMITTED in `manifests/hub.yaml` until v0.53.0 (flagged in the 0.81/0.113 and 0.85/0.120 publish runbooks, incl. a Phase-D screenshot exposure); the manifest now carries a `secretKeyRef` and `scripts/manifest_bearer_gate.py` blocks reintroduction. **The git-history copy stays alive until the value is ROTATED** — de-git alone kills nothing. **What uses it (live consumers of the GLOBAL key):** | Consumer | How it reads the key | |----------|----------------------| | `hub` (`Deployment/hub`) | env `REPORT_API_KEY` ← `secretKeyRef: report-api/REPORT_API_KEY` (v0.53.0 env override fills `api.report_api_key`; the ConfigMap field is an empty placeholder). **Not `optional:`** — a missing Secret fails Ready by design. | | Operator tooling (`felhom-ops keys upload -hub-key …`, runbook curl probes in break-glass.md / offsite-endpoint.md) | typed per-invocation from the out-of-band store — nothing machine-persisted. | | ~~`felhom-controller` repo `controller.yaml.example`~~ | carried the LITERAL as example text (never a live consumer) — scrubbed 2026-07-13. | Per-customer (`customer_configs.api_key`) and per-host (`hosts.api_key`) keys are hub-generated and **unaffected** by a global-key rotation — no customer box breaks. **Where the value lives out-of-band:** the operator's password manager, entry "Felhom hub global bearer (report_api_key)". ### Create the Secret (pre-deploy for v0.53.0 — same value, no rotation yet) Create it with the CURRENT value **before** syncing the v0.53.0 manifest (the pod refuses to start without it). Render on the build host without echoing the value (file-to-file, the operator-present rule): ```bash # on 192.168.0.180, as kisfenyo — put the current key in a 0600 temp file first (no echo): kubectl create secret generic report-api -n felhom-system \ --from-file=REPORT_API_KEY=/dev/stdin < /path/to/keyfile \ --dry-run=client -o yaml | sudo kubectl apply -f - shred -u /path/to/keyfile ``` ### Rotation (supervised — operator GO required; ordered, load-bearing) 1. Mint the new key into a 0600 file: `openssl rand -hex 32 > keyfile` (no terminal echo). 2. Re-run the create-Secret pipe above with the new file; store the value out-of-band. 3. `sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout restart deploy/hub && sudo kubectl -n felhom-system rollout status deploy/hub --timeout=120s` 4. **Verify before declaring the old key dead:** - a customer box still reports (per-customer key — proves rotation touched nothing it shouldn't); - an operator call with the NEW key succeeds (e.g. an authed `GET /api/v1/…` probe); - the SAME call with the OLD key returns 401 — only now is the git-history copy dead. 5. Update the password-manager entry; note the rotation date in the publish-runbook disposition. --- ## Other committed secrets (tracked, NOT yet de-gitted — backlog) `manifests/felhom.secret.yaml` still commits other plaintext secrets (`healthchecks-config` `SECRET_KEY` / `SUPERUSER_PASSWORD`, `umami-config`, `gitea-creds`). These are **out of scope** for the Resend rotation but are the same hygiene problem; de-git them the same way (out-of-band `Secret/...` + placeholder) when touched. Tracked here so the gap is visible.