# SPIKE — R-6: LAN service discovery from the guest (SSDP · WSD · mDNS · SMB) — 2026-07-18 > **STATUS: COMPLETE (objective legs) — verdict below. One human leg (S4.4 Explorer render) is > PENDING Viktor and the samba+wsdd stack is intentionally left live for it.** Empirically maps which > Docker network mode inside the appliance LXC can send AND receive each LAN discovery protocol on the > real household LAN, proves the negative for the default bridge, and stands up a real samba+wsdd > stack that a Windows 11 client discovers and mounts. No production code shipped; every live mutation > is a `spike-`-prefixed throwaway container or a `/tmp` script, inventoried in §CLEANUP. The verdict > matrix is the architecture input R-7 (SMB) and R-8 (DLNA) were gated on. **Class:** SPIKE (empirical; no product code). **Repos touched:** `felhom.eu` (this doc + the ROADMAP R-6 row only). `felhom-agent` / `felhom-controller` read-only for the premise. ## 1. Baselines (verified at session start, git HEAD) | Repo | live `main` @ | spec-brief expected @ | Version | Delta | |---|---|---|---|---| | felhom.eu | `9e13ead` | `ee4e061` | hub v0.66.0 / scripts v1.20.0 | docs/iso-out-path commits since the brief (07-18) | | felhom-agent | `f222a7b` | `8208a80c` | v0.90.0 | docs-only build-root-move commit (07-18) | | felhom-controller | `ac13966` | `a4a7de3d` | v0.143.0 | build.sh path repoint (07-18) | The deltas vs the brief are all the 2026-07-18 "DooPlex build root moved off SSD" doc/path commits; none touch the guest-network premise. **Premise re-confirmed LIVE in S0**, not from memory. ## 2. Probe topology (all four actors on one L2, `192.168.0.0/24`) | Actor | IP | Role | |---|---|---| | Appliance guest LXC 9201 (`demo-vm-felhom`) | **192.168.0.127** | probe target — responders live here | | DooPlex (192.168.0.180) | 192.168.0.180 | scripted Linux LAN peer | | Windows 11 workstation | 192.168.0.110 | the REAL client (WSD/mDNS/SMB probes + Explorer) | | felhom-pve host / vmbr0 | 192.168.0.162 | read-only bridge facts only | --- ## VERDICT (one paragraph) **The appliance guest IS LAN-bridged and multicast discovery works from it — but ONLY when the responder shares the guest's network namespace (guest-direct or a Docker `--network host` container). Docker's default bridge cannot receive LAN multicast at all**, so WSD and mDNS discovery are dead there while a published unicast port still works. Empirically, guest-netns (S1) and host-network (S2) are byte-for-byte equivalent and pass SSDP/mDNS/WSD in **both** directions; the default bridge (S3) fails multicast RX for all three. A real **samba + wsdd** stack on host-network is discovered by Windows 11 (ProbeMatch confirmed), answers on TCP 445, and serves an authenticated read/write SMB round-trip. A real **SSDP `MediaServer:1`** advertisement from host-network is received by both LAN clients. **Recommendation for R-7: run the samba/wsdd stack as a host-network infra stack, LAN-bound.** For R-8: Jellyfin's built-in DLNA is physically viable on this topology **if it runs host-network**. One caveat R-7/R-8 must carry: `vmbr0` runs with `multicast_snooping=1` and no STP — it worked here because the household router (.1) is an active IGMP querier, but a customer LAN with snooping-on-and-no-querier could prune the groups (§7d). --- ## S0 — live topology facts (GATE PASSED) ``` # pct config 9201 features: nesting=1,keyctl=1 net0: name=eth0,bridge=vmbr0,hwaddr=BC:24:11:9F:70:B4,ip=dhcp,type=veth unprivileged: 1 # pct exec 9201 -- ip -4 addr show eth0 2: eth0@if7: mtu 1500 ... inet 192.168.0.127/24 brd 192.168.0.255 scope global dynamic eth0 # vmbr0 (host /etc/network/interfaces) iface vmbr0 inet static address 192.168.0.162/24 bridge-ports enp1s0 bridge-stp off # /sys/class/net/vmbr0/bridge/multicast_snooping => 1 # pct exec 9201 -- ss -lntu | grep -E ':(445|139|1900|5353|3702|5357) ' => ports free ``` **Confirmed:** guest holds its own DHCP lease on the household `/24` (same subnet as the workstation and DooPlex), `eth0` carries the `MULTICAST` flag, all six target ports are free. **Premise HOLDS.** Anchor caveat recorded: **`vmbr0 multicast_snooping = 1`, STP off** — the querier-dependence risk the matrix must settle. ## S1 — raw multicast matrix, guest netns directly (no Docker) Responder `python3 /tmp/spike-mcast.py ` in `pct exec 9201`; probers on DooPlex (.180) and the workstation (.110), multicast egress pinned to each host's LAN IP (`IP_MULTICAST_IF`). | Protocol | guest RX (responder logged probe) | guest TX (prober got unicast reply) | |---|---|---| | SSDP 239.255.255.250:1900 | **PASS** (both probers) | **PASS** (both probers) | | mDNS 224.0.0.251:5353 | **PASS** | **PASS** | | WSD 239.255.255.250:3702 | **PASS** | **PASS** | Evidence (SSDP, representative): ``` [probe .180] GOT REPLY from 192.168.0.127:1900 :: b'SPIKE-REPLY proto=ssdp from=responder' [probe .110] GOT REPLY from 192.168.0.127:1900 :: b'SPIKE-REPLY proto=ssdp from=responder' [guest RX] from 192.168.0.180:48169 :: 'M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 ...' -> [TX] replied unicast from 192.168.0.110:64537 :: 'M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 ...' -> [TX] replied unicast ``` **Finding:** all three pass in both directions **despite `multicast_snooping=1`** on vmbr0 — no querier-absence pruning observed on this LAN (see §7d for why, and the BYO risk). ## S2 — same matrix from a Docker `--network host` container in the guest Responder in `docker run --network host … python:3-alpine`. **Result: identical to S1 — all PASS.** Host netns = guest netns, proven not assumed. Bonus corroboration (mDNS leg): the host-net responder also logged **unsolicited real LAN mDNS reverse-lookup queries from the router 192.168.0.1** (`…192.168.0.162.in-addr.arpa … QTYPE PTR`) — independent proof the container genuinely receives live LAN multicast, not just our own probes. ## S3 — the negative proof: default bridge + `-p` published ports Same responder, `docker run --network bridge -p :/udp …`. | Protocol | multicast RX across bridge | unicast → published port (`192.168.0.127:`) | |---|---|---| | SSDP 1900 | **FAIL** (container never logged the M-SEARCH — see note) | **PASS** (both probers) | | mDNS 5353 | **FAIL** (`[NO REPLY] 3s timeout`) | **PASS** | | WSD 3702 | **FAIL** (`[NO REPLY] 3s timeout`) | **PASS** | The container's own log shows **only** the unicast datagrams, never the multicast probe — the multicast simply never crosses the docker bridge. The port-publish itself works, so the failure is **specifically multicast**, exactly the negative R-7 needs. > **SSDP note (a tell-tale, not a pass):** the SSDP multicast probe *did* get a reply — but from > `192.168.0.1:1900` with `ST: upnp:rootdevice, USN: uuid:e4c7…`, i.e. the **household router's real > UPnP IGD** answering the broadcast M-SEARCH, NOT our container (whose log confirms it never received > the datagram). Recorded as FAIL for the container; the stray reply is corroboration that the > M-SEARCH genuinely propagated on the LAN while the bridged container stayed deaf to it. ## S4 — the real thing: samba + wsdd (host network), Windows 11 client Throwaway host-network stack in the guest: `spike-samba` (alpine + `apk add samba`, share `spike-share` on a `/tmp`-backed dir, user `spikeuser`, **throwaway password — NOT a real secret**, `disable netbios=yes`, `smb ports=445`) and `spike-wsdd` (alpine + `apk add wsdd`, `wsdd -i eth0 -4 -H 4 -n FELHOM-SPIKE -w WORKGROUP`). Listeners confirmed: `udp 192.168.0.127:3702`, `tcp 192.168.0.127:5357`, `tcp 0.0.0.0:445`. | Leg | Method | Result | |---|---|---| | 1. WS-Discovery ProbeMatch | scripted Probe (`Types=wsdp:Device`) from the workstation | **PASS** — ProbeMatch from `192.168.0.127`; wsdd logged our exact `MessageID` from `192.168.0.110` | | 2. Port 445 reachability | `Test-NetConnection 192.168.0.127 -Port 445` | **PASS** — `TcpTestSucceeded: True` | | 3. SMB round-trip | `New-SmbMapping` as `spikeuser` → write `roundtrip.txt` → read back → byte-compare | **PASS** — `BYTE-COMPARE: PASS`; dir listed `README.txt` (24B) + `roundtrip.txt` (28B) | | 4. Explorer Network view (human) | Viktor: Explorer → Network shows **FELHOM-SPIKE**, double-click opens the share | **PENDING — human leg; stack left live** | wsdd log for leg 1: ``` 08:32:29 joined multicast group 239.255.255.250 on 192.168.0.127%eth0 ; scheduling Hello 08:32:44 192.168.0.110:55639(eth0) - - "Probe urn:uuid:aaaaaaaa-...-000000000001 UDP" - - ``` The scripted client's friendly-name auto-fetch reported FAIL only because python-wsdd's metadata HTTP endpoint (`:5357//`) requires the native WS-Discovery **Resolve→Transfer/Get** handshake that Windows Explorer performs itself (a direct throwaway `Get` 404s). The **objective discovery gate is the ProbeMatch (PASS)**; the `FELHOM-SPIKE` name is what wsdd is configured to present and is the subject of the human leg. Optional S4.5 (mDNS `.local` name + phone) was **skipped**. ## S5 — SSDP / DLNA pre-check for R-8 (scripted only) Host-network responder advertising `urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:MediaServer:1`, answering **only** that ST (so a reply can't be the router IGD). Device-specific `M-SEARCH` from DooPlex and the workstation: ``` [.180] reply from 192.168.0.127:1900 felhom-spike=True :: HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... SERVER: FelhomSpike/1.0 [.110] reply from 192.168.0.127:1900 felhom-spike=True :: HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... [responder] RX M-SEARCH ST='...MediaServer:1' from .180 -> replied ; from .110 -> replied ``` **PASS** from both clients; the router did NOT answer (it is not a MediaServer). **A DLNA advertisement physically reaches clients on this LAN.** No Jellyfin/catalog touched — R-8 owns the real-media validation. ## S6 — macvlan fallback **NOT RUN — conditional on S2 failing, and S2 PASSED.** Host-network fully satisfies the requirement, so the macvlan-on-veth-in-unprivileged-LXC path was not needed. Left as a documented fallback if a future deployment must avoid host-network port collisions (§7c). --- ## 7. Verdict matrix + prose | Protocol / mode | guest netns (S1) | docker host-net (S2) | docker bridge+publish (S3) | macvlan (S6) | |---|---|---|---|---| | SSDP 1900 RX / TX | PASS / PASS | PASS / PASS | **FAIL** / n-a · unicast-publish PASS (router-IGD false reply) | not run | | mDNS 5353 RX / TX | PASS / PASS | PASS / PASS | **FAIL / FAIL** · unicast-publish PASS | not run | | WSD 3702 RX / TX | PASS / PASS | PASS / PASS | **FAIL / FAIL** · unicast-publish PASS | not run | | SMB 445 unicast | n/a | **PASS** (S4) | publish PASS | not run | | Explorer visibility (human) | n/a | **PENDING** (S4.4) | n/a | not run | **(a) Recommended transport for the R-7 SMB stack — HOST-NETWORK, LAN-bound.** The matrix is unambiguous: WSD (Windows Explorer's actual discovery) and mDNS require the responder in the guest netns; the default docker bridge is categorically deaf to LAN multicast. So samba + wsdd (and any avahi) must run `network_mode: host`. Bind SMB to the LAN interface only; **never expose 445 over the tunnel** (the LAN-only rule R-7 already states). This is the expected outcome — and the matrix, not the expectation, now backs it. **(b) R-8 "try Jellyfin built-in DLNA first" — PLAUSIBLE on this topology.** SSDP `MediaServer:1` adverts physically reach both LAN clients (S5). The only structural requirement carried over from (a): Jellyfin's DLNA server must also run host-network to send/receive SSDP — the same constraint, not a new one. The cheap path is worth trying before adding minidlna. **(c) Bridge/snooping caveat for R-7's spec.** Two things must appear in the R-7 spec: (i) host-network binds 445 / 3702 / 5357 **directly on the guest's LAN IP** — the appliance owns those ports; a customer running a second SMB/WSD service on the box would collide (macvlan is the escape hatch, untested here); (ii) the multicast-snooping dependency below. **(d) Open question for BYO topologies — NOT tested, named as a doc-level gap.** Everything here was measured on the **operator's own household LAN**, where `vmbr0` has `multicast_snooping=1` but the router (.1) is a live IGMP querier + UPnP IGD, so groups are not pruned. Two untested risks for real customers: (i) a customer LAN with **snooping on and no querier** could prune SSDP/mDNS/WSD groups — discovery would silently fail even though this spike passed; (ii) **Peti's BYO cluster** bridge is unknown — a BYO guest may sit on an isolated/routed bridge with no L2 path to the household LAN, where discovery is impossible regardless of network mode. R-7/R-8 specs should require a per-deployment "discovery reachability" check (a snooping/querier probe) rather than assuming the appliance result generalizes. ## NOT tested (explicit) - **Explorer Network render** (S4.4) — human leg, pending Viktor; stack left live. - **macvlan** (S6) — not needed (host-net passed). - **Real DLNA client / TV** rendering actual media — R-8 owns. - **Phone mDNS** `.local` resolution (optional S4.5) — skipped. - **BYO bridge topology** (Peti's arc) — untested by design; §7d gap. - **IPv6** discovery — probes were IPv4-only (`wsdd -4`). - **Customer LAN with snooping-on + no-querier** — the §7d structural risk; not reproducible on this LAN. - **SMB signing / large-file throughput / multi-user** — R-7 owns. - **wsdd friendly-name via direct HTTP Get** — 404 without the native Resolve handshake; Windows does it natively. ## CLEANUP Throwaway containers `spike-hostnet-*`, `spike-bridge-*`, `spike-ssdp-ms` and all guest-netns responder processes were `docker rm -f` / `pkill`'d at the end of each leg. **Intentionally left live for the S4.4 human leg:** `spike-samba` + `spike-wsdd` (host-network), share `\\192.168.0.127\spike-share` as **FELHOM-SPIKE**. Teardown one-liner once Viktor confirms Explorer: ``` ssh felhom-pve "pct exec 9201 -- docker rm -f spike-samba spike-wsdd; \ pct exec 9201 -- rm -f /tmp/spike-*.py /tmp/spike-*.sh /tmp/spike-*.log" ssh kisfenyo@192.168.0.180 "rm -f /tmp/spike-probe.py /tmp/spike-msearch.py" ``` Then `pct exec 9201 -- docker ps -a | grep spike` must be empty. The demo box is wiped in the upcoming rehearsal regardless, but this leaves it report-clean.